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Preface
This book is to show the concept of face from many distinct perspectives. Paul
Ekman, who studied the face and facial expression for more than fifty years,
said in an interview for the San Francisco Chronicle (2002) that “Everyone is
interested in faces.” My fascination with faces is the main reason why I have
taken up the concept. As a linguist whose main research interests focus on
sociocultural conditioning of language use, I cannot concentrate exclusively on
the physicality of face. Therefore, I decided to create a picture of the concept
which would include its most important aspects. Although my intention is to
provide a thorough presentation of face, the key issue is to be the role it plays in
social interaction. Entering into contact with other people, we have to take into
account:
• the face as a part of the body, with its stable features and transient expressions,
• face understood as an image of self which every person creates during social
interaction.
The social significance of these two aspects of face is indisputable and deserves
a close analysis.
Thus, the topic of the book is face, and the main objective is to carry out an
analysis of this complex, multi-dimensional concept in an interdisciplinary
perspective (interdisciplinarity is understood here as the diversity of practices
and relations among disciplines (Fairclough and Duszak, 2008)). The concept of
face has been the subject of many academic papers and monographs in different
disciplines, e.g., psychology, sociology, cultural and historical anthropology,
philosophy, literary studies, biology, medicine, communication studies, linguistic
pragmatics and sociolinguistics. It should be indicated, however, that no
monograph on the subject of face has been published, which takes such an
interdisciplinary perspective as the present work. The interdisciplinary
perspective taken here involves:
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• a cognitive study of the concept of FACE,
• an analysis of the role of the face as a part of the body over the centuries and
across cultures and disciplines,
• a cross-cultural analysis of face as a folk concept in Anglo-American (further
in the book called American; for the explanation see p. 168) and Polish
cultures,
• a presentation of the Cultural Face Model — a new theoretical approach to
face interpretation and management.
It is also worth mentioning that face is not a “popular” topic among Polish
scholars. There are only a few publications on face by Polish authors
(e.g., Kępiński, 1998; Marcjanik, 1991/2001; Kopytko, 1993, 1993a; Filipowicz,
1998; Twarz. Punkt po punkcie, 2000; Kornacki, 2004; see also Kisiel, 1992;
Tomiczek, 1992; Duszak, 1998), myself among them (e.g., Jakubowska, 2001,
2003, 2004, 2007, 2007a, 2007b). There are, however, no works on the emic
concept of Polish face. The present work is to compensate for this lack.
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Introduction
Justification of the approach
Face is a complex concept which over the centuries and across cultures has
attracted a lot of attention among both scholars and laymen. Even a superficial
observation of any aspect of everyday life results in finding faces. Before
greeting a friend, we have first to identify his face. Drawing money from our
bank account or crossing the border we have to present our identity card with
a photo of our face. In face-to-face interaction, the success of meeting other
faces depends on whether they like our face. However, no matter how we
communicate with others, e.g., face to face, by phone or through an internet
communicator, we have to think about face (the self-image). To lose face is one
of the greatest dangers involved in social interaction.
A brief look into a dictionary allows us to see abundance of meanings of the
word face or of any of its equivalents in other languages. Putting the English
word face through an internet search engine gave 640,000,000 results, and
a search for the Polish word twarz (face), 8,650,000. This indicates the
omnipresence and complexity of the concept. We are, literally and
metaphorically, surrounded by faces. To understand the concept, however, one
cannot restrict its analysis to one discipline or one perspective.
No one can deny the social character of face. Changing Erving Goffman’s
(1967: 12) words slightly, we can say that it is a condition of interaction. Any
form of social contact between individuals (social interaction) is conditioned by
face; its existence, recognition and maintenance. Communication, the transfer of
messages from one interactant to another, is necessary for social interaction
(Giddens, 2006). The face (the part of the body) is indispensable for an
individual to participate in social interaction and communicate with others.
First of all, because its elements contribute to the transfer of information from
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one interactant to another: the lips, one of the organs of speech, participate
both in verbal and nonverbal communication, the eyes “tell” us things that are
left out by the lips. The face as a whole is an invaluable source of information
about its owner. Possession of the face makes it possible for the individual to be
recognized by other interactants and identified as a particular person. Mutual
maintenance of face (the image of self) involves treating the other with due
respect. Deprived of the face, either through an unfortunate accident or injury
or through improper behaviour, the individual is incapable of interaction with
others.
The face is not only social but also cultural in nature. The face we present to
others during social interaction, although said to be the mirror of our soul, to
some extent can be controlled by its owner. Facial expressions of emotions have
been proved to be universal, but there are significant differences across cultures
in the extent to which they are free or controlled. All cultures have special
display rules regarding the expected management of facial appearance and
emotional expressions (Ekman, 1999). Face (the image of self) is also
culture-determined. In different cultures, different aspects of self may be
foregrounded during social interaction, as members of these cultures are “face
sensitive” to various attributes related to different hierarchies of values (Ruhi
and Işik-Güler, 2007; Spencer-Oatey, 2007). The concept of culture helps greatly
to understand the diversity of human behaviour (Fitzgerald, 1993), both verbal
and nonverbal; it helps one also to understand interpersonal relations which
shape the culture-specific content of face (Duszak, 1998).
As can be seen, the face (the part of the body) as well as face (the self-image),
due to their social relevance, are closely interrelated. As such they are a focus of
interest and subject to research in many academic disciplines, social sciences in
particular, e.g., cultural anthropology, communication studies, psychology (social
psychology in particular), and sociology. The face is subject to philosophical
investigations. For medicine, it is both a location of illness symptoms (e.g., in
psychiatry) and a part of the body to be cured (e.g., plastic and aesthetic surgery).
In criminology, facial features have been investigated for signs of a criminal
nature. The face had even its own “science” — physiognomy. Finally, face (the
self-image) has become one of the central notions of sociolinguistics-based
politeness research. Such a diversity of approaches to one concept suggests that it
constitutes a good construct for interdisciplinary use.
Because face is culture-determined, it is reasonable to investigate how it
(both facial expression and image of self) is managed cross-culturally. There is
a distinction between the cross-cultural and intercultural aspects of
communication. As William Gudykunst (2001: 19) states, cross-cultural “involves
comparisons of communication across cultures,” while intercultural
communication “involves communication between people from different
cultures.” In the present book, face will be analysed across cultures.
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Taking into consideration everything mentioned above, I think that face as
a multi-faceted concept, involving psychological and social motivation, cultural
knowledge, and the ability to perform appropriate roles, deserves to be
presented in an interdisciplinary perspective. The main aim of the book is to
present a comprehensive picture of face.
Methods of collecting data
Methods of collecting data should be adjusted to the aims of the study. As this
book involves different approaches to the concept of face and investigates its
different aspects, the data used in the respective parts of the book are of
different character. In this study two kinds of data have been used:
• ethnographic data,
• linguistic data.
The linguistic data are collated from:
• English and Polish dictionaries,
• word searches conducted in newspapers and literary works,
• various corpora,
• word searches conducted on the Internet, on web pages both in English and
in Polish,
• American and Polish library catalogues,
• electronic resources,
• general observation.
The ethnographic data used in this study come from different sources as well.
Ideally, to study behaviour across cultures, which is what a cross-cultural study
of face involves, the researcher should use multiple methods of collecting data.
In my selection of ethnographic data collecting methods, I was inspired by
Erving Goffman’s “eclectic array of sources,” including newspapers, memoires,
novels and observations. Goffman (1959) used both casual observation and
participant observation. In the former case, he himself admitted that he was
following Georg Simmel, the German sociologist, who justified his opinions by
his own observations. The ethnographic data used in this study come from:
• introspection,
• participant observation,
• interviews,
• questionnaire,
• searches of newspapers and literary works.
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2 — Face...
Introspection is “a means for data collection only about one’s speech
community” (Saville-Troike, 2003: 96). The method can give valuable
information and important insights about the researcher’s own culture, his
beliefs, values and behaviour, which on the one hand constitute useful data, and
on the other stimulate the formation of working hypotheses. Introspection can
be a starting point for fieldwork; the researcher can use the data obtained by
introspection to select problems to be investigated by other methods. It can also
give him some clues as to the questions to be asked in interviews.
In this study, I resorted to introspection at the beginning of my fieldwork
when I tried to formulate working hypotheses on which my analysis of the
concept of face was to be based.
Participant observation is useful for researchers investigating different
domains of culture. It is the most common method of collecting ethnographic
data, in which the researcher participates in the situation he observes. In a talk
about his fieldwork methods given in 1974, Goffman defines participant
observation in the following way:
a technique that wouldn’t be the only technique a study would employ, [...] It’s
a matter of getting data, it seems to me, by subjecting yourself, your body and
your own personality, and your own social situation, to the set of contingencies
that play upon a set of individuals, so that you can physically and ecologically
penetrate their circle of response to their social situation, or their ethnic
situation, or whatever (1989: 125).
Such an understanding of participant observation requires that the researcher
immerse himself in the culture he is to investigate, become a part of it, and
allow its routines to become his own. This makes the method appear very
time-consuming. Another weakness of this method is that conclusions drawn
from the analysis of the data obtained by means of it are not open to
verification and replication by others (Rosenfeld et al., 1995: 186—187).
However, it has also some benefits. As Muriel Saville-Troike (2003: 97) claims:
One of the most important benefits of participation is being able to test
hypotheses about rules for communication, sometimes by breaking them and
observing or eliciting reactions. Participation in group activities over a period
of time is often necessary for much important information to emerge, and for
necessary trusting relationships to develop.
Participant observation allows the researcher to collect information about
spontaneous, natural behaviour, not monitored in any way by the participants,
during everyday social interaction.
As maintenance of face is a condition of interaction, I used participant
observation by taking part in various types of social gatherings, both formal
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(e.g., faculty meetings, seminars, conferences) and informal (e.g., parties,
restaurants or cafés, street encounters) to see how participants manage their
face, express concern for the other’s face or react to a face threat.
Both the interview and the questionnaire constitute a good supplement to
participant observation. Interviewing may provide a lot of valuable cultural
information and explanation for the data collected by observation. Unlike
participant observation, which presents the researcher with the “real” specific
behaviours (what actually occurs), interviews provide “ideal” answers (the
respondents give answers which reflect a cultural ideal or norm) (Saville-Troike,
2003). An interview usually has the form of a guided conversation during which
the researcher asks questions with no predetermined response alternatives
(Saville-Troike, 2003).
I decided to choose this method of collecting data, because:
To achieve conceptual equivalence so that meaningful cross-cultural
comparisons can be made, it is important first to determine the meaning of
face in various cultures. Open-ended interviews or surveys in which people
within the culture respond to questions designed to elicit the meaning of face
are needed. Such studies would help identify commonalities with which to
establish a conceptualization of face that is shared by various cultures [...]. To
determine which situations involve face, determination of common emotions
associated with face is necessary (Cocroft and Ting-Toomey, 1994: 500).
The interviews prepared for the present research were carried out in informal
settings. They were composed of open-ended questions intended to elicit the
information concerning the informants’ culture, the values they cherish and the
meaning of the concept of face as well as face management during social
interaction. Sometimes I asked some supplementary questions in order to get
a more clear and full answer.
The questionnaire is a data collecting method which, like the interview,
involves asking questions that can be either close-ended or open-ended. As in
the case of interviewing, the informants give answers which reflect cultural
ideals or norms rather than admit what they actually mean or do.
A questionnaire can be an alternative for interviewing, because it is much less
time-consuming. However, its weakness is that the researcher does not have the
chance to ask additional questions to clarify the respondents’ answers.
The questionnaire used in the present research consisted of open-ended
questions which were designed, as in the case of the interviews, to elicit data
concerning culture, face interpretation and management.
As face is to be analysed cross-culturally, i.e. as it is interpreted and
managed in two cultures, American and Polish, American and Polish
respondents participated in the research. All of them were native speakers of
their respective languages. Both groups came from a similar sociocultural
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background and were rather homogenous. All of the participants were educated
(university or high school graduates), often related in some way or another to
university circles. There were 110 respondents, 50 Americans and 60 Poles,
aged 22 to 74.
The application of this multiple-method approach allowed me to collect
objective data which adequately illustrate the picture of face and represent
patterns of face-related behaviours in the two cultures.
Outline of the book
The book consists of five chapters and conclusions. It shows interrelations
between different aspects of the concept of face as well as between face and
other concepts or phenomena relevant to its description. Chapter 1,
“A cognitive study of the concept of FACE in English and Polish,” is devoted to
a general presentation of the concept of face. First, a semantic analysis of the
English word face and the Polish word twarz is carried out; lexicographic
definitions of these two words which are found in modern English and Polish
dictionaries, respectively, are compared. Second, I employ the cognitive
linguistics approach to present the concept of FACE as a radial category and
FACE/TWARZ metaphors existing in English-speaking and Polish cultures,
respectively. I use the English word face to refer to the universal concept of face;
when referring to a culture-specific concept I use the word modified by an
adjective denoting a given nationality (e.g., the Polish face) or a word denoting
an emic concept (e.g., twarz).
In Chapter 2, “The face as a part of the body,” the face is described in terms
of the functions it performs in human life, the impact of its appearance on
interaction with other people and the quality of life, and the meanings it conveys.
Here I ponder the role of the face in our lives and discuss various approaches to
this specific part of the body taken over the centuries and across cultures by
different scientific or pseudo-scientific disciplines, such as anthropology,
criminology, medicine, psychology, philosophy, physiognomy, and sociology.
The rest of the book deals with face as an image of the self which is socially
constructed. However, in order to carry out an adequate analysis of the concept
of face, one cannot avoid the study of the self (the self is said to be externalized
through the face). In Chapter 3, the self is defined from psychological,
sociological and philosophical perspectives. It is a concept which is central to
various social theories describing the complexity of individual experience. As
such it is contrasted with other related concepts, such as soul, identity and
person. Finally, the self is described in terms of its relationship with the body,
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starting with body—soul dualism, and leading to the body as a symbol of the
self.
Face as a social construct is the topic of the next two chapters. Chapter 4
depicts the commonsense concept of face, a folk or emic notion. First, it is
presented together with some related concepts, such as morality, dignity and
honour. Second, the concept of culture and the models of cultural variability
(Hofstede, 1980, 1991, 2001; Triandis, 1995; Hall, 1976) are introduced, as emic
concepts of face need to be analysed against the cultural background. Culture
and cultural experience have a strong impact on our hierarchies of values, ways
of thinking and social relations, and they also shape the self (Marsella, 1985;
Holland, 1997; Thoits and Virshup, 1997; Hofstede, 1998; Owens and Aronson,
2000; Barker, 2005) and face (the self-image). In the following sections, three
emic concepts of face are described and analysed against the detailed
background of three cultures: Chinese (as Chinese culture is said to be the
original source of the concept of face), American and Polish. The analysis of
the Chinese concept of face is based, for obvious reasons, on sociological and
linguistic literature. My analyses of the American and Polish concepts of face
are based on the data I collected in the United States and in Poland, and
supported by a discussion of the character of interpersonal relations and the
role of facial expressions in the two respective cultures.
The presentation of the academic concept of face, in Chapter 5, begins with
an analysis of the works of Erving Goffman, the American sociologist who was
the first to employ it in his research. In his works on “the world of social
encounters,” he presents social interaction in a theatrical perspective: treating its
participants as actors, he sees the ritual organization of everyday social contacts,
and perceives maintenance of face as a condition of interaction. Goffman’s
original ideas have become an inspiration for scholars in many academic
disciplines, e.g., social psychology, sociology, (intercultural/cross-cultural)
communication studies, linguistic pragmatics and sociolinguistics. Next, there
follows an overview of the theories whose central concept is face. The first and
most thorough treatment of the concept is Brown and Levinson’s (1978, 1987)
theory of politeness. Their theory and conceptualization of face were met with
many voices of criticism, the most important of which are discussed. This
discussion is followed by the presentation of other relevant theories and
conceptualizations of face. Finally, in the section “The Cultural Face Model —
and approach to face interpretation and management,” I present my own
contribution to the interpretation of the social construct of face, formulating an
alternative theory of face and facework, the Cultural Face Model. The chapter
concludes with a discussion of the applicability of the model to American and
Polish cultures.
Conclusions include general remarks on the character of the concept in
question.
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Chapter 1
A cognitive study of the concept of FACE
in English and Polish
1.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I am going to discuss:
• the word face and its Polish equivalents; I want to find out what face and
twarz (and its Polish synonyms) mean in the two languages, respectively;
• the concept of FACE; I want to analyse FACE metaphors existing in
English-speaking and Polish cultures.
The important role of the concept of FACE and its complexity result from
the way we perceive the world, which is both anthropocentric and
anthropomorphic (Maćkiewicz, 2000). Our perception of the world is based on
two principles (Maćkiewicz, 2000: 31):
[...] the man is the centre of the universe [...] and the world was created in our
own image. That is why the names of parts of the body constitute a good
starting point for the discussion on the popular (or naïve) perception of reality
recorded, or perhaps — spelled, in language.
The way we perceive the surrounding reality and talk about it is based on our
physical and cultural experience. “Some of the central concepts in terms of
which our bodies function — UP—DOWN, IN—OUT, FRONT—BACK,
LIGHT—DARK, WARM—COLD, MALE—FEMALE, etc. — are more sharply
delineated than others” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 57). It is in terms of these
concepts that our social reality is organized. The face can also be analysed in
terms of these concepts. The face is the FRONT part of the head, which is in
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the UPPER part of the body. And UP IS GOOD, and if we adjust the metaphor
mentioned by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980), FRONT IS GOOD.
Face is the LIGHT side, always looking towards the sun (cf. Tuan, 1998). In
ancient Greece the word meaning “face” also denoted noon, while the word
meaning “back of the head” also denoted midnight (Tuan, 1998). Thus the face
in its physicality is special. Its location gains it a positive evaluation. This goes
in line with the way we conceptualize the space:
FRONT IS GOOD BACK IS BAD
to look somebody in the face to do something behind somebody’s back
(to look directly at somebody) (unknown to the person concerned) (LDCE)
face to face with somebody/something to turn one’s back on somebody
(in the direct presence of somebody (to avoid or refuse to help, esp. unfairly
/something) or unkindly) (LDCE)
patrzeć komuś w twarz obgadywać kogoś za plecami
(to look somebody in the face) (to gossip about somebody behind his back)
spotkać kogoś twarzą w twarz zadać komuś cios w plecy
(to meet somebody face to face) (to stab somebody in the back)
odwrócić się do kogoś twarzą odwrócić się do kogoś plecami
(to turn one’s face to somebody) (to turn one’s back on somebody)
Turning our face to the other, we reveal ourselves to him to some extent and in
this way signal our willingness to engage in social interaction. The “naked” face
implies directness and openness. In the world of social relations, the face is
a person’s accessibility to the other. As Tadeusz Sławek (2000: 19) claims, the
face is the name for communication, agreement “which perhaps in the
articulatory sense is silent, but in the philosophical sense does not leave
anything unsaid.” Further, he (Sławek, 2000: 20) maintains that:
It is natural that we are puzzled by those who turn their back on us, those
who turn their face away. Somebody who has turned his back on me protects
his solitude; his back is an impenetrable barrier, a boundary, which I cannot
overcome.
The special role of the face in every individual’s life as well as in social life
is reflected in language. The next section deals with English and Polish words
denoting the face included in English and Polish dictionaries, respectively. In
the sections to follow, the concept of FACE is analysed within the framework of
cognitive linguistics in terms of its metonymic and metaphoric extensions.
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1.2. Face and twarz — two words for one concept?
To best understand a word it is necessary to start with its etymology. The
English word face is of Latin origin: it is related to the Latin word facia, the
altered form of facie–s, meaning “form, figure, appearance.” The etymology of
the word facie–s is uncertain: some scholars refer it to face–re, meaning “to make,”
others to the root fa-, meaning “to appear, shine” (Oxford English Dictionary
Online (OED), 2007, Second Edition 1989; Klein, 1971; Onions, 1966).
The general sense of ‘form, appearance,’ which in Latin was app[arently] the
source of the more specific use ‘visage, countenance,’ is in many of its
Eng[lish] applications apprehended as a transferred use of the latter [...]
(OED).
The Polish word twarz is of Slavonic origin. It is etymologically related to
another Polish word, tworzyć (to create, make). In Old Polish, the noun twarz
denoted the result of this action, “creation, product, work.” It also meant
“(living) creature,” “form, shape, figure” or “person, sex.” The sense “oblicze”
(face) is secondary to the sense “creation, form, shape, figure” (Boryś, 2005;
Długosz-Kurczabowa, 2008). Wojciech Kalaga (2006) mentions the
old-fashioned word of Italian origin facjata, which means “face” and is used in
colloquial Polish in a jocular sense (Słownik języka polskiego (SJP),
1978—1981). Although the two words in question, face and twarz, have
completely different, unrelated etymologies, their past semantics seem to have
a lot in common.
A short analysis of two dictionary entries for English face and Polish twarz
will show whether their contemporary senses bear any resemblance. The English
word face has verbal and nominal meanings. In most dictionaries, separate
entries describe each meaning, within which a number of senses are
characterized. In the Oxford English Dictionary Online, the entry face (noun)
takes up 37 pages. This reflects the great diversity of senses of the word. With
the omission of a few irrelevant senses (e.g., technical uses), the entry defines
face as:
III.
a) The front part of the head, from the forehead to the chin; the visage,
countenance, both in man and lower animals,
b) Person,
c) With reference to its position in the front of the body, or as the part
presented to encounter. Some phrases express the notion of confronting
or opposition, e.g., to meet (a person) in the face (to confront directly),
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d) Sight, presence, e.g., before or in the face of (before the eyes of, in the
sight of),
e) The countenance as expressive of feeling or character; a countenance
having a specified expression, a grimace, e.g., to make, pull a (crooked,
pitiful, wry, etc.) face,
f) Command of countenance, esp. with reference to freedom from
indications of shame; a ‘bold front’; impudence, effrontery, e.g., to have
the face to (do something).
III. Outward form, appearance:
g) External appearance, look, e.g., at the first face (at the first
appearance/look, at first sight),
h) Visible state or condition; aspect, e.g., the face of the country,
i) Outward show; assumed or factitious appearance; disguise, pretence, e.g.,
to put on a good face on (a matter) (to make (a matter) look well),
j) Good name, reputation, e.g., to save one’s face.
III. The part of a thing presented to the eye:
k) The surface or one of the surfaces of anything, e.g., the face of the earth,
l) The principal side (often vertical or steeply inclined) presented by an
object; the ‘front’ as opposed to the ‘flanks,’ e.g., the face of
a cliff/building,
m) Of anything having two sides: The side usually presented outwards or
upwards; the ‘front’ as opposed to the ‘back’; the ‘right’ side of cloth,
e.g., the face of the card.
The entry for face (verb) is much shorter than the one for the nominal senses:
III. To show a bold or opposing front:
n) To meet (danger, an enemy, or anything unpleasant) face to face; to
meet in front, oppose with confidence or defiance,
o) To look in the face of; to meet face to face; to stand fronting,
p) To look seriously and steadily at, not to shrink from, e.g., to face the
facts.
III. With reference to the direction of the face:
q) Of persons and animals: To present the face in a certain direction; to
look,
r) Of persons and animals: To present the face or front towards; to look
towards,
s) Of a building, a country, and objects in general: To be situated opposite
to, front towards.
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The senses of the word face are classified by lexicographers into several
super-senses, which allows the reader to see their great diversity. The definitions
of face provided above show the wealth of its meanings and the internal
complexity of the concept.
Słownik współczesnego języka polskiego (Dictionary of Contemporary Polish)
(1999) defines the Polish word twarz (face) as:
a) przód głowy człowieka (od czoła po brodę) (the front part of the human
head (from the forehead to the chin)),
b) człowiek, osoba (a person).
The word twarz, then, has a narrower meaning than the word face, as it can be
used only with reference to humans (the front part of an animal’s head is called
pysk or morda in Polish). Other senses of the word twarz are not defined, but
the lexicographers provide numerous examples of its use.
In the majority of cases, the two words, face and twarz, share their senses,
although some senses mentioned in the entry for face are realized in Polish by
other face-related words. Here is a list of Polish expressions with the word twarz,
or other face-related words, semantically equivalent to expressions with the word
face mentioned in OED:
Stanąć [znaleźć się] twarzą w twarz (z kimś, z czymś) (to be face to face with
somebody/something) (cf. sense (c) of the word face)
Rzucić (coś, czymś) (komuś) w oczy [w twarz] (to throw something (e.g., an
insult) at somebody) (cf. sense (d) of the word face)
Uśmiechnięta twarz (a smiling face) (cf. sense (e) of the word face)
Na pierwszy rzut oka (at first sight) (cf. sense (g) of the word face)
Stracić twarz (to lose face), wyjść (z czegoś) z twarzą (to get out of something
without losing face), zachować [uratować] twarz (to save face) (cf. sense (j) of
the word face)
The sense of “a ‘bold front’; impudence, effrontery” (cf. sense (f) of the
word face) is rendered in Polish by the word czelność, e.g., mieć czelność (coś
zrobić) (to have the face to (do something)). The abstract noun czelność is
derived from the adjective czelny, meaning “arrogant, insolent or impudent”
(Boryś, 2005). Czelny appeared as a result of back-derivation from the adjective
bezczelny, meaning “insolent, shameless,” which itself is derived from the
prepositional phrase bez czoła (without a forehead), meaning “without shame”
(Boryś, 2005). Thus the sense of “a ‘bold front’; impudence, effrontery” is
rendered in Polish by means of a word denoting an element of the face, the
forehead. The sense of “visible state or condition; aspect” (cf. sense (h) of the
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word face) is rendered in Polish by a synonym of twarz, oblicze (countenance,
face, character, aspect), e.g., zmienające się oblicze Europy (the changing face of
Europe). To express the sense of “outward show; assumed or factitious
appearance; disguise, pretence” (cf. sense (i) of the word face), Poles use the
word mina (face, facial expression), e.g., robić dobrą minę do złej gry (to put
a good face on a bad business) (Stanisławski, 1982). “The part of a thing
presented to the eye” (cf. senses (k—m) of the word face), which in many
contexts is called in English face, in Polish is referred to by means of several
words, e.g., powierzchnia (surface), ściana (wall), fasada (façade), front (front),
tarcza (shield), awers (obverse) or strona (side). All the words share some
semantic features with the word twarz: +visible, +surface and +front.
powierzchnia ziemi (the face of the earth)
północna ściana Rysów (the northern face of Mt. Rysy)
fasada/front gmachu Muzeum Narodowego (the façade/front of the National
Museum building)
tarcza zegara (the face of a clock)
awers monety (the face of a coin)
prawa strona materiału (the face/right side of cloth)
The word twarz can also be used in the expression do twarzy, meaning “good or
suitable for somebody’s appearance.” A similar sense can be rendered by the
adjective twarzowy, which, apart from its basic meaning “facial,” as in nerw
twarzowy (facial nerve), means “becoming, flattering.”
Do twarzy ci w niebieskim. (The blue colour suits you, you look good in blue.)
Ta sukienka jest bardzo twarzowa. (This dress looks good.)
The above analysis of what the dictionaries say about the two words, face
and twarz, shows that:
• While the word face has both nominal and verbal senses, the word twarz has
only nominal meanings.
• There is a high degree of both semantic and pragmatic equivalence between
the two words. The word face, however, appears in a greater number of
contexts than twarz.
• In some contexts in which in English the word face is used, in Polish other
face-related words appear.
• There are also some face-related words in English.
The face-related words are those which include:
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• words denoting parts of the face (e.g., eyes, oczy) or their derivatives
(e.g., czelność),
• words denoting actions involving a part of the face (e.g., sight, widzenie),
• synonyms of the words face and twarz (e.g., countenance, oblicze),
• words sharing one of the senses of face and twarz, “the part of a thing
presented to the eye” (e.g., façade, fasada, powierzchnia, ściana, front, tarcza,
awers, (prawa) strona).
1.3. A theoretical framework
The concept of FACE is going to be presented and analysed within the
theoretical framework of cognitive linguistics (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980;
Lakoff, 1987, 1993).
Lakoff (1987) formulated a notion of radial category, which can be
represented structurally as a container. Its subcategories are containers inside it.
It is structured by the center—periphery schema. One subcategory is the center,
defined by a cluster of converging cognitive models. The other subcategories,
non-central extensions, are linked to the center. They “may be ‘subcenters,’ that is
they may have further center—periphery structures imposed on them” (Lakoff,
1987: 287). Extensions are not specialized instances of the central category, but
are extended by convention as its variants (Lakoff, 1987). Different categories
have a radial structure; e.g., Lakoff (1987) presents the two concepts of
MOTHER and TRUTH as radial categories; Roman Kalisz and Wojciech
Kubiński (1993) discuss the radial category of speech acts; Bogusław
Bierwiaczonek (2002), analysing various subcategories of LOVE, describes them
in terms of radial models. In the radial category, there may be two different
kinds of extensions: metaphoric and metonymic.
In cognitive linguistics, metaphor is understood as “a cross-domain mapping
in the same conceptual system” (Lakoff, 1993: 203), e.g.:
TIME IS MONEY
You are wasting my time.
You’re running out of time.
That flat tire cost me an hour (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 7—8).
The target domain is “usually abstract or psychological, and the source domain,
usually a physical domain, is more basic and easily accessible for human
perception” (Kalisz et al., 1996: 42). The term “metaphorical expression refers
to a linguistic expression (a word, phrase, or sentence) that is the surface
realization of such a cross-domain mapping” (Lakoff, 1993: 203). The mappings
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are not arbitrary. They obey the principle called by Lakoff (1993) the Invariance
Principle, which says that:
Metaphorical mappings preserve the cognitive topology (that is, the
image-schema structure) of the source domain, in a way consistent with the
inherent structure of the target domain (Lakoff, 1993: 215).
These mappings are grounded in the body and everyday experience. The
inherent target domain structure automatically limits the mappings. For
example, in the metaphor ACTIONS ARE TRANSFERS, actions are
conceptualized as objects which are transferred from an agent to a patient
(e.g., to give someone a kick, to give someone a punch). It is common knowledge
that an action does not exist after it occurs (target domain knowledge), while
the recipient possesses the object given after the giving (source domain
knowledge). However, this cannot be mapped onto the target domain as no such
object as a kick or a punch exists after the action is over (Lakoff, 1993).
Our knowledge about the world is organized by Idealized Cognitive Models
(ICM), perceived as structured wholes having parts (Lakoff, 1987). Metonymy is
defined as “a cognitive process in which one conceptual entity, the vehicle,
provides mental access to another conceptual entity, the target, within the same
domain, or ICM” (Kövecses and Radden, 1998: 39). Using the concept of ICM,
Zoltan Kövecses and Gunter Radden (1998: 48—54) formulated a typology of
metonymy:
• THE WHOLE ICM FOR ITS PART, e.g., America for “the United States,”
• PART OF AN ICM FOR THE WHOLE ICM, e.g., face, hand, head, leg for
“the person,”
• PART OF AN ICM FOR ANOTHER PART OF THE SAME ICM, e.g., She
was upset for “something made her upset.”
It is often hard to distinguish between metaphors and metonymies, although
the criteria for distinguishing between them are quite clear (Kalisz, 2001). The
difference between them may be characterized in the following way: While
metonymy “involves a contiguity relationship, which can be expressed by several
specific associative relationships,” metaphor involves a relationship between
both domains, which can be characterized in terms of similarity (Feyaerts,
2000: 64). Because metonymic mappings occur within one domain, there are no
qualitative differences between the elements of the relationship, as in the case of
metaphorical mappings (Kalisz, 2001). Unlike metonymic mappings,
metaphorical mappings occur only within the same ontological realm (the
“concept” realm) but map across different and “distant” domains (Kövecses and
Radden, 1998; Dirven, 1993).
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Metaphors and metonymies often interact with each other (Barcelona, 2000a;
cf. Goossens, 1990). Most often this is interaction at the purely conceptual level.
There are two subtypes of this interaction (Barcelona, 2000a: 10):
• the metonymic conceptual motivation of metaphor (cf. metonymy-based
metaphor in Radden, 2000),
• the metaphorical conceptual motivation of metonymy.
In the first case the mapping involves two conceptual domains which can be
traced back to one conceptual domain (Croft, 1993) (e.g., the metaphor SAD
IS DOWN/HAPPY IS UP is conceptually motivated by the metonymy
DOWN(WARD BODILY POSTURE) FOR SADNESS (Barcelona, 2000b)).
The metaphorical conceptual motivation of metonymy may be found in
metonymic interpretations of a linguistic expression possible only within
a co-occurring metaphorical mapping (e.g., to catch somebody’s ear — the
metonymy EAR FOR ATTENTION, a specific variety of the metonymy BODY
PART FOR (MANNER OF) FUNCTION is conceptually motivated by the
metaphor ATTENTION IS A (TYPICALLY MOVING) PHYSICAL ENTITY
(Barcelona, 2000a)).
There is an obvious relation between metaphors and metonymies and
culture, understood “as a set of shared understandings that characterize smaller
or larger groups of people” (Kövecses, 2005: 1). As Lakoff and Johnson claim
in their book Metaphors We Live By (1980), metaphors exist not only in
language, but also in thoughts and action. They cannot be treated as mere
linguistic ornaments, because “we actually understand the world with
metaphors” (Kövecses, 2005: 1). In different cultures people share different
understandings of the world and conceptualize reality in different ways, and
consequently the metaphors they use also vary. Certain conceptual metaphors,
however, are potentially universal or near-universal. These metaphors are based
on universal human experiences and are shared by different cultures, but in
different languages they commonly display variation in metaphorical linguistic
expressions (Kövecses, 2005).
FACE belongs to the conceptual system in terms of which we both think
and act. It is one of the concepts which govern our everyday life. Among its
numerous meanings, FACE is the positive social value every person effectively
claims to have (cf. Goffman, 1967). And as one of many social values it is not
independent, but must form a coherent system with the other metaphorical
concepts we live by. As a term designating a very significant element of the
human body, face is considered “part of a universal analogical repertoire which
can be used for metaphorical production in all cultures” (Strecker, 1993: 121).
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1.4. FACE as a radial category
FACE is an example of a radial category. It is structured radially with respect to
a number of its subcategories. This radial structure involves a central
subcategory and peripheral extensions which are its variants understood via
their relationship to it (Lakoff, 1987). The concept of FACE cannot be clearly
defined in terms of common necessary and sufficient conditions. The central
subcategory of FACE is the prototypical face, defined as the front part of the
head from chin to forehead and hair line:
The stone struck him on his face (OALD).
She had a round face.
Z bliska jego twarz wydawała się jeszcze bardziej odrażająca. (From close up his
face seemed to be even more repugnant.)
Jej piękna, opalona twarz przyciągała wzrok wszystkich mężczyzn. (Her beautiful,
suntanned face caught all men’s eyes.)
Non-central subcategories are metonymic and metaphoric extensions of the
central subcategory (see Fig. 1).
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Fig. 1. The radial category of FACE
A façade/the front,
outer or most
important surface
of something
The presence
of/confrontation with
somebody/something
FACE as a part of the
body
The person The (person’s)
look
The person’s
inner self
An image of
self/good
name/reputation
A bold
front
A mask
The metonymic extensions of the category FACE are:
• FACE = the person,
• FACE = the (person’s) look,
• FACE = the person’s inner state,
• FACE = an image of self/a good name/reputation,
• FACE = the presence of/confrontation with somebody/something.
The metaphoric extensions are:
• FACE = a mask,
• FACE = a bold front/self-confidence which is disrespectful or rude,
• FACE = a façade/the front, outer or most important surface of something.
The metonymic extensions: FACE = the person, FACE = the (person’s) look,
and FACE = the person’s inner state, constitute a central subcategory for their
own extensions (see Fig. 2—4).
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Fig. 2. The radial subcategory FACE = the person
Fig. 3. The radial subcategory of FACE = the person’s look
Fig. 4. The radial subcategory FACE = the person’s inner self
3 — Face...
The
representative
The representation
of a human visage
FACE = the
person
The look of the
place/institution/phenomenon
FACE = the
person’s look
The characteristics of the
place/institution/phenomenon
The person’s
personality/character
The mirror of
the mind/soul
FACE = the
person’s inner
self
The expression
of emotion
1.5. FACE metaphors in English and Polish
The metonymies and metaphors of FACE to be discussed here, although not
proved to be universal, can be observed at least in the two analysed cultures,
English-speaking and Polish. The examples of metonymic and metaphorical
expressions come from English and Polish dictionaries, literary texts, the
Internet, web pages both in English and Polish, American and Polish library
catalogues, electronic resources, and observation of everyday life.
The FACE metonymies and metaphors presented below exist in
English-speaking and Polish cultures. The metaphorical expressions related to
them in the two languages often display semanto-syntactic equivalence, although
in Polish expressions we can find also other words than twarz, e.g., oblicze
(face), czoło (forehead), nos (nose), oczy (eyes), policzek (cheek), widzenie
(sight), czelność (audacity) and potwarz (calumny, slander).
(A) THE FACE FOR THE PERSON
The metonymy THE PART FOR THE WHOLE has traditionally been given
special status under the name of synecdoche (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980). Parts
which are used to stand for physical things include well known metonymies:
body or body parts such as hand, face, head, heart, or leg for the whole person
(Kövecses and Radden, 1998; Niemeier, 2000), e.g.,
We need a couple of strong bodies for our team.
There are a lot of good heads in the university.
Co dwie głowy to nie jedna. (Two heads count more than one) — a Polish
proverb
Jej mąż to taka złota rączka, wszystko potrafi zrobić. (Her husband is a golden
hand (dim.) (meaning “handy about the house”), he can do everything.)
In our conceptual system there is a special case of the metonymy THE
PART FOR THE WHOLE, namely, THE FACE FOR THE PERSON. (Lakoff
and Johnson, 1980: 37). People often refer to other people as faces. This tells us
a lot about the importance of the face as a part of the human body and as
a source of information about its owner. This metonymy exists both in
English-speaking and Polish cultures, which can be exemplified by English and
Polish metonymic expressions:
She’s just a pretty face.
There are an awful lot of faces out there in the audience.
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We need some new faces around here (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 36—37).
Na zebraniu były same nowe twarze (SJP). (In the meeting there were only new
faces.)
Obce twarze zawsze ją onieśmielały. (Strange faces always made her shy.)
In colloquial Polish, this metonymy can be found in utterances in which
TWARZ = OSOBA (person) (Maćkiewicz, 2000):
Wypadło pół litra na twarz (na głowę). (There was half a litre per face (per
person, per head).)
A special case of the metonymy THE FACE FOR THE PERSON is the
metonymy THE FACE FOR THE REPRESENTATION OF A HUMAN
VISAGE:
Walker arrived in London. His face was in every print shop (OED).
Jackson’s was the first high profile face to portray a physical transition from
African to Caucasian [...] (Kemp, 2004: 32).
The second face is an extraordinary mask, made in New York in the early years of
the twentieth century by W.T. Benda (Kemp, 2004: 33).
Internetowy Bank Twarzy umożliwia zaprezentowanie się każdej osoby, która chce
pracować i zarabiać w reklamie. (The Internet Bank of Faces makes possible
the presentation of every person who wants to work and earn money in
advertising.)
Twarze Fryderyków. Portrety i małe formy groteskowe. (Fredericks’ faces.
Portraits and small grotesque forms.)
Another special case of the metonymy THE FACE FOR THE PERSON is
the metonymy THE FACE FOR THE REPRESENTATIVE (cf. Pietrzak-
Porwisz, 2007).
The new face of the Democratic Party — and America (Barack Obama).
[Obama] offered searing and far-reaching attacks on his presumptive Republican
opponent [McCain], repeatedly portraying him as the face of the old way of
politics and failed Republican policies (The New York Times, August 29, 2008).
Football star David Beckham’s appeal seems to be ever rising; latest reports
indicate that the handsome sport star has been offered a £10 million deal to be
the face of a new L’Oreal hair care line.
Janusz Palikot, twarz Platformy Obywatelskiej. (Janusz Palikot, the face of the
Civic Platform party.)
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Twarzą L’Oreala została Penelope Cruz. (Penelope Cruz became the face of
L’Oreal.)
The Polish actress Joanna Szczepkowska, discussing the moral aspects of actors’
participation in advertisements, said:
Skoro ona taka wrażliwa, daje swoją twarz, to już naprawdę musi być dobre... (If
she is so sensitive, and gives her face, it [the product] must be really good...)
Jeśli reklamujesz towar swoją twarzą, to tym samym wchodzisz w całą siatkę prawną
dotykającą konkurencji. A więc jeśli utożsamiasz się publicznie z jednym kefirem, to
już nie wolno Ci się utożsamić z innym. (If you advertise a product with your face,
at the same time you enter a legal net involving the competition. Thus, if you
identify yourself in public with one kefir, you cannot identify with another one.)
(Wysokie Obcasy, Nr 38, September 27, 2008).
The above examples express the metaphor: THE FACE IS A THING WHICH
CAN BE USED FOR SOME PURPOSE, e.g., for advertising some product.
Thus, the special case of this metaphor is: THE FACE IS A TOOL OF WORK.
(B) THE FACE FOR THE (PERSON’S) LOOK
The face is the part of the body that helps us identify the person. As Antoni
Kępiński (1998: 196) argues:
One should expect that in at least higher vertebrates, the head is an essential
factor in mutual recognition and the recognition of basic emotional states.
This is certainly so in man — the face is his identity card. Covering the face
makes the identification of another person difficult or impossible.
In a similar vein, Lakoff and Johnson (1980: 37) comment on the role of the
face in human recognition:
In our culture we look at a person’s face — rather than his posture or his
movements — to get our basic information about what the person is like. We
function in terms of a metonymy when we perceive the person in terms of his
face and act on those perceptions.
The metonymy THE FACE FOR (THE PERSON’S) LOOK, or its special
case THE FACE FOR THE PERSON’S IDENTITY (cf. Kępiński, 1998), is
very productive and has been an intriguing inspiration for many authors. For
example, Milan Kundera (1991), in his novel Immortality, ponders the role of
the face in human life. One of his characters, Agnes, talks about the relation
between the face and identity:
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Yes, you know me by my name, you know me as a face and you never knew me in
any other way. Therefore it could never occur to you that my face is not myself
(Kundera, 1991: 35).
In English and in Polish, the two metonymies are realized by the following
expressions:
I know your face. You’re Mary Robinson.
He knew her by sight.
Tak się zmienił na twarzy, że go nie poznałam. (He had changed in the face so
much that I did not recognize him.)
Znała go z twarzy, ale nie wiedziała jak się nazywa. (She knew him by his face,
but she did not know his name.)
Znamy się tylko z widzenia. (We know each other only by sight.)
In Polish, there are two equivalent expressions, z twarzy and z widzenia (by
sight). This is not accidental. We can tell something about a person, we can
identify him, only if we look at his face. The face and vision are one. The face is
a vision. This is true in German and ancient Italian, in which the words Gesicht
and viso, respectively, mean both “vision” and “face” (Stimilli, 2005). Dante
Alighieri, in Paradise (Dante and Beatrice rise to the empyrean, the tenth circle.
Here all Heaven is revealed as a river of light, as a celestial rose) (2004: Canto
XXX, 19—33; 319—321), uses the word in these two senses:
I saw her beauty passing all our ways
of understanding, and believe indeed
that He alone who fashioned her enjoys
Its fullness. From this pass I must concede
myself more overcome than ever was
tragedian or comic at the peak
Of difficulty: as the sun in eyes
that tremble weakly, so my memory
of her sweet smile now robs the intellect
And leaves me at a loss. From the first day
I saw her face until this vision now,
my road to song has not been cut away,
But here, as every artist, I must bow
to my last power, and cease to follow on
her loveliness by signs in poetry.
The face helps us to identify the person’s gender, age and ethnicity. As Dan
McNeill (1998: 96) argues, “Race is in the face.”
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a paleface
blada twarz (a paleface)
a Teutonic face, an Anglo-Saxon face
nordycka twarz, słowiańska twarz/nordyckie rysy (twarzy), słowiańskie rysy
(twarzy) (a Nordic face, a Slavic face/Nordic features, Slavic features)
żydowski nos (A Jewish nose)
murzyńskie rysy/wargi (Negro features/lips)
(C) THE FACE FOR THE PERSON’S INNER SELF
Władysław Kopaliński, in his Słownik Symboli (2001: 441), defines twarz as “the
speech without words, the door to the invisible in the man, a substitute for the
whole man, an occasional revealing of oneself.” The face is considered to be an
external manifestation of what is going on in the person. THE FACE FOR THE
PERSON’S INNER SELF is a special case of the metonymy THE OUTER
FOR THE INNER. The face (the outer) can reveal to others a person’s
personality, character and intellectual abilities, and psychological and physical
state (the inner). The metonymy is conceptually motivated by the metaphor
THE FACE (BODY) IS THE MIRROR OF THE MIND (SOUL) (see also
Section 2.4.), which is expressed in language by:
The face is an image of the soul, and the eyes its interpreter (Cicero on the Ideal
Orator, 2001).
Reading Faces: Window to the Soul? (Zebrowitz, 1997).
Każdego twarz pokazuje, jakim się wewnątrz znajduje. (Everyone’s face shows
what he is like on the inside.) — Polish proverb (Kopaliński, 2001).
Sometimes, however, this characteristic of the face is extended to the whole
body, e.g.:
The human body is the best picture of the human soul (Wittgenstein, 1968).
The face, nonetheless, does not always show what happens in the person’s
soul/mind:
There’s no art
To find the mind’s construction in the face (Shakespeare, Macbeth, 1.iv).
Twarz nie zawsze umysłu okrywa. (The face does not always show what is
[happening] in the mind.) — Polish proverb (Kopaliński, 2001).
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The face is a good source of information about its owner. We can read the
face like a text. Or more properly, the face is a text, and its owner is the author
(Limon, 2000). We can get a lot of information about a person by studying his
face:
Your face, my thane, is as a book where men
May read strange matters [...] (Shakespeare, Macbeth, 1.v).
Read o’er the volume of young Paris’ face,
And find delight writ there with beauty’s pen; (Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet,
I.iii).
As a rule a man’s face says more of interest than does his tongue [...] it is the
monogram of all his thoughts and aspirations (Schopenhauer, “On
physiognomy,” 1810).
Looking at his face I understood what had happened.
The actor has absolute control over his/her face and expression (BNC).
The face can betray its owner.
Smutek malował się na jej twarzy. (Sorrow was painted on his face.)
Powiedział, że wszystko w porządku, ale zdradziła go twarz. (He said that
everything was all right, but his face betrayed him.)
Winę miał wypisaną na twarzy. (He had his guilt written on his face.)
Miał bardzo przejrzystą twarz, widać było kiedy kłamie, a kiedy mówi prawdę. (He
had a very transparent face; one could see when he was lying and when he was
telling the truth.)
We usually comment on a person’s condition on the basis of the appearance of
his face:
You look ill/unwell.
His face bore the mark/sign of disease.
Wyglądasz źle/niewyraźnie/na chorego. (You look unwell/ill.)
Chorobę miał wypisaną na twarzy. (He had the disease written on his face.)
Jego twarz nosiła wyraźne piętno choroby. (His face bore the mark of illness.)
facies hippocratica (Lat), oblicze hipokratesowe (Hippocratic face) (Kopaliński,
2001).
The face is very important in social interaction, because unlike the rest of
the body it is often “naked” (Kępiński, 1998). That is why it is so easy to
recognize somebody’s emotions expressed on the face. It is easier to control
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hand movements, movements of other parts of the body, or verbal reactions
than facial expression, because mimic muscles are difficult to control
intentionally. “The face does not lie” (Kępiński, 1998: 196). The degree of face
control may be both idiosyncratic and culture-specific. In some cultures it is
greater than in others, e.g., in Chinese culture it is greater than in European
culture, in English greater than in Polish (Kępiński, 1998). Besides, the degree
of face control depends on the social role of the person, e.g., whether he is
a judge, a doctor or an actor (Kępiński, 1998).
The information about a person comes not only from the face as a whole,
but also from its parts: the forehead, eyes, nose, lips and chin. The forehead is
the uppermost part of the face. Traditionally, it is associated with a person’s
state of mind (general orientation in the surrounding world and general attitude
to what happens there) (Kępiński, 1998) or mental abilities. The forehead, for
example, can express surprise, disbelief or concentration (Kępiński, 1998).
Some linguistic expressions denoting the expression on the forehead are related
to the metaphor THE FOREHEAD/FACE IS LIKE THE SKY (cf. Kępiński,
1998):
zachmurzone czoło (the [frowning] clouded-over forehead (covered by
temporary wrinkles))
Czoło mu się rozpogodziło. (His forehead brightened up.)
Twarz się komuś rozjaśniła, rozpogodziła. (Someone’s face brightened up.) (SJP).
zachmurzona twarz (a clouded-over face)
The size and shape of the forehead can imply a person’s mental abilities. It is
commonly believed that a large forehead signifies a high level of intelligence,
and a low forehead, a low level of intelligence:
Low foreheads, high pinched nasal roots, nasal bridges and tips varying to both
extremes of breadth and narrowness, excesses of nasal deflections, compressed
faces and narrow jaw, fit well into the picture of general constitutional inferiority
(Hooton, 1939: 306).
Miał takie niskie czoło i wyglądał jak neandertalczyk. (He had such a low
forehead that he looked like a Neanderthal.)
Of the whole face, the eyes are the best source of information about
a person. Folk tradition says that the eyes do not lie. Looking at the person’s
eyes, or into them, we can learn what his true feelings are. Georg Simmel
(1901/1959: 281) says that “The eye epitomizes the achievement of the face in
mirroring the soul.” As Kępiński (1998: 198) says, one “can put a mask on
other parts of the face, on the eyes — not. Their expression can be controlled by
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[our] volition only to a minimal degree.” That is why it is so easy to recognize
a person’s emotional state by looking into his eyes. The English word eyes and
its Polish equivalent oczy (or the words spojrzenie (look) and wzrok (sight)) are
often modified by phrases denoting emotions or states of the mind:
radiant eyes, unhappy eyes, smiling eyes
Your questioning eyes are sad. They
seek to know my meaning as the moon
would fathom the sea (R. Tagore, The Gardener XXVIII: Your Questioning Eyes).
a mocking look (OPWN)
oczy wesołe, oczy smutne (cheerful eyes, sad eyes)
psie spojrzenie (a dog’s look)
oczy/spojrzenie nieprzytomne (vacant eyes/look)
(nie)ufne oczy ((mis)trustful eyes) (Kępiński, 1998: 199)
Powiedział, że nie przejmuje się niczym, ale spojrzenie go zdradziło. (He said that
he did not care, but his look betrayed him.)
Nic nie mówiła, ale z jej oczu można było wszystko wyczytać. (She did not say
anything, but one could read everything in her eyes.)
The way somebody looks at others tells also whether he is shy and timid or
bold:
She dropped her eyes in embarrassment.
He looked her in the face and said he was leaving.
Wstydliwie spuszczała wzrok/oczy, gdy miała się publicznie odezwać. (She
dropped her gaze/eyes when she was to talk in public.)
Miał odwagę spojrzeć jej ojcu prosto w oczy/twarz. (He had the courage to look
her father in the eyes/face.)
Metaphorically, THE EYES ARE CONTAINERS (Maćkiewicz, 2001). Looking
into another person’s eyes implies trying to learn something about his feelings,
state of mind and attitude towards others:
Look into the eyes, and you’ll see a whole different person.
Zajrzeć komuś głęboko w oczy, to jak zajrzeć mu w duszę. (To look into
someone’s eyes is like looking into someone’s soul.)
The nose is the element of the face that plays the least important role in
providing the information about its owner and his feelings and thoughts:
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My children turn up their noses at fresh vegetables (LDCE).
Trudno ją było zadowolić. Na wszystko kręciła nosem. (She was hard to satisfy.
She turned up her nose at everything.)
The lips are an important part of the face. Unlike its other parts, the lips,
which are an organ of speech, can literally “say” what one feels and means.
However, they can also express nonverbally one’s feelings and thoughts:
O, what a deal of scorn looks beautiful
In the contempt and anger of his lip! (Shakespeare, Twelfth Night, 3.i)
Ostentacyjnie wydęła usta. (Ostentatiously, she pouted her lips.) [an expression
of dissatisfaction or contempt]
Zrobiła usta w podkówkę i łzy pociekły jej po policzkach. (She turned her mouth
down and tears rolled down her cheeks.)
The shape of the lips is said also to speak about their owner’s character/
personality. Kopaliński (2001) writes that a big mouth is said to signify
self-confidence, a salivating mouth, lecherousness. Narrow lips are said to imply
dogged determination. In English a big mouth implies talking too much:
Don’t tell him any secrets; he’s got a big mouth (meaning “he talks too much,
and will tell somebody”) (LDCE).
The lowest part of the face which can tell us something about its owner is
the chin. Although it is not so good a source of information as the eyes or lips,
it is said to give some hints as to a person’s strength of character and emotional
state:
a weak/strong chin
All the time he tried to keep his chin up.
Silny podbródek mówił o jego sile i zdecydowaniu. (The strong chin testified
about his strength and decisiveness.)
Podbródek zaczął mu drgać. Wiedziałam, że zaraz się rozpłacze. (His chin started
to tremble. I knew he was about to break down.)
Analysing the human face, one can observe temporary and permanent
elements. The temporary elements, related to a particular social situation, are
momentary facial expressions of joy, laughter, sadness, anger, anxiety or
hostility. The permanent elements are said to tell about the person’s past
experience and character (Kępiński, 1998). By analogy to this dichotomy of
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facial expression, the metonymy THE FACE FOR THE PERSON’S INNER
SELF has two special cases:
(C1) THE FACE FOR THE EXPRESSION OF EMOTION
(C2) THE FACE FOR THE PERSON’S PERSONALITY/CHARACTER
Face is a countenance or expression on the face. It tells us about the physical
and emotional states of a person (e.g., red-faced, suggesting a connection
between emotion and physiological change; shame-faced, pointing at an intimate
connection between shame and facial expression (Ho et al., 2004); or twarz
purpurowa z wściekłości (a face purple with rage); twarz czerwona ze wstydu
(a face red with shame), suggesting the same connection). The importance of
facial expression cannot be overestimated. Deprived of it, an individual is
incapable of establishing and maintaining relationships and interacting with
others. As Kobo Abé (1967: 27—28) says, in his novel The Face of Another (the
main character lost his face and had to wear an artificial face):
The face, in the final analysis, is the expression. The expression — how shall I put
it? — well, the expression is something like an equation by which we shape our
relationship with others. It’s a roadway between oneself and others. If it’s blocked
by a landslide, even those who have been at pains to travel it will think you are
now some uninhabited, dilapidated house and perhaps pass by.
The metonymy THE FACE FOR THE EXPRESSION OF EMOTION is
realized by many linguistic expressions:
a happy face, a cheerful face, a radiant face, a laughing face
Robert tried to compose his face into an expression of humble trust (BNC).
Polly hastily rearranged her face into an expression of businesslike interest
(BNC).
Conservatives on the platform fixed their faces into expressions of interested
concern (BNC).
When he was told he couldn’t go to the zoo he pulled a long face (LDCE).
żałosna twarz/mina (forlorn face), uśmiechnięta twarz/mina. (smiling face)
naburmuszona mina (a sour face (showing dissatisfaction))
twarz pełna wyrazu (a face full of expression)
twarz bez wyrazu (an expressionless face)
Twarze się dzieciom wydłużyły, że nie będzie wycieczki. (The children’s faces fell
[when they heard] that they would not go on the excursion.) (Dunaj, 1999)
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The metonymy THE FACE FOR THE PERSON’S PERSONALITY/
CHARACTER is the other special case of the metonymy THE FACE FOR
THE PERSON’S INNER SELF:
Marion’s face and smile were angelic (BNC).
He was an old man with a kind face.
Miał taką dobrą/szlachetną/dobroduszną twarz. (He had such a good/
noble/good-natured face.)
Z jego twarzy biła inteligencja. (His face shone with intelligence.)
Za oknem zobaczyła wściekłą twarz psychopaty. (Through the window she saw
the enraged face of a psychopath.)
This metonymy is also expressed by means of the following phrases:
inteligentny wyraz twarzy, inteligentne spojrzenie (an intelligent expression/
face/look)
psychopatyczny wyraz twarzy, psychopatyczne spojrzenie (a psychopathic
expression/face/look)
The metonymies THE FACE FOR (THE PERSON’S) LOOK and THE
FACE FOR THE PERSON’S PERSONALITY/CHARACTER are the basis for
the metaphor THE FACE IS THE LOOK/CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
PLACE/INSTITUTION/PHENOMENON (cf. Pietrzak-Porwisz, 2007).
The real face of the political emigration from Germany
The face of my motherland
The changing face of India
The changing face of the third world
Odnowić oblicze tej Ziemi — naszej Ziemi. (To renew the face of the Earth — our
Earth.) (John Paul II)
Nowe oblicze polskiej architektury (The new face of Polish architecture)
Odmienne oblicze kobiet w polskim filmie (A different face of women in Polish
film)
Nowa twarz postmodernizmu (The new face of postmodernism)
Nowa twarz i program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości (The new face and programme of
the Law and Justice party)
44 A cognitive study...
(D) THE FACE FOR AN IMAGE OF SELF
Face is fundamental to a sense of self (Cupach and Metts, 1994). The
metonymy THE FACE FOR AN IMAGE OF SELF organizes the world of
social interaction. This metonymy may be understood in two different ways: as
THE FACE FOR A TRUE IMAGE OF SELF, or, using Goffman’s (1967: 5)
sense of face (also called social face (Tjosvold, 1983)), as THE FACE FOR AN
IMAGE OF SELF DELINEATED IN TERMS OF APPROVED SOCIAL
ATTRIBUTES or THE FACE FOR A POSITIVE IMAGE OF SELF
(a self-image which is socially acceptable). In the latter case, the self-image does
not have to be true; it is the positive self-image claimed by its owner, the
interactant. The metonymy in the Goffmanian sense, THE FACE FOR
A POSITIVE IMAGE OF SELF, is closely related to another metonymy, THE
FACE FOR A GOOD NAME/REPUTATION. These metonymies are realized
in English by means of the folk expression to lose face, meaning “to be
embarrassed” (Brown and Levinson, 1987), whose origins have been traced to
Chinese culture (Mao, 1994; Ho, 1975). Mao (1994: 45) claims that the word
face is a literal translation of the two Chinese words mianzi and lian, which
originally appeared in the phrase to save face which was used in the English
community in China, and conveyed the meaning of preserving “one’s credit,
good name, reputation.” In this way, this metonymic use of the word face was
borrowed into English from Chinese. “[The] first evidence of the sense of face
[...] is attested by an 1876 quotation from R. Hart in These from the Land of
Sinim: ‘Arrangements by which China has lost faces’” (Ervin-Tripp et al., 1995:
45; Hart, 1901). Susan Ervin-Tripp et al. (1995: 47) give the following
explanation for this borrowing:
[There] was an accelerating fad for things and ideas Chinese which peaked in
the mid-eighteenth century, with the importation of tea, porcelain, silk, chintz,
and wall-paper, the copying of Chinese and Japanese decorative elements in
Chippendale furniture and Gobelin tapestries, and the design of Chinese-style
rooms and Chinese gardens.
The Jesuit missionaries became interested in Chinese philosophical
traditions, particularly in Confucius, and in turn the philosophers were
attracted to the idea of a secular morality unlinked to religion. [...] As is usual
in borrowing, assimilation to the borrowers’ concerns revealed a quite
superficial acquaintance with Chinese culture, [...] the missionaries created
a stereotype, a Chinese who was imagined on the basis of Confucius to be soft
and polite [...].
The two Chinese words denoting face can be found in many different
collocations (see Section 4.4.); in English, according to the Oxford English
Dictionary, the collocational range of face meanining “good name, reputation” is
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limited to two expressions, to save face and to lose face. As mentioned in Section
1.2., the Polish word twarz also has the sense of “good name, reputation,” and
occurs in similar contexts.
Criticism should never cause the recipient to lose face, inner dignity or self-respect
(BNC).
He was afraid of failure because he didn’t want to lose face with his colleagues
(LDCE).
Saving face is the strongest motive in the world (OED).
Hiding from others may save face, but at the cost of an increased weight of private
guilt and doubt (BNC).
Kiedy nie udało mu się pokonać przeciwnika, czuł, że stracił twarz w oczach
swoich przyjaciół, którzy liczyli na jego zwycięstwo. (When he failed to beat his
opponent he felt he has lost his face with his friends, who all expected him to
win.) (Kakietek, 2004)
Za wszelką cenę starał się zachować twarz. (At all costs he tried to save face.)
Z całej tej kłopotliwej sytuacji udało im się wyjść z twarzą. (They managed to
maintain face in this embarrassing situation.)
The metonymies THE FACE FOR AN IMAGE OF SELF and THE FACE
FOR A GOOD NAME/REPUTATION are the conceptual motivation for the
metaphor AN ATTACK ON THE FACE (PART) IS AN ATTACK ON THE
PERSON’S IMAGE OF SELF/GOOD NAME:
It was a slap in the face for her parents when she ignored their advice and gave
up her job (LDCE).
His words were like a slap across her face. The blood rushed to her head (BNC).
It was a slap on his cheek.
Nie dostał awansu, na który tak liczył. Dla niego to był policzek. (He was not
promoted, and this was [a slap on] his cheek.)
Sam Niesiołowski po debacie mówił, że słowa Kaczyńskiego to potwarz [...].
(Niesiołowski himself said after the debate that Kaczyński’s words were
a slander.) (Gazeta Wyborcza, December 4, 2008)
The Polish word potwarz (calumny, slander, libel) is etymologically related to the
word twarz. Calumny constitutes an attack on and threat to the person’s
self-image, his good name/reputation.
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(E) THE FACE IS A MASK
The metaphor THE FACE IS A MASK carries a truth which is in opposition to
everything that has been said above, i.e. that the face is naked, that it does not
lie and is a reflection of the soul. It agrees only with the metonymy THE FACE
FOR A POSITIVE IMAGE OF SELF and the Goffmanian interpretation of
FACE. Every person can to some extent control his facial expression and put on
different masks, suitable for certain situations and for his social role, through
which he wants to be perceived by other people. As Kępiński (1998: 204) says,
the mask “is a certain kind of social mimicry, [by means of which] the
individual deceives other participants in the social contact.” He puts on
different faces like actors in the ancient theatre put on different masks.
He put the best face on his dismissal, saying that he had intended to take another
job anyway.
Unruffled, his face was now a mask of deep interest (BNC).
His face was a taut bitter mask (BNC).
The woman’s thin face was a mask of terror (BNC).
A false face, seen but unable to look back (Kobo Abé, The Face of Another.
1967: 15).
Although she didn’t feel very confident, she put on a brave face and accepted the
challenge (LDCE).
He put on a poker face and nobody could make him say anything about the trial.
a two-faced/double-faced liar
No matter how many faces I have, there is no changing the fact that I am me (Kobo
Abé, The Face of Another, 1967: 19).
Openly or covertly, anxiously or eagerly, we catch our reflections in mirrors, glass
doors and shop-fronts and ‘put on a face to meet the faces’ when we go out
(Kemp, 2004: 23).
W trudnych sytuacjach przybierał maskę niewinności. (In difficult situations he
put on a mask of innocence.)
Zrzucił maskę i ukazał swoje prawdziwe oblicze. (He dropped the mask and
showed his true face.)
człowiek o dwu twarzach (a man with two faces (insincere)) (Kopaliński,
2001).
Bardzo szybko odkryli jego dwulicowość. (They soon discovered his duplicity.)
Przybrał pokerową twarz i nic więcej już nie chciał powiedzieć na ten temat. (He
put on a poker face and did not want to say anything else about it.)
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Here the face is not a source of truth, but something that is used to hide it. The
inconsistency between the metonymy THE FACE FOR A TRUE IMAGE OF
SELF and the metaphor THE FACE IS A MASK can be compared to the
inconsistency between the INNER-SELF metaphor and the REAL-ME
metaphor, discussed by Lakoff (1996):
I’m not myself today. That wasn’t the real me yesterday (Lakoff, 1996: 107).
Her sophistication is a façade. You’ve never seen what she’s really like on the
inside (Lakoff, 1996: 108).
Discussing the INNER-SELF metaphor, Lakoff argues that the real Self is the
inner, private self; the external, public Self is not real. This conception of
a hidden self is inconsistent with “the REAL-ME metaphor, in which the ‘real’
self is normally the visible, public self rather than the hidden, private self”
(Lakoff, 1996: 108). Likewise, the “naked” face tells the truth about its owner; it
is a reflection of his inner, private self, while the mask is not a real face; it is an
image of his public self.
It is not only a human being that can have more than one face; things,
abstract concepts and phenomena also can. The metaphor THE FACE IS AN
ASPECT OF SOMETHING takes the following linguistic forms:
The rural face of white supremacy.
The present personal: philosophy and the hidden face of language.
The Face of Immortality (Stimilli, 2005).
Druga twarz Europy. (The other face of Europe.)
Druga twarz portretu. (The second face of the portrait.)
Ukryta twarz twojej osobowości. (The hidden face of your personality.)
(F) THE FACE IS A BOLD FRONT
THE FACE IS SELF-CONFIDENCE WHICH IS DISRESPECTFUL OR RUDE
People do not always behave according to the rules of politeness. Quite often
they do not show due care for other people’s wants and are self-confident and
daring in a disrespectful or rude way. The expressions to have the face/the cheek
to do something, meaning “be bold or impudent enough” (OALD) are linguistic
realizations of the metaphor THE FACE IS A BOLD FRONT/
SELF-CONFIDENCE WHICH IS DISRESPECTFUL OR RUDE:
He had the face to ask me for money.
He had the bare-faced impudence to ask me for a loan 10 minutes after we had
been introduced! (OALD).
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bare-faced lies
He had the cheek to ask me to do his work for him!
Miał czelność poprosić ich o pożyczkę. (He had the face to ask them for a loan.)
Bezczelne kłamstwo! Kłamie w (żywe) oczy! (That’s a blatant lie! He is lying in
his eyes (meaning “through his teeth”)!)
(G) THE FACE FOR THE PRESENCE OF SOMEBODY/SOMETHING
THE FACE FOR THE CONFRONTATION WITH SOMEBODY/
SOMETHING
When we meet somebody face to face, we come into his presence, or confront
him. Face implies the presence of a person or thing, the physical or
metaphorical proximity or confrontation. The physical proximity is especially
vital in social interactions, in which the fact that we see our interlocutor, his
face and the expression on his face may influence the outcome of the
conversation. “Face makes presence” (McNeill, 1998: 237). The examples below
are linguistic realizations of the metonymy THE FACE FOR THE PRESENCE
OF OR CONFRONTATION WITH SOMEBODY OR SOMETHING:
I’ve talked to him on the phone but I’ve never actually met him face to face
(LDCE).
There is a greater time lag in a printed book, as in a recording, than there is in
face-to-face talk (OED).
He shut the door in John’s face.
In the face of great hardship, she managed to keep her sense of humour (LDCE).
He wouldn’t be so rude to her face (LDCE).
He does not like to be praised to his face (OED).
How can you show your face here after the way you behaved last night? (OALD).
Po wielu latach spotkali się wreszcie twarzą w twarz. (After many years they
finally met face to face.)
W obliczu niebezpieczeństwa, zawsze potrafił wziąć się w garść. (In the face of
danger, he was always able to pull himself together.)
Powiedziała mu prosto w twarz/oczy, że go nie kocha. (She told him to his face
that she did not love him.)
Roześmiał mi się w twarz/nos. (He laughted in my face/nose.)
Zamknęli mu drzwi przed nosem i tyle. (They closed the door in his [face] nose.)
Po tym wszystkim, jak możesz się tutaj pokazywać? (After all this how can you
show yourself [your face] here?)
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4 — Face...
(H) THE FACE IS A FAÇADE
THE FACE IS THE FRONT, OUTER, OR MOST IMPORTANT
SURFACE OF SOMETHING
The metaphor A MOUNTAIN IS A PERSON consists of the following,
conventionally fixed, expressions of language, the foot of the mountain (Lakoff
and Johnson, 1980: 54) and the face of the mountain, in which the mountain is
personified. In the latter expression, the metaphor A MOUNTAIN IS
A PERSON interacts with the metaphor THE FACE IS A FAÇADE or THE
FRONT, OUTER, OR MOST IMPORTANT SURFACE OF SOMETHING,
which consists also of other fixed expressions (cf. the metaphorical use of the
word czoło meaning “the front part of something” in Maćkiewicz (2006)), e.g.:
the face of a clock (OALD)
They disappeared from the face of the earth (OALD).
The team climbed the north face of the mountain (OALD).
The value of a coin is shown on its face.
The face of the house from one end to the other was covered with vines and
passion flowers (OED).
The miners work at the coal face for seven hours each day (LDCE).
the face of the fabric
a double-faced fabric
The face of an anvil is its upper surface (OED).
Budynek Opery Narodowej zdobiła bogata fasada. (The building of the National
Opera was graced with a rich face/façade.)
Frontową ścianę/Front domu porastało dzikie wino. (The face of the house was
covered with Virginia creeper.)
lico budynku (the face of the building) (SJP)
lico siekiery (the face of the axe) (SJP)
licowa (prawa) strona tkaniny (the face of the fabric)
Dwóch górników pracowało na przodku. (Two miners were working at the front
[coalface].)
The metonymies and metaphors analyzed above form a complex, though not
complete, picture of the concept of FACE as it functions in both
English-speaking and Polish cultures. Having analysed FACE metaphors and
metonymies existing in the two cultures, one can observe that the word face is
more broadly used than its Polish equivalent twarz. The word face, with a few
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exceptions in which it can be replaced by other words, appears in all
face-related metaphorical expressions. The word twarz, on the other hand, is one
among the many words found in Polish face-related metaphorical expressions.
Apart from twarz, Polish face-related expressions include:
• twarz synonyms: oblicze, lico;
• words denoting parts of the face: czoło, nos, oczy, usta, podbródek;
• words derived from the above: bezczelny, czelność, potwarz;
• words denoting the front part of something, e.g., fasada, front, przodek.
Taking the above analysis into consideration, one can conclude that FACE, or
to be precise its cultural variations, English face and Polish twarz, are
conceptualized in a highly similar way. However, certain senses, which in
English are related to the face as a whole, in Polish are taken over by names of
some of its parts.
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Chapter 2
The face as a part of the body
2.1. Introduction
The face is the most important element of self-perception and sensitivity to the
other. According to Courtine and Haroche (2007: 7), “the face is a subject of
individual work, indispensable for talking and interacting with other people.”
They say “the face speaks.” The face is what makes an individual social. We
literally speak with our face, but we also “speak” using different facial
expressions. To fully participate in social interaction, we need the face. We need
it to communicate with others and to create our self-identity.
Thus, the face cannot be treated like other parts of the body. Sławek (2000:
29; Sochoń, 2000) maintains that “all our culture is oriented at the face
(façade) [...].” The special character of the face is stressed by Berrios (2003: 56;
Kemp, 2004), who tries to find an adequate conceptual apparatus for the study
of the face:
The face is not a ‘natural kind’ but a ‘cultural construct’ and hence its study
requires a discipline that may borrow equally from biology, theology, poetry,
history, philosophy, portraiture, and aesthetics.
Throughout human history, people in general and representatives of various
scholarly and artistic disciplines in particular have made this special part of the
body the centre of their interests and investigation. The face, perceived as the
source of information about its owner, has become central to our understanding
of our own identity.
A discussion of the face as a part of the body, however, has to begin with
the fundamental question — is it exclusively human?
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2.2. Is the face exclusively human?
If we posed the question what the face is, we would find many different
answers. The first thing which comes to our mind is that the face is a part of
the body. This aspect of the face is always mentioned first in definitions. The
Oxford English Dictionary (1989) defines face as “the front part of the head,
from the forehead to the chin”; the visage, countenance: in man and in lower
animals (e.g., lion, eagle, insect).
The human face is an anatomical entity which arose through biological
processes during human evolution (Henneberg et al., 2003). The evolution of
the human face from its apelike ancestral form was gradual. It was regulated by
three main factors: changing diets, the ability to process food extra-orally, and
the development of the ability to produce spoken language (Henneberg et al.,
2003).
There are different anatomic-evolutionary definitions of the face. One says
that the face consists of two eyes, nostrils, and a mouth. Another definition
“requires evolutionary transformation of the skull, in which a face is recognized
in mammals, but not in fish, amphibians, or reptiles. The jaw is suspended from
the braincase in reptiles, but mammals have: (a) three ear ossicles, (b)
a secondary palate separating the airway passage from the mouth, and (c)
vertical positioning of the dentary, with alterations of the jaw muscles” (Cohen,
2006: 3).
The human face, as we know it now, appeared about 200,000—130,000
years ago, with modern Homo sapiens in Africa. It differs significantly from
the face of the Neanderthals, as it has flattened, the forehead has risen to
house the ballooning brain, the nose juts out, the Neanderthals’ bulging
browridges turn into human eyebrows, the skull is no longer moonlike and
more oval, and the chin appears (McNeill, 1998). The face is “the center of
our humanity” (Kuczynski, 2006: 117; Kalaga, 2006). Its mere existence
makes possible our contacts with other human beings. Through the face we
gather information about the world and communicate with others. It is
through the face that we breathe and nourish ourselves. It is indispensable for
our survival.
The view that the face is an exclusively human feature is nothing new. It was
already represented by ancient thinkers. Aristotle (384—322 BC), in his Historia
Animalium, defines the face in the following way:
The part below the skull is named the face, but only in man, and in no other
animal; we do not speak of the face of a fish or of an ox (Aristotle, 1965: I.
vii—ix).
54 The face as a part of the body
Several centuries later, Dante Alighieri (1265—1321) expressed a similar
opinion, that the face identifies us as human beings. Dante, in his Divine
Comedy (1309—1320), writing about Abel being killed by Cain and the marking
of Cain, explains the mark on Cain’s brow:
The sockets of their eyes seemed rings without gems. Whoso in the face of
men reads OMO, would surely there have recognized the M (Dante, 1920:
Purgatory, Canto XXIII, 176).
In Cain’s face, as in the face of any other man, his name is inscribed —
(H)OMO (meaning “man” in Latin or Italian). The Os represent the two eyes,
and the M is made by the lines of the cheeks or eyebrows (Synnott, 1993;
Stimilli, 2005). Thus we have our name inscribed in our face, as an
identification mark. Our face makes us human.
The head, and particularly its front part, the face, were always treated
specially in comparison to the rest of the body. From earliest times, the head
was associated with the essence of life and people treated this part of the body
with great reverence. In many cultures it was believed that the spirit was
located in the head and resided in the breath (Edson, 2005). “The face, as
unique, physical, malleable and public, is the prime symbol of the self”
(Synnott, 1993: 73). It is unique, because there are no two identical faces in
the world. The face provides others with a lot of important information about
the person. Looking at it, we can determine its owner’s age, sex, ethnicity and
race; we can say whether he or she is beautiful or ugly, fat or thin (Zebrowitz,
1997). The appearance of a person is constantly changing over the course of
his life. This includes the face, which gradually changes with age. The facial
changes include the growth of the face, the loss of primary teeth and the
emergence of permanent dentition during childhood, the maturation of the
adult face after puberty, the loss of teeth and the formation of lines and
wrinkles in old age (Henneberg et al., 2003). “Contrary to the popular belief
that faces of members of various human ‘races’ differ predictably, the majority
of the variation of facial metric characters occurs among members of same
populations, while sexual dimorphism and population differences each are
responsible for minor, though significant portions of the total facial variation”
(Henneberg et al., 2003: 41). Thus, the face marks us as individuals. Each of
us is different from the other.
The face is physical as the body is. Understandably, the face as the front part
of the head is the anatomical feature that attracts the greatest attention. Thus
the first impression of a person is, in fact, the impression made by his face. It is
usually by the face that a person is evaluated at first sight. The face is also
accorded primacy in our social relations. Its malleability, resulting from a great
number of mimetic muscles (80), allows for thousands of facial expressions. The
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facial muscles, which “are fundamentally just sphincters that regulate vision,
olfaction, and ingestion,” are used for social displays — “facial expressions of
emotion” and facial paralanguage (Fridlund, 1994: 80; cf. Kryk-Kastovsky,
1997). From the behavioural point of view, communication by facial expression
is the necessary condition defining the face. Fish, amphibians, reptiles and birds
cannot smile or frown. In contrast, mammals can suckle and chew, supported
by a muscular tongue, movable lips and cheeks. Their external ears can change
their positions; their movable nose is used in smelling and touching. Some
mammals have facial hair — the vibrissae — on either side of the muzzle, chin,
cheeks, and above the eyes, serving “as tactile organs, which are associated with
musculature that allows them to move voluntarily. [...] The muscles of facial
expression in primates, including humans, allow direct emotional
communication” (Cohen, 2006: 4).
This special function of the face does not result only from its physical
construction, but also from the fact that the face is public; it is the part of the
body that is most of the time on public display. “Face makes presence”
(McNeill, 1998: 237). In Western cultures it is one of the few parts of the body
that remains naked (along with the hands) (Hennegerg et al. 2003; Schoug,
2001). It is the face, as well as language, that can convey messages:
A language is always embedded in the faces that announce its statements and
ballast them in relation to the signifiers in progress and subjects concerned.
Choices are guided by faces, elements are organized around faces: a common
grammar is never separable from a facial education. The face is a veritable
megaphone (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 179).
The face, however, is not only public, but also private. It stands for the self.
it is “a self-image,” “a reflection of the soul.” It is “a showcase of the self”
(McNeill, 1998: 4). Looking at it we can learn a lot about its owner’s inner life.
The face can “tell” us something about his true self (there is a saying: the face
does not lie), or it can be a mask, put on to hide his true feelings (see also
Section 1.5.). The face, like the body, is an object which can be manipulated by
the self from behind (Giddens, 1991). The face we show to others is not always
our true face. We manipulate our body, and the face in particular, to be
accepted by others. This ability to manipulate the face is said to be exclusive to
humans.
Man is said to be a social creature. The face he constantly displays during
interaction with others also has a social character. The face and facial
expressions, together with other gestures, make up the fundamental content of
the contextuality or indexicality which is the condition of everyday
communication (Giddens, 1991; Gabryś-Barker, 2004). “To learn to become
a competent agent — able to join with others on an equal basis in the
56 The face as a part of the body
production and reproduction of social relations — is to be able, which is also
important, to be seen by others to do so” (Giddens, 1991: 41). Instead of
talking about human communication, i.e. communication between individuals,
we perhaps should talk about communication between faces (the basic form of
communication is face-to-face communication). It is the face that “can send
messages too elusive for science, so far, and it bewitches us with its beauty. The
Trobriand Islanders deemed the face sacred, and well they might, for it is our
social identity, compass, and lure, our social universe” (McNeill, 1998: 4). The
variety of meanings ascribed to the word face over the centuries shows how
many different functions and roles the face has played and how important it has
always been both for an individual person and for social life.
The answer to the question posed in the beginning of the section, is the face
exclusively human, is not simple, as there are many definitions of the face, some
of which make it limited to humans and others not. However, from the
anthropocentric perspective, the face is an exclusively human feature.
2.3. The face as a person
As characterized above, the face is not simply one of the parts of the body. It is
both physical and personal, and as such it is the prime determinant of our
personal and social identities. It symbolizes the self. Its special character consists
in that it can stand for a person. This is reflected in our language. A person
identifies himself with his face, saying it is me. We often speak metaphorically
about meeting new faces (meaning “persons”) (see Section 1.5.).
The proto-concept of the face is the ancient Greek ó, which
originally meant “face, countenance, mask.” In Hellenistic Greek, prosopon also
denoted “dramatic part, character, person, person of the Trinity, outward form,
appearance.” (OED; Berrios, 2003). Thomas Hobbes (1588—1679), in
Leviathan, writes about the identification of the person with the face:
The word Person is Latin: instead whereof the Greeks have ó, which
signifies Face, as Persona in latine signifies the disguise, or outward appearance
of a man, counterfeited on the Stage; and sometimes more particularly that
part of it, which disguiseth the face, as a Mask or Visard: and from the Stage,
hath been translated to any Representer of speech and action, as well in
Tribunalls, as Theaters. So that a Person is the same that an Actor is, both on
the Stage and in common Conversation [...] (Hobbes, 1651/1973: 83).
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In Latin the two concepts, face and person, seem to be equivalent. What is
more, the person stands for the outward appearance, the face and the mask.
Hobbes compares the situation of everyday conversation to performance on the
stage. The person is always an actor, showing to others his face or mask.
The exceptionality of the face and its sole ability to identify the person can
be illustrated by the following example: Person A shows his holiday pictures to
person B. Not all of them are masterpieces of photographic art. One picture
shows only someone’s feet (the camera was pointed too low). Person A,
pointing to it laughingly, says, It’s me. These are my legs. Another picture shows
a group of tourists by the Siklawica falls, and their faces are visible. Pointing to
a man standing on the right, person A says again, It’s me. He can easily identify
himself in all the pictures, because he knows all the situations in which they
were taken. But the situation would be different if someone else (neither the
photographer nor his object) were to confront the persons in the pictures. He
definitely would be unable to identify the owner of the feet. Whereas if he knew
the person he would be able to identify him by his face.
It is true that “the face is an identity card” (Kępiński, 1998: 196;
Orzechowski, 2007). The identification of a person is almost impossible when
his face is hidden or covered. Almost impossible, because there are also other
marks which can help identify him. Kępiński (1998, 1998a; cf. Ciechowicz,
2000) claims that the legs and the hands can also have an identification
function. The hands, like the face, are also almost always naked. In the hands,
as in the face, we may read a person’s life history, the history of his active
attitude to reality in particular. If the face is the reflection of our emotional
attitude to others, the hands are a reflection of our volitional attitude. The
hands of manual workers differ from the hands of white collar workers, and
those of infants differ from those of elderly people (Kępiński, 1998). But it was
the face that was used by Alphonse Bertillon (1853—1914), a French
physiognomic anthropologist and criminologist, who in 1883 developed the
photographic identification system. These were photographs of the head, taken
in profile and in full face, printed on a card providing pertinent information for
the purposes of identification (e.g., date of birth, height, or hair colour) (Kemp,
2004). Known as mug shots, such photographs have been used for many
decades by the police to identify criminals. Later, however, the full-face
identification photograph became the international method for identifying
individuals on passports, driving licences or identity cards (Kemp, 2004). So,
more than any other part of the body, the face functions as an identification
mark for a particular person.
The metaphor THE FACE FOR THE PERSON (see Section 1.5.) has been
used also in the name of the popular social networking website, Facebook, in
which users present their personal profiles with full-face photographs and join
school, workplace or region networks. The website’s name derives from the
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name of books given to freshmen students at the start of the academic year by
university administrations with the intention of helping them get to know each
other better. As in the books, on the website people can find their friends
identifying them by their name and face.
2.4. The face as a mirror of the soul
The face does not serve only as an identification mark, it is also said to function
as a display of the person’s inner life. For centuries philosophers and scholars in
various disciplines were intrigued by the relationship of the body to the soul.
The Greeks adopted as their highest law that impulse of the will which they
called Kalokagathia (´ , meaning “beautiful and good (the perfect
character)”), denoting “nobility and goodness of character” (OED). The
doctrine involved the relationship between the beauty of the body and that of
the soul. According to it, the face is the “effect” of the soul. Sometimes the soul
is visible through the eyes “(animi sedem est in oculos), and generally it is
reflected in the face” (Chojecki, 2000: 201). Plainly speaking, a good character
is reflected in a beautiful face, and a nasty character in an ugly face.
A distinct discipline was even established, physiognomy, which was already
known in Mesopotamian culture. The word physiognomy has many etymologies,
but one of the most credible suggests that it is meant “to spell out the hidden rules
of composition of the human body, those rules that determine the make-up of
each individual” (from physis and gno–me, “the rule of nature”) (Stimilli, 2005:
33). Physiognomy can be defined as “the study of the features of the face, or of
the form of the body generally, as being supposedly indicative of character; the art
of judging character from such study” (OED), or simply as “judging character and
personality traits from facial features” (Cohen, 2006: 221). It has been practised
by representatives of different professions, such as philosophers, doctors and
astrologers, and by average people who wanted to learn more about others with
whom they interacted face to face.
Physiognomy understood in this way has attracted a lot of attention in every
epoch, although the methods and theories used have differed. Physiognomy can
be treated as a special type of somatomancy, divination (the body reveals
knowledge by supernatural means) from the human body (Lessa, 1958). Over
the centuries two main types of somatomancy could be observed, astral
somatomancy — judging a person’s character and temperament from the features
of the body and astrology, and natural somatomancy — divination from the
human body only (Lessa, 1958). Lessa distinguishes four types of the latter:
theriologic physiognomy, the doctrine of the average person, the
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pseudo-inductive type, and the inductive method. Theriologic physiognomy
involves a comparison of human faces and animals. A person’s character is
likened to the behavioural characteristics of the animal which the person’s face
resembles. The ideas of this type of physiognomy are also reflected in modern
language. Every day we use idioms of comparison such as as bold as a lion, as
gentle as a lamb, as greedy as a wolf/pig/dog, as innocent as a dove, as obstinate
as a mule, as silly as a sheep, or as wise as an owl (Seidl and McMordie, 1978).
The doctrine of the average person is based on the assumption that the mental,
moral and physical attributes are most favourable if they approach the average.
“People who departed from the norm were, in proportion to their deviation,
inferior in mentality, morality, and appearance” (Cohen, 2006: 221). This
shaped the way people perceived others; nowadays people often detest those
who are different or stigmatized in some way (see Section 2.10.4.). The
pseudo-inductive type is a single-case method with overgeneralization. If a woman
with dimples in her cheeks has a character that pleases everyone, then all
women with such dimples have such a character. The last is the inductive
method based merely on examining a person’s face on the basis of which the
character and personality traits are determined (Lessa, 1958). All these
methods, which had the common feature that they were based on an intuitive
mode of reasoning, constituted the methodological framework of physiognomy.
This, together with the fact that it could not test any of its theses and did not
formulate any general rules, made physiognomy excluded from academic
disciplines. Nevertheless, judging character and personality traits from the face
has been through the centuries a very popular pseudo-scientific occupation in
many parts of the world.
2.4.1. Reading faces in ancient China
In China, siang mien — the reading of faces — has been practised for more than
2000 years. In ancient China, it was based on the premise that body balance
depends on the two forces, negative (the yin) and positive (the yang).
Equilibrium between them is said to be important for good health. The yin has
feminine and maternal influences on the right side of the face, the yang has
masculine and paternal influences on the left side of the face. If the yin is
dominant, the person is submissive and overemotional. If the yang is dominant,
the person is a high achiever, striving for success (Hu, 1944; Cohen, 2006).
Chinese face-reading consists further in a detailed analysis of facial elements,
such as facial shape, three facial zones, the eyebrows, eyes, nose, mouth, ear,
cheek, cheekbones, chin, and moles. The Chinese believe that the forehead zone
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indicates a person’s mental capacity, the eyebrow-to-nosetip zone indicates
a person’s fortune and ability to overcome obstacles, and the nosetip-to-chin
zone indicates the suitability for old age (Young, 1984; Cohen, 2006; Mong,
1989). The face is also divided into eight regions: life region, pulse points,
career region, wealth region, friendship region, parental region, health and
energy region, and love region, each of which is analysed separately to show
a person’s predispositions in a certain area of his life (Young, 1984; Cohen,
2006; Mong, 1989). The Chinese believe that even the smallest detail of the
human face carries some information about its owner. Therefore they scrutinize
every inch of the face and combine the results with the astrological data. Thus,
“the Five elements, the Yin and the Yang i.e. the negative and the positive
forces of the universe and the human body, the stars including the Heavenly
Stems [...] and Earthly Branches [...], and all the minute details of the eyes,
nose, eyebrows, ears, mouth, hair, hands and feet and a thousand and one other
things of the human body form one complete whole in this study of a person’s
character and destiny” (Mong, 1989: 11). Such a detailed data analysis is
supposed to result in a thorough description of the person’s character and
future life.
2.4.2. Physiognomy in ancient Greece and Rome
China was not the only cradle of physiognomy. It developed also in other regions
of the world. In ancient Greece and Rome, it was used by philosophers and
physicians. In ancient Greece, it was probably Pythagoras (ca 580—500 BC), who
began the study of physiognomy. He is said to have selected his students on the
basis of their facial features. Pythagoras, however, was not the only one who put
the physiognomic knowledge into practice. Hippocrates (460—377 BC) and Galen
(129—199) incorporated it in their medical treatises and used it in medical
diagnoses (Tytler, 1982; Fridlund, 1994; Cohen, 2006) (see also Section 2.10.1.).
The first text devoted entirely to the problem of physiognomy, which
established the conceptual foundation for the discipline, was the treatise
Physignomics (Physiognomica) (1984) once attributed to Aristotle (384—322 BC)
(though it is now thought to have been written by one of his disciples), in which
the author established a new technique or art of dealing with faces. The main
assumptions of this discipline are:
• “Soul and body [...] are affected sympathetically by one another: on the one
hand, an alteration of the state of the soul produces an alteration in the form
of the body, and contrariwise an alteration in bodily form produces an
alteration in the state of soul” (1984: 1243).
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• The face is the part of the body which is most fit to indicate a person’s
character.
The author discusses the role of different parts of the body, the face included,
and their importance as signs of character. He does not talk only about the face
as a whole, but concentrates also on its constituent elements: lips, nose, eyes,
and forehead. Their shapes and colour can tell a lot about their owner’s
character. The author claims that:
The most suitable part of all is the region of the eyes and forehead, head and
face; next to it comes the region of the chest and shoulders, and next again,
that of the legs and feet; whilst the belly and neighbouring parts are of least
service. In a word, the clearest signs are derived from those parts in which
intelligence is most manifest (1984: 1250).
He mentions three methods of analysing the human appearance. The first one
involves relating a specific mental character to different animals:
The face, when fleshly, indicates laziness, as in cattle; if gaunt, assiduity, and if
bony, cowardice, on the analogy of asses and deer. A small face marks a small
soul, as in the cat and the ape; a large face means lethargy, as in asses and
cattle. So the face must be neither large nor little: an intermediate size is
therefore the best (1984: 1246).
The other two methods are based on the inferences drawn from racial
differences and facial expressions, respectively. The latter together with gestures
are “interpreted by their affinity to different emotions” (1984: 1240).
Physiognomy was also among the interests of Aristotle himself. Analysing
human faces he looked for forms and shapes indicating different types of
character. In Historia Animalium (1965), Aristotle writes about the facial signs
of psychological traits:
Persons who have a large forehead are sluggish, those who have a small one
are fickle; those who have a broad one are excitable, those who have a bulging
one, quick-tempered. [...] Straight ones [eyebrows] are a sign of soft
disposition, those which bend out towards the nose, a sign of harshness; those
which bend out towards the temples, of a mocking and dissimulating
disposition (I. vii—ix). [...] eyes may tend to blink, or to remain unblinking, or
exhibit no extreme in either direction: the last-named show the finest
disposition, the first indicates instability, the second impudence (I. ix—x, x—xi).
[...] Large, projecting ears are a sign of senseless talk and chatter (I. xi).
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A specific shape, bend or curve of a part of the face or its certain movement
could be interpreted as a sign of a particular disposition or a feature of character.
The problem of the relation between the body and the soul or the character
traits was a very popular topic in ancient Greece. Aristotle had many followers
who were inspired by his works and tried to interpret human faces. Galen,
mentioned above, a Greek anatomist and physician, claimed that personality
was a reflection of four humours or fluids that make up human body (Cohen,
2006). He used the signs he read in the human face in his medical diagnoses.
Even in ancient times, the conviction of the interdependence between the face
and character traits was not shared by everyone. Some people observed that the
human appearance, especially the face, often does not agree with the character of
the person. The beautiful face does not have to imply a beautiful soul, and the
beautiful soul does not have to dwell in a beautiful body. This could be explained
by the fact that the “‘Signatures’ which the physiognomist observes in the face
indicate disposition, not necessity” (Berland, 2005: 28). Although natural
inclinations are important and play a great role in the formation of a man’s
character, a lot depends on his free will (Berland, 2005). Thus, in some cases the
face can mislead the physiognomist. Cicero (106—46 BC), the Roman orator,
mentions the problem in De Fato, where he writes about Socrates:
Again, do we not read how Socrates was stigmatized by the “physiognomist”
Zophyrus, who professed to discover entire characters and natures from their
body, eyes, face and brow? He said that Socrates was stupid and thick-witted
because he had not got hollows in the neck above the collarbone [...]. He also
added that he was addicted to women [...] (1948: 203—205).
Cicero claims that although the face is the reflection of the soul, natural
inclinations and character are not fixed and can be changed by means of “the
rational control of the passions” (Berland, 2005: 29). In other words, it is
possible for a man to change his character by the mere power of his mind, and
this does not have to involve a change in his physiognomy.
Although the face was investigated and analysed, and treated as the source
of knowledge about the man, its relevance was never directly stated by the
ancients. St Jerome (342—420) was probably one of the first to mention the
importance of the face in human life:
The face is the mirror of the mind, and eyes without speaking confess the
secrets of the heart (Letter 54; 1975: 251; in Synnott, 1993).
Over the centuries this truth served as the starting point for the adepts of
physiognomy and other disciplines investigating the face. The thoughts and
ideas of the first physiognomists remained popular in the years to come and
became reformulated according to the main trends of the subsequent epochs.
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2.4.3. Physiognomy in Europe
The popularity of the study of the face in Europe has its roots especially in
ancient Greece and the texts of the first physiognomists. In addition, the
approach to face-reading in a particular epoch always represented general
trends of that time. During the Middle Ages, Europe turned away from
naturalism toward the occult, and this had its effect on physiognomy. “Facial
morphology now provided clues not to temperament but to fate, and
face-reading joined the astrologer’s armamentatium along with numerology,
soothsaying, and palmistry. This physiognomy was cosmological [...]” (Fridlund,
1994: 3). The interest in the face revived, and many works on physiognomy
were published, mainly by astrologers and physicians. Astrologers described
human bodies and faces according to seven planetary types. In 1272, an
astrologer to Emperor Frederick II, Michael Scott, wrote De Hominis
Physiognomia, in which he provided physiological explanations of the facial
muscles and nerves, and the causes of the appearance of certain features were
said to be astrological (Cohen, 2006). Physicians looked for the illness
symptoms in the face. In the Middle Ages, following the tradition of
Hippocrates and Galen, physiognomy was also related to medicine, which is
evident in the concept of complexio (the totality of the physical make-up). If
the medical treatment was to be effective, the practitioner, in forming his
diagnosis, had to use his knowledge of physiognomy and the four
temperaments (Tytler, 1982). In brief, in the Middle Ages, physiognomy based
on Greek tradition provided the explanation of human fate, understood
cosmologically as well as physically. The face was treated as a source of
information concerning the person’s future life and physical condition.
The revival of physiognomy was based not only on the Greek tradition but
also on the Arab art of fira–sa, which taught a person to infer from the other’s
face and body (and the smallest details, such as the shape of the nose) the truth
of his soul and the secrets of his heart (Courtine and Haroche, 2007). Arab
physiognomy developed independently of Greek physiognomy. It was an art of
second sight which enabled a person to “quickly and correctly evaluate a given
person [...] on the basis of his external features [...] visible only to a trained
eye” (Mourad, 1939: 1; in Courtine and Haroche, 2007: 29). The two
physiognomic traditions, Greek and Arab, had a strong impact on European
physiognomy and the first texts on the role of the face in human life.
The interest in the face as an image of the soul is visible in many medieval
literary works. There were numerous texts “that dealt with the beauty of an
upright soul in an upright body, a Christian ideal of the soul externally revealed”
(Eco, 1986: 10). Gilbert of Hoyt in his Sermones in Canticum Salomonis (XXV,
1; PL, 184, col. 129; in Eco, 1993: 10) writes:
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And have regard also for the bodily countenance whose grace can be seen in
its abundant beauty; for the exterior face can refresh the spirit of those who
look upon it, and nourish us with the grace of the interior to which it
witnesses.
In a similar tone, St Bernard (ca 996—ca 1081) reasons in his Sermones in
Cantica:
The body is an image of the mind, which, like an effulgent light scattering
forth its rays, is diffused through its members and senses, shining through in
action, discourse, appearance, movement — even in laughter, if it is completely
sincere and tinged with gravity (LXXV, 11; PL, col. 1193; in Eco, 1993: 10).
The relationship between the beauty of the face and the beauty of the soul
also fascinated Dante. In Convivio, intended to be a comprehensive summary of
the truths of philosophy, he explains that the soul is expressed through the face
and has an impact on its looks:
And since in the face the soul operates chiefly in two places, because in these
two places all three natures of the soul, as it were, have jurisdiction, I mean in
the eyes and in the mouth, she adorns these most of all, and directs her whole
attention thither to beautify them as far as possible. And in these two places
I affirm that these pleasures appear by saying, ‘In her eyes and in her sweet
smile.’ These two places by a graceful simile may be called balconies of the
lady, namely, the soul, who dwells in the edifice of the body, for she oft-times
shows herself there though as it were under a veil. She reveals herself in the
eyes so manifestly that any one who gazes intently on her may know her
feeling at the moment (1909: 153—154. Tractate III. viii. 38—75).
As can be seen, Dante does not treat the face as a whole, but analyses the role
of its two main parts, the eyes and the mouth. He employs two metaphors, THE
BODY IS AN EDIFICE and THE BODY IS THE HOME OF THE SOUL,
together with the related metaphors, THE FACE IS A FAÇADE and THE
EYES AND THE MOUTH ARE THE BALCONIES (WINDOWS). The soul,
which dwells in the body, hides behind the façade (the face). Only a careful
observer can notice it in the eyes and the mouth. Dante believes that the soul
contributes significantly to the beauty of the body, and to the beauty of the face
in particular.
The beginning of the 16th century was marked by an increase in the interest
in the face and “the science of the face,” which was a natural continuation of
the ancient Greek concept of the body—soul relation. The Latin saying in facie
legitur homo (a man’s character lies in his face) became popular again. This
view is represented by Giambattista della Porta (1538—1615) in his treatise On
Human Physiognomy (1586/1601), where he says that the face is an image of the
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soul, and the eyes are an image of the face, at the same time reaffirming the
eyes’ “traditional preeminence among the facial features as the site of the soul”
(Stimilli, 2005: 67). Della Porta combines the Aristotelian comparative method
with the Hippocratic typology of temperament. He compares human beings to
animals to describe their character. Persons whose faces resemble lions are
courageous, while those who resemble goats are stupid. In sum, man is an
accumulation and extract of different animal species. Della Porta illustrates his
disquisition by an iconography of human faces and the animals that they
resemble. In his work Of Celestial Physiognomy (1603/1627), he rejects the idea
of astrological influence on human facial features and character, which was
earlier (especially in the Middle Ages) widely propagated by astrologers (Cohen,
2006). He argues that human character is not influenced by planets or zodiac
signs. He tries to find specific facial features that could help him diagnose
whether a person is sanguine, phlegmatic, melancholic or choleric. The four
temperaments correspond to the four elements and four animals: the man who
is quick-tempered or choleric has the nature of fire and that of the lion; the
phlegmatic man has the nature of water and that of the lamb; the sanguine man
has the nature of air and that of the monkey; the melancholic man has the
nature of earth and that of the pig (Magli, 1989; Fridlund, 1994). For della
Porta (1601), the main purpose of physiognomy is to decipher the face of the
other. The face is to be understood as a social stigma, telling us whether
a person is moral or evil and spoiled, in which case people should avoid him for
their own good. Physiognomy can be useful also for the analysis of ourselves.
Della Porta claims that by observing our own face we can learn about our own
self.
Not for all physiognomists of that time did the face matter as a social
stigma. Others saw in it the signatures of nature and individuality. Paracelsus
(ca 1493—1541), a Swiss physician and philosopher, treated physiognomy as “a
subdiscipline of signature theory, a science whose aim is to decode the
manifestations of nature as expressions of its own powers” (Bergengruen, 2005:
42). He claims that the external form is shaped according to its inner being, not
the other way around. So the inner being and its corresponding physical
signature are manifestations of individuality and a consequence of man’s fall
from grace (Paracelsus, 1999; in Bergengruen, 2005).
The doubts about the interdependence between the face and the character
traits, already expressed by the ancients, echoed in the works of the prominent
representatives of that time. One of Michel de Montaigne’s (1533—1592) essays,
Of Physiognomy (1603), is devoted to this subject, and in it he writes:
There is nothing more truely-semblable as the comformity or relation betweene
the body and the minde (1603/1906: 357).
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Montaigne was convinced that there exists a relationship between the body and
the mind, but unlike others he was reluctant to concede that a beautiful mind
dwells in a beautiful body:
[...] me thinkes that the same feature and manner of the face, and those
lineaments by which some argue certaine inward complexions and our future
fortunes, is a thing that doth not directly nor simply lodge under the Chapter
of beauty and ill favourdnesse, no more than all good health [...] For ill
favourd and ill composed face may sometimes harbour some aire of probity
and trust. As on the contrary I have sometimes read between two faire eyes
the threats of a maligne and dangerous ill-boding nature [...] A mans looke or
aire of his face is but a weake warrant, notwithstanding it is of some
consideration (de Montaigne’s, 1603/1906: 359).
Such reluctance, however, was not represented by Jerome Cardan (16th—17th
century), an Italian philosopher, mathematician and physician, who developed
a new discipline called metoposcopy, or face-reading, based on the physiognomic
principles formulated by Aristotle; it consisted in reading the lines and marking
of the forehead (the forehead was mapped into zones, each one denoting
a planet). Cardan wrote two works on the subject, Metoposcopia (1658) and
Fisionomia Astrologica (1659). According to his theory, every mark on the face,
even “the moles, warts and wrinkles are ‘divined’ for their cosmic significance”
(Synnott, 1993: 80). The universe, according to Cardan, is organized in
a hierarchy of three orders of decreasing importance, which are mutually
interdependent. The three of them, the intellectual or divine order, the celestial
or astral order and the earthly or elementary order influence the human
microcosm, in particular the face (Magli, 1989). In other words, the way the
human face looks is cosmologically determined, and its features tell us about the
person’s life and individuality.
In spite of the great popularity of physiognomic ideas, enthusiasm for
physiognomy was not shared by all social circles. The Catholic Church
condemned physiognomy and metoposcopy, together with other disciplines
based on divination, such as oneirology, necromancy, pyromancy, oenomancy,
pedomancy, geomancy, chiromancy, fortune-telling, and judicial astrology (“the
constant campaign against astrology by the Holy Inquisition and the
proscriptions against its exponents in the papal bulls of Paul IV in 1559 and of
Sixtus V in 1586”) (Tytler, 1982; 43; Berland, 2005). Divination was treated as
“sacrilegious because it attempts to foresee the future, which is God’s to dispose
of as he sees fit. It also fails to acknowledge the power of grace to effect moral
change” (Berland, 2005: 25). The church condemned physiognomists for trying
to acquire a power which belonged entirely to God. These acts of condemnation
against physiognomists and representatives of other related disciplines did
influence significantly the development and popularity of these disciplines.
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Over the centuries the fashion for physiognomy did not diminish. However,
with the decline of astrology, its character changed. It was no longer predictive
and cosmic, but became more descriptive in the Aristotelian mode (Synnott,
1993). This new, more tentative, approach to physiognomy was represented by
William Hogarth (1697—1764). In 1753, he published Analysis of Beauty, in
which he expressed his ideas about taste and beauty. One chapter, entitled “On
the face,” is devoted to physiognomical issues. In it Hogarth voices a thought
deeply rooted in people’s minds, “the face is the index of the mind,” but he
seems not to be completely convinced by physiognomical theory, reasoning that
human appearance is the result of many other factors (Hogarth, 1753/1810:
125—127).
This more rational approach to physiognomic ideas and to the “power” of
the face was soon overshadowed by a significant new figure in European
physiognomy. Johann Gaspar Lavater (1741—1801), a pastor from Zurich, in
1775 published his classic work Essays on Physiognomy, which made the
discipline even more popular. He defined physiognomy as “the science or
knowledge of the correspondence between the external and internal man [...]”
(1804: 19), or “the knowledge of the signs of the powers and inclinations of
men,” which involves character in rest (1804: 20). He distinguished it from
pathognomy; “the knowledge of the signs of the passions,” which involves
character in motion (1804: 20). Lavater believed that he had a special gift for
recognizing God in people through the divination of traits from the shapes of
their face. What distinguished him from other physiognomists was that he
insisted on the use of artistic representations of the human face, rather than
the living face, as the object of physiognomic analysis. He was fascinated by
the human face, which he treated as the element of the body that most clearly
distinguishes man from other living creatures. He believed that the face and its
parts, when analysed motionless or in motion, provide the observer with
a great variety of information concerning the man’s interior:
The head, especially the face, and the formation of the firm parts, compared
to the firm parts of other animals, convince the accurate observer, who is
capable of investigating truth, of the greatness and superiority of his
intellectual qualities. The eye, the look, the cheeks, the mouth, the forehead,
whether considered in a state of entire rest or during their innumerable
varieties of motion, in fine, whatever is understood by physiognomy, are the
most expressive, the most convincing picture of interior sensation, desires,
passions, will, and of all those properties which so much exalt moral above
animal life (Lavater, 1804: 14).
Lavater maintained that man has three types of life: the lowest — animal life,
which encompasses the area between “the belly” and “the organs of generation”;
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the moral life, which is located in the breast; and the supreme, intellectual life,
which is located in the head. All of them are expressed through the face:
If we take the countenance as the representative and epitome of the three
divisions, then will the forehead, to the eye-brows, be the mirror, or image, of
the understanding; the nose and cheeks the image of the moral and sensitive
life; and the mouth and chin the image of the animal life; while the eye will be
to the whole as its summary or centre (Lavater, 1804: 16).
Thus different parts of the face are related, according to Lavater, to different
powers and skills of the interior. And, in accordance with folk tradition, he
believed that
[...] intellectual life, or the powers of the understanding and the mind, make
themselves most apparent in the circumference and form of the solid parts of
the head; especially the forehead, [...] the power of thinking resides [...] in the
head, and its internal parts (Lavater, 1804: 15).
In the chapter “Of the harmony between moral beauty and physical beauty”
(1804: 175—203), Lavater discusses in greater detail the relationship between
morality and outer appearance. According to him, “The moral life of man,
particularly, reveals itself in the lines, marks, and transitions of countenance”
(Lavater, 1804: 15). Unlike Montaigne, who was reluctant to agree that the
beautiful mind dwells in a beautiful body, or Hogarth, who saw many other
factors as formative of the human appearance, Lavater believed that the man’s
moral stance influences his appearance, especially his face:
Moral degradation changes the body, producing “caricaturas” of the original,
while true goodness confers “lasting charms” on the exterior. [...] the beauty
and deformity of the countenance is in a just, and determinate, proportion to
the moral beauty and deformity of the man. The morally best, the most
beautiful. The morally worst, the most deformed (Lavater, 1804: 182—183).
The role of Lavater’s work and its impact on the “science” of physiognomy
is enormous and undeniable. Lavater turned physiognomy into a respectable
discipline, his work was rapidly translated into the major European languages
and he became a celebrity. But his controversial theories also encountered many
opponents, e.g., Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. First of
all his “eclectic approach was criticized for its methodological weaknesses”
(Percival, 2005: 18). He was accused of forming judgements based on prior
knowledge of the person, and not on direct observation and contemplation of
the subject, which he claimed.
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Hegel (1770—1831) was one of the most ferocious opponents of Lavater. In
his Phenomenology of Mind (1807/1931: 342), he strongly attacks Lavater’s main
ideas, calling physiognomy a “science” which deals with the person’s “presumed
reality and seeks to raise to the level of knowledge uncritical assertions of
everyday physiognomy,” and which is “therefore something with neither
foundation nor finality” (Hegel, 1931: 348). Everyday physiognomy, as
distinguished from Lavater’s “science,” is defined by Hegel as a familiar
procedure of mankind, in divining and supposing what is in a man’s mind from
bodily expressions (e.g., the tone of his voice, the lineaments of his face, the
play of his features, and in general the conformation of his body). For Hegel,
physiognomy, like craniometry and phrenology, which will be discussed below, is
a pseudo-science. He calls physiognomy “guesswork thinking” (1931: 347),
referring to the words in Shakespeare’s Macbeth: “There is no art to find the
mind’s construction in the face” (Act I. iv). As an alternative Hegel presents his
own view on the relation of the inner to the outer:
This outer, in the first place, does not act as an organ making the inner visible,
or, in general terms, a being for another; for the inner, so far as it is in the
organ, is the activity itself. The mouth that speaks, the hand that works, [...],
are the operative organs effecting the actual realization, and they contain the
action qua action, or the inner as such; the externality, however, which the
inner obtains by their means is the deed, the act, in the sense of a reality
separated and cut off from the individual (Hegel, 1931: 340).
He further continues discussing the problem of making the inner visible:
If now the external shape and form were able to express the inner individuality
only in so far as that shape is neither an organ nor action, hence only in so far
as it is an inert passive whole, it would then play the role of a subsistent thing,
which received undisturbed the inner as an alien element into its own passive
being, and thereby became the sign and symbol of it — an external contingent
expression, whose actual concrete aspect has no meaning of its own —
a language whose sounds and tone-combinations are not the real fact itself, but
are capriciously connected with it and a mere accident so far as it is
concerned (Hegel, 1931: 341).
Hegel sees the true self expressed mainly by and through the man’s actions, the
body in general, and the face in particular, being the mere symbols of the self.
“The true being of a man is [...] his act; individuality is real in the deed [...]”
(Hegel, 1931: 349). For him, the spirit is actualized in a man’s demeanour,
which distinguishes him from other living creatures. Although not
a physiognomist himself, agreeing with physiognomists (e.g., Dante and Della
Porta) Hegel believed that a man’s soul can be visible in his eyes. In Aesthetics,
Lectures on Fine Art (1835/1975), Hegel writes:
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[...] the external human form is alone capable of revealing the spiritual in
a sensuous way. The human expression in face, eyes, posture and air is
material and in these is not what spirit is; but within this corporeality itself the
human exterior is not only living and natural, as the animal is, but is the
bodily presence which in itself mirrors the spirit. Through the eye we look into
a man’s soul, just as his spiritual character is expressed by his whole
demeanour in general. If therefore the bodily presence belongs to spirit as its
existence, spirit belongs to the body as the body’s inner being and is not an
inwardness foreign to the external shape, so that the material aspect neither
has in itself, nor hints at, some other meaning. The human form does carry in
itself much of the general animal type, but the whole difference between the
human and the animal body consists solely in this, that the human body in its
whole demeanour evinces itself as the dwelling-place of spirit and indeed as
the sole possible existence of spirit in nature (Hegel, 1975: 433—434).
Discussing the ideal formation of the human head on the basis of the Greek
profile, Hegel also concentrates on the relation between the physical and the
spiritual (1975: 729):
[...] the human face has a second centre in which the soulful and spiritual
relation to things is manifested. This is in the upper part of the face, in the
intellectual brow and, lying under it, the eye, expressive of the soul, and what
surrounds it. [...] with the brow there is connected meditation, reflection, the
spirit’s reversion into itself while its inner life peeps out from the eye and is
clearly concentrated there. Through this emphasis on the forehead, while the
mouth and cheek-bones are secondary, the human face acquires a spiritual
character.
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788—1860) shared Hegel’s idea of the spirituality of
the face. For him, the relation is clear:
That the outer man is a picture of the inner, and the face, an expression and
revelation of the whole character, is a presumption likely enough in itself, and
therefore a safe one to go by; [...] (Schopenhauer, 1910: 61).
But unlike Hegel, Schopenhauer was a physiognomist and believed that the
deciphering of faces is an art which provides us with fuller and more interesting
information about the person than his tongue. “For the face of a man is the
exact impression of what he is; and if he deceives us, that is our fault, not his”
(Schopenhauer, 1910: 66). Schopenhauer stressed the importance of
physiognomy for the cognition of human nature. He claimed that:
The study of physiognomy is one of the chief means of knowledge of mankind,
because the cast of a man’s face is the only sphere in which his arts of
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dissimulation are of no avail, since these arts extended only to that play of
feature which is akin to mimicry (Schopenhauer, 1910: 67).
Schopenhauer believed that by observing a person’s face one can learn about
his intellectual and moral qualities. But “it is only in conversation that the
features and especially the eyes become animated, and the intellectual resources
and capacities set their mark upon the countenance” (Schopenhauer, 1910: 66).
However, he pointed out that
the rule does not apply to moral qualities, which lie deeper […], to get a pure
and fundamental conception of a man’s physiognomy, we must observe him
when he is alone and left to himself [...] [then] he is wholly himself
(Schopenhauer, 1910: 67).
Simply speaking, a man’s intellectual qualities can be noticed when he enters
into interaction with others, while his moral qualities, kept secret, can be
observed only when he takes off the mask in private. Thus it is much easier to
discern a man’s intellectual capacity than his moral character. Such an attitude
to the relationship between morality and outer appearance made
Schopenhauer’s physiognomy significantly different from Lavater’s ideas.
Lavater’s physiognomy, however, had more supporters than opponents. One
of Lavater’s most famous supporters was his great friend, Johann Wolfgang von
Goethe (1749—1832). In the beginning, Goethe was really enthusiastic about
Lavater’s physiognomic analysis. He even mediated between Lavater and the
Weidmann publishing house in Leipzig, which was to print the first volume of
his Physiognomische Fragmente. Goethe’s portrait, with a physiogmomic
interpretation, appeared in the third volume of Lavater’s work (Gray, 2004).
Later, however, Goethe became sceptical about Lavater’s methods and criticized
him for exaggerated “Lavaterianism.” Although he did not lose interest in
physiognomy, Goethe came completely to reject Lavater’s views. He carried out
some osteological studies, concentrating mainly on the intermaxillary bone,
which he also found in animals. But in this, Goethe was interested in
anatomical, not physiognomic or characterological, issues (Gray, 2004). He
“was interested in the typical, understood as the reference to the ‘type,’ to the
common ‘idea’ of species,” the type referring to an idea or an archetype in the
Platonic sense (Gray, 2004: 173). In the 1930s he was hailed as having been the
founding father of modern German physiognomy (see Section 2.12.2.), and his
intellectual authority was exploited to rehabilitate physiognomy during the Nazi
era.
In the 18th and 19th centuries, parallel to Lavaterianism, physiognomic
investigations went beyond discussions of characterological issues and
concentrated on physiognomy as a sign of race and the face as a sign of man’s
fall (see Section 2.12.1.). These started with Petrus Camper (1722—1789),
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a Dutch anatomist, who tried to establish national and racial distinctions
among humans on the basis of measurements of the human skull. In a famous
lecture, first presented to the Amsterdam Drawing Academy in 1770, on the
facial angle, he established a gradation of humans and animal species based on
the angle of facial prognathism. Camper established the “facial line,” or “facial
angle” — linea facialis — formed by the intersection of two lines, one drawn
from the base of the nose to the base of the skull, the other from the nose to
the most prominent part of the forehead. So it was “the line constructed
mathematically out of the geometry of the face. It was to serve as the key to
the anatomical segregation of humans from the higher forms of animals”
(Gray, 2004: 148). Camper treated the facial angle as one of the criteria for
identifying human beings as belonging to a particular race. His system of
human face measurements was soon developed into the formal system of
craniometry (measurement of the skull) established by Johann F. Blumenbach
(1752—1840), a German physiologist and anatomist (Henneberg et al., 2003).
According to the principles of craniometry, the idealized Greek face has a 100
percent angle. The smallest angle, 70 percent, is characteristic of the skull of
the Negro “as the dividing line between humans and apes” (Gray, 2004: 109).
Physiognomy and craniometry were not the only disciplines focusing on the
analysis of the head and the face. A new morphological enterprise became
popular, called phrenology. According to this theory, developed by Franz Joseph
Gall (1758—1828), the mental powers or characteristics of an individual consist
of separate faculties, each of which has its location in an organ found in
a definite region of the surface of the brain, the size or development of which
is commensurate with the development of the particular faculty; this led to the
study of the external conformation of the cranium as an index to the position
and degree of development of the various faculties (OED). Unlike
physiognomy, phrenology was a learnable system and was not based on
divination. It consisted in scrutinizing bumps on the head for memory, reason
and imagination (McNeill, 1998). In spite of Gall’s openly negative attitude to
Lavater’s physiognomy, the two disciplines were often practised together
(Tytler, 1982).
The 19th century can be called the age of physiognomy, as Lavater’s ideas
“permeated many areas of culture,” literature, art, medicine and the newly
established social sciences (Percival, 2005: 20). In 1886, the German physician
Theodor Piderit (1826—1912) published his book Expression and Physiognomy,
the publication of which marked the beginning of neo-physiognomy. Piderit
disclaimed both Lavater’s physiognomy and Gall’s phrenology. He maintained
that muscular movements of the face indicate sentiments, and the exercise of
these muscles causes permanent changes in the face (Fridlund, 1994). Piderit
(1886: 139—140; in Fridlund, 1994: 11) believed that:
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Facial expressions provide not only insight into a person’s momentary psychic
state; his individual peculiarity, up to a certain point, can likewise be guessed
from them. In young faces, in which characteristic physiognomic traits have
not yet been developed, one is solely dependent upon the careful observation
of such signs. When during lively conversation certain mimetic facial
movements are repeated very often, with little provocation, one may be sure
that these mimetic traits will, over time, develop into physiognomic ones, and
in judging such a person one will rarely be wrong to attribute physiognomic
significance to such mimetic indicators [...] Physiognomic traits may be
assumed to be mimetic movements that have become permanent.
Thus, what we can learn about a mature man’s self from his physiognomy, we
can learn about a youth from his facial expression. The neo-physiognomy
propagated by Piderit differed from the physiognomy of the earlier epochs in
that it did not give priority to the analysis of the face in rest over the analysis of
the face in motion, and that it was based on common knowledge employed by
ordinary people during social interaction and deeply rooted in the folk tradition.
Among those who treated the face through the prism of the folk tradition
was Georg Simmel (1858—1918), a German professor of philosophy. For
Simmel, the face can tell a lot about the person. In his essay “The aesthetic
significance of the face,” he writes that “in the features of the face the soul
finds its clearest expression” (1901/1959: 276). But he goes even further,
claiming that “The face strikes us as the symbol, not only of the spirit, but also
of an unmistakable personality” (Simmel, 1959: 278). In other words, the face is
a sign of our humanity and a display of our character. Simmel agrees with many
of his predecessors, maintaining that the eyes are a very important element of
the face. Looking at a person’s eyes, or into them, we can learn what his true
feelings are. We can control facial expressions, but we are unable to control the
expression of our eyes. They tell all the truth about ourselves (see also Sections
1.5. and 2.5.).
Nowadays physiognomy as a “science” is almost completely forgotten.
Nobody treats it seriously any longer. It has the status of nothing more than, as
Hegel called it, “guesswork thinking.” Daniel McNeill, in his monograph The
Face (1998: 168), poses the question of the validity of physiognomy and answers
it in the following way:
It posits genes that link facial surface to mental and emotional traits. In fact,
no a priori fiat excludes such bonds. The genetic code yields many odd
associations. For instance, a diagonal cleft in the earlobe comes with greater
risk of heart attack.
We cannot entirely reject the link between the inner and the outer, between the
self and the face, but there is little evidence for its existence. “Yet a folk
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physiognomy persists. People utterly ignorant of Lavater make judgements from
facial stereotypes, often predictably across cultures” (McNeill, 1998: 168). They
cannot stop doing this and by analysing the face of the other they are
constantly doing the “guesswork.”
2.5. The face and expression of emotions
The face is the body area which is most usually naked and on almost constant
display to others (except for the use of the veil in certain cultures), and as such
it is “a source of social signalling and communication via its multitude of
muscles serving expressions” (Gilbert, 2002: 32). The face involves movement;
it is never stable. It is hard to find a moment when the face does not express
anything. As Denis Diderot maintained: “In the man every moment has its
physiognomy and expression” (Diderot, 1795/1984: 371; in Courtine and
Haroche, 2007: 7—8). Man interacting with others all the time communicates
something to them. This communication involves not only the use of words, but
the whole person. His body, similarly to the word, is an expression, “the natural
language of the soul.” The face as part of the body is part of this natural
language too (Courtine and Haroche, 2007: 21). Facial expressions, like words,
can tell the truth or lie:
The face is an uncanny semaphore. In life and in some fictions like Jane Eyre,
it issues messages of startling depth and infinite hue. We rely on these signals
constantly and willy-nilly, for almost none of us can define them. We are
reading a language we cannot articulate and may not consciously notice. Yet
we regularly feign these cues. Deceit pervades animal communication, and
even chimps can lie with their faces. The face is both ultimate truth and fata
morgana (McNeill, 1998: 8).
Thus the human face is able to lie. In our interactions with other people we are
often insincere, do not want to say everything we know or think, or do not
speak the truth. Concealment or lying can occur not only at the linguistic level,
for we can lie or try to conceal our true feelings or opinions without saying
a word. Facial expressions do not always occur when emotions are experienced,
because people are capable of inhibiting their expressions. On the other hand,
emotions do not always occur when a facial expression is shown, because
people are capable of fabricating an expression (Ekman, 1999). This requires
some mastery in the control of one’s face. Actors, who are professionally
instructed in this art, are often called masters of “the facial nerve” (McNeill,
2.5. The face and expression of emotions 75
1998: 240). Very often, however, these attempts are unsuccessful, because, as
Kępiński claims (1998), the eyes do not lie; they are the part of the face that we
cannot mask. The eyes give away what we really feel. That is why to hide their
inner reactions, secret agents, apart from putting on the poker face (good poker
players show neutral faces), wear reflex sunglasses to make their eyes invisible
(see also Section 1.5.). Lying with one’s face is a hard task. In order to assume
an appearance of objectivity, examiners during exams or interviewers at job
interviews try to conceal their true feelings towards the candidates, putting on
a mask of indifference. In intimate relations many people, especially women, try
to assume an air of mystery to make themselves look more attractive. Some
people, however, seem incapable of hiding a lie, like Pinocchio, whose nose
grew longer whenever he was lying.
The idea that the face is a source of communication had been known before,
but it was in the 17th and especially the 18th centuries that it became a source of
inspiration for many scholars and researchers. Early analyses of facial
expressions, similarly to physiognomy, combined moral philosophy with the
observation of human character (Berland, 2005). The moral element can also
be found in the works of Charles Le Brun (1619—1690), a French painter and
art theorist. He studied facial expressions and was among the practitioners of
the symptomatology of emotion, the study of facial expression in movement (as
distinguished from physiognomy — the study of the shape of the face at rest)
(Duchenne de Boulogne, 1862/1990). Le Brun based his investigations on the
Cartesian ideal of the body and claimed that the pursuit of the good and
aversion to the harmful produces passions in the mind. The brain, which is the
mental site of the passion, is adjacent to the face, which is the locus of
expression. “Moral conduct is initially produced by impulses, which the face
expresses. Thus the study of facial expression has a moral dimension” (Berland,
2005: 27). Facial expressions signal our emotions, both positive and negative,
and our attitudes towards various problems and, most of all, towards others.
Although facial expressions were mainly analysed in humans, some
researchers noted that some animals are also able to express emotions using
their facial muscles. Charles Bell (1774—1842), a Scottish anatomist, surgeon
and artist, in The Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression as Connected with the
Fine Arts (1872), claims that emotions and passions are marked on the faces of
both humans and animals by movements of muscles designed by the divine for
that purpose. He mentions a special apparatus for communicating by a “natural
language” the use of which results in changes in the face. Bell’s views on the
participation of the divine were shared by a famous French physician and
neurologist, Guillaume Benjamin Armand Duchenne de Boulogne (1806—1875).
Duchenne de Boulogne, in his book The Mechanism of Human Facial
Expression, published in 1862, presented a study in which he identifies the
particular muscles producing specific changes in facial appearance. To do so he
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carried out an experiment in which he asked his subjects to make certain facial
expressions. He also electrically stimulated their faces to produce expressions:
Armed with electrodes, one would be able, like nature herself, to paint the
expressive lines of the emotions of the soul on the face of man. What a source
of new observations! (Duchenne de Boulogne, 1862/1990: 9).
In his book, Duchenne claims that facial muscles are dedicated mainly to the
expression of emotion:
The face in repose must undergo some modification by the tonic force of these
muscles, [...]. Facial expression is formed in repose in the individual face,
which must be the image of our habitual sentiments, the facies of our
dominant passions (1990: 31).
He discovered that all the facial muscle actions can occur involuntarily, and
only some can be produced deliberately, which agrees with the results of
modern clinical neurological research (Ekman, 1990). Some of these facial
movements are more difficult to make voluntarily than others:
The muscles that move the eyebrows, of all the expressive muscles, are least
under the control of the will; in general only the emotions of the soul can
move them in an isolated fashion (Duchenne de Boulogne, 1990: 43).
One of the most important findings Duchenne made was that there exist certain
facial patterns which are universal, common to all humanity, and can be easily
identified as evidence of certain emotions, e.g., happiness, merriment, grief, or
terror:
In the face, our Creator was not concerned with mechanical necessity. He was
able in his wisdom, or — please pardon this manner of speaking — in pursuing
a divine fantasy, to put any particular muscle in action, one alone or several
muscles together, when he wished the characteristic signs of the emotions,
even the most fleeting, to be written briefly on man’s face. Once this language
of facial expression was created, it sufficed for him to give all human beings
the instinctive faculty of always expressing their sentiments by contracting the
same muscles. This rendered the language universal and immutable (Duchenne
de Boulogne, 1990: 19).
His claim for the universality of certain facial expressions has been confirmed
by the results of modern research carried out in this field (Ekman, 1989; 1990;
Peck, 1987). Ekman and Oster (1982) found that, although humans have
a language of the face that is limitless, there is a limited number of innate facial
expressions of emotion. They are identified with six basic emotions: happiness,
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anger, disgust, sadness, fear, and surprise, the last two often being combined.
The universal in facial expressions, according to Ekman (1999), is the
connection between particular facial configurations and particular emotions.
Our evidence, and that of others, shows only that when people are
experiencing certain strong emotions, and are not making any attempt to mask
their expressions [...], the expression will be the same regardless of age, race,
culture, sex, or education (Ekman, 1998: 391).
The six basic expressions of emotion are universal, but the contexts in which
they are displayed depend on cultural factors (Ekman and Oster, 1982). In all
cultures, there are special display rules regarding the expected management of
facial appearance and emotional expressions (Ekman, 1999). In the so-called
backstage, using the terminology of the theatrical model of interaction, when
the culture-specific norms of social behaviour do not apply, universal
expressions of emotion can be observed: “In private, when no display rules to
mask expressions were operative, we saw the biologically based, evolved,
universal facial expressions of emotion” (Ekman, 1984: 321). There are
significant differences across cultures as to the extent to which facial expression
of emotions is free or controlled. For example, the Japanese mask negative
emotions with a smile; they smile when they are pleased and when they are
embarrassed (like Westerners), but also when they are depressed and shocked.
For them smiles are commonly false (McNeill, 1998). Americans treat the smile
like a social mask which should be put on whenever the person comes into
contact with others. Poles perceive the “smiling mask” as something extremely
artificial and insincere. Thus, expressing emotions interculturally, like
intercultural communication in general, can cause some problems or even
communication breakdown.
Probably the first attempt to explain why certain facial actions occur was in
the book The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals by the English
naturalist Charles Darwin (1809—1882), published in 1872. Darwin provides
here the first natural-history study of human facial behaviour (Fridlund, 1994).
He is looking for evidence for the continuity of humans with nonhuman
primates and nonprimates. He agrees generally with the main results of
Duchenne’s work. According to Darwin, facial expressions are universal and
innate or inherited, but result from mechanisms that do not have a current
function. He shows that these expressions are either accidents of nervous system
wiring or vestiges of old habits; the vestigial habits being the behavioural
equivalents of the “rudimentary, atrophied, or aborted organs” (Fridlund, 1994:
25). What makes Darwin’s findings different from Duchenne’s is that Darwin
believes that facial expressions do not imply a communicative function, so they
do not express emotions, but only accompany emotion “by force of habit.” He
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restricts the communicative function to those faces which are made wilfully,
including those that intentionally resemble the habitual ones (Fridlund, 1994).
Despite all this, Darwin does not deny the great importance of facial
expressions in our lives, enumerating their various functions (Darwin, 1998:
359):
• They serve as the first means of communication between the mother and her
infant.
• We readily perceive sympathy in others by their expression.
• The movements of expression give vividness and energy to our spoken words.
• They reveal the thoughts and intentions of others more truly than do words,
which may be falsified.
Contemporary research results have proved that Darwin was mostly right in his
studies of facial expressions (Ekman, 1998).
One of the more interesting facial expressions is the smile. It is unique and
differs from other facial expressions in many ways. The smile takes only two
muscles, while others require three to five. It is the easiest facial expression to
recognize. The smile is characteristic exclusively of humans: “A smiling mouth
smiles only in a human face” (583; Wittgenstein, 1947/1968: 153). The
uniqueness of the smile consists in that it cannot be successfully simulated:
[...] it will be simple for me to show that there are some emotions that man
cannot simulate or portray artificially on the face; the attentive observer is
always able to recognize a false smile (Duchenne de Boulogne, 1990: 30).
That is why Duchenne distinguished between the smile of enjoyment and the
social or feigned smile, in creation of which different facial muscles take part.
The smile of enjoyment is the one which is produced when the eyelids are
tightened (easily done by the majority of people), the cheeks are raised and the
skin from around the eyes is drawn inward (only a few people can do this
voluntarily). Describing the mechanism of the smile of enjoyment, Ekman and
Friesen (1982) called it, in his honour, the Duchenne’s smile (called also “felt
smile” or enjoyment smile by Ekman et al. (1990)):
Related to enjoyment — in terms of when it occurs and how it relates both to
subjective experience and distinctive physiological changes — and other smiling
[is] not. [...] The Duchenne smile, in which the orbicularis oculi, pars lateralis
muscle that orbits the eye is contracted in addition to the zygomatic major
muscle’s pull on the lip corners, is a better sign of enjoyment than other kinds
of smiles (Ekman et al., 1990: 350).
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Thus, the true smile employs two muscles, one of them “curves the mouth” and
the other “hoists the cheek, pressing skin toward the eye in a squint of joy.” In
a wider smile, the teeth can flash and the eyes can glisten (McNeill, 1998: 182).
Such a smile cannot be feigned.
There are innumerable smile variations, of which Ekman identifies eighteen.
He distinguishes between genuine, essentially involuntary and biologically based
smiles (enjoyment smile) which can also occur when people are alone (Ekman
et al., 1990), and other smiles which are merely “put on,” and as such are
voluntary and perceived as “false.” Voluntary smiles can appear in different
situations and have many functions: they can cover fear or contempt, keep the
expression of emotion or the emotion itself under control, or indicate
a willingness to bear negative feelings without protest. They can be blends: the
“enjoyable-anger” or sadistic smile, the “enjoyable-sadness” smile, or the
“enjoyable-surprise” smile. Other smiles can signal embarrassment, flirtation, or
a frightening but exhilarating experience (Brener, 2000). A different smile
accompanies criticism, and yet another is used to show agreement or approval.
False smiles are “made deliberately to convince another that enjoyment is
occurring when it is not” (Ekman et al., 1990: 343; Ekman and Fiesen, 1982).
Apart from them, there are also masking smiles, which “are made deliberately to
conceal the experience of negative emotions, and miserable smiles, which
acknowledge a willingness to endure an unpleasant circumstance” (Ekman et al.,
1990: 343). Almost any emotion can be masked by a smile (Ekman, 1992). One
of the most reliable indicators of the false smile is the lack of eyebrow
movement. (Brener, 2000). In the false smile, only the zygomatic major muscle,
which runs from the cheekbone to the corner of the lips, moves (Ekman and
Friesen, 1982).
Fridlund (1997) rejects the distinction between “authentic” and “false”
expressions, smiles included; he claims that all these expressions are social and
voluntary, and all these smiles can be observed during social interaction. He
(1997: 104—127) argues that all facial expressions can be treated as social
signals, they are “messages” rather than “readouts of an ‘emotional state.’” Thus
the face’s chief display role is paralinguistic, i.e. facial expressions accompany
and supplement speech (Fridlund, 1994). We smile in many different situations,
both pleasant and unpleasant. The smile is very important when we are
interacting with others. We smile at introductions, we smile when we greet each
other and when we say goodbye. The absence of a smile in contexts where it is
expected is immediately noticed and is often interpreted as seriousness,
contemplation, or lack of concern for the feelings of the others.
Ekman does not deny the social character of some types of smile. He admits
that the face can express more than just emotions. According to Ekman et al.
(1982), the face can send messages not only about transient and sometimes
fleeting events, such as feelings or emotions, but also about “moment-to-moment
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fluctuations of a conversation.” “[E]ven in highly emotional situations,
emotional facial expressions are outnumbered by facial actions that regulate the
flow of conversation and illustrate speech as it is spoken” (Ekman, 1990: 272).
These facial actions are called conversational signals. Ekman and Friesen (1969)
created a typology of facial paralanguage (how the face can act in conversation
rather than how it does act), based on inductions from informal observations of
natural and contrived conversations. According to them, there are four main
types of paralanguage:
• Emblems are facial gestures that are used to replace words. Facial emblems
are usually part of a larger emblematic display. These are “collusive winks”
(meaning “I’m with you”’ or “You’re in on this with me”) co-occurring with
a yaw of the head pointing the wink to the other (Fridlund, 1994: 297) or the
“facial shrug” (meaning “I don’t know” or “You’ve stumped me”) (Ekman,
1985/1992), which Fridlund (1994: 297) describes as facially marked by
a “downturned, horseshoe-shaped mouth,” often accompanied by
a momentary tilt of the head.
• Adaptors are self-manipulative facial actions, e.g., biting the lips, wiping them,
clamping, running the tongue in the crevices between the teeth and cheeks,
and then widening the eyelids, or working the jaws (Fridlund, 1994).
• Illustrators are illustrative facial movements whose main function is to vivify
speech. They can do so in three different ways. They can place accent on the
uttered words (e.g., raising the eyebrows), they can replace finger-pointing
and function as an indexical (e.g., tilting the head and raising the eyebrows
when saying “that’s my friend over there”) or they can indicate spatial
relationships (e.g., raising and lowering the brows to indicate “above” and
“below”) (Ekman and Friesen, 1969; Fridlund, 1994).
• Regulators are used to regulate access to the floor during conversation (e.g.,
the head nod indicating that we have got the point; the exaggerated mouth
movements preparatory to speech showing that we want to add a word or
two; the raised eyebrows signalling that we like what others are saying and
want them to continue; frowns and head shakes signalling that we do not like
it and want them to stop; yawns signalling that we find it boring; and forward
head jerks signalling that we want them to say it faster) (Ekman and Friesen,
1969; Fridlund, 1994).
This facial paralanguage plays an important role in human communication.
It illustrates or replaces the linguistic production, and as such it is as
meaningful as language is. Anna Wierzbicka (1999; 2000) calls it “the semantics
of facial expression.” For her, facial expressions are analogous to verbal
utterances. Each of them sends a message which has a certain meaning. The
meaning of a facial expression, like the meaning of any verbal utterance, can
rely on the “Natural Semantic Metalanguage,” used in linguistic semantics; in
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6 — Face...
other words, all facial expressions can be expressed verbally. Analysing the
nature of the human smile, Wierzbicka (1999: 177) maintains that:
Whether a particular smile is voluntary, involuntary, or semi-voluntary, or
“false,” sincere, or semi-sincere, is irrelevant from the point of view of this
smile’s social meaning: no matter what a smiling person actually feels, or
thinks, or wants, a smile as such never means “I feel something bad now”; it
always means “I feel something good now.”
A semantic analysis of the human face, according to Wierzbicka (2000),
requires the identification of minimal meaningful units of facial behaviour (e.g.,
brow furrowed, eyebrows raised, eyes wide open, corners of the mouth raised,
corners of the mouth lowered, mouth open, lips pressed together, upper lip and
nose “raised”). The messages expressed “facially” have an inherent first-person,
singular and present-tense orientation, like performatives, because they express
the speaker’s current state of mind (e.g.: “I am smiling because I feel something
good now, not because somebody else feels it or I felt it some time ago”).
Adopting a semantic approach to the analysis of the human face, Wierzbicka
proposes to analyse human faces “from the point of view of human
understanding rather than neural programming” (2000: 176), which, according
to Ekman, “links facial muscles with particular emotions.” However, these two
perspectives, although different, complement each other and present facial
expression in a full light.
Expressions on the face we present to others, no matter what their
mechanism is, whether they are voluntary or involuntary, and whether they are
genuine or pretended, provide some information about us, our feelings and our
intentions. This information is important for us (self-presentation), the others
(communication) and our interaction with them. What they see is our true face,
expressing our true emotions, sending the message we really mean, or a mask,
intended to pretend or to hide something.
2.6. Face and mask
There is an undeniable relation between the concept of face and the concept of
mask. This relationship is both semantically and physically close. First of all,
both the face and the mask are usually on public display. Both play an
important role in social life. We turn the face or the mask to confront the other.
The mask exists only in a dialogue with the other; only then is it meaningful
(Ciesielski, 2006). The mask as well as the face may be used for the expression
of some emotion, and in that for the deception of the other (cf. Bachelard,
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1986). The mask is always used to put on the face, to hide it. Mask is
“a covering for the face” (OED).
The origins of the two concepts can be traced back to ancient Greece. The
ancient Greek word ó meant both “face” and “mask” (see Section
2.1.). Thus, the two concepts were rendered by means of one word. In Greek
and Roman theatre actors and members of the chorus wore comic or tragic
masks (prosopon). The mask signified the role the actor was playing. The
individual hidden behind it was not known to the public, in the usual sense of
knowing someone, i.e. by recognizing his face. He was only known per sonare,
that is, through the voice (Fridlund, 1994). In classical Latin there was the word
persona meaning “mask, character, role.” The English word person, originating
from it, apart from the original meaning (“an assumed character or role”),
means “the aspect of a person’s character that is displayed to or perceived by
others” (OED).
The word mask has more than one meaning. The most common, narrow
meaning of the word is “a false face with which one hides the features in order
to disguise oneself” (Pernet, 1992: 10). The notion of mask is even included in
the figurative meaning of some words equivalent to English face: the two
Japanese terms menboku and taimen include the character for mask (men)
(Haugh, 2005). The mask is a method of hiding the identity of an individual
for purposes of spiritual transformation or supernatural communication. The
word mask refers also to “ornaments that crown the head but do not cover it,
to the elements of costumes worn in front of the face (veils, visors), and to
entire or partial disguises of the body or face”. It can also mean “all
representations of a face, whether or not they are worn on the face or on the
head of a dancer” (Pernet, 1992: 10—11). Some authors extend the definition of
mask to paintings.
Masks are elements of culture which have been used for at least 20,000
years. There are some records in the form of cave paintings depicting figures
with animal masks, and there are early Egyptian images of humans with animal
heads, and Incan burial chambers containing masks of gold to cover the faces of
the dead (Edson, 2005). Masks are said to be universal (Edson, 2005). And so
are the functions they have. They were worn to provoke fear, to symbolize social
status, but also to mock or to amuse. Wearing a mask, a person moved from the
real world to one which was otherwise out of reach (Oettinger and Kenagy,
1988). The first masks might have been used for protection against the
elements, as protection for warriors, as disguises to confuse animals being
hunted, to appease the gods, or to attract a woman (Edson, 2005). Thus, from
the very beginning, masks played an important role in religious, economic, and
social activities. Prototypical masks were removable. The appearance of
a person was also changed by means of other forms of physical masking, such
as tattooing or scarifying (Edson, 2005). In many societies, such body
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modifications, including face lacerations, were indications of rank and status.
The person’s physical appearance altered by means of such mutilation
conformed in this way to customs specific for a particular society (Edson,
2005). Such indelible masking, or marking, was to denote group membership
and to reinforce group identity. The initiates received permanent marks,
e.g., tattoos (Maori women usually inked the chin and the upper lip; in India
Kumbi and Warli women tattooed dots and lotus symbols on their faces; in the
1980s punks tattooed their heads and other parts of the body, arms and legs,
with skulls and swastikas; permanent make-up), scars (made by cutting or
scratching the skin with shells, knives, or stones and rubbing clay or ash into
the wound), brands (shaped scarification applied with hot needles or tools), or
some form of anatomical modification such as teeth extraction or shaping; lip,
nose, ear, or tongue perforation; and head, neck, arm, or foot deformation
(Edson, 2005; McNeill, 1998). The lips and earlobes were distended to
accommodate lip or ear plugs. Some people, women in particular, adorned their
faces by painting them with the juices of wild fruit and leaves. According to
Claude Lévi-Strauss (1979), such cosmetic facial paintings, representing
different arrangements of fundamental elements, e.g., spirals, hatching, volutes,
frets, tendrils, or crosses and whorls, were popular among the Siberian
primitives, in New Zealand and among the Caduveo Indians in southern Brazil.
According to the anthropological evidence:
[...] the true home of masks is in ritual. [...] Impersonation — “acting” is most
easily effected if the ritualist’s or actor’s face is covered by another face, one
whose symbolic value is encoded and recognizable, thus integral to its
appearance (Patton, 2007: 361).
In many cultures masks were, and sometimes are, used as “ancillary
paraphernalia of ritual events” (Edson, 2005: 6). They were used in rituals as
early as in the Neolithic Age, ca 6500 BC. Shamanic practices and ritual dances
the world over deployed masks (Patton, 2007). Elaborate theriomorphic masks
were used in healing ceremonies by Inuits (Patton, 2007). A shaman, priest or
tribe chieftain performed a ritual dance wearing a mask (Edson, 2005). The use
of masks was intended to change the identities of individuals in a “magical” way
for purposes of spiritual transformation or supernatural communication (Patton,
2007). Mircea Eliade, in Symbolism, the Sacred, and the Arts (1992: 64) stresses
the mystic function of masks:
Ceremonial nakedness greatly increases the magico-religious power of woman
[...] Man, on the contrary, increases his magico-religious possibilities by hiding
his face and concealing his body.
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Some people put on masks or painted their faces before approaching the dead
(e.g., indigenous peoples in South America) or before starting a journey
(e.g., the peoples of the North West Coastal region of North America) (Edson,
2005). The mask was a primary element of dramatic activities in which
imitative movements and dances were used to placate supernatural powers or
appease them to fulfil the people’s wishes or grant them success. It was “revered
as an apparition of the mythical being” that it represented, even though
everyone knew that it was made by man and that a man was wearing it (Edson,
2005: 9). Masks (prosopa) were significant elements of the worship of the god
Dionysus at Athens, and it is likely that “their use in rites and celebration
predates the emergence of drama” (Ley, 2006: 25).
The theatre (dramatization) is said to have begun as a masked ritual (Smith,
1984). Masks in Greek theatre were used to enhance the individual qualities of
the characters played by the actors. In Greek and Roman theatre, by changing
masks the actor appeared and reappeared as different characters, or he altered
the masks for the same character within a play to achieve a dramatic effect
(e.g., in Euripides’ Helen, the main protagonist appears in two different masks,
expressing different emotions) (Ley, 2006). These were full head masks with an
exaggerated jaw, usually made of fragile materials, linen and wood. Comic
masks were distortions, some of them were modelled directly on life,
caricaturing a well known individual, e.g., a politician, playwright, or
philosopher (Socrates was portrayed in this way) (Ley, 2006). The use of masks
in ancient Greek theatre is known to have become a universal Western symbol
for dramatic acts.
Masks were, and sometimes still are, used in Chinese and Japanese theatre.
The Chinese theatrical tradition has always involved intricate costumes and
refined and elaborated styles of “painted face” make-up (Dolby, 1983). Masks
were mainly connected with exorcism or merrymaking diversions, and were
restricted to supernatural roles. They also symbolized spirits or animals, such as
fish, lions, bears, leopards, or tigers (Dolby, 1983). Generally, make-up was
preferred. It had two prime uses, “to render the player more comic or to render
him more awe-inspiring” (Dolby, 1983: 29). Looking at the painted faces of the
actors, the audience could also tell the characters’ age, social position and
moral character. The painted face defined the character’s identity on stage, just
as the face is related to the social position a person occupies and the role he
plays in real life (Ho et al., 2004).
Much Japanese theatre is played with a “stone face”; the facial expressions
of the actors or their masks are predominantly serious and tragic. In Kabuki
theatre, which has been a major form of artistic expression in Japanese society
for over four hundred years, actors do not wear movable masks, but put on
make-up (Cavaye et al., 2004). Make-up styles range from the realistic to the
exaggerated, but they are always white, as white skin is traditionally a sign of
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refinement and high social status, and white is associated with purity. In No–
theatre, actors wear masks (about sixty different types). “[W]ith the exception
of some clearly ferocious or very happy masks, their most important
characteristic is the ambiguity of their expressions” (Cavaye et al., 2004: 177).
Actors have to communicate different emotions through the unchanging
expression of the mask’s face. In Kyo–gen theatre, unlike in the other two kinds
of Japanese theatre, there is a lot of laughter, and masks are employed only for
supernatural characters, e.g., gods and devils, and for animals (Cavaye et al.,
2004).
In Europe masks were especially popular in the 17th century, when people
(e.g., lovers and prostitutes) wore them to disguise their identity when pursuing
clandestine activities or those which were socially disapproved of (Edson,
2005). Over the centuries, masks came to be used for playful reasons; those
made of velvet or silk and concealing the whole face or the upper part of it
(except the eyes) were worn on or held in front of the face for disguise at balls
and masques; others, made of pasteboard or plastic, were grotesque or comical
representations of faces and were worn at carnivals (the carnival in Venice still
cultivates this tradition). Masks also had a commemorative function. At the
death of some prominent person (e.g., the king, the emperor, a writer or
a composer), the likeness of his face was made in clay or wax by taking a mould
from the face itself (death-mask).
In modern times, masks differ from what they were originally. They are
either utilitarian or metaphorical. Masks are used for practical purposes; they
are usually protective coverings for the face, worn to protect it from physical
injury in certain sports and other activities (e.g., fencing mask). Some, made of
fibre or gauze, are designed to protect the mouth and nose by filtering dust or
microorganisms from air inhaled or exhaled. Other masks are to protect the
person from inhaling a potentially poisonous gas (gas-mask), or to enable to
breathe while underwater swimming or diving (diving mask). Through the
oxygen mask, placed over the patient’s nose and mouth, oxygen or anaesthetic is
supplied. To appear young and become more attractive, women spread various
cosmetic preparations (beauty mask or face mask) on their faces. Masks have
always been used by bandits, robbers and terrorists (robber’s mask) to hide their
identities. None of these masks can be compared to the ritual or theatrical ones
either in their form or function. But all of them have one thing in common —
they are close to the face.
Mask is a metaphor (see also Section 1.5.). In lyric poetry authors often
hide behind a mask. Their opinions and emotions are expressed by a fictional
character, a persona, acting as their mask or alter ego. This practice was quite
common among romantic poets, e.g., George Gordon Byron (1788—1824) and
Juliusz Słowacki (1809—1849) used Oriental heroes to distinguish the writer
from the character in the work (Głowiński et al., 1991). Writing lyrics of the
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mask is also popular among modern poets; it consists in anthropomorphization
of objects, animals, and plants. In one of the poems by Bolesław Leśmian
(1877—1937), for example, the shield is talking to the knight, and its words
express the knight’s dream; the shield is a mask of the poet (Kulawik, 1994).
Hiding behind the mask allows the poet to freely express his ideas and at the
same time avoid the risk of taking responsibility for his own words.
We talk about “‘tearing the mask from someone’s face’ or ‘unmasking’ him,
meaning that we have removed his disguise as an honest man and exposed him
for what he really is” (Lommel, 1972: 7). Such a mask is a pretence, a front, an
outward show intended to deceive the other. It is a relational category. The
mask becomes a mask only in the presence of the other, who tries to interpret
it; otherwise it is a meaningless façade (Ciesielski, 2006). It is also a facial
expression assumed deliberately to conceal an emotion or give a false
impression, or an outward appearance which belies a person’s true nature (see
also Section 2.5.). A person can be said to put on, throw off or drop the mask
(OED). We are all “personas who speak from behind a mask, even off-stage [...].
This ‘mask’ is the musculature of our face, which regulates our social roles just
as the Greco-Roman mask did for the actor who wore it” (Fridlund, 1994: 80).
We choose our masks with respect to the roles we perform and the expectations
of others:
We model ourselves so much on the expectation of others that we assume the
mask or, as the Jungians say, the persona which life assigns to us, and we grow
into our type till it moulds all our behaviour, down to our gait and our facial
expression (Gombrich, 1986: 111).
The mask is a sociocultural construct. And like culture itself, it is employed
to change the natural reality. People use it to hide their nature. During social
interaction with others, as Hobbes claims in Leviathan (1651/1973), the mask
becomes more important than the face. Our natural face reveals our desires and
emotions. Authenticity, unrestrained expression and spontaneity do not agree
with the social order. That is why every rationally thinking individual has to
hide his face behind various forms of convention. Showing a “naked face” is
often not accepted even in private interactions.
The 18th century physiognomic texts acknowledge the great impact
civilization has on the body. The body in general, and the face in particular, are
stigmatized by civilization. Good manners, courtesy, and the requirements of
civilized dressing inhibit the physiological forces of the natural body. For Jean
Jacques Rousseau (1712—1778), civilization causes nature to degenerate and
weaken; it is “a prison for the body” and a mask for the face (Courtine and
Haroche, 2007: 95). Rousseau (1956) claims that the evil is in the look.
Everyone wants to be looked at and respected. The one that can best respond to
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others’ looks is the most respected. This is how refinement became important,
and how the first principles of politeness (civilité) were created. For Rousseau
civilization as well as politeness and refinement appear in a definitely
disfavourable light. In a similar way, Watts (2005: 44) describes polite
behaviour in eighteenth-century England, writing:
If we scratch the surface of polite behaviour in the eighteenth century, we
frequently encounter not only “inconsideration and irreligion” but also
“positive selfishness, malevolence, evil” (Sell, 1991: 210).
At that time, politeness was linked to social class and was treated “as a sign of
good breeding and high social status, but it did not necessarily correlate with
consideration for, and deference towards, other individuals” (Watts, 2005: 44).
As a consequence, “[...] polite manners would connote, not a refinement in
feeling, but only the most sinister refinement in lying [...]” (Sell, 1991: 210).
Politeness, understood in this way, was used as “a mask to conceal ego’s true
frame of mind” (Watts, 2005: 47). In eighteenth-century England, the mask of
politeness served many important functions (Watts, 2005):
• to enhance individuals’ social standing,
• to signal their membership in a social elite,
• to exclude would-be members of the elite,
• to stigmatize and/or persecute out-groupers who oppose the elite’s claims to
socio-political hegemony.
None of these functions involved the well-being of others or the fulfilment of
altruistic goals.
In a similar vein, Honoré Gabriel Riqueti de Mirabeau (1749—1791), the
French writer and statesman who introduced to the French language the word
civilisation, describes it as a mask which does not mean anything (1756—1760; in
Courtine and Haroche, 2007: 149):
If I asked most of you what civilisation means to you, I would hear that it is
good manners, civility, politeness and refinement so common that
appropriateness rules everywhere and replaces particular laws. [...] Everything
seems to me only a mask of virtue, and not its face, and civilization means
nothing for the society if it does not endow it with some form and content the
virtue should assume.
The society that was so criticized by Rousseau and Mirabeau is called by
Courtine and Haroche (2007) the society of the mask. They claim that
18th-century social relations could be characterized by (2007: 151):
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• the duality of the man — he is both the being and appearance, être and
paraître;
• the praise of appearance on account of its accessibility;
• poise and refraining from the expression of emotions;
• calculation in the relations with others.
The best example of such a society is the royal court, “a theatre of intrigues,” in
which courtiers were symbols of duality and servility. The prevailing regime of
public activity was the regime of the mask, in which the individual identity was
encoded in forms that imposed a mask on the individual (Filipowicz, 1998).
The performance of a certain social role required from the individual to
enhance his social standing and to signal his membership in a social elite — this
always involved the use of an appropriate mask.
François de La Rochefoucauld (1613—1680) (1939) contrasts the mask of
civility with the “natural” mask. For him, the mask does not have to be a sign of
artificiality, calculation or servility. It does not have to prevent the manifestation
of authenticity. The mask, in this sense, has to be suitable for the person.
Everyone has to find the mask which would suit his face best and be in
harmony with his inner self. Rochefoucauld propagates naturalness, authenticity
and sincerity, which better than pretence can help us gain the approval of
others.
The depiction of the society of the mask, however exaggerated it may seem
nowadays, resembles a picture of the present society we are part of. What we
usually put on public display differs a lot from what we really are. What really
matters in our relations with others is how they perceive us and how we
perceive them. Any uncontrolled expression of emotion can spoil our image and
as such should be avoided. As a consequence, our relations with others cannot
be based on mutual sincerity but have to be maintained in a coldly calculated
manner. Thus our society, too, is mask-dominated. But what Mirabeau called
civilisation has matured and our general attitude to it has changed. More than
two centuries after Rousseau and Mirabeau critically wrote about the role of
civilization and politeness, Leszek Kołakowski agreed with them in claiming that
during the civilizing process the human face acquires a mask which
distinguishes it from the face of other living creatures. However, he does have
a different opinion on the character of civilization’s impact on the face. He
claims that “there is no reason for maintaining that our animal nature is ‘true,’
and our humanity is deviation and voluntary self-deception” (2004: 280). In his
view, by becoming civilized human beings we put on masks (these thin layers of
culture and civilization) which are not aimed at deceiving anybody. The mask
becomes our “second nature.” There is no longer any difference between the
face and the mask. “The mask has clung to the face” (Kołakowski, 2004: 281).
Kołakowski thinks that if we expressed everything we felt we would live
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a barbaric life, beyond culture. Referring to the Greek etymology of the word
truth, meaning “noncovering,” as Heidegger proposed, he reasons that even if
truth means “noncovering,” this does not imply that we should live noncovered,
naked.
Since the beginning of the 21st century, one of the characteristic aspects of
public behaviour has been, as Filipowicz (1998; Kalaga, 2006) claims, the
glorification of sincerity and authenticity. The prevailing regime of public activity
has become the regime of the face, in which the individual creates his self-image
(face) and demonstrates his identity (Filipowicz, 1998). Nowadays, as Józef
Tischner (2004: 165) maintains, “if a man is a person, it means that he is an
expression of something which is hidden in him — he is an expression of some
truth.” The concept of person implies an identity to the man. The participation
in social interaction does not only involve the performance of a social role, but
also the process of self-creation. Individuals actively participate in what we call
today civil society, “a community of people accepting the imperative of friendly
co-participation, encoded in the concept of civility” (Filipowicz, 1998: 10). As the
regime of the mask evolved into the regime of the face, together with the
dominating patterns of public activity the understanding of the concept of civility
and politeness has likewise changed. Even if, as in the 17th or 18th centuries,
politeness nowadays does not fulfil altruistic goals but is a mask to hide the
individual’s true frame of mind, it appears in a much more favourable light. We
put on the modern mask of politeness for other reasons than the cultivators of
polite manners in 17th- or 18th-century France or England. Nowadays, politeness
functions (Watts, 2005: 47):
• to avoid conflict (Fraser and Nolen, 1981),
• to tone down potential aggression (Brown and Levinson, 1987),
• to ensure that interactions will be accomplished smoothly, in an atmosphere
of relative harmony (Lakoff, 1975; Leech, 1983).
Both politeness and the mask have acquired a new positive meaning. We put on
the mask of politeness to make others feel good, or we do so for the common
good. This is what Kołakowski is talking about — the mask which turns us into
civilized persons.
The regime of the face, which prevails in our public life, does not imply
getting rid of all masks. Apart from masks that are the thin layers of culture and
civilization, there are masks which, as Zygmunt Bauman (1996: 153) claims, are
“uniforms [which] classify, referring to symbols, categories and categories of
symbols.” Masks are omnipresent; we have to get used to them, but at the same
time we should be aware of the danger they can carry:
the mask one puts on depends on whom one has to deal with and what one
needs to do. To know how to behave I have to learn the meanings ascribed to
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different types of masks and remember reactions associated with them. But
even then I cannot feel completely safe. One cannot count on the mask like
on the face: the mask may be put on and taken off; the mask hides more than
it reveals (Bauman, 1996: 154).
We may say that persons are the masks they put on. “The man-person is a being
that in the drama and through the drama reveals his ‘face’” (Tischner, 2004:
167). Thus, the mask takes over the role of the face. We present ourselves to
others and to ourselves, and see ourselves in their eyes. The masks we then
present to the world are fashioned upon our anticipations of their judgements
(Strauss, 1959). The face no longer reflects their judgements. It is the mask that
“takes on the role of the social mirror” (Kępiński, 1998: 106; cf. Ciechowicz,
2000; see also Sections 1.5., 2.4. and 2.5.). Witold Gombrowicz calls the mask
gęba (mug). The main protagonist of his metaphorical novel Ferdydurke
(1937/1989), Józio, looks for his own true face, the source of his identity and
freedom, and wants to get rid of the mask, which shows a deformed picture of
him. Every contact with other people involves, using Gombrowicz’s terminology,
przyprawianie gęby (putting on a mug (a deformed mask)). This constitutes part
of the process of socialization. The individual becomes a prisoner of convention
and fossilized patterns of behaviour. His image depends on others:
[...] człowiek jest uzależniony od swego odbicia w duszy drugiego człowieka,
chociażby ta dusza była kretyniczna (Gombrowicz, 1989: 9).
(The man depends on his own reflection in the other’s soul, even if this soul is
idiotic.)
In Gombrowicz’s model of the world, the individual will stay forever in “the
magic of mugs-masks” (Kietlińska, 1995: 16),
gdyż nie ma ucieczki przed gębą, jak tylko w inną gębę, a przed człowiekiem
schronić się można jedynie w objęcia innego człowieka (Gombrowicz, 1989:
254).
(because there is no escape from the mug, except only to another mug, and
one can take refuge from a man only in the arms of another one.)
Social life is crowded with masks, deformed substitutes of our faces, imposed on
us and on our identities as a kind of superordinate form. The mask, or gęba, is
a self-image forced on us by others (cf. Kietlińska, 1995). Prisoners of culture,
wanting to get the acceptance of others, we hide our true self behind it. The
mask and the face become one.
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2.7. The face of the other
Emanuel Levinas has been called “an increasingly central presence in
contemporary debates about identity and responsibility” (Hand, 1996: 1). His
work encompasses the major philosophical and ethical problems of the 20th
century. Almost everything Levinas wrote refers to the face-to-face relation, or
the encounter with the Other (human being) (Bernasconi, 2000). One of the
most outstanding features of his philosophical ethics is his consideration of the
face. He himself writes that it was the Bible that was one of his main
inspirations for treating the concept of face (Levinas, 1990a: 140):
For us, the world of the Bible is a world not of figures, but of faces.
Discussing this source of Levinas’ inspiration, Astell (2004: 32) states that:
He associates the Glory of God’s face-to-face encounter with Moses in Exodus
33: 20 — “My face you cannot see, for no one sees me and still lives” — with
the glory of the divine commandments, vulnerable to disobedience, that were
given to Moses on the holy mountain: “The Torah is given in the Light of
a face” (Levinas, 1990b: 39, 47).
In Levinas’ description of the face of the Other, it is possible to see
a reminiscence of the Holy Face (Levinas, 1981: 49):
The one is exposed to the other as a skin is exposed to what wounds it, as
a cheek is offered to the smiter.
How are we to define Levinas’ concept of face? For Tischner (2002: 174),
“the face goes beyond every ‘what.’ The face is the face.” In Totality and Infinity
(1969), Levinas discusses the face at great length. For him, when we come into
social interaction with the Other, we have to forget about his corporeality. His
face as a part of his body no longer matters. What we have to take into account
is human well-being, as
access to the face is straightaway ethical. You turn yourself toward the Other
as toward an object when you see a nose, eyes, a forehead, a chin, and you can
describe them. The best way of encountering the Other is not even to notice
the color of his eyes! When one observes the color of the eyes one is not in
social relationship with the Other (Levinas, 1985: 85).
Thus the face cannot be reduced to an object of perception. It is a “disincarnate
presence of the Other. [...] It is the source of revelation of the other who cannot
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be encompassed in cognition” (Wyschogrod, 2000: 245). We can get to know
him by looking into our own self. The face of the Other is accessible only
“starting from an I” (Levinas, 1969: 220). Discussing the character of the face
of the Other Levinas (1969: 194) writes: “His face in which his epiphany is
produced and which appeals to me breaks with the world that can be common
to us.”
The Other’s face is the bearer of values and human personality (Wyschogrod,
2000). Levinas writes about its upright exposure, its lack of defence. It is naked
and destitute. “[...] there is an essential poverty in the face; the proof of this is
that one tries to mask this poverty by putting on poses, by taking on
a countenance. The face is exposed, menaced, as if inviting us to an act of
violence” (Levinas, 1985: 86). But at the same time it says: “you shall not
commit murder.” This is its meaning. For Levinas, the face is meaning without
context. When we talk about people, we usually refer to them by the roles they
perform or by special attributes they have. So they are characterized in relation
to others. Here, the face is meaning by itself. You are you (1985: 86).
For Levinas, there are two dimensions of face, the physical face, belonging
to a particular person, and face as the relation with the Other. In Time and the
Other, he describes this relation in the following way (1987: 78—79):
The relationship with the Other, the face-to-face with the Other, the encounter
with the face that at once gives and conceals the Other, is a situation in which
an event happens to a subject who does not assume it, who is utterly unable in
this regard, but where nonetheless in a certain way it is in front of the subject.
During the encounter with the Other the face simultaneously gives away the
information about the Other and acts as a façade, behind which he can hide.
The face is like a façade. “By the façade the thing which keeps its secret is
exposed, enclosed in its monumental essence and its myth, in which it gleams
like a splendour but does not deliver itself” (Levinas, 1969: 193). However, the
face is not given to us in the mode of sense experience; we do not see it. It is
given to us as language. There is a strong connection between the face and
discourse. Levinas says that “The face speaks” (1985: 87; see also Sections 1.5.
and 2.5.). It invites us to a relation and by discourse maintains the relation with
us (Levinas, 1969). It is “only in cooperation with the Other that any cognition
is possible” (Bogdanowska, 2001: 139). Through discourse the Other tells us
something about himself, The face cannot be contemplated; it must be
responded to. The Other is greeted, answered for. “Speaking, rather than “letting
be,” solicits the Other” (1969: 195). Finally we can see his disincarnate face.
“The epiphany of the face is ethical” (1969: 199). The relationship with the
Other can result in conflict, but such conflict can arise after the epiphany of the
face. Levinas claims that entering into a social relationship with the Other, we
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present and expose ourselves at the same time. Such a presentation in
face-to-face interaction always involves imposition. Any imposition can
potentially lead to conflict:
To manifest oneself as a face is to impose oneself above and beyond the
manifested and purely phenomenal form, to present oneself in a mode
irreducible to manifestation, the very straightforwardness of the face to face,
without the intermediary of any image, in one’s nudity [...] (Levinas, 1969:
200).
Certainly, the expression of the face does not provide us with information
concerning the Other’s inner state, but is rather a presentation of the self, which
does not have to be true. And as such it should always arouse our suspicion:
The Other who expresses himself precisely does not give himself, and
accordingly retains the freedom to lie. But deceit and veracity already
presuppose the absolute authenticity of the face [...]. What we call the face is
precisely this exceptional presentation of self by self, incommensurable with
the presentation of realities given, always suspect of some swindle, always
possibly dreamt up (Levinas, 1969: 202).
The truth of the face is its own truth. The Other guarantees what he says no
matter whether he is lying or is telling the truth. Social interaction is
a revelation of the inequality between self and others.
The Other is always superior (Wyschogrod, 2000). He stands in an
asymmetrical relation with the self. The Other always commands and is the
teacher of the self. The face of the Other bears the trace of God. Our
relationship can never be one of equality:
The relationship between us and the Other is asymmetrical. The Other is
higher, he gives us an order, ‘you shall not commit murder.’ It is
a commandment in the appearance of the face, as if a master spoke to me
(Levinas, 1985: 89).
But on the other hand, the face of the Other is destitute, and to it we owe all. In
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (1981), Levinas writes about the
responsibility for the Other and for his face. Entering into the relationship with
him, we create the image of his body (face), which makes us serve him. This is
a moral relationship, which Zygmunt Bauman (1990: 17) characterizes as
“I being for the Other, I bearing responsibility for the Other.” This is
a non-reciprocal relationship; we are responsible for the Other, but cannot
expect reciprocity from him. Bauman (1990: 20) interprets Levinas’ concept of
responsibility in the following way:
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Responsibility is my affair, reciprocity is his. My responsibility is unexceptional
and unconditional. The Other need not “prove” anything to “deserve” it.
All human relationships can be characterized by the “mastery” and poverty of
the Other at the same time. This is a distinctive feature of all social relations.
Levinas illustrates this with an example: before an open door we say to the
Other, “After you, sir!”.
2.8. Face-blindness
Prosopagnosia can be defined as “an inability to recognize a face as that of any
particular person” (OED), or face-blindness (Stimilli, 2005) (from the Greek
prosopon — “face” and agnosia — “lack of knowledge”). It presupposes
“a pre-eminence of the figure over the face,” which “is undoubtedly the legacy
of Greek humanism” (Stimilli, 2005: 1).
Medically speaking, prosopagnosia stems from brain damage, due to which
people suffering from it often do not recognize friends, family members, or even
themselves (The human brain has special areas devoted to face recognition —
face cortex) (McNeill, 1998). This kind of brain damage has a serious impact
on the social life of the person suffering from it, as it often leads to isolation
from the relatives and friends. Face-recognition is indispensable for normal
functioning among people. The inability to associate a person’s face with his
name, social role or any aspect of social context may lead to serious social
disfunction. Unawareness of the “problem” on the part of the others often
makes them perceive the sufferer as ill-mannered and impolite, and as
a consequence it can lead to social ostracism.
The problem of prosopagnosia is not new. It was already recognized by the
ancients, for whom the figure often meant more than the face. This is signalled
in one of early Plato’s dialogues, “Charmides.” This is a dialogue in which
Socrates converses with Critias and a beautiful youth, Charmides (both
members of Plato’s own family). At the beginning Socrates, talking with Critias
about Charmides, agrees that he is extraordinarily good looking (literally,
well-faced: eyproso–pos (Stimilli, 2005: 1)). All the people around are “gazing at
him as if he were a statue” (Plato, 2005: 4). His body is much more attractive
to them than his face: “if he can be induced to strip,” someone says, “he has
such a fantastic body that you won’t even notice his features” (literally, he was
faceless: aproso–pos (Stimilli, 2005: 1)) (Plato, 2005: 4). So, if naked,
Charmides’s body would “efface his face in the eyes of the viewers” (Plato,
2005: 4) (a similar effect of effacing the face is achieved by Rembrant van Rijn
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in his first self-portrait; but his motivation was different: the artist used the
technique of chiaroscuro in order not to expose his self and face to view (Drong,
2001)). The adjective aproso–pos, used by Plato to describe Charmides, was later
used in Greek law in reference to slaves, those who have no face, those who are
no legal person. “A face is no body, personne” (Stimilli, 2005: 2). In the modern
world, some people are dismissed as a nobody, meaning “a person of no
importance or influence” (LDCE). Nobody is a person who counts only as
a mere presence, but we do not want or do not need to identify him. We seem
not to notice his face.
Subsequently Socrates tries to test Charmides in order to see whether his
physical beauty corresponds to inner beauty, which to Socrates is much more
important. Charmides is then invited to speak. In Socrates view, it is not
through the face that man truly reveals himself but through language. “Language
is the true face of man, for language is the face of the soul, and not just of the
body” (Stimilli, 2005: 3). So does the face tell us anything about its owner or is
it only a sign of identity? Stimilli argues that “physiognomy is indeed bound to
remain a prosopolepsia, an acceptance, or just a reconnaissance, of the other’s
face prima facie: we do not reach any knowledge through physiognomy, we can
only acknowledge faces, or recognize them” (2005: 4). The true cognition of
a person is only through discourse, by means of which we can interact with
him.
A similar idea, of the face being overshadowed by the body, is expressed by
Joshua Reynolds in his manifesto of classical aesthetics, Discourses on Art
(1778/1961):
As the general figure presents itself in a more conspicuous manner than the
features, it is there we must principally look for expression or character; patuit
in corpore vultus; and, in this respect, the Sculptor’s art is not unlike that of
Dancing, where the attention of the spectator is principally engaged by the
attitude and action of the performer; and it is there he must look for whatever
expression that art is capable of exhibiting. The Dancers themselves
acknowledge this, by often wearing masks, with little diminution in the
expression. The face bears so very inconsiderable a proportion to the effect of
the whole figure, that the ancient Sculptors neglected to animate the features,
even with the general expression of the passions (Reynolds, 1961: 159—160).
The Latin words Reynolds quotes (and misspells) belong to Statius, latuit in
corpore vultus, meaning “the face hid in the body” (Stimilli, 2005: 2). Sometimes
the face, as in the example given by Reynolds, loses its usual attraction in
comparison to the whole body. Then it seems almost nonexistent, just another
part of the body. Others cannot recognize it.
Prosopagnosia, both as an intention and as a mental disorder, always did
and always will exist. A momentary inability to recognize somebody or
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recognizing the wrong person may happen to everybody. Jacques Derrida, in
The Post Card: From Socrates to Freud and Beyond (1987: 188), describes his
own experience:
[A] man came up to greet us thinking that he recognized me, and then
excused himself at the last moment — he must be suffering, as I am, more and
more, from prosopagnosia, a diabolical impulsion to find resemblances in
faces, to recognize, no longer to recognize.
Errare humanum est (to err is human), and prosopagnosia constitutes a part of
this erring. We do not recognize somebody in a person, or we recognize the
wrong person in him. The inability to recognize faces does not, however,
prevent us from seeing people’s personhood and beauty.
2.9. The face and beauty
Thinking about beauty in the human body, most people would immediately look
for it in the face. Other parts of the body may be characterized as beautiful, but
it is definitely facial beauty that becomes the beauty of the observed person.
A person may have beautiful hands or legs, but having beautiful hands or legs is
not enough for him or her to be called beautiful. This is one more argument for
the centrality of the face in the human body and its special role in the life of
a person.
Everyone knows that a beautiful face makes a person beautiful. But what
does it mean to be beautiful? What makes us perceive a particular face as being
more attractive than others? Alexander Pope (1688—1744), in his Essay on
Criticism (1711/1988: part II, lines 45/46), writes about the complexity of facial
attractiveness:
Tis not a lip, or eye, we beauty call,
But the joint force and full result of all.
The general impression of the beauty of the face is hard to explain, as its
particular elements can hardly be called beautiful. It is their combination that
allows us to see the beauty of the whole — the face. The beauty of the face is
conditioned by many factors, biological, aesthetic and psychological. Standards
of beauty have changed over the centuries and across borders.
Beauty in general and the beauty of the human body in particular have
fascinated philosophers, scholars, artists and ordinary people for centuries. The
ancient Greeks paid a lot of attention to the aesthetic side of life. They loved
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7 — Face...
beauty in all its manifestations, artistic, spiritual and bodily. The body and
beauty are a central theme of Plato’s philosophy, in which beauty is equated
with goodness. Apart from that, he associates beauty with love, happiness,
wisdom, truth and knowledge, while ugliness is correlated with evil, ignorance,
lies, hate, unhappiness and destruction (Plato, 1963: 373, 493—495). Aristotle
was also interested in beauty, but he understood it in a different way, for he saw
it in “order and symmetry and definiteness” (1984: 1705). But what he was
most fascinated by was the human face. For Aristotle, who established what was
later called facism, the face reflects the inner qualities, both spiritual and
intellectual, of a person. Facism in association with Plato’s beautyism created
a picture of the beautiful face “semiotically linked to God, Love, the self and
the soul; it is far more than simply physical” (Synnott, 1993: 80).
The question of human beauty was later taken up by many other
philosophers. Some of them considered forms of beauty to be expressions of
ideas. Kant (1724—1804), for example, in his Critique of the Power of Judgment
(1790/2000: 120), maintains that beauty in the human figure can be taken as
“the visible expression of moral ideas, which inwardly govern human beings”; he
argues that only human beauty can be taken as a unique standard for beauty,
because it is the only form of beauty that can express something absolutely and
unconditionally valuable, namely the moral autonomy of which humans alone
are capable. At the same time he holds that there is no determinate way in
which this unique value can be expressed in the human form; thus there is
always something free in the outward expression in the human figure of the
inner moral value of the human character (Kant, 2000).
Hegel explains the beauty of the face in a different way. In Aesthetics (1975),
he discusses the ideal formation of the human head as presented in the Greek
sculpture. He describes the face as consisting of two distinct parts, theoretical or
spiritual (the forehead) and practical (the mouth, the organ of nourishment).
The nose (the organ of smell) belongs to both parts. According to Hegel, for the
face to be beautiful, the two parts of the face have to be in harmony:
[...] the Greek profile introduces a beautiful harmony into the gentle and
unbroken connection between the forehead and the nose and so between the
upper and lower parts of the face. The effect of this connection is that the
nose is made more akin to the forehead and therefore, by being drawn up
towards the spiritual part, acquires itself a spiritual expression and character.
[...] Something similar is true of the mouth too. [...] it serves [...] in man for
speech, laughter, sighing, etc., and in this way the lines of the mouth already
have a characteristic connection with the eloquent communication of spiritual
states or of joy, grief, etc. (1975: 730)
He also claims that:
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[...] these particular parts [of the face] have to have their form harmonized into
the head as into one whole. Here the beautiful shape is determined by a line
which most nearly approaches an oval, and therefore anything sharp, pointed, or
angled is dissolved into a harmony and a continuous soft connection of form,
but without being purely regular and abstractly symmetrical or running away
into a manifold variety of lines and their turning and bending as happens with
the other parts of the body (Hegel, 1975: 737—738).
Facial beauty understood in this way could be mathematically calculated. The
ancient Greeks defined facial attractiveness using the mathematical concept of
the Golden Proportion, a ratio of roughly 1: 1.6 which is used to describe the
relationship between different parts of physical structures. The Golden
Proportion was later used by Renaissance artists such as Leonardo da Vinci in
painting the human face by using it as a guide for placing facial features
(Rubenstein et al., 2002). In other words, according to the Greeks one can talk
about an attractive face in terms of proportionality (e.g., eye-to-eye distance,
nose length) and facial recognition (Gilbert, 2002).
The beauty of the face, however, does not depend only on the symmetry and
harmony of its features. Charles Bell, in The Anatomy and Philosophy of
Expression as Connected with the Fine Arts (1872), stresses the importance of
temporary expressions, which may change the face completely and make it
beautiful:
Beauty of countenance may be defined in words, as well as demonstrated in
art. A face may be beautiful in sleep, and a statue without expression may be
beautiful. On the other hand, expression may give charm to a face the most
ordinary. Hence it appears that our inquiry divides itself into — the permanent
form of the head and face; and the motion of the features, or the expression
(Bell, 1872: 19).
The expression of thought and emotion makes the face look special, and as
a consequence, beautiful:
A countenance may be distinguished by being expressive of thought; that is, it
may indicate the possession of the intellectual powers. It is manly, it is human;
and yet not a motion is seen to show what feeling of sentiment prevails. On
the other hand, there may be a movement of the features, and the quality of
thought — affection, love, joy, sorrow, gratitude, or sympathy with suffering —
is immediately declared. A countenance which, in ordinary conditions, has
nothing remarkable, may become beautiful in expression (Bell, 1872: 20).
From times immemorial people have looked for a universal standard of
beauty. Darwin, in The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals
(1872/1998), debunks it as a myth. He claims that “It is certainly not true that
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there is in the mind of man any universal standard of beauty with respect to the
human body” (1872/1998: 890). Recent research results, however, challenge
this view. Many researchers (e.g., Rhodes et al., 2002; Little et al., 2002) claim
that:
• There is considerable agreement about which faces are beautiful and which
are not.
• Preferences appear very early in development, before cultural standards of
beauty are likely to have been assimilated.
• Some standards of beauty are part of our biological heritage.
Beauty is claimed to be “ingrained in our biology: characteristics associated with
evolutionarily relevant advantages to the choosing individual are perceived as
attractive” (Little et al., 2002: 84). Besides harmony and symmetry, of great
importance are secondary sexual characteristics, which are partly responsible for
our perceptions of facial attractiveness. “Face shapes carry markers of underlying
physiological processes” which indicate the likelihood of survival and
reproductive success (Gilbert, 2002: 32; Little et al., 2002). Among such
markers are the levels of testosterone, which in men shape jaw and cheek bone,
and oestrogens, which in women shape facial bone architecture and lip fullness
(Gilbert, 2002; Jackson, 1992). Females are judged by their attractiveness to
a greater extent than males are, and these judgements have real consequences
for their lives.
Research conducted in the 19th century provides results allowing us to
conceptualize facial attractiveness by pointing to its main factor — averageness.
Francis Galton (1822—1911), an English anthropologist (1883, 1888), tried to
find out whether members of different groups (e.g., vegetarians and criminals)
had specific facial characteristics. He created photographic composite images (he
overlaid images of faces onto a single photographic plate) of the faces of
vegetarians and criminals, respectively, to see if there was a “typical” facial
appearance of members of these two groups. As a side result, he noted that
a final composite, “averaged” face is more attractive than the component faces.
J.T. Stoddard (1886, 1887), an American psychologist, came to a similar
conclusion, when he created composite faces of members of the National
Academy of Sciences and graduating seniors of Smith College (Rubenstein et
al., 2002). These findings have been confirmed by contemporary research —
averageness is an important component of facial beauty.
Most attractive of all facial features seem to be specific exceptional features,
such as large eyes and a small nose, which convey neoteny (the retention of
juvenile characteristics in a (sexually) mature organism (OED)), and high
cheekbones in women, and a large chin in men, which convey sexual maturity
(Cunningham et al., 2002). Besides the power of averageness, regularity and
harmony, the beauty of the face and its attractiveness are associated with other
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factors such as youthfulness, smoothness of complexion and health (Rubenstein
et al., 2002; Rhodes et al., 2002). This is important in mate preferences, though
more in males than in females (Jackson, 1992). But maximum facial
attractiveness can be achieved only when to the above-mentioned facial features
one adds a “positive nonverbal facial expression, and grooming qualities that are
prescribed by the culture” (Jackson, 1992: 226). None of features, however, can
fully explain why we perceive certain faces as beautiful, nice or attractive.
Some variation in facial attractiveness depends on social context. Keating
(2002: 181) claims that some “aspects of facial growth conveying social status
information evolved in humans as in other species. [...] Faces are ‘attractive’ in
that they draw us into relationships,” whether it be as friends, lovers, caregivers,
or followers. Facial status cues convey charismatic qualities that make us like,
follow, or trust some people more than others (Keating, 2002). Besides, facial
attractiveness can serve many other functions, such as advertising genetic
quality, a desirable age and sex, nonthreatening familiarity, or desirable
personality traits (Zebrowitz and Rhodes, 2002).
The face, beautiful or not, young or old, is the part of the body which is
most attended to by means of various procedures, such as make-up, shaving and
cosmetic surgery. One common goal underlies the use of all these procedures —
to make the face more attractive (cf. Łotocka, 2000). In different times and
different cultures, however, the cannon of facial appearance has differed. Facial
make-up has looked different and there have been different attitudes towards it.
But generally speaking, make-up was, and still is, used to make an individual’s
face look more expressive, and in this way more attractive. Its main function is
to highlight elements of the face: the eyes, the lips, and sometimes the cheeks.
The Egyptians were among the first ones to see the value of cosmetics in
increasing allure. Egyptian women wore green malachite eye shadow and black
antimony and kohl. Men wore paint.
[Cleopatra] typically daubed blue on her upper eyelid and malachite green on
her lower. [...] she lined her eyelids and darkened her eyebrows with black
kohl, and smeared white ceruse over her face, neck, and breasts. She colored
her cheeks with yellow ochre and her lips with a carmine dye (McNeill, 1998:
293).
Nowadays, facial make-up has become an exclusively female domain. Women’s
interest in face-adorning is continually fuelled by the flourishing cosmetics
industry, which is all the time launching new beautifying cosmetics
(e.g., mascara, eye shadow, powder, rouge or lipstick).
Women are not the only to think about their appearance and care for their
face. To look attractive men “play” with their facial hair. Biologically speaking,
beards emerge after puberty and indicate sexual maturity. The beard enlarges
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the apparent size of the jaw, and is said to be the sign of a man’s
aggressiveness and reproductive success (a beast mark). This conviction
originates from the days where our teeth were weapons and it was important
for a male to have a big jaw (McNeill, 1998). In civilized times, facial hair in
men depends on fashion (facial hair on a woman’s face, however, is
considered unacceptable or freak). Men grow a moustache, beard or sideburns,
or to look neat and tidy they shave. Sometimes the beard is used as a mask to
hide a man’s identity.
Another type of facial adornment, which is permanent, is “tattoos,
scarification, piercing, cutting, mutilation, and the intersection of various objects
into the nose, lips, or ears” (Cohen, 2006: 227). The ancient Thracians,
Assyrians, and Britons tattooed their faces. Face tattoos appeared also in
northern Africa, the Middle East, India, and among the native inhabitants of
North and South America (McNeill, 1998). They were used as signs of ancestry,
group membership, and prestige (see also Section 2.6.). But they also could be
a stigma, e.g., the Romans tattooed slaves between the eyes (McNeill, 1998). In
modern times, this type of facial adornment is popular only in certain
sub-cultures.
For some people, however, simple make-up or any other adornment is not
enough. For aesthetic reasons they undergo surgical treatment. Some want to
become more attractive and beautiful, some want simply to look younger.
Cosmetic surgery procedures, such as upper or lower blepharoplasty (removal of
excess upper or lower eyelid skin), rhytidectomy (face lift/neck lift), or forehead
lift, different procedures for treating facial wrinkles, such as chemical peels,
dermabrasion, laser resurfacing, or collagen or botulinum toxin injections are
intended to reverse or at least diminish facial aging changes which as time goes
by strongly influence the contour and appearance of the face (Nesi et al., 2001).
To appear closer to the present canon of beauty people undergo, e.g., rhinoplasty
(changing the shape of the nose), hair transplantation, orthodontic treatment or
some types of orthognathic surgery (Cohen, 2006). A beautiful and attractive
face, however, is not enough. It has to allow for the proper and aesthetic
expression of emotions; it has to be able to smile in an appropriate way. That is
why a new specialization has appeared, smile restoration, combining dental and
plastic surgery and aimed at improving or restoring (after some illness or
accident) the ability to smile (Szarota, 2006). All these actions and procedures
have a common aim, the realization of the old ideal — the happy soul in the
beautiful body.
Sometimes a single improvement does not satisfy the person. He, or more
often she, wants more. It has become very popular to undergo a makeover:
the total overhaul of a woman’s appearance [...] On daytime television, mostly
female audiences still yelp with pleasure when a woman — or man — is
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transformed into a new and better person through makeup, hairdo, wardrobe
(Kuczynski, 2006: 6).
Making oneself over has now become a part of the American lifestyle. Surgery
is no longer perceived as mere cutting and suturing; it has become a part of
“the journey toward enhancement, the beauty outside ultimately reflecting the
beauty within” (Kuczynski, 2006: 7). Cosmetic surgery has inspired reality
programs (e.g., Extreme Makeover in the US) in which individuals who do not
like their own appearance and have low self-esteem spend a long time under the
care of a plastic surgeon, a physical trainer, a hairdresser, a make-up artist and
a stylist to become “better,” more attractive and, finally, to accept their
self-image (Kuczynski, 2006). Similar TV programs have recently been launched
in many European countries, Poland included, as a response to the general
fashion for the young and beautiful.
Commercial culture has a strong influence on the face. It not only
contributes to beautifying it but has also turned it into a tool of commerce. The
body, and the face in particular, have, “over the past few years, become one of
the principal mainstays in the selling of merchandise” (Hagège, 2005: 21; Kemp,
2004). In most cases, the face has to be young and beautiful, but empty. The
face in advertisements contradicts everything that has been said about this
special part of the body over the centuries: it does not, and should not, reflect
its owner’s personality. The only purpose in staging it is to sell some product
(Hagège, 2005). As Hagège (2005: 26—27) writes:
The beauty market is huge, as we have seen. To better sell beauty in all its
forms, it has been assimilated into that elusive thing known as seduction, by
transforming desirable subjects into objects of desire. By dehumanizing them.
The imagery of advertising manages the illusion through fakery by preserving
only its form and identifying that form with a product. This mimetic reference
is used a great deal in advertising.
We can say that the body, and the face in particular, are used to sell (advertise)
different types of products. The face is often used in cosmetics advertisements,
and then it has to portray the effectiveness of the cosmetic advertised. We say
that “a certain actress has become the face of a certain cosmetics company”; in
other words she has sold her own face to the company, so that it can be used to
enhance product sales (see also Section 1.5.). It is no longer the face of
a particular individual, but becomes an icon. It is an idealized and manipulated
image which is offered to the consumers. Once again the face is used to deceive.
The power of facial beauty should not be neglected. A beautiful face can
have a great impact on its owner’s life and relations with others. That is why
beauty and attractiveness are a common topic of folk sayings and proverbs, e.g.,
the Polish proverb Nie to ładne, co ładne, lecz to, co się komu podoba (Nice is not
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what is nice, but what others find attractive), or the popular English maxim
with the same meaning, Beauty is in the eye of the beholder. Rubenstein et al.
(2002: 28) do not agree with the sentiment expressed in these sayings, arguing
that “mathematical averageness is a necessary and fundamental characteristic of
perceived attractiveness in the human face”. However, the folk wisdom should
not be entirely rejected. When we analyse the attractiveness of somebody’s face
we always, apart from current standards of beauty, take into consideration our
subjective taste and preferences. Other sayings concerning attractiveness, Beauty
is only skin deep, indicating that a person’s appearance is not a true reflection of
his or her inner personality traits, Never judge a book by its cover, advising us
that we should not base our treatment of others upon their physical appearance
(Rubenstein et al., 2002), and A fair face may hide a foul soul (Kakietek, 2004),
are constantly confirmed by our everyday experience. In spite of that, people
often tend to judge others by their outward appearance. These judgements
influence our perception of people and shape our attitudes toward them. For
people with nice faces, they make their life easier, and for people with faces
which do not meet the beauty/attractiveness standards, they make their life full
of disappointment.
2.10. The “troubled” face
Not all people enjoy a beautiful, healthy-looking face which evokes warm
feelings or at least acceptance in others. Many people have “troubled” faces.
They can be “troubled” in two ways. These faces may express their owners’
problems, either physical or psychological. The face in such cases functions as
a displayer showing that something is going wrong in the person’s body or
psyche. In other situations the face, or more specifically its particular features,
may get its owner into trouble, when other people react to it with hostility and
contempt. The face perceived as such, as a trouble displayer and a trouble
cause, once again proves its centrality in human life.
2.10.1. The face as a display of illness symptoms
The face is a part of the body in which it is easy to observe the first symptoms
of an illness. It always reflects both a person’s psychological and physical
condition. First of all, this is because the face is naked and constantly on
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display to others. The slightest change in a person’s mood and psychological
condition is visible in the face, when its expression is uncontrolled. Any illness
affects its physical appearance: the skin, its colour and texture, the eyes and
other facial features. Hippocrates (ca 460—377 BC), “the father of Western
medicine,” was one of the first who used facial cues to detect his patients’ state
of health. He believed that a facial examination could help him accurately
diagnose the patient. In “Prognostic,” he writes:
In acute diseases the physician must conduct his inquiries in the following way.
First he must examine the face of the patient, and see whether it is like the
faces of healthy people, and especially whether it is like its usual self. Such
likeness will be the best sign, and the greatest unlikeness will be the most
dangerous sign. The latter will be as follows. Nose sharp, eyes hollow, temples
sunken, ears cold and contracted with their lobes turned outwards, the skin
about the face hard and tense and parched, the colour of the face as a whole
being yellow or black (1923: Vol. II, i—ii, 9).
The above description of an ill face is now known by the term facies
hippocratica. In his treatise on prognosis, Hippocrates claims that the body can
predict its own decay and that the face is the main displayer of its symptoms.
So every physician should start the examination of the patient with the
examination of his face.
In the traditional medicine of China, Japan and some other Far Eastern
cultures, the face was also treated as a main diagnostic tool. Modern research
has provided some evidence that Hippocrates and other ancient medics were
right to ascribe so much importance to the face as the mirror of man’s physical
condition (Zebrowitz, 1997).
In short, the face is a good displayer of illness. It can undergo many
different transformations which can be treated as signs of the illness process. As
has been said, this refers also to the problems of the psyche. There are some
mental disorders which, apart from affecting the person’s behaviour, change his
face, which may even become difficult to identify.
2.10.2. The face as a symbol of split personality
Split personality (also called Multiple Personality Disorder or Dissociative Identity
Disorder) is a condition in which two or more distinct identities are present in
one person and alternately take control of him. It is characterized by
a splintering of identity. The individual suffering from Dissociative Identity
Disorder fails to integrate different aspects of his identity. Beside his primary
2.10. The “troubled” face 105
identity, which carries his name and is usually passive and depressed, he
experiences other identities related to a completely different self-image and life
history. These identities are often in open conflict or do not know each other
(Colman, 2009).
Cases of split personality have always fascinated people, and not only
psychiatrists. Robert Louis Stevenson (1850—1894) devoted to it his novel The
Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (1885/2004), an allegory of the
destruction of a human personality. In it he describes the life of Dr Henry
Jekyll, a respected, good-natured citizen who lives a double life, turning into his
alter ego, Edward Hyde, who is capable of every meanness and even of murder.
At first, Mr Hyde is not identified with Dr Jekyll, as they differ not only in their
behaviour but also in their bodily appearance. Mr Hyde has his deeds imprinted
in his face. He differs a lot from Dr Jekyll; his face bears the mark of evil.
Interest in the “differentness” and uniqueness of individuals suffering from
split personality also inspired Gene Brewer, an American doctor, who wrote
a novel about a psychiatric patient claiming to be from another planet (K-PAX
(2002)), called “prot,” who turns out to be one of the alter egos of Robert
Porter. Robert suffers from Dissociative Identity Disorder as a result of some
traumatic experience (his wife and daughter were brutally murdered and he
killed their murderer). Unlike Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde, Robert and prot resemble
each other, but the great differences between the two personalities have a strong
impact on their facial expression, which makes them at first almost impossible
to identify with each other.
These two examples are literary depictions of split personality, which show
how an individual’s behaviour can influence his perception by others, how his
corporeality gets transformed under the pressure of different personalities and
different expectations on the part of others. The face of a person with more
than one personality and more than one identity is a “troubled” face as well.
2.10.3. Face and shame, guilt and embarrassment
Trouble in the face may also be brought about by some everyday social
experience evoking strong self-directed emotions, such as shame, guilt or
embarrassment. Shame, guilt and embarrassment are universal emotions which
belong to the most painful of human experiences. All of them “are intimately
rooted in religion and ethics, conceived and experienced differently in different
cultures and at different historical times within the same culture” (Ho et al.,
2004: 64). In Christian tradition, shame and guilt are said to originate from
humankind’s first transgression against God’s command, and as such they are
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the consequence of original sin (Ho et al., 2004; Jędrzejko, 1998). In the Bible,
original sin is presented with strong sexual overtones. Having eaten the fruit of
the tree of knowledge, Adam and Eve realized that they were naked and they
felt shame, which they had not felt before. In Christian understanding, these
two emotions, shame and guilt, are related to nakedness and sexuality.
Shame is the most socially significant of all emotions. It is “a socio-cultural
phenomenon that reflects and refracts wider social trends and relationships”
(Pattison, 2000: 131). It performs many social functions:
• it helps to define social boundaries and norms,
• it signals the state of social bonds,
• it provides a powerful tool of social conformity and control (Pattison, 2000:
131; Ho et al., 2004).
Characterized in this way, shame can be said to be a necessary element of social
order (Pattison, 2000). Public shaming is “instrumental to socialization” and
constitutes a potent sanction (Ho et al., 2004). In the former times, public
shaming or humiliation used to be a common mode of punishment for petty
crimes.
Shame and guilt “originate from the internalization of cultural standards”
(Ho et al., 2004: 75). Cultures differ in terms of standards they promote and
different attitudes of their members towards shame, guilt and their role in social
order. Pattison (2000) distinguishes between “‘shame-based’ cultures” and
“‘guilt-based’ cultures.” The former are based on conformity to unwritten rules,
the maintenance of honour and appearance, and the avoidance of pollution;
while the latter, which evolved from the former, are based on juridical rules and
procedures, internalized conscience and the concept of correlation between
offence and punishment. In both types of culture, however, shame exists.
Individuals can choose from a wide range of possibilities how to present
themselves to others in clothes, manners, behaviour and attitudes. This allows
for freedom of self-expression. However, “it also creates anxiety as people worry
about whether their ‘face fits’” (Pattison, 2000: 143). Being constantly on
display, under the eyes of a critical audience, the modern self tries to perform
its role correctly. This necessarily creates a lot of strain and anxiety (Goffman,
1959; Pattison, 2000). And any failure to perform adequately involves shame,
“cutting to the centre of personal esteem and identity” (Pattison, 2000: 143).
So, while the experience of shame is a personal phenomenon which is
individually experienced, shame itself is a phenomenon which is socially
conditioned. No one is shamed in social isolation from others. We can feel
shame only by participating in social interaction.
The experience of shame is usually associated with “negative automatic
thoughts of the self.” It is a complex set of feelings, cognitions and actions
which are self-focused. It is dependent on the competencies to construct the
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social self and that is why it is called a “self-conscious emotion” (Gilbert, 2002:
5—6). Any action which can cause a flaw in the social self may make a person
experience shame. This experience often leaves its imprint on the person’s body
and face in particular.
To speak of Shame as a Virtue is incorrect, because it is much more like
a feeling than a moral state. It is defined, we know, to be ‘a kind of fear of
disgrace,’ and its effects are similar to those of the fear of danger, for they who
feel Shame grow red and they who feel death turn pale. So both are evidently
in a way physical, which is thought to be a mark of a feeling rather than
a moral state (Aristotle, 1911: 99: 1128b).
The way Aristotle defines shame in the Nicomachean Ethics (1911) immediately
connects it to the face, which expresses our emotions and feelings. Shame
expresses itself through the face, making it turn red. In fact, shame can be
expressed through other parts of the body as well, e.g., the neck, which can also
turn red, or the hands, which can sweat.
There are close associations between shame and a certain kind of facial
expression (Ho et al., 2004). The feeling of shame is most often expressed,
especially in young persons and in women, in the form of blushing. Blushing is
regarded as “a facial expression of the ‘self-conscious’ emotions — an outward
manifestation of shame, embarrassment, shyness and/or modesty” (Crozier,
2002: 206). The feeling of physical heat which causes blushing is the source of
the metaphor: SHAME IS FIRE, which gives rise to many metaphorical
expressions in Polish (Jędrzejko, 1998):
Myślałam, że spalę się ze wstydu. (I thought I would burn up with shame.)
Jego twarz płonęła wstydem. (His face was burning with shame.)
Jego czoło płonęło wstydem. (His forehead was burning with shame.)
Another metaphor related to this troublesome feeling is SHAME IS A WAVE
OF WARMTH:
Fala wstydu objęła jej twarz i rozlała się na szyję. (Jędrzejko, 1998) (A wave of
shame covered her face and spread over her neck.)
Shame, guilt and embarrassment are emotions expressed by means of blushing.
However, blushing is not the only signal the face can give. Anxiety or fear
blanche the face (McNeill, 1998). But, according to Darwin:
Of all expressions, blushing seems to be the most strictly human; yet it is
common to all or nearly all the races of man, whether or not any change of
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colour is visible in their skin. The relaxation of the small arteries of the
surface, on which blushing depends, seems to have primarily resulted from
earnest attention directed to the appearance of our own persons, especially of
our faces, aided by habit, inheritance, and the ready flow of nerve-force along
accustomed channels; and afterwards to have been extended by the power of
association to self-attention directed to moral conduct (Darwin, 1872/1998:
358).
The self-attention that Darwin writes about can be directed towards two
important aspects of the person’s social self: social behaviour, mentioned above,
and appearance. Our appearance often evokes anxiety in us. The need to be
accepted and classified as attractive to others makes us self-conscious. There is
also a special feeling of shame connected with the body and the face in
particular. The so-called “body (and facial) shame” is evoked by the conviction
of an unwanted physical appearance (Gilbert, 2002).
Shame and the other related emotions are expressed through the face (a part
of the body), and are caused by some threat to face (a self-image). We feel
shame when we lose face, our good reputation or good name (cf. Ho et al.,
2004). This experience can be characterized as that of “internalized pollution”:
There seems to be a kind of metaphorical affinity between ancient notions of
pollution, defilement and dishonour and contemporary experiences and
descriptions of shame, albeit that the latter mostly now refer to the experience
of individuals rather than describing a primary social reality (Pattison,
2002: 89).
Shame, like pollution, “has elements of social dislocation and exclusion”
(Pattison, 2002: 89). Shame, like pollution, is often accompanied by the feeling
of being unworthy of respect. The ashamed person may feel as if he stands
“outside the social order and social relationships,” as if he is “in the wrong, and
thus in the state of alienation from others” (Pattison, 2002: 89; Termińka,
1998). The power of this emotion is proof of the great importance of others in
our life. Shame, which is a reaction to a face-threat (a threat to our self-image),
is marked on our face.
When we lose face, we can also feel other emotions than shame, for example
wanting to hide, humiliation, or feeling inhibited, inferior, self-conscious or
exposed. In such situations, we often feel embarrassed. Embarrassment is
a form of emotion which is closely related to shame. It is also a social
phenomenon which lies at the heart of the social organization of everyday
behaviour. “It provides a personal constraint on the behaviour of the individual
in society and a public response to actions and activities considered problematic
or untoward” (Heath, 1988: 137). Embarrassment plays a vital role in sustaining
the individual’s commitment to social norms, values and conventions (Heath,
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1988). In his pioneering paper “Embarrassment and social organization”
(1956), Goffman investigates the interactional organization of embarrassment.
He maintains that “An individual may recognize embarrassment in others and
even in himself by objective signs of emotional disturbance: blushing, fumbling,
stuttering, [...] blanching, blinking, [...] absent-mindedness and malapropisms”
(Goffman, 1956: 264; Ho et al., 2004). This may happen “if expressive facts
threaten or discredit the assumptions a participant has projected about his
identity” (Goffman, 1956: 265), as a consequence he may temporarily lose
balance and self-control and he “cannot for the time being mobilize his
muscular and intellectual resources for the task at hand” (Goffman, 1956:
265—266). As such, embarrassment is a feeling which may have a strong impact
on the organization of social interaction (Merkin, 2006a). To avoid being
embarrassed, people try to preserve and negotiate face in all communication
situations.
Shame, guilt and embarrassment occur in social contexts; shame and guilt
are said to be felt in situations of moral transgression, while embarrassment is
said to appear in situations of loss of poise or composure (Ho et al., 2004).
These three emotions are undeniably face-related. On the one hand, they appear
when the person’s face (self-image) is threatened by some unfortunate event,
evoked either by his action or the action of another person. On the other hand,
the feeling of shame, guilt or embarrassment causes some disturbance which
usually influences the person’s physical face.
The imprint left on the face by these strong negative emotions is only
momentary, and it can soon be forgotten. Due to its transient nature, it rarely
involves social exclusion or any other serious social consequences. But apart
from these momentary signs on the face, sometimes there are also some
long-lasting signs which determine the person’s social life and negatively
influence his relations with others.
2.10.4. The stigmatized face
The term stigma, which originates from Greek, refers to “bodily signs designed
to expose something unusual and bad about the moral status of the signifier”
(Goffman, 1963/1986: 1). The signs were cut or burnt into the body, and the
persons who had them — slaves, criminals, or traitors — were treated as
blemished and ritually polluted, and were to be avoided. In Christian times, the
term acquired two additional meanings, and referred to “bodily signs of holy
grace” and “bodily signs of physical disorder” (Goffman, 1986: 1). The Penguin
Dictionary of Sociology (2000) defines stigma as “a social attribute which is
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discrediting for an individual or group.” The modern concept of stigma or
spoiled identity is when a person feels that there is some blemish in his identity
that excludes him from social relations and society (Goffman, 1963/1986).
Nowadays stigmatized people, those who have spoiled identity, possess “an
undesired differentness from what we had anticipated” (Goffman, 1986: 5), and
because of that they are excluded from social participation. In fact, a stigma is
“a special kind of relationship between attribute and stereotype” (Goffman,
1986: 4) existing in a given society.
Every society establishes means of categorizing persons and “a complement
of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of each of these
categories” (Goffman, 1986: 2). So when we meet a person, we can easily
anticipate his category and attributes, his social identity, from first appearances.
If he possesses an attribute that makes him different from what is an established
standard, he is often treated as a tainted person, with the attribute that makes
him different being a stigma. A good description of social stigmatization is
provided in the novel The Scarlet Letter (1850/1964) written by Nathaniel
Hawthorne. The main character, a young woman, as a result of an extramarital
affair, gives birth to a daughter. The act of adultery she has committed, as
morally wrong, is totally unacceptable for the 17th-century Puritan society. The
woman is punished for her sin with public humiliation (a common form of
punishment for minor offences at that time) and a symbolical stigma of the
scarlet letter “A,” standing for adultery, attached to her dress. She is stigmatized
socially by committing adultery and literally by “a rag of scarlet cloth.”
Goffman (1986: 4) distinguishes three types of stigma:
• various physical deformities (stigmas of the body),
• blemishes of individual character, such as weak will or dishonesty, or
blemishes inferred from a known record of, for example, mental disorder,
imprisonment, addiction, alcoholism, or unemployment (stigmas of character),
• the tribal stigma of race, nation or religion (stigmas of social collectivities).
A person with a physical deformity, especially when it is a facial deformity (e.g.,
a harelip or misshapen nose) suffers a lot of discrimination starting in early
childhood. This type of discrimination, having its origins in rules of
physiognomy, is deeply rooted in many cultures. One of the main premises of
traditional Arab physiognomy, which was later adopted by European
physiognomy, is:
[D]o not trust the one-eyed, the lame, hunchbacked, the red-haired and those
with a rare beard, in other words — anybody who has any bodily deficiency.
Avoid those who have any physical flaw, because they are mean, foul and
insincere, and you will only regret spending time with them (Mourad, 1939:
61; in Courtine and Haroche, 2007: 31).
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Such a differentness is often approached with a mixture of curiosity and
suspiciousness. For example, the title character of the film The Elephant Man
(directed by David Lynch, 1980), a 19th-century Englishman who suffers from
heavy disfigurement caused by some congenital disease, spent many years as
a side-show freak. This sensitive and intelligent man hidden behind a monstrous
“mask” suffers from losing his real countenance and, as a consequence, from
losing his dignity and good name. His deformed face is his stigma. This also
happens to people suffering from Moebius Syndrome. This is a rare neurological
disorder which affects the cranial nerves and makes those with the condition
unable to move their faces and eyes. They cannot smile, frown, suck, grimace or
blink their eyes (Moebius Syndrome Foundation). Incapable of any expression,
their faces are like masks. Jonathan Cole, a neuropsychologist, in his book
About Face (1998), writes about facial mobility problems. He describes how they
can influence selfhood and social relations. The necessary condition of good
relations with others is an emotional sensibility revealed to them via the face.
Individuals deprived of that, or as Cole describes them, “without a face,” are
socially invalidated. He describes several case histories which
tell of the essential role of the face in the expression and experience of feeling
itself. Those who were hardly aware of the facial origin of their problems show
how deep within us are these matters that they only brought to light by
a shattering disconnection between personality and the face (Cole, 1998: 192).
Physical damage to the face can also have “particular powers of horror” (Kemp,
2004: 66). Seeing a deformed face, people often expect that its owner has
a matching character and can exhibit “monstrous” behaviour (e.g., Quasimodo
in The Hunchback of Notre Dame (1831) by Victor Hugo).
As has been mentioned above, the stigmatized face does not involve only
facial deformity. Other types of stigma are also imprinted in people’s faces.
Some stigmas of character strike the observer at first sight, e.g., the red nose
and the bloodshot eyes of alcoholics. This type of stigma can very often
determine the exclusion of a person from normal social interaction. Any
attempts on his part to participate in it may lead to open expressions of
contempt, fear or hostility on the part of the others. A dark complexion,
slanting eyes, an aquiline nose or any other facial trait which is not typical for
members of a particular culture and race can evoke negative or even hostile
reactions. Thus we can divide members of a society into the normals, who do
not depart negatively from particular expectations, and persons with a stigma,
who are despised and disapproved of by the normals. The stigmatized often
disapprove of their own attributes and feel shame due to them.
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2.11. The hidden face
As mentioned above, the face is one of the few parts of the body that are
constantly on display to the public. However, this is not always the case. In
some cultures, women are made to hide their faces behind a veil. The Koran
says that women “should draw their veils over their bosoms and not display
their beauty except to their husbands, their fathers, [...]” (Chaudhry, 1995: 42).
But there is no consensus in the Muslim world whether women should be
completely covered. Chaudhry quotes the following story:
Ayesha reported that Asma’a daughter of Abu Bakr came to the Prophet of
Allah while there were thin clothes on her. He approached her and said:
O Asma’a! When a girl reaches the menstrual time, it is not proper that
anything on her should remain exposed except this and this. He hinted on her
face and palms (Chaudhry, 1995: 42—43).
Thus, the face together with hands can be left uncovered. However, Purdah, the
dress code, requires a “non-display rule.” It varies among Muslim communities.
There are two kinds of garments, body tents and face veils. The best known
body tent is chador, a black swath of fabric hanging from pate to anklebone
(worn by women in Iran, and among Lebanese Shiites). The abayya is the
Arabian chador, “a black cloak with arm slits.” The chadris is the Afghan
version, a colourful tent with an oblong lattice over the face. The farshiyah is
the white coverall that leaves a single eye exposed (in Libya). There are two
types of face veil, the niqab, which completely occludes the face, while the
burqa is “a black-and-gold face mask” that usually hides all but the eyes (in the
Persian Gulf) (McNeill, 1998: 269). Whatever type of veil a woman wears, it
makes her face invisible to the public and therefore deprives her of one type of
expression. The veil becomes her mask, but a mask which does not say anything
about its owner, a mask which makes her faceless.
Some advocates of purdah claim that it “frees women from the leers of men
and the whims of fashion”; others say that it “is an assertion of cultural pride,
a symbol of resistance to the West” (McNeill, 1998: 270). Thus, from the
Muslim point of view, purdah is a tradition which should be cherished and
complied with; it makes women free. But from the Western point of view, it
deprives them of the right to participate in social interaction, as the face,
understood both literally and metaphorically, is the condition of interaction
(cf. Goffman, 1967).
“Dress codes stem from custom, not sense, as fashion designers well know.
And purdah fits into a larger system of sexual segregation” (McNeill, 1998:
270). In the Muslim world, women’s faces undergo segregation by means of the
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veil. Divisions in different societies, however, can go also along other lines, such
as racial or occupational. There are cultures and situations in which the face
becomes a criterion for segregation and discrimination.
2.12. The “wrong” face
In the early 19th century, physiognomists took to analysing the faces of the
ill-reputed: the mentally ill and criminals. Both were regarded as atavistic
(evolutionary reversions) (Fridlund, 1994). The mentally ill were said to have
their illness written on their faces, the criminals — their crimes. Drawing
extensively on the tradition of physiognomy and craniometry, researchers tried
to provide scientific justification for the anatomical segregation of races
(Cohen, 2006). In various disciplines, research was carried out to reinforce
pre-existing racial prejudices and stereotypes. As Deleuze and Guattari (1987)
maintain,
[r]acism operates by the determination of degrees of deviance in relation to
the White-Man face, which endavors to integrate nonconforming traits into
increasingly eccentric and backward waves, sometimes tolerating them at given
places under given conditions, in a given getto, sometimes erasing them from
the wall, which never abides alterity (it’s a Jew, it’s an Arab, it’s a Negro, it’s
a lunatic...). From the viewpoint of racism, there is no exterior, there are no
people on the outside. There are only people who should be like us and whose
crime it is not to be.
The face which is not like ours, by some (e.g., racists) treated as a “wrong” face,
is the topic of this section.
2.12.1. The “mismeasured” face
Craniometric studies started by Petrus Camper, and especially his concept of
linea facialis (see Section 2.4.3.), gave rise to interest in physiognomy as a sign of
race. One of the leading representatives of “racial” physiognomy was Carl Gustav
Carus (1789—1869), famous for his cranioscopic works (cranioscopy is the
examination of the size and configuration of the skull; the term was formerly
applied to what is now commonly called phrenology (OED)). He was among the
first German physiognomists who became interested in the question of race. In
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his famous Über ungleiche Befähigung der verschiedenen Menschheitsstämme für
höhere geistige Entwicklung [On the unequal capacities of the different human
races for higher intellectual development] (1849), he presents a typology of races.
According to Carus, people can be divided into “daylight,” “twilight,” and
“nocturnal.” He claims that his cranial measurements of diverse people show that
“daylight” peoples of Europe have the frontal lobe (the seat of intelligence)
predominating, the “twilight” peoples — those of Asia and North and South
America — have a larger medial brain (the locus of the emotions), while
“nocturnal” peoples, the blacks from Africa, have the occiput (the locus of desire
and will) well developed. The main conclusion of his work is that the peoples of
Europe have the greatest intellectual capacities and are thus superior to other
human beings (Gray, 2004).
Paul Broca (1824—1880), a professor of clinical surgery in Paris, became
famous for his studies which consisted in weighing human brains during
autopsies to determine the cranial capacity of human skulls. Broca claimed that
the appearance of the face, and generally the head, specific for a particular race
determines the social capacity of the person:
A prognathous1 face, more or less black color of the skin, woolly hair and
intellectual and social inferiority are often associated, while more or less white
skin, straight hair and an orthognathous2 face are the ordinary equipment of
the highest groups of the human series [...]. A group with black skin, woolly
hair and a prognathous face has never been able to raise itself spontaneously
to civilization (Broca, 1866: 280—296; in Cohen, 2006: 225).
The Swedish scientist Anders Retzius (1796—1860) popularized another
measure of craniometry, the cranial index, calculated as the ratio of maximum
width to maximum length of the skull. Retzius distinguished between
dolichocephalic skulls, relatively long (ratio of .75 or less) and brachycephalic
skulls, relatively short (ratio of over .8). On the basis of this index, he created
a theory of civilization, according to which Stone Age peoples of Europe were
brachycephalic, and were later invaded and replaced by Bronze Age peoples
(Indo-Europeans, or Arian dolichocephalics). Some more primitive,
brachycephalic people survived among Basques, Finns, and Lapps (Gould,
1996). This theory was later disproved by Broca, who found dolichocephalics
among Stone Age skulls (he himself was brachycephalic) (Gould, 1996).
Craniometry and craniometric studies evoked, and still evoke, a lot of
controversy. In many cases, research results were adjusted to match pre-existing
opinions. In the 1840s Samuel George Morton, a scientist and physician from
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1 Forward-jutting (Cohen, 2006).
2 Straight (Cohen, 2006).
Philadelphia, analysing the physical characteristics of the brain and measuring
skulls, formulated the ranking of various races, according to which whites were
the highest, Indians were in the middle, and blacks were the lowest. Among
whites, Teutons and Anglo-Saxons were the highest, Jews were in the middle,
and Hindus were the lowest. The results of his measuring studies matched
American prejudices (Gould, 1996). More than a hundred years later, Stephen
Jay Gould decided to check Morton’s measurements. He found that Morton
had often included or deleted large subsamples in order to conform group
averages to prior expectations. He had made calculations to demonstrate the
superiority of Teutons and Anglo-Saxons, because he was convinced that
variation in skull size recorded differential, innate mental ability.
Racial prejudice can also be found in the works of the English psychiatrist
John Langdon Haydon Down (1828—1897), who published in 1866 a paper
entitled “Observations on an Ethnic Classification of Idiots.” He provided there
a now classical description of the Mongolian type of idiot. Down described
some cases of mental retardation in children whose facial features, according to
him, had not evolved to conform to the Anglo-Saxon type. These children were
said to be “trapped” in the inferior Mongolian race. This type of mental
retardation was called Mongolism. Recently the term was replaced by the more
politically correct Down’s syndrome or Trisomy-21 syndrome (the actual genetic
defect). The syndrome has nothing to do with the Mongolian people’s
intelligence (Fridlund, 1994). Children suffering from Down’s syndrome can be
easily recognized by a characteristic face, which Down described in the
following way:
The face is flat and broad, and destitute of prominence. The cheeks are
roundish, and extended laterally. The eyes are obliquely placed, and the
internal canthi more than normally distant from one another. The palpebral
fissure is very narrow. The forehead is wrinkled transversely from the constant
assistance which the levatores palpebrarum derive from the occipito-frontalis
muscle in the opening of the eyes. The lips are large and thick with transverse
fissures. The tongue is long, thick, and much roughened. The nose is small.
The skin has a slightly dirty yellowish tinge, and is deficient in elasticity, giving
the appearance of being too large for the body (Down, 1866: 261).
These facial features were treated as a sign of mental deficiency. Although
Down believed that “A very large number of congenital idiots [are] typical
Mongols,” he claimed that mental deficiency can be marked also by facial
features specific for other races. Accordingly, he called those who suffer from
other types of mental deficiency idiots of the “Ethiopian variety,” “white
negroes of European descent,” or “idiots of the Malay type.” Following the
stereotype of the superiority of the white race, he maintained that “if a mentally
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defective member of a white race could show the racial features of a non-white
race, it proved that racial differences were not specific” (Brain, 1967: 4). He
tried to prove human unity by showing that the representative features of lower
races could appear in degenerates of the higher.
All the research carried out by the scientists mentioned above involved the
search for signs of race in the human head and face. Very often it was inspired
and influenced by racial prejudice; sometimes it even contributed to reinforcing
it. The results of the research together with the racial prejudice that existed in
many European societies prepared the basis for the formation of a new
dangerous type of physiognomy which flourished in the early decades of the
20th century in Germany.
2.12.2. The “racial face” in Germany
Deeply rooted in the German intellectual tradition, physiognomy engaged many
creative representatives of German thought, such as Lavater, Lichtenberg,
Herder, Goethe, Gall, Hegel, Carus, Schopenhauer, Klages, Kassner, and
Kretschmer (Gray, 2004; see also Section 2.4.3.). Having flourished in the 19th
and early 20th centuries, physiognomy developed powerfully and most
perniciously from “the racial-genetic turn German biology and anthropology
underwent in the early decades of the twentieth century, leading up to the
catastrophe of the Nazi racial state. The convergence of these diverse
intellectual forces occurred during the years of the Weimar Republic, leading to
an explosion of physiognomically-oriented theories in diverse academic and
intellectual disciplines in the years from 1918 to 1935 and beyond” (Gray, 2004:
xx). In this period of time, the face was turned into a socially and politically
powerful tool used against other races.
The years of the Weimar Republic are often described as the time of “the
physiognomic boom” and the emergence of the German “physiognomic
worldview.” In 1919, one of the most significant German physiognomists,
Rudolf Kassner (1873—1959), published his first physiognomist work, “Zahl und
Gesicht” [Number and face], in which he breaks with an essential principle of
the physiognomic tradition, “the identification of the external and the internal,”
the conviction that the body is the mirror of the soul (Gray, 2004: 167), and
postulates “the great paradox of every physiognomics” which says that “the
human being only is the way he looks, because he does not look the way he is”
(1919: 3, 192; in Gray, 2004: 167). Unlike traditional, “scientific”
physiognomists, Kassner glorifies subjectivism; he claims that the subjective
interpretation of the face is the form of empathy through imagination. The
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power of imagination legitimizes every possible interpretation of other people
(Gray, 2004). In “Physignomik” Kassner defines what he calls Ständegesicht
(the socially determined face):
the socially determined face means that the physician, the scholar, the
schoolteacher, the tailor, the interior decorator, the painter, the Count, the
Baron, the accountant, that each of these figures also has the peculiar face
befitting his social class, the socially apt face (1932: 5, 29; in Gray, 2004:
204).
Among the representatives of the “physiognomic boom” was Ludwig Klages
(1872—1956), a psychologist, who created a physiognomically based theory of
expression, and Ernst Kretschmer (1888—1964), a physician, who tried to relate
physiognomic body types to predispositions for certain mental illnesses (Gray,
2004). But the most representative figure of the physiognomic worldview, and
the most infamous of them all, was a proto-fascist thinker, Hans F.K. Günther
(1891—1968). Called “Rassen-Günther,” or “Race-Günther,” he applied
physiognomic theories to racial anthropology and was one of the strongest
advocates of the Nordic Movement in Germany. He practised a type of
materialist physiognomy which sought to establish the relationship between
intellectual, spiritual, and cultural traits and such physical features as blue eyes,
blonde hair, a particular skull form, and the shape of the nose (Gray, 2004).
Using various tools to measure the head and face, Günther analysed the
proportions of the skull and used them as the primary characteristic of the
European races he identified (Gray, 2004). According to Günther, the members
of the “Nordic” race, identified with a cross section of modern Germans, had
the long and narrow (dolichocephalic) skull, and the “Eastern” race — the
Slavic peoples — had the short and broad (brachycephalic) skull (Gray, 2004).
The main source of the information about hair and eye colour that Günther
used in his studies was Germania, in which Tacitus describes the Germanic
peoples (Gray, 2004). All the physiognomic attributions he analysed in his
studies are mediated by criteria of race. People’s negative attitude towards
another person who has dark hair or a pointed nose, for example, according to
Günther, is due to the “blood,” which intuitively separates “us” from others
(Gray, 2004: 233). Thus, his racial physiognomy was mainly based on Germanic
tradition, intuition and pseudo-scientific research.
Interpreting the anatomical features of human beings as indicative of both
racial type and certain psychological and characterological traits specific for
those particular racial types, Günther expressed the common prejudices of
middle-class Germans about their representatives (Gray, 2004). The typology he
formulated was extremely Eurocentric: he believed that all races which are
extra-European are lower than the low. This also applied to the Jews, who,
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according to racial physiognomists of Weimar Germany and Nazi Germany,
were the primary vehicles of degenerate Otherness (Günther, 1929; in Gray,
2004). He did not treat Jews as a religious or cultural community; Jewishness,
for him, from the very beginning, was an innate racial characteristic associated
with certain attributes. Thus the only way to eradicate these attributes was to
eradicate the Jews themselves (Günther, 1929). The conclusions formulated by
Günther were well suited to the epoch he lived in and were soon used as
a scientific basis of Nazi policy.
The biased results of these and other studies by racial physiognomists
coincided clearly with the anti-Semitic prejudices of the Nordic Movement, and
created favourable ground for the Final Solution (Gray, 2004). In the Third
Reich, racial physiognomy was put into practice. The main racial-physiognomic
theories formulated in Germany at this time were popularized among the
general public, the young generation included. Obligatory classes were organized
on racial ethnology in schools. The popularizers of racial physiognomy claimed
the absolute infallibility of the methods of the “science,” which in practice
consisted in cranial measurements and comparison of eye and hair colour with
a range of colours listed in special charts. The idea that “race is in the face”
(McNeill, 1998: 96) in Nazi Germany became a dangerous truth. Having the
“wrong” face very often meant a death sentence. The saying that the face can
betray its owner got a new literal meaning.
2.12.3. The criminal face
Criminals, like the mentally ill, were in the 19th century treated as brutish
animals that were incapable of participating in social life. As such they became
subjects of academic research. A new discipline was even established, called
criminal anthropology. Its creator, Cesare Lombroso (1835—1909), an Italian
physician, claimed that people who committed crimes are evolutionary
throwbacks. Their atavism is both physical and mental. In his works, and
especially in Criminal Man (1887/2006), Lombroso saw in features
characteristic of criminals many resemblances to animals, “negroes” and
“Peruvian Indians.” He tried to prove that heads and faces of criminals had
many apish features: greater skull thickness, simplicity of cranial sutures, large
jaw, the dominance of the face compared to the cranium, precocious wrinkles,
low and narrow forehead, large ears, dark skin, greater visual acuity, inability to
blush, and absence of baldness (Cohen, 2006). Lombroso discussed analogies
between savages and delinquents, among which were the oblique eyes, the small
skull, the developed jaw, “the forehead retreating obliquely from the eyes,” the
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large ears, and “a greater extension of all new characteristics added to the
necroscopic characteristics which assimilate the European criminal to the
Mongolian and Australian type” (Lombroso, 1895/2004: 38). All “these
characteristics pointed to one conclusion, the atavistic origin of the criminal,
who reproduces physical, psychic, and functional qualities of remote ancestors”
(Lombroso Ferrero, 1911: 7—8).
Fifty years later Ernest A. Hooton (1887—1954), who investigated the
relationship between the criminal life and physical features, came to similar
conclusions, though stripped of the atavistic connotations. He claimed that
“within the human species it is reasonable to suppose that hereditary, racial, or
other physical differences may be associated with mental and behaviouristic
variations” (1939: 252). According to Hooton, crimes arise from deteriorated
organisms, so the primary cause of crime is their biological inferiority.
Criminals are both socially and physically inferior individuals. Analysing their
appearance, Hooton came to the following conclusions:
Marked deficiencies in gross dimensions and in head and face diameters are
unequivocal assertions of undergrowth and poor physical development (1939:
305—306). Deficiencies of dark brown eyes and of blue eyes suggest that these
criminals include fewer of the relatively pure racial types and more of the
mixed types than occur among civilians. Noses broader relative to their height
that are characteristic of the civil check sample are an evidence of infantilism
or of primitiveness. Poor development of other facial dimensions favours the
former interpretation. Low foreheads, high pinched nasal roots, nasal bridges
and tips varying to both extremes of breadth and narrowness, excesses of nasal
deflections, compressed faces and narrow jaw, fit well into the picture of
general constitutional inferiority. The very small ears with submedium role of
helix, prominent antihelix, and frequent presence of Darwin point, hint at
degeneracy (Hooton, 1939: 306).
Lombroso and Hooton were not the only ones to pursue the physiognomic
route in studies of the nature of criminals. In the 1940s, a new interdisciplinary
specialty called criminology developed. Within the range of its research was the
criminal face. In 1939, Thornton showed photographs of 20 criminals convicted
for various offences to 175 University of Nebraska students and asked them to
identify the crime each man had committed. “The students discriminated
accurately at a level significantly better than chance” (Wilson and Herrnstein,
1986: 80). E. Kozeny (1962) divided 720 physiognomies of criminals into 16
offence categories and found significant differences in facial features across at
least some categories (Wilson and Herrnstein, 1986). The results of these
studies were, however, strongly undermined by the results of research carried
out by Bull and Green (1980), who showed 10 photographs of men to a group
of civilians and police officers and asked them to say which of eleven listed
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crimes each photographed man had committed. Both civilians and officers
made similar choices, but what makes this study particularly interesting is that
none of the photographed men had ever committed any crime (Wilson and
Herrnstein, 1986). Thus, the face is a source of information about its owner, but
the information it provides does not always have to be true. The face can
mislead those who perceive others in terms of stereotypes.
Similar situations occur quite frequently — persons whose faces match the
stereotypical facial traits of criminals often are evaluated on the basis of their
appearance. The power of stereotype is great. People “agree to some extent
about the faces that go with certain crimes” (Wilson and Herrstein, 1986: 81).
Due to their unfortunate “criminal” face some persons are more often than
others evaluated as morally unreliable and suspected of committing various
offences or crimes. As argued above, the criminal face is not the only face
which is perceived as “wrong.” The “wrong” face may be defined as a face
whose features evoke some negative connotations in a group of people, for
example:
• a face displaying some symptoms of mental disorder,
• a face of different colour and/or having features other than specific for the
members of the group,
• a face evoking the feelings of fear and uneasiness, and as such treated as
a sign of the person’s capability to do something wrong, e.g., to commit
crimes.
The stereotype of the “wrong” face often has a strong negative impact on the
interpersonal relations, and social life in general, of the people having facial
traits characterized as typical of the mentally ill, members of other races, or
criminals.
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Chapter 3
The concept of self
3.1. Introduction
As mentioned above, the concept of face is inseparably related to the social
aspect of human life. And it is not only because of the character of the face,
a part of the body, which functions as “a source of social signalling and
communication.” It is also because face is an image of self created by
individuals during social interaction. As such it can be classified as a social
construct which needs other people in order to be created.
To adequately describe the concept of face, understood as an image of self,
I have decided to start from its “source.” An individual’s face is said to reflect
his or her self; it is the self’s image. Thus, to truly understand face, one should
start from the self. To understand the complexity of face, one has to take into
account the problem of self-conceptualizations and identities (Tracy, 1990;
Scollon and Scollon, 1994). The topic of the self differs from other academic
topics in that it is shared by many disciplines. It is of great interest to
psychology, anthropology, sociology and philosophy. Other concepts which are
related to the concept of self, and sometimes confused with it, are identity, soul
and person.
Like the concept of self, identity can be characterized as a complex
construct of transdisciplinary nature. It is defined as “the sense of self, of
personhood, of what kind of person one is” (Abercrombie et al., 2000: 171).
Self and personhood develop through communication. Identity is “biologically
based but ultimately symbolically transformed by culture” (Fitzgerald, 1993: 26).
Fitzgerald (1993: 3) treats identity as “the academic metaphor for
self-in-context.” In spite of the undeniable relation between the two concepts,
self and identity do not have the same meaning, as there are forms of identity
which are not based on self, e.g., such forms of group identity as national
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identities, which require a commonality of interests and group solidarity. The
creation of the self is more subjective (Elliot, 2007).
The soul, which has interested both ordinary people and thinkers from the
beginnings of civilization, was thought to be “the distinguishing mark of living
things, as something that is the subject of emotional states and that is
responsible for planning and practical thinking, and also as the bearer of such
virtues as courage and justice” (Lorenz, 2003). In ancient times the soul was
supposed to be responsible for mental or psychological functions like thought,
perception and desire, and to be the bearer of moral qualities (Lorenz, 2003).
A third concept related to the self is person. The word derives from classical
Latin perso–na, meaning “mask used by a player, character in a play, dramatic
role, the part played by a person in life, character, role, position, individual
personality, juridical person, important person, personage, human being in
general” (OED). Later on the meaning of the word person evolved. Over the
centuries, the person gradually acquired “individuality that existed apart from
the mask, or role” (Fitzgerald, 1993: 42). The Western concept of person has
a Christian origin, and it is endowed with moral character, independence, free
will, responsibility and consciousness, “thereby establishing the locus of
rationality and individual unity in the concept of the self” (Fajans, 1985: 370).
For John Locke (1632—1704) (1978) and Immanuel Kant (1724—1802)
(1785/1964), who understood the concept in a similar way, persons are
intelligent subjects capable of imposing law upon themselves. Kant maintains
that because of this capacity they deserve respect.
3.2. The definition of self
Self is a concept which is central to various social theories in which there are
different approaches to the description of the complexity of individual
experience (see Elliot, 2007). It is a concept which is hard to define, and its
definitions have caused many controversies among researchers. It is equated
with (Leary and Tengney, 2003: 6—8):
• the person himself or herself (in everyday discourse),
• all or part of an individual’s personality (in everyday discourse),
• “the inner psychological entity that is the centre or subject of a person’s
experience” (e.g., James, 1890),
• perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and beliefs about oneself,
• an “executive agent” regulating people’s behaviour (e.g., Baumeister, 1998).
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The first two meanings are now avoided in academic work as the self is thought
to refer to something else than person or personality. While the other three are
the most frequently used meanings of self, there are many others, because the
term self or the prefix self- are used in many different contexts with many
different meanings. Generally speaking, the self(-concept) is “the set of
meanings we hold for ourselves when we look at ourselves” (Stets and Burke,
2003: 130). It is based on (Stets and Burke, 2003):
• our observations of ourselves (the self-image),
• our inferences about who we are from others’ behaviour towards us (the
reflected self),
• our wishes and desires (the idealized self),
• our evaluations of ourselves (self-esteem).
George Herbert Mead (1863—1931) (1934), who is thought to be one of the
founders of symbolic interactionism, a theoretical approach to the self, claims that
every individual has “a thing-like self” which can be distinguished from the
immediate organism. It is a complex concept and can be looked at and analysed
from different perspectives. On the one hand, it is presented as something
belonging entirely to the individual, something responsible for his psychological
structure, and shaped to some extent by the culture he belongs to. In a similar
tone, Spiro (1993: 114) sees the self as “the cultural conception of some psychic
entity or structure within the person.” According to Ashmore and Jussim, the self
is “crucial to making sense of the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of individuals”
(1997: 11—12). But on the other hand, the self is “also important to explaining the
formation, maintenance, and dissolution of [...] personal relationships and role
relationships” (Ashmore and Jussim, 1997: 12). It appears as an important agent
in the formation of societies and cultures (Ashmore and Jussim, 1997). Thus, the
self is not only created by culture, but itself creates it. Its character and structure
not only are the core of the individual’s personhood but also influence the nature
of the individual’s relations with others and the character of greater collectivities
of individuals such as societies.
The concept of self has been central in psychology since the 1890s, back to
which can be dated the beginning of the scientific analysis of the concept. In
1890 William James published The Principles of Psychology. The main
assumption of his work was that the self is a major determinant of human
thought and behaviour, and as such can be taken into consideration as a subject
of scientific analysis (see also Calkins (1900), “Psychology as science of
selves”). The date of the publication of James’ seminal work also saw the birth
of symbolic interactionism, the study of the relationship between self and
society (Abercrombie et al., 2000). James Mark Baldwin (1897), Charles
Horton Cooley (1902), and George Herbert Mead (1934) are three scholars
whose works had a great impact on the formation of symbolic interactionism.
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According to this school of thought, both the self and society are created and
sustained through the process of symbolic communication between social
actors. The self is shaped by social interaction, but it also has an impact on
social reality. The self and society are mutually interdependent (Stets and Burke,
2003: 128; Mead, 1934; Stryker, 1980; Denzin, 1992). The self influences
society through the individual’s behaviour. Society influences the self through
language and meanings that make it possible for a person to take the role of the
other, reflect on himself as an object, and participate in social interaction (Stets
and Burke, 2003). As Mead claims in his famous work Mind, Self, and Society
from the Standpoint of the Social Behaviorist (1934), the social self is created
through interaction with other people. During the process of self creation it is
language that plays a principal role. People, unlike other living creatures,
communicate by means of symbols. That is why this approach to the self is
called symbolic interactionism.
The social character of the self is said to lie in the fact that it can exist only
in relationships with other selves (Mead, 1934/1972). That is, “each individual
finds himself or herself in a web of complex social relations” (Dunning, 2003:
433). Understood in this way, the concept has a definitely interpersonal
character.
Interactionists have taken two basic views of the self. In the first one, arising
from the works of Mead, who extended Kant’s idea in which a transcendental
“I” is contrasted with an empirical “me,” “the self became the structure that
organized the flow of experience confronted and produced by the person”
(Denzin, 1988: 67). William James (1890) also differentiated between the
subjective and objective aspects of selfhood. For him, the principal form of the
self is the knower, the subject, or the “I,” which is at the centre of
consciousness. The self as subject interacts with the self as object, the “me.”
The word self is reflexive, in the sense that it can be both subject and object.
Every individual can take the attitude of others and act toward himself as they
do. In other words, he can become an object to himself. Such an objective,
impersonal attitude toward oneself is treated as an instance of rational conduct.
The “me” is the social identity of which the “I” becomes conscious during the
social development of the individual. However, Mead’s (1934) understanding of
the concept of self differs from James’s in that his self is not mentalistic; it is
rather a “social object which lies in the field of experience” (Denzin, 1992: 4).
The “I” is present in memory. The “me” is in the other’s attitude towards the
self; it represents the situation in which the self is. The “I” responds to this
situation (Mead, 1934: 175). Thus, the self is a result of the social symbolic
interaction. This understanding of the self has been maintained in the majority
of interactionist theories of the self.
The second view of the self within the interactionalist tradition treats it as
a linguistic structure; The “I” and the “me” are perceived as linguistic terms that
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are given in the language of the subject. Denzin (1988: 67) claims that these
two views of the self are incompatible and cannot be held simultaneously, as
“the self and its component structures are either linguistic structures, in which
case the language speaks for the subject, or the “I” and the “me” have to be
assumed to exist alongside language, as primordial, deep structures of
a structure called self.”
The first view is represented by Erving Goffman (see Section 5.2.5.).
Goffman’s research interests ranged from urban anthropology, ethnology of
communication and micro-sociology (with the study of social interaction) to
sociolinguistics. Among the concepts he studied were self, face and ritual in
social interaction. In spite of the diversity of topics he investigated and his
unwillingness to subscribe to any particular trend, he is often placed in the
symbolic interactionist tradition of sociological thought.
Anthony Giddens is a self theorist whose impact on sociological thought can
be compared to that of Goffman. But unlike Goffman, Giddens (1991) claims
that in the late Modern Age the self is a reflexive project. Self-identity is not
a constant entity. It is rather a way of thinking about oneself which varies in
different situations. Changes in an individual’s life are always related to the need
for some psychological reorganization; the self is constructed and transformed
in the reflexive process, involving both individual and social changes. The
individual reflects on his own identity and tries to rework it. Reflexivity,
according to Giddens (2006), is the relationship between knowledge and social
life. It is a process of incessant self-defining based on observations and
reflections on psychological and social information which could influence the
individual’s choices (Elliot, 2007). In this way, the individual makes use of the
knowledge to change his self-identity.
Self-identity does not refer merely to the persistence of the self over time,
but “presumes reflexive awareness. It is what the individual is conscious ‘of ’ in
the term ‘self-consciousness.’” It is “something that has to be routinely created
and sustained in the reflexive activities of the individual” (Giddens, 1991: 52: cf.
Goffman’s ego identity (1963/1986)). It is the knowledge of the self, its mental
representation and its image in the individual’s eyes (Gajda, 2008). Discursively,
self-identity can be defined in terms of the linguistic differentiation of
“I”/“me”/“you” (or their equivalents). For Giddens (1991; Gajda, 2008), the
relation of “I”/“me”/“you” is internal to the language, and not, as Mead
claimed, one that connects the unsocialized part of the individual, the “I,” to
the social self. It is through language that self-identity is expressed and created.
The language is an integral element of the individual’s self-presentation.
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3.3. The self and its components
We all are human beings, and as such we share some necessary characteristics
which make us different from other living species. But each of us is also unique
and different from other people. What makes us different and unique is both
external and internal to the individual. To define ourselves we use different
identities. Identities are parts into which the self is organized, and each of them
is tied to different aspects of the social life, positions and role relationships
a person holds in the society (Stryker, 1980; Stets and Burke, 2003). Identity
can be defined as
a set of meanings attached to the self in a social role, this set of meanings
serves as a standard or reference for a person. When an identity is activated in
a situation, a feedback loop is established (Stets and Burke, 2003: 137).
Discussing the concept of identity, Anna Lubecka describes it as
the self-consciousness in all aspects of being and action, i.e. the knowledge of
one’s corporeality, spirituality and emotionality [...] (Lubecka, 2005: 30).
It involves both features which are shared by all members of one group,
community or culture and features distinguishing them from others (Lubecka,
2005: 30). Identity incorporates the individual and the social.
From the very beginning of the study of the self, scholars have discussed the
multiplicity of the human self and provided various descriptions of its
components. James (1890: 294) maintained that a person “has as many social
selves as there are individuals who recognise him” (see also Mead, 1934; Harter,
1997). These selves are organized into a complete unitary self whose components
correspond to different aspects of the social process the individual is involved in
(Mead, 1934). A person’s self-concept is typically represented as a set of
self-aspects (multiple selves) (Showers and Zeigler-Hill, 2003; Fitzgerald, 1993).
Thus, in the unity of the self there is multiplicity of identities. The basis for the
multiple self-concept varies from individual to individual; it usually includes
distinct roles, contexts, relationships, activities, traits, and states (Showers and
Zeigler-Hill, 2003).
Various scholars have divided the self into different component elements.
According to James (1890), the self (he calls it empirical self) consists of three
parts: the material self, spiritual self and social self. The material self refers to
tangible objects, people, and places, talking about which one can use one of the
possessive pronouns, my or mine. It includes the bodily self (e.g., my head, my
hand) and the extracorporeal self (e.g., my computer, my son, my book). The
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spiritual self “refers to our perceived inner psychological qualities” (Brown,
1998: 25; cf. Denzin’s phenomenological self). It includes everything we refer to
as my or mine, but which is not a tangible object, a person, or a place. These
are our emotions, interests, abilities, motives and desires. The third
self-component is the social self, the creation of which involves the participation
of other people. Baldwin (1897), whose interests focused mainly on social
aspects of the self, claims that the social self consists of ego and alter. Ego
refers to your own view of yourself, while alter to your thoughts about other
people. Ego elements include an individual’s social roles, interests, affiliations,
and interpersonal relations. Alter elements include all the persons an individual
has some thoughts of, e.g., intimates, friends, acquaintances, and public figures.
Denzin (1992), who also analyses the concept of self from the symbolic
interactionist standpoint, adds to James’ three self components a couple of
others. The linguistic self refers to the person filling in the empty personal
pronoun (I, me) with personal, biographical, and emotional meanings. The
ideological self involves the broader cultural and historical meanings surrounding
the definition of the individual in a particular group or social situation (e.g.,
tourist, husband). The self as desire refers to “that mode of self experience
which desires its own fulfilment through the flesh, sexuality, and the bodily
presence of the other” (Denzin, 1992: 26).
Although the human self is a complex of natural, species-given structures
and processes, it is also a cultural construct. The natural (“true,” “real,” or
“private”) self exists beneath a sometimes dazzling, but always thin, cultural
overlay (Holland, 1997: 162; Ashmore and Jussim, 1997; Barker, 2005). We are
similar by nature, but we differ a lot in the ways we behave. This way of
thinking is shared by many theorists of self. For Turner et al. (1987), everyone
uses three basic self-categorizations to define themselves: human identity, social
identity and personal identity. Human identity is that part of an individual’s
self-concept which involves the features shared by all human beings. Social
identity “refers to how we are regarded and recognized by others” (Brown,
1998: 24; cf. Denzin’s (1992) interactional self presented and displayed to
another in a sequence of action). It is a socially constructed and socially
meaningful category which is accepted by an individual as descriptive of
himself. It provides answers to the question “Who am I?” (Thoits and Virshup,
1997). It is this part of an “individual’s self-concept which derives from his
knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the
value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1981:
255; 1978; 1972). Our social identities may be based on our membership in
various categories (e.g., nationality, ethnicity, gender, age, social class), the
roles we play (e.g., mother, husband, teacher), our membership in different
organizations (e.g., political parties, professional societies), our vocations
(e.g., scholar, tailor, artist), or our membership in “stigmatized groups”
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(e.g., the homeless, people with AIDS) (Gudykunst, 2004: 77). We can
simultaneously be members of many groups or communities, and as such have
many different identities which form the self.
Personal identity is the part of the self-concept that defines the individual as
unique. Goffman (1986: 57) describes personal identity as
the positive marks or identity pegs, and the unique combination of life history
items that comes to be attached to the individual with the help of these pegs
for his identity. Personal identity, then, has to do with the assumption that the
individual can be differentiated from all others and that around this means of
differentiation a single continuous record of social facts can be attached,
entangled, like candy floss, becoming then the sticky substance to which still
other biographical facts can be attached.
So what distinguishes an individual from others can be (Goffman, 1986: 56;
Harter, 1997):
• a “positive mark” or “identity peg,” e.g., “the photographic image of the
individual in others’ minds, or the knowledge of his special place in
a particular kinship network,”
• “name-bound” — information about his life history (Giddens, 1991),
• “body-bound,” or more specifically face-bound — information concerning his
pattern of behaviour.
The personal identity is a self-description referring to unique details of
biography and idiosyncratic experiences. It is a construct deeply embedded in
interpersonal relationships in which the impact of significant others is of crucial
importance (Harter, 1997). Thus, both the individual and the social have
a strong impact on its creation.
Brewer and Gardner (1996) see an individual not only as a participant in
social interaction in which he comes into contact with other people, but also as
a member of various collectivities which can influence him as a person. That is
why they distinguish between three aspects of the self: the individual self
(cf. personal identity as described above), which can be defined by personal
traits that differentiate a self from others, the relational self (cf. social
self/identity and interactional self as described above), defined by dyadic
relationships assimilating the self to significant others, and the collective self
(cf. social self/identity as described above), defined by group membership that
differentiates “us” from “them” (Hogg, 2003; see also Tajfel and Turner, 1979).
All these forms of self-conceptualization are socially constructed and grounded
and are culturally variable (Harter, 1997; Hogg, 2003; Barker, 2005). They
depend on cultural and social circumstances (see Section 4.3.3.). All self
components are “enacted” during social interaction and become part of
a person’s biography.
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The self-concept may also be described in terms of the truth-falsity of its
components. Among the multiplicity of selves an individual may have true and
false ones. The true self is what constitutes “the real me.” True self-behaviour
consists in “saying what you really think,” “expressing your own opinion.” This
is not always what individuals would like to show to others. The false self, on
the other hand, is created when an individual tries to live up to the standards
and expectations of significant others. False self-behaviour, then, includes “not
stating your true opinion” and “saying what you think others want to hear”
(Harter, 1997: 85). The main reasons for not expressing one’s true self are:
• the belief that it will not be accepted by significant others,
• an attempt to be approved of,
• an attempt to avoid rejection,
• an attempt to maintain a good social relationship with others.
So hiding the true self and creating a false one is usually done for pragmatic
reasons. Certainly, acting differently in different contexts does not have to
constitute false self-behaviour (Harter, 1997). We behave in different ways in
different situations in which we “put on” different social identities. This
multiplicity in unity is a characteristic feature of every individual self-concept.
3.4. Self-presentation
Self-presentation can be defined as:
The conscious or unconscious control of the impression that one creates in
social interactions or situations. It is one of the important forms of impression
management, namely management of one’s own impression on others through
role playing (Colman, 2009: 682).
The concept of self-presentation often has negative connotations of
superficiality, pretence, deceit, and immoral manipulativeness (Schlenker and
Pontari, 2000), yet it has been a popular topic in many scholarly disciplines,
including social psychology, sociology, counselling, developmental psychology,
and organizational behaviour. The scientific study of self-presentation started
with the works of early psychologists and sociologists (James, 1890; Cooley,
1902; Mead, 1934); they stated that people see themselves as they think others
see them. So the self is built on reflected appraisals. It is produced in social
interaction and reflects other people’s opinions about the individual. According
to Cooley, who introduced the concept of a “looking-glass” self (a reflected self),
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a person observes how others see him, and afterwards incorporates their views
into his self-concept (Tice and Wallace, 2003).
The self arises in the process of the social experience of the individual as
a result of his relations with others. The full development of the self depends on
the particular attitudes of other individuals toward the individual and the social
attitudes of the generalized other or the social group to which he belongs
(Mead, 1934). However, as mentioned above, our self-concepts are not constant.
They undergo continual change, depending on the situation we are in and the
different others we are interacting with. We see ourselves “in the ‘looking glass’
of others’ appraisals and build or construct a self that is congruent with the
appraisals of others” (Tice and Wallace, 2003: 92). Thus, significant others
(e.g., parents, siblings, relatives, friends, teachers, bosses), or a “generalized
other” have a great impact on the person’s form of self (Cooley, 1902; Mead,
1934). Mead, who developed Cooley’s idea of the looking-glass self, claims that
generalized others, the whole social group and their views of the person, are
extremely important for the formation of the person’s self. The idea of the
reflected self was later developed by Goffman (1959) in his book The
Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, in which, using theatrical metaphorization,
he studied how people behave in front of others and “control the impression
they form of him” (Goffman, 1959: xi) (see Section 5.2.1.).
Self-presentation is “aimed at establishing, maintaining, or refining an image
of the individual in the minds of others” (Baumeister, 1982; cf. Goffman, 1959;
Leary and Kowalski, 1990). In other words, it consists in using behaviour to
communicate some information about oneself to others. It is one of the most
important elements of communication, an underlying motive of many aspects of
social behaviour (Goffman, 1959; Baumeister, 1982; Bangerter, 2000; Leary,
2005). Like other acts of communication it is conditioned by social values and
interactional norms specific to a particular culture. As mentioned above, it is
a type of impression management, which is “the goal-oriented activity of
controlling information in order to influence the impressions formed by an
audience” (Schlenker, 2003: 492). Self-presentation is a more specific term
referring to the control of information about the self (Schlenker and Pontari,
2000).
Self-presentation is a complex activity that is shaped by “a combination of
personality, situational, and audience factors” such as:
• an expression of self,
• a role-played response to situational pressures,
• conformity to the identity expectations of salient others (Schlenker, 2003:
498; Brown, 1998),
• conformity to culture-specific norms of self-presentation (Kuryło and Urban,
1997).
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So, to present oneself in an effective and positive way, it is not enough to
communicate some information about oneself to others and present them with
a somewhat glorified picture of the self irrespective of context. Schlenker (1975)
stresses the importance of managing the impression of consistency between the
individuals’ self-perceptions, their behaviours and the reactions of others to
these behaviours in situations in which reality interferes with self-enhancement
(e.g., when public events could invalidate an unrealistically positive
self-presentation). The presented image of self must be consistent with the role
an individual plays in a particular situation and with the expectations, both
socially and culturally conditioned, of other participants.
Cooley (1902) and Mead (1934) stress the interplay between the private and
the public self. A “true,” “real” or “private” self is constructed through one’s
choices and performances. Creating the self is a matter of self-presentation only
insofar as it is concerned with establishing and maintaining one’s public self,
that is, the image of one in the minds of others (Baumeister, 1982). Usually, it
is a slightly polished and glorified picture of the self which is believed by the
individual to be true, but sometimes self-presentation may be a little
manipulative and result from deceptive activity designed to exploit others
(Schlenker, 2003). Thus, self-presentation can involve deceptions about oneself
as well as genuine images of oneself (i.e. what one thinks one really is). Leary
(2005), however, claims that usually the image presented by us is relatively true.
The two main self-presentational motives are to please others and to
construct (create, maintain, and modify) one’s public self congruent with one’s
ideal (Baumeister, 1982). Behind these motives there is one fundamental motive
of “constructing a desired identity” resulting from the two desires for having
positive, socially desirable qualities, and for the approval of others (Schlenker,
2003). In reality, however, self-presentation is often guided by other, more
pragmatic, motives.
When self-presentation is treated as a goal-oriented activity, it can be viewed
as a transaction rather than a mere expression of self. Then what is at issue is
not the individual but his relationship with other people (the audience)
(Schlenker, 2003). The results of this presentation are beneficial images which
are expected to facilitate the individual’s goals. Such images, although preferably
positive and socially desirable, in practice sometimes are socially undesirable or
even negative if their being such may facilitate the individual’s goals (Schlenker,
2003).
The extent to which people resort to self-presentation depends on the social
context, i.e. on the important others with whom they interact, and the
relationship between them and a generally understood situation. The careful
presentation of self is especially relevant:
• to important, evaluative situations that prompt people to behave pretentiously,
such as a job interview,
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• to formal situations that cue well-established social roles and interaction
rituals, such as a wedding,
• to situations in which the actor feels himself to be the centre of an audience’s
attention and may experience shyness or stage fright, such as giving a speech
(Schlenker and Pontari, 2000: 201).
In other conditions, focusing less consciously on the type of impressions they
are making on others, people mostly express their genuine qualities. However,
there are people who by virtue of their personality characteristics, such as high
self-monitoring or public self-consciousness, are more likely to self-present
almost all the time (Schlenker and Pontari, 2000). Some self-images resulting
from conscious presentation are more desirable than others, as they are
associated with beneficial consequences for the person, such as approval,
respect, or material rewards; they are called desirable identity images (Schlenker
and Pontari, 2000: 204). In other words, desirable identity images refer to what
a person “would like to be and thinks he or she really can be” (Leary and
Kowalski, 1990: 40).
Self-presentation, especially the kind that is goal-oriented, is “sensitive
business” (Holtgraves, 1990: 197) and can create a threat to the individual’s
positive self-image (face). In fact, as Goffman (1955: 226) claims, “there is no
occasion of talk so trivial as not to require each participant to show serious
concern with the way in which he handles himself and the others present.” The
end-result of the self-presentation activity is a self-image — face, a complex of
positive attributes the individual wants to be associated with and characterized
by. These attributes vary with respect to the interpersonal relations the
individual has with others, the social situations in which he interacts with them,
and the culture he belongs to.
3.5. The self and the body
For centuries philosophers have pondered the nature of the relation of body and
self, or body and soul, or body and mind. The body as understood here is not
just skin and bones, but is “loaded with cultural symbolism, public and private,
positive and negative, political and economic, sexual, moral and often
controversial” (Synnott, 1993: 1). The self, on the other hand, is our internal
structure, and consists of experiences specific for an individual person. Since
times immemorial, people have looked for the place in which the self is located.
And some have claimed to have found it. Descartes (1649/1989) maintained
that the soul is in the pineal gland, a small organ in the centre of the brain in
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which he believed all our thoughts are formed. Some have searched for the
“true” self. Sigmund Freud looked for it “in the darkest regions of our heart.”
Many philosophers and thinkers have pondered over the locus of the “true” self,
thinking it to reside somewhere inside the body or the mind (Fontana and
Tillett, 1993).
There have been different opinions and theories concerning the relation of
body and self/soul/mind. Some have insisted on the dualism of body and
self/soul/mind, others have maintained that a person is his body.
3.5.1. Body—soul dualism
Body—soul dualism had already become a subject of philosophical investigation
in ancient times. Aristotle, in De Anima (1968), writes:
It is not necessary to ask whether soul and body are one, just as it is not
necessary to ask whether the wax and its shape are one, nor generally whether
the matter of each thing and that of which it is the matter are one. For even if
one and being are spoken of in several ways, what is properly so spoken of is
the actuality (1968: ii 1, 412b 6—9).
The two, body and soul, are closely related: one cannot act without the other,
but it is the soul that is responsible for the actual organization of the body; it is
the form of the body. No activities specific to the soul, e.g., imagination or
passions, can occur without the assistance of the body. Thinking seems to
Aristotle to be an exception — the only human activity which exclusively belongs
to the soul and does not need any relation to the body. Aristotle also claims
that:
[...] they all join the soul to a body, or place it in a body, without adding any
specification of the reason of their union, or of the bodily conditions required
for it. Yet such explanations can scarcely be omitted; for some community of
nature is presupposed by the fact that the one acts and the other is acted
upon, the one moves and the other is moved; interaction always implies
a special nature in the two interagents. All, however, that these thinkers do is
to describe the specific characteristics of the soul; they do not try to determine
anything about the body which is to contain it, as if it were possible, as in the
Pythagorean myths, that any soul could be clothed upon with any body — an
absurd view, for each body seems to have a form and shape of its own. It is as
absurd as to say that the art of carpentry could be embodied in flutes; each art
must use its tools; each soul its body (Aristotle, 1968: 407b 14—25).
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For Aristotle, each particular soul is connected to a particular body. Each body
has a specific form of its own, and is unique. He argues that “a human soul is
actualized “in a matter of its own appropriate to it.” For Aristotle, “matter refers
to the particular organic totality which is besouled” (Spicker, 1970: 7).
“I think, therefore I am” — this is the main principle of Cartesianism. In his
Discourse on the Method (1637/1985), René Descartes claims that the human
soul is completely distinct from the body. They are two completely distinct
substances which separate at death. Descartes maintains that:
I was a substance whose whole essence or nature was only to think, and
which, to exist, has no need of space nor of any material thing. Thus it follows
that this ego, this soul, by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the
body and is easier to know than the latter, and that even if the body were not,
the soul would not cease to be all that it now is (Descartes, 1985: 21).
The body is like a machine (Descartes, 1989). Animals are machines but people
are more than that, because in addition to the machine-like body they have
a soul. And what makes human beings different from animals is the ability to
conduct conversations and to reason. For Descartes, the body is the “not-I,” and
“the ‘I’ in the total absence of any relation or activity of the body has no power
of imagery or sense” (Spicker, 1970: 13). The “I” is a completely spiritualized
concept. It is neither the self nor the person. By the self Descartes (1950)
understands the composite whole of the mind and the body. Descartes (1950:
VI, 94) agrees with Aristotle when he writes that:
Nature likewise teaches me by these sensations of pain, hunger, thirst, etc.,
that I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel but that I am
besides so intimately conjoined, and as it were intermixed with it that my mind
and body compose a certain unity. For if this were not the case, I should not
feel pain when my body is hurt, seeing I am merely a thinking thing, but
should perceive the wound by the understanding alone, just as a pilot perceives
by sight when any part of his vessel is damaged.
The coexistence of the mind and the body fascinated also Thomas Hobbes,
he saw them as distinct from each other. In his famous work Leviathan
(1651/1973: 53—54), he writes:
this ‘I’, that is to say, the mind, by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct
from the body [...] I considered myself, firstly, as having a face, hands, arms,
and the whole machine made up of flesh and bones, such as it appears in
a corpse and which I designated by the name of body.
136 The concept of self
3.5.2. The body and the soul/self in modern philosophy
The dualistic concept of soul and body prominent in Cartesian philosophy was
finally rejected. The majority of modern thinkers claim that (Spicker, 1970:
17—18; Synnott, 1993):
• a person is not a nonphysical or nonbodily entity;
• the distinction between a person and his body is not perfectly legitimate;
• it is not merely a contingent fact that a person has that body which he calls
his;
• a person necessarily has that particular body which he calls his;
• this body which is mine could not (logically) have been the body of someone
else;
• this body which is mine cannot (logically) someday be the body of someone
else;
• no two persons can (logically) be said to exchange or switch bodies;
• the identity of the body is not logically independent of the identity of the
person whose body it is;
• although it is correct to say that a person has a body, it is more precise to say
that a person is his body.
Thus, it is no longer valid to talk about body—soul dualism. A person is his
body. “Body is also, and primarily, the self” (Synnott, 1993: 1). And as
a consequence, the identity of the body depends on the identity of the person
whose body it is (This is, certainly two-way dependency, for the person’s identity
also depends on the identity of his body).
John Dewey (1859—1952) maintains that:
The soul is immanent in the body just so far as it has made the body its
organic instrument. The common saying that the “body is the organ of the
soul” is literally much truer and more significant that is usually thought or
meant. [...] Organ presupposes function, and soul and body are related indeed
as function and organ, activity and instrument. [...] The body is the organ of
the soul because by the body the soul expresses and realizes its own nature. It
is the outward form and living manifestation of the soul (1886/1970: 117).
For Dewey, the relationship between the soul and the body consists in that the
soul being transcendent, it expresses and manifests its nature in the body. In
other words, the body is a reflection of the soul, while the soul is an acting
force which is constantly forming the body.
Jean-Paul Sartre (1905—1980) analyses the relationship between the body
and consciousness; the body “from the start posited as a certain thing having its
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own laws and capable of being defined from outside” and consciousness, which
can be “reached by the type of inner intuition which is peculiar to it” and which
can be grasped “by a series of reflective acts” (Sartre, 1970: 218). The body is
the instrument and the end of our actions. Sartre claims that it is impossible to
distinguish “sensation” from “action,” as “this is what we had in mind when we
made the observation that reality is presented to us neither as a thing nor as an
instrument but as an instrumental-thing” (1970: 226). The body is not
a “contingent addition to the soul; on the contrary it is a permanent condition
of possibility for my consciousness as consciousness of the world and as
a transcendent project toward my future” (1970: 235). Finally, Sartre states
that:
The body is the instrument which I am. It is my facticity of being
“in-the-midst-of-the-world” in so far as I surpass this facticity toward my
being-in the-world (Sartre, 1970: 239).
According to Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908—1961), who was among those to
reject dualist theories of body and soul, “The body is no more than an element
in the system of the subject and his world” (1970: 249). He claims that a man is
literally what others think of him and what his world is. Moving his body, he is
aware neither of the actual stimulus nor of its reaction, he is his body.
The self is embodied and constantly “‘on display’ to others in terms of its
embodiment” (Giddens, 1991: 58; Goffman, 1967). Both the self and the body
are social constructs, shaped in different ways by members of different groups
and cultures. The body, its parts and attributes are undoubtedly social, and
determine our lives. They have a strong impact on the creation of our social and
personal identities.
3.5.3. The body — the symbol of the self
The body determines who we are, and at the same time is the symbol of the self
(cf. Synnott, 1993; Magli, 1989; Łotocka, 2000). It is “highly polarized in moral
terms: male/female, old/young, beautiful/ugly, fat/thin, black/white/ red/yellow,
and so on, with valences depending upon personal and cultural values”
(Synnott, 1993: 3). Our identities depend largely on these attributes of the body.
The identity expectations of salient others together with a stereotypical
perception of these bodily attributes determine our life and as a consequence
our identities. To a great extent we are perceived and evaluated in terms of the
way we look and manage our bodies. The attributes of the body contribute to
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the overall image of the person, and have a strong impact on the person’s
self-image.
Although the body is a social category, not all its parts are equally social, as
the body is also internally polarized; there are public parts (e.g., the face) and
private parts (e.g., the genitals). This coincides with the traditional Western
dichotomies of front/back, high/low and good/bad (Synnott, 1993; see also
Section 1.1). These dichotomies are visible in the metaphors by means of which
we function in our everyday life:
UP IS GOOD and DOWN IS BAD
FRONT IS GOOD and BACK IS BAD
THE PUBLIC IS ON DISPLAY and THE PRIVATE IS HIDDEN
WHAT IS ON DISPLAY IS GOOD and WHAT IS HIDDEN IS BAD
The majority of the human body is hidden from the public, as something
shameful and embarrassing. These parts of the body are called private or
intimate, and their exposure is considered to be something morally wrong and
socially unacceptable. The back of the body is treated differently from its front
part. The only part of the body which is “naked,” constantly on display to the
public, is the face. It is in the upper, front part of the body, and as such
deserves respect. Thus, something low and therefore bad, like the genitals, is
hidden from public view, while something high and therefore good, like the
face, is constantly subject to public evaluation.
There are several aspects of the body which are especially relevant to the
self and self-identity (Giddens, 1991). These are appearance (features of the
surface of the body, the face included), demeanour (determining how
appearance is used by the individual in everyday activities; Goffman, 1967),
sensuality (the handling of pleasure and pain), and regimes (“modes of
providing food and other basic organic necessities” (Giddens, 1991: 61), or
“learned practices that entail tight control over organic needs” (1991: 62), to
which bodies are subject). All of them help create an image of the person in the
eyes of others. Bodily discipline, and especially routine control of the body, is
essential for the self, both for its management and presentation. It is the
necessary condition for an individual to be accepted by others as a competent
member of society (Giddens, 1991). By controlling particular aspects of the
body and the way it functions, the individual complies with social norms.
The face plays a special role in the creation of self-identity and in
self-presentation. It has to be under constant control, as it is traditionally treated
as a mirror of the soul and a part of the body which expresses the person’s
emotions (see Sections 2.4. and 2.5.). Socially speaking, it is the most important
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part of the body. The information provided by a person’s face can be divided
into:
• information which is given independently of the person’s will, concerning his
identification and social identities,
• information whose giving can be controlled to some extent by the person,
concerning his feelings and attitudes.
People can try, however, to control or even to block both types of information.
To hide their identity, they can put on masks. To change their social identities,
they can put on make-up (a kind of mask as well), which will make them look
younger or older, beautiful or ugly, or which will hide their gender. To control
the expression of their true feelings or to hide their true attitudes towards
others, people also put on masks, but unlike the real masks, these ones are
metaphorical; they change the face into an expressionless mask.
Whatever could be said about the relationship between the self and the body
(the face included), one thing will be always true: in the unity which they form
— the person — there is a two-way dependency: the self (the inner) has to some
extent power and control over the body (the outer); and the body determines to
some extent the self.
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Chapter 4
Face as a folk concept
4.1. Introduction
In most recent research on politeness and face, authors distinguish between
first-order face and second-order face. The distinction is made by analogy to the
distinction between first-order and second-order politeness made by Watts et al.
(1992; Eelen, 2001). First-order face (face1), as Haugh (2009: 5) notes, is
conceptualized in two different ways:
• the commonsense concept of face, a folk or emic notion (Haugh and Hinze,
2003; Ruhi and Işik-Güler, 2007; Terkourafi, 2007),
• the notion of face from the participant’s perspective, as opposed to the
analyst’s perspective.
In the present study, I take the first, emic, perspective. Second-order face (face2)
is an academic concept. By analogy to the definition of politeness2 by Watts et
al. (1992: 4), one can characterize face2 as “a more technical notion which can
only have a value within an overall theory of social interaction.”
In this chapter, face1, a folk notion, is subjected to analysis. First, it is
presented together with some related concepts, such as morality, dignity and
honour. Second, the emic concepts of face are investigated in a broad
sociocultural context, understood in terms of values, norms and beliefs.
Although face is considered a universal concept, its meaning and social
role differ across cultures. In other words, there are culture-specific
conceptualizations of face which function “as a kind of shared cultural
construct that constrains social behaviour” (Haugh, 2009: 4). Such an
understanding of face makes culture an indispensable factor in helping to
explain social behaviour. That is why, before particular folk notions of face
are analysed, I would like to concentrate on culture and, in particular,
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dimensions of cultural variability, which may explain differences in face-related
behaviour.
Next, three culture-specific conceptualizations of face are presented:
Chinese, American and Polish. The reasons for a discussion of Chinese face are
different from those in the case of American and Polish face. First, in Chinese
culture, face has a special role to play in social interaction, as it is “a measure of
the recognition accorded by society” (Chang and Holt, 1994: 99). Second, it
was Chinese face that was first introduced into academic discourse (Hu, 1944),
eleven years later to be borrowed into sociology by Goffman (1955). Third, the
origins of the concept of face have recently been traced to Chinese culture
(e.g., Mao, 1994; Ho, 1976). The two chapters to follow are devoted to an
analysis of the American and Polish concepts of face, presented in a broad
sociocultural context. These two independent analyses, apart from forming
a general picture of the two respective concepts, also aim to stress differences
and similarities between the two cultures in the character of interpersonal
relations, facial expressions and face-related behaviour.
4.2. Face, morality and related social concepts
The social concept of face is related to certain social values. Through face an
individual expresses his self. When he participates in social encounters, he has
to follow some moral rules, which “determine the evaluation he will make of
himself and of his fellow-participants in the encounter, the distribution of his
feelings, and the kinds of practices he will employ to maintain a [...] ritual
equilibrium” (Goffman, 1967: 45). Face is associated with pride, honour,
dignity, tact, respect and esteem. All these values, like face, are indispensable if
the individual wants to be a member of a community and successfully
participate in social interatcion. Face, however, involves more than the values
enumerated above. Ho (1976: 868; see also Ting-Toomey and Oetzel, 2001)
argues that
one finds in literature that face has been variously confounded with an
assortment of sociological as well as non-sociological concepts, such as status,
prestige, dignity, honor and the like. [...] If one substitutes other terms, such as
‘prestige,’ for ‘face,’ however, one is invariably left with a dissatisfaction that
some essential component of ‘face’ has been left out.
So these concepts, although related to face and functioning as components of
the meaning of face, are not sufficient to explain the concept as a whole.
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4.2.1. Face and morality
Morality is what makes an individual human. It “is about human well-being. All
our moral ideals, such as justice, fairness, compassion, virtue, tolerance,
freedom, and rights, stem from our fundamental human concern with what is
best for us and how we ought to live” (Lakoff and Johnson, 1999: 290). We
should behave in a right and honest way, always having in mind the enhancing
of well-being, but especially the well-being of others. This is in line with what
two fathers of ethics asserted centuries ago. According to Socrates, virtues
produce benefits and happiness. Only what is virtuous is really beneficial.
People often go astray because they do not know what is good. Thus, virtue is
the knowledge that we have to acquire to be able to make the right choice, and
as a consequence to become happy (Tatarkiewicz, Vol. 1, 1978). In a similar
vein Aristotle argues that virtues which people develop lead them to act morally.
In The Nicomachean Ethics (1911), he starts with what all people think to be the
aim of life, eudaimonia (“happiness,” “well-being”). He maintains that in seeking
happiness people acquire habits which help them to choose what is right. These
habits are formed at home with the family, which provides them with the
necessary nurturance. This nurturance turns them into fully-fledged human
beings, well-balanced and aware of what is morally right.
For Kant, to act morally means to act out of duty. Good feelings and
inclinations cannot be the motive for moral action, as they are not subject to
the will. Kant’s ethics is universalistic: there is nothing personal in duty, which
can be the only motive for moral action. The point of duty is to adhere to the
moral principle. This is the categorical imperative, which says: “Act only on that
maxim which you can at the same time will to become a universal law” (Kant,
1785/1964: 30). So it does not tell us which principle we should adopt, but that
we should adopt the principle which could be adopted by everyone (Flew, 1979;
Tatarkiewicz, Vol. 2, 1978).
According to David Hume (1711—1776), who represents a social orientation
in ethics, moral choices are mainly motivated by sentiments. In Book 3 of his
Treatise of Human Nature, “Of Morals,” he argues that moral sentiments are not
simple and primal, because they are the result of associating. They are not
egoistic, either. The primal sentiment is benevolence or sympathy, which Hume
treats as a natural, biological phenomenon. We morally evaluate our own
actions in terms of benevolence or sympathy for others (1740/1969;
Tatarkiewicz, Vol. 2, 1978). John Stuart Mill (1806—1873) maintains that the
ultimate goal of every individual is the promotion of the agent’s own happiness,
hedonistically understood as consisting in pleasure (Tatarkiewicz, Vol. 3, 1978).
In Chapter II of Utilitarianism, Mill explains how “the creed which accepts as
the foundations of morals ‘utility’ or the ‘greatest happiness principle’ holds that
4.2. Face, morality and related social concepts 143
actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness; wrong as
they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended
pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of
pleasure” (Mill, 1861/1965—1991: II 2).
Over the centuries, philosophers have presented different views of morality,
and they have found different motivations for moral action. But what their
theories have in common is the treatment of morality as a code of conduct. For
Kant and Mill, morality is a code that all rational individuals would put forward
for governing the behaviour of all moral agents, and it has a fairly definite
content. Kant regards morality as applying to behaviour that affects no one but
the agent; however, he admits that it is also commonly related to behaviour that
affects other people. Mill, and most other philosophers writing in English,
restrict the concept of morality to behaviour that, directly or indirectly, affects
others (Gert, 2005). Morality as a code of conduct exists in every society and
every community. By adhering to it in social interaction an individual becomes
part of his group.
According to Mead, morality is constituted
where the person has in his own conduct the universals that govern the whole
community. The community thus becomes moral, as it can recognize itself in
one of its citizens. This is characteristic of human society; the behavior of the
group as a whole enters into the separate individual (Mead; cited by Miller,
1982: 168).
In this way moral issues are pervasive in social life. Every social activity has
a moral sense, and all moral choices are socially conditioned. Thus, morality
has a definitely social character. An individual can behave in a moral way only
in relation to others. Charles Taylor, in Sources of the Self (1989: 15), argues
that morality involves three dimensions:
[...] our sense of respect for and obligations to others [...], our understanding
of what makes a full life [and] the range of notions concerned with dignity.
Whenever we come into contact with other people, we are expected to do our
best to treat them with due care and respect, and do whatever is consistent with
their face; we are expected to take care of their social well-being. Certainly, we
think also about our own well-being and face. The moral character of social
interaction is stressed by Jürgen Habermas. He maintains that “interaction is
the dialectic of the moral life; claims of right and wrong are implicit in all
modes of communication” (Habermas, 1975: 37). Similarly, Garfinkel (1967:
50) claims that “daily life is a morality.” Morality understood in this way
constitutes “an externally functioning set of values, norms and patterns of
behaviour and an internal element of the individual consciousness” (Mariański,
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2006: 8). Its most important element is a set of moral values that determine
what is perceived as good or bad in the society. Understood in this way, these
values are variable and reflect the collective consciousness. They are actualized
in social norms, which describe how to behave properly (Mariański, 2006).
Moral order involves routine everyday activities, and participants of social life
see it in ordinary types of action and images of everyday life.
Participation in social interaction affects individuals. Goffman (1967: 45)
maintains that the person becomes “a kind of construct, built up [...] from moral
rules that are impressed upon him from without.” These rules turn him into “an
interactant.” He is taught “to be perceptive, to have feelings attached to self and
a self expressed through face, to have pride, honor, and dignity, to have
considerateness, to have tact and a certain amount of poise” (Goffman, 1967:
44; Mariański, 2006), which together constitute “universal human nature.”
Morality as understood by Goffman thus strongly resembles Emile Durkheim’s
morality, which depends on the group the person belongs to and on the
hierarchy existing in it. To be able to co-exist and interact with other members of
the group/society, the person has to comply with the moral rules existing in it.
The general capacity to be bound by moral rules, as Goffman says (1967),
belongs to the individual, but the rules which transform him into a human being
derive from “requirements established in the ritual organization of social
encounters” (1967: 45). This set of moral rules presents every individual
participating in the social encounter “in an idealized light, a light which in turn
celebrates wider social values.” The participants enter into a temporary
agreement to undertake the joint task of this idealization and celebration. Each
of them has a role to play in the performance of the ritual order (Strong, 1988:
234). Thus, adherence to moral rules seems to be the only rational course of
action. It helps the participants to “idealize” the image of self (face) they try to
maintain during the social encounter. If they behave in the right way they are
rewarded by their inner sense of self-esteem and self-respect, and they are
granted acceptance, approval and respect by other participants. If they behave
as though they did not know the difference between right and wrong they are
punished by internal guilt, shame, lack of self-respect and lack of acceptance by
other participants.
As social interaction and communication always involve the other or others,
any decision we take, any choice we make, has an impact on them. This can
also influence face, which, according to Goffman (1967), is “a condition of
interaction.” To be able to interact with others successfully, or at all, the
individual has to maintain his own face and the face of the other. To do so, he
has to engage in highly moral activities, which are “moral” in the sense that
they are motivated both by the sense of duty to oneself as well as to the other
(cf. Kitowska-Łysiak, 2000). One’s moral decisions play an important role in the
process of self-construction. The ultimate goal of the individual’s choice-making
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and social activities is successful face-management, i.e. presenting oneself in the
best possible light and making it possible for the other to do the same. Morality
is an indispensable element of the constant redefinition of individuals’ face and
the interaction in which they participate with others. Thus there is a close
relationship between face, morality and social interaction (see Fig. 5).
MORAL ACTIONS  MUTUAL FACE MAINTENANCE  SOCIAL INTERACTION
Fig. 5. One-Way Dependency in Social Encounters
Concluding what has been discussed above, one can assume the following order
of dependencies. Face, or to be precise the maintenance of face of all the
participants, is a condition of interaction. Mutual face maintenance, which is
a common enterprise of all the participants, makes possible for them successful
interaction, or any interaction. Face maintenance is only possible when another
condition is fulfilled, when the participants engage in action which results from
adhering to a moral code of conduct, for example, when they express
considerateness, behave in a tactful way and treat the other with due respect.
4.2.2. Face and pride, dignity, tact, respect and (self-)esteem
To understand the concept of face [...], we have to understand the moral
conditioning or moral drives (e.g., shame, guilt) of the self (Ting-Toomey and
Oetzel, 2001: 36).
Pride and shame are two emotions which may indicate the salience of face to
a particular situation (Cocroft and Ting-Toomey, 1994). These are two primary
emotions which can be treated as “a sign of the state of one’s social bond with
others” (Scheff, 1990; see also Section 2.10.3.). Pride and shame are related to
both self-face and other-face, because, as Scheff maintains, they communicate
the state of one’s attitude both to the self and to the other. Shame is invariably
related to situations in which face is threatened or lost: “One becomes painfully
embarrassed and flustered when one ‘loses face’ in public” (Scheff, 1990: 170).
Every human being feels the need for approval and inclusion, the need for pride
and the need to prevent shame. Face is the locus of all these needs, and
face-negotiation is one way to secure social bonds and satisfy these needs
(Cocroft and Ting-Toomey, 1994). Even though pride, like face, exists in most
cultures, it gets different interpretations. In individualistic cultures (see Section
4.3.2.), it is positively evaluated and associated with the positive feeling of
self-satisfaction and success. In collectivistic cultures, it is negatively evaluated
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and treated “as a sign of arrogance and as failure to acknowledge the
contributions of others” (Cross and Gore, 2003: 550). This can be explained by
the great importance attached by members of collectivistic cultures to modesty,
which is in opposition to pride.
Another value which is said to be related to the notion of face is dignity. It is
an idea which organizes a certain type of evaluative thinking. But it is not so
much an element of the collection of moral values as a superordinate idea for
morality which determines the range of the community (Środa, 1993). Dignity
is indispensable for an individual to feel well with himself as well as with others.
So, as in the case of face, mutual dignity maintenance and the avoidance of
affronts to other people’s dignity as well as dignified behaviour are a condition
of interaction. Lebra (1976), who discusses dignity and disgrace, asserts that
a balance between them is necessary for face maintenance. This balance can be
achieved by employing certain supportive mechanisms, e.g., tact.
Tact is commonly understood as consideration in dealing with others.
According to Goffman, it is employed by participants of social interaction as
a means of maintaining trust between them. He claims (1967: 30) that:
Tact in regard to face-work often relies for its operation on a tacit agreement
to do business through the language of hint — the language of innuendo,
ambiguities, well-placed pauses, carefully worded jokes, and so on. The rule
regarding this unofficial kind of communication is that the sender ought not to
act as if he had officially conveyed the message he has hinted at, while the
recipients have the right and obligation to act as if they had not officially
received the message contained in the hint.
Tactful behaviour is an indispensable element of face-oriented activity (facework,
see Section 5.2.7.). It has many functions. Employing tact helps to sustain
mutual confidence and respect (Giddens, 1988) as well as to avoid conflict
situations (Leech, 1977). Such situations are always potentially threatening to
participants’ face, so self- and other-awareness and intuition are indispensable in
order for the interaction to be successful.
To live up to their face, people behave with dignity and in a tactful way, and
show respect for others. Respect is identified with high opinion and esteem for
a person. Manifesting respect for others we show admiration and consideration
for them. Respectful behaviour is very important for face maintenance. Face
operates along the continuum of respect and contempt (Penman, 1990).
Showing respect we give face to others; treating them with contempt we threaten
their face. To maintain good social relations with others, and thus avoid conflict
in social interaction, we are oriented at the respect end.
Self-esteem, or “an attitude toward or an evaluation of oneself” (Cross and
Gore, 2003: 549), is not less relevant for the success of social interaction than
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the display of our positive evaluation of others. The way we perceive ourselves
has a great impact on the picture of ourselves we create in the eyes of others.
Therefore self-esteem, which is an important element of one’s self-conception, is
identified with face by many scholars (e.g., Hirshon, 2001; Spencer-Oatey 2000,
2003; Ruhi and Dogˇan, 2001). Like face, self-esteem depends on standards set
up by cultural norms and culture-specific models of self. As such it differs
across cultures.
Morisaki and Gudykunst (1994: 69) maintain that an individual’s self-esteem
“is a combination of both personal and collective self-esteem.”
On the one hand, self-esteem is based on fitting in, being accepted, pleasing
others, and gaining approval for meeting the expectations of others. On the
other hand, self-esteem is based upon realizing one’s unique potentialities;
being an individual in one’s own right; and having others recognize, respect,
affirm, support, and encourage one’s personal talents and individual
uniqueness. [...] A balance must be achieved between fitting in and being an
individual in one’s own right (Josephs, 1991: 8—9).
The balance between the two types of self-esteem, however, differs across
cultures; personal self-esteem prevails in individualistic cultures, while collective
self-esteem prevails in collectivistic cultures. In cultures in which the
independent model of self (see Section 4.3.3.) prevails, an individual has high
self-esteem when he succeeds in being independent, autonomous and unique,
when he can say, “I am special and different from others” (Cross and Gore,
2003: 549). In cultures in which the interdependent model of self prevails, an
individual has a good attitude towards himself and evaluates himself highly
when he behaves according to the social and moral standards operating in his
culture, and he is in a good relationship and harmony with other people. In
other words, he has high self-esteem when he can say, “I am similar to and in
harmony with others” (Cross and Gore, 2003: 549).
4.2.3. Face and honour
Apart from pride, dignity, tact, respect and (self-)esteem, the concept of honour
is the one most often referred to in face-related discussions. Honour is the
concept most often identified with face.
[...] notions of face naturally link up to some of the most fundamental cultural
ideas about the nature of the social persona, honour and virtue, shame and
redemption [...] (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 13).
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The close connection between the two concepts becomes clear if one compares
their dictionary definitions. Honour is defined as:
• (honour) high respect, esteem, or reverence, accorded to exalted worth or
rank, deferential admiration or approbation, [or as] received, gained, held, or
enjoyed: glory, renown, fame, credit, reputation, good name (OED),
• (honor) poczucie godności osobistej, dobre imię, cześć (feeling of personal
dignity, good name, reverence); plural only: dostojeństwa, godności,
odznaczenia (high position, rank, distinctions); plural only: oznaki czci,
poważania, szacunku (indications of reverence, high regard, respect) (SJP).
Face in its social sense is defined as:
• (face) good name, reputation (OED),
• (twarz) szacunek (respect) (SJP),
• (twarz) dobre imię, szacunek ludzki (good name, human respect) (Kopaliński,
1987).
As can be seen above, the two concepts honour and face have a lot in common.
Both concepts are defined in part as good name, reputation and respect (which
can be gained by moral conduct). The words honour and face in English, and
honor and twarz in Polish, are partial synonyms. For example, in Polish it is
possible to say stracić honor (lose honour) or uratować honor (save honour)
instead of saying stracić or zachować/uratować twarz (to lose or save face).
Renée Hirschon (2001) reaches similar conclusions when he analyses the
character of social life and politeness in Greek culture. He claims that face and
honour are cognate concepts. He discusses two interpretations of the concept of
honour. The first refers to a person’s reputation, prestige and esteem, the
second to a person’s intrinsic worth and moral integrity. In the first case it is an
attribute which belongs to social life, while in the second case it is a moral
attribute, “inherent in a person’s notion of self” (Hirschon, 2001: 20). These are
the same attributes and values constitutive of the notion of face.
Harald Weinrich, in the essay “Politeness, an affair of honor” (2005), tries
to find some relation between honour and politeness. According to him,
honour “expresses the high opinion held by others (to the extent that they
themselves are possessed of honor) of the absolute value of the honorable
man’s personal worth,” whereas politeness serves “to accommodate others, to
be as pleasant as possible to them so as actually to please them” (Weinrich,
2005: 109). The code of honour is more rigid than the code of politeness,
which consists of subtleties and nuances. Weinrich mentions a social strategy
of avoidance employed to prevent insult and loss of honour. And this is “the
special task of politeness,” claims Weinrich, quoting Claude Chauchadis
(1990). Thus, politeness involves avoidance (cf. Brown and Levinson’s (1987)
concept of negative politeness; see Section 5.3.1.1.). Weinrich claims that the
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honour code is masculine and the politeness code is feminine. He explains this
in the following way:
At the center of the honor code is masculine honor, which must be defended
with weapon in hand against every insult [...]. Women’s honor, which differs in
many respects from men’s, depends in the last analysis upon it, since a woman
who loses her virginity or a woman who violates the commandment of
faithfulness in marriage brings more disgrace to the male members of her family
than to herself [...]. To that extent, by the rules of this code, feminine honor is
only a pendant to masculine honor. [...] The reverse is true with regard to gender
and politeness, which in Europe [...] has taken a specifically feminine turn, in
the form of courtesy. [...] At the center of this conduct stands the conversation,
a gay and witty form of linguistic intercourse (2005: 111—112).
The division into men’s and women’s honour is also noted by Hirschon (2001),
who maintains that there are different constituents of honour for men and
women. Men’s honour is connected with upholding the reputation of the family
and protecting it from insult; men are expected to be brave and assertive.
Women’s honour is associated with shame, entailing modesty and chaste
behaviour.
Honour is said to be located in the human body (Weinrich, 2005: 112):
Everything that attacks honor touches the body, and in this sense “touches on
honor,” like a slap in the face but also an insulting word that makes the face
redden with anger, and correspondingly all affairs of honor ultimately concern
“body and soul.”
The honour code depends on this fundamental corporeality. The norms of
politeness also have corporeal elements as they require that polite people
control their “creatureliness” (Weinrich, 2005: 112). The corporeality of face is
even more evident, due to the bodily origin of the concept. Besides, it
encompasses the two areas; to maintain face people are obliged to comply with
both the honour code and the norms of politeness. Face is gender-neutral and is
inclusive of both types of honour. Face concerns go far beyond the honour
concerns mentioned above. Apart from men’s and women’s honour concerns,
they include the need for dignity, respect and esteem, the need to be treated
tactfully and the need for justified pride and self-esteem.
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4.3. Defining culture
The concept of culture is central to studies of intercultural and cross-cultural
communication. It helps researchers understand the nature of social interaction.
There are many different definitions of the concept of culture, depending on the
perspective taken on it.
For Lado (1957) the term culture is “synonymous with the ‘ways of
a people,’” a structured system of patterned behaviour. A similar definition is
proposed by Gudykunst (2004: 41), who writes about “an implicit theory that
guides our behavior.” No one, however, knows all the aspects of his own culture,
and each member of a culture sees it in his own individual way (Gudykunst,
2004). Culture is also conceived of as “the context in which people derive
a sense of who they are, how they should behave, possibly where they are
pointed in the future” (Fitzgerald, 1993: 59). Their identity, functioning as
a link between intention and action, guides their behaviour “through complex
rules that connect culture and communication” (Fitzgerald, 1993: 59).
Hofstede (1980: 260) defines culture as “the collective programming of the
mind which distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from
another.” Admitting that culture is a “fuzzy” concept, he makes his definition
more specific, referring to culture “in the anthropological sense of broad
patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting, which includes much more than
‘civilization’ alone” (1998: 5). These “mental programs” shared by the majority
of members of a culture include symbols, rituals, and values (Hofstede, 1991).
Culture is understood in a similar fashion by Ting-Toomey and Chung:
[...] a meaning system that is shared by a majority of individuals in
a particular community. On a general level, it refers to a patterned way of
living by a group of interacting individuals who share similar sets of traditions,
beliefs, values, norms, and behaviors. On a specific level, cultural values and
norms influence the expectations that we hold in the development of personal
relationship (Ting-Toomey and Chung, 1996: 237—238; cf. Spencer-Oatey,
2000; Scollon and Wong Scollon, 2001).
For the aims of the present study, the definitions formulated by Hofstede and
Ting-Toomey and Chung constitute the most useful interpretation of the concept
of culture.
To be able to get to know, to understand, or to adequately describe people’s
behaviour typical for a given culture one has to specify its key elements:
traditions, beliefs, symbols, rituals, values and norms. Beliefs constitute sets of
basic assumptions shared by members of a culture. Symbols are signs, artifacts,
words, gestures, or nonverbal behaviour that stand for something meaningful to
people sharing the culture. Rituals are fossilized patterns of behaviour regularly
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performed by members of a community or a culture (Goffman, 1971, 1983;
Hofstede, 1991; Ting-Toomey and Oetzel, 2001; Giddens, 2006). All these
elements and the way they are understood and interpreted by members of
a culture reflect the values cherished in it.
Cultural values can be defined as “broad tendencies to prefer certain states
of affairs over others” (Hofstede, 1991: 8), or “a set of priorities that guide
desirable or undesirable behaviors or fair or unfair actions” (Ting-Toomey and
Oetzel, 2001: 10; cf. Dubisz, 2002). They serve as “the explanatory logic for
why people behave the way they behave” (Ting-Toomey and Oetzel, 2001: 10).
Values are attitudes or interests that people in a cultural group cherish for their
own sake, or cherish instrumentally as something that is essential to the
maintenance of the group itself (Corson, 1995). They provide guidance for
human activities. Norms are sets of rules specifying what constitutes proper or
improper behaviour in a given situation. They are “standards for values” that
exist within a group of people (Hofstede, 1991). In other words, cultural values
translate into interactional norms, which determine the communicative
behaviour of members of a given culture. Some researchers, however, think that
cultures do not differ in values but “in their intensity, salience and degree of
importance attached to them” (Lubecka, 2000: 37). Wierzbicka (1991: 61;
cf. Gumperz, 1985) claims that “what is at issue is not just different cultural
values. [...] The crucial fact is that different pragmatic norms reflect different
hierarchies of values characteristic of different cultures.” All these key elements
are interrelated and influence each other, creating a unique culture against
which people enter into various relationships and engage in social interactions.
Other aspects of culture which influence the nature of communicative
behaviour, and as such constitute a conceptual basis for the present study, are
social relations, which play a very important role in the formation of behavioural
patterns and interactional norms. Social relations are a part of social life which
differs between cultures. The character of these relations depends on the
perception of the role of an individual in a given culture.
4.3.1. Cultural traditions and belief systems
The cultural shaping of the individual members of a particular society begins
with a culture’s religious and philosophical heritage and traditions (Cross and
Gore, 2003). These are usually expressed in various religious texts (e.g., the
Bible, the Torah, the Koran), historical documents, legal documents (e.g., the
Bill of Rights, the Declaration of Independence, the 3rd of May Constitution, or
the Gdańsk Shipyard demands). The way we are and the way we think depend
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on the traditions we are brought up in (e.g., Roman Catholic tradition,
Protestant tradition, a tradition of living with parents in Poland, a tradition of
mobility in the United States).
The documents and traditions have a strong impact on people’s beliefs about
human nature and about relations between people, and on normative and moral
beliefs. The way people live and perceive the world is shaped by religious and
national traditions. The religious and historical texts of the East and the West
differ significantly in their representations of the world and the individual. The
Confucian and Buddhist texts, for example, present “the person and objects as
continuous with and embedded in the environment. This resulted in a holistic
worldview, in which persons and objects are understood and perceived as part
of a greater whole” (Cross and Gore, 2003: 539—540). Western texts present
people as separate from the world and society. This idea of the person is “part
of an analytical worldview, which originated in ancient Greek philosophy.”
According to the Greeks, the world is a collection of discrete objects which can
be classified in terms of their stable, universal properties (Cross and Gore,
2003: 539). In this way, an individual is perceived as independent and
autonomous, separated from the natural world. These two opposed views of the
world have a great impact on hierarchies of values, social norms and the role of
the individual in the society.
4.3.2. Dimensions of cultural variability
In his books Culture’s Consequences (1980) and Cultures and Organizations.
Software of the Mind (1991), Hofstede claims that cultures can be positioned in
four independent dimensions, power distance, masculinity—femininity,
uncertainty avoidance and individualism—collectivism. Each of these dimensions
of culture can be measured relative to other cultures.
Power distance, the aspect of culture which involves “dependence
relationships,” is the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions
(e.g., family, school, or the community) or organizations (the places where
individuals work) within a country expect and accept an unequal distribution of
power (Hofstede, 1991; 2001; Merkin, 2006a). Along the power distance
dimension, we can distinguish between small power distance cultures and large
power distance cultures. In the former, people think that inequalities among
people should be minimized; less powerful individuals are dependent on more
powerful individuals to a limited extent. In the latter, people think that
inequalities among people are desirable; there is considerable dependence of
less powerful individuals on more powerful individuals. According to Hofstede
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(2001), in large power distance cultures, people value respect and formal
deference to any type of authority. In other words, members of small power
distance cultures believe that power should be distributed relatively equally,
while members of large power distance cultures believe that it should be
distributed unequally.
Another dimension mentioned by Hofstede (1991, 1998) along which
cultures vary is the dimension of masculinity—femininity. Masculine societies are
those in which “men are supposed to be assertive, tough and focused on
material success,” and women are to be “more modest, tender, and concerned
with the quality of life” (Hofstede, 1998: 6). In feminine societies, both men and
women are to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life.
Uncertainty avoidance, the next dimension of cultural variability discussed by
Hofstede (1980, 1991, 2001), refers to “the extent to which people feel
threatened by ambiguous situations and have created beliefs and institutions that
try to avoid these” (Hofstede and Bond, 1984: 419). This dimension pertains to
how people deal with conflict and aggression and how tolerant they are of
ambiguity. Different degrees of uncertainty avoidance can be found in every
culture, but one model (high uncertainty avoidance or low uncertainty
avoidance) always predominates. Hofstede distinguishes high uncertainty
avoidance cultures (e.g., Japan, France) and low uncertainty avoidance cultures
(e.g., England, Ireland, Denmark, the USA). For people in high uncertainty
avoidance cultures, “what is different is dangerous,” so they try to avoid
uncertainty, accept aggressive behaviour and freely express emotions. To reduce
uncertainty, they resort to ritualistic behaviours and customs to avoid ambiguity
(Hofstede, 2001; Merkin, 2006b). For people in low uncertainty avoidance
cultures, “what is different is curious” (Hofstede, 1991: 119).
The most important dimension of cultural variability is individualism—
collectivism, which is said to have the greatest impact of them all on communica-
tive behaviour. Individualism characterizes societies in which ties between peo-
ple are loose and individuals are expected to look only after themselves and
their family (Hofstede, 1991). Collectivism characterizes societies in which
individuals throughout their lifetime are integrated into their ingroups, which
protect them in return for loyalty (Hofstede, 1991). Individualism—collectivism
is not a static dimension. Cocroft and Ting-Toomey (1994) claim that indivi-
dualism and collectivism should be treated on a continuum basis.
The two types of culture, collectivistic and individualistic, differ in the way
their members understand morality. Among collectivists morality is “more
contextual” and the supreme value is the welfare of the collective (e.g., family).
Morality in collectivistic cultures (such as those of Japan and China) is
connected with adherence to many specific rules; to be moral means to comply
with these rules in particular situations (Triandis, 1995). People in collectivistic
cultures are particularistic in this respect; they tend to apply different value
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standards to members of their ingroups and outgroups. In individualistic
cultures (such as those of Australia and the United States), morality is
perceived in more universalistic terms; the same value standards apply to all
people (Gudykunst, 2004).
Individualistic and collectivistic cultures can be divided with respect to
relations among people into horizontal and vertical (Triandis, 1995). Horizontal
cultures are those in which people see themselves as the same as and equal to
others, while vertical cultures are those in which people feel different from
others and do not value equality much. Both types of culture can be found
among individualistic and collectivistic societies. Thus, there are vertical
individualistic cultures (e.g., the United States, Germany and Great Britain), in
which people try to stand out from others, and value freedom but do not value
equality (although equality is said to be one of the most important American
values!); and horizontal individualistic cultures (e.g., Sweden and Norway), in
which people act as individuals, but at the same time do not try to stand out
from others, and value both equality and freedom. In horizontal collectivistic
cultures (e.g., Japan) people highly value equality, but do not attach much
importance to freedom, while in vertical collectivistic cultures (e.g., India)
people value neither equality nor freedom (Triandis, 1995).
Another difference between individualistic and collectivistic cultures lies in
interpersonal communication. Hall (1976) distinguishes between low- and
high-context communication. In individualistic cultures, in which people are
more affect-oriented and more inclined to talk than members of collectivistic
cultures, low-context communication predominates, in which “the mass of
information is vested in the explicit code” (Hall, 1976: 70; Gudykunst et al.,
1996). Explicit messages are used to convey personal thoughts, opinions and
feelings (Ting-Toomey, 2005). In collectivistic cultures, in which people are
more concerned with avoiding hurting others than members of individualistic
cultures, high-context communication predominates, in which “most of the
information is either in the physical context or internalized in the person, while
very little is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message” (Hall, 1976:
79; Gudykunst et al., 1996). What matters is the “multilayered” context (e.g.,
historical context, social norms, roles, situational and relational contexts)
framing the interaction encounter (Hall, 1976; Ting-Toomey, 2005).
According to Gudykunst (2004; Gudykunst et al., 1996), the individualism—
collectivism dimension shapes communication on two distinct levels: cultural
and personal. At the cultural level, patterns of behaviour depend on cultural
norms and values. Individualism “refers to the broad value tendencies of
a system in emphasizing the importance of individual identity over group
identity, individual rights over group rights, and individual needs over group
needs” (Ting-Toomey, 1994: 314). Individualistic cultures draw up the “I”
identity as the prime focus; they are concerned with the authenticity of
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self-presentation style, and they value autonomy, choices, and negative-face need
(Ting-Toomey, 1988; cf. Shweder and Bourne, 1984). Members of such cultures
see themselves as independent of any collectives, and they are primarily
motivated by their own preferences and needs. They put the emphasis on
individual initiatives and achievement (Triandis, 1995, Gudykunst, 2004).
Collectivism “refers to the broad value tendencies of a system in emphasizing
the importance of the ‘we’ identity over the ‘I’ identity” (Ting-Toomey, 1994:
314). Collectivistic cultures are concerned with the adaptability of
self-presentation style, and they value group goals over individual goals,
interdependence, reciprocal obligations, and positive-face need (Ting-Toomey,
1988). Members of such cultures see themselves as parts of one or more
collectives — e.g., family, business company, or nation — and are primarily
motivated by the norms of these collectives. They put the emphasis on
belonging to certain groups rather than on their own achievement (Triandis,
1995; Gudykunst, 2004).
At the personal level, the patterns of behaviour used by members of
a particular culture depend on individual socialization. There are three main
characteristics that mediate the impact of individualism—collectivism on
communication: personality orientations, individual values, and self-construals
(Gudykunst, 2004; Gudyunst et al., 1996). Triandis et al. (1988) distinguish two
types of personality, which can appear in both individualistic and collectivistic
cultures: idiocentric and allocentric. Idiocentric individuals in individualistic
cultures “do their own thing” and do not pay attention to the needs of other
members of their ingroup, while allocentric individuals in individualistic cultures
are concerned about them. Allocentric individuals in collectivistic cultures “feel
positive about accepting ingroup norms,” while idiocentric individualists in
collectivistic cultures “feel ambivalent and even bitter about acceptance of
ingroup norms” (Triandis et al., 1988: 325).
4.3.3. Culture-specific concepts of self
The other two important components of individual personalities which
determine the way people behave and communicate are individual values and
self-construals. Cultural experience conditions our values, ways of thinking and
social relations, and it also conditions the formation of self (Marsella, 1985;
Holland, 1997; Thoits and Virshup, 1997; Hofstede, 1998; Owens and Aronson,
2000; Barker, 2005). One of the most powerful ways in which cultures shape
individual behaviour is “through their influence on one’s way of being a person
[...] The self-system is a primary locus of sociocultural influence — the basis of
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culture-specific being” (Markus et al., 1997: 13). Interacting with other members
of his culture, the individual becomes a person — an actor in a social theatre.
The concept of self presented by each person in particular social interactions is
central to the functioning of people in any social setting, and it is still used in
much the same way in almost every culture. But members of different cultures
conceptualize the self in different ways, and to define themselves they use the
concepts, values, and ideologies provided by their cultural environment (Markus
and Kitayama, 1991; Cross and Gore, 2003). Thus, many researchers consider
it universal, although “its component elements differ in significance according
to culture and societal context” (Earley, 1997: 37; Brown and Levinson, 1987;
Ting-Toomey, 1994; Gao, 1996). What is universal in the self is the sense of
being physically distinct and separate from others and some awareness of
internal activity; many aspects of the self, however, are specific to particular
cultures. Culture influences both the content and structure of the inner, private
self as well as the public self whose nature depends on the individual’s relations
with others and social institutions, which vary cross-culturally (Markus and
Kitayama, 1991; Markus et al., 1997).
The cultural shaping of the self occurs at four levels (Cross and Gore, 2003:
539):
• Cultural models of the person derive first from the sociohistorical ideals and
values of a society.
• These sociohistorical ideals and values shape social customs, practices, and
institutions, including linguistic practices, employment practices, and
educational and legal systems.
• These practices and institutions provide settings and situations in which
individuals act and behave.
• These experiences in everyday settings sculpt a self and shape individual
psychological tendencies.
As a result of the process of cultural shaping, in different cultures two
different construals of the self can be found, the independent self-construal and
the interdependent self-construal (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). The Western
independent “self as an entity containing significant dispositional attributes, and
as detached from context” differs from the Oriental self “as interdependent
with the surrounding context, [in which] it is the ‘other’ or the
‘self-in-relation-to-other’ that is the focal in individual experience” (Markus and
Kitayama, 1991: 225). Individuals with a strong independent sense of self
perceive themselves as autonomous, self-reliant, unencumbered, and as “rational
choice makers.” Individuals with a strong interdependent sense of self perceive
themselves as “ingroup-bound, obligatory agents, and as relational peacemakers”
(Ting-Toomey and Oetzel, 2001: 33; Markus and Kitayama, 1991). Both
self-construals exist in every culture. So it is possible to find individuals with
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a strong independent sense of self in collectivistic cultures, and individuals with
a strong interdependent sense of self in individualistic cultures (Ting-Toomey
and Oetzel, 2001). However, the independent self-construal can be said to be
characteristic of individualistic cultures, in which a dualistic worldview prevails,
according to which the self is a separate, independent entity. The
interdependent self-construal, on the other hand, is characteristic of
collectivistic cultures, in which a holistic worldview prevails, propagating the
connectedness of individuals to each other, and in which the self is seen as an
integral part of the natural world.
Individualistic and collectivistic cultures differ in the degree to which their
members wish to project an authentic self in a given situation and the degree to
which they choose to maintain a social self (Ting-Toomey, 1988: 215). In
individualistic cultures, individuals’ public self-image should be consistent to
a certain degree with their private, authentic self-image. Their identity is based
on what they own and their experiences (Triandis, 1995). The individual is
perceived as central and relationships as peripheral and “not definitive of
personhood.” The relation between the self and others is construed as
independent and separate. Individual motivation is dominant (Cross and Gore,
2003).
In collectivistic cultures, the self is bounded by mutual role obligations and
duties, and as such is subject to negotiation during social interaction
(Ting-Toomey, 1988; Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998). Collectivists’ identity is
based on relationships and group memberships (Triandis, 1995). The relation
between the self and others is construed as harmonious, interdependent, and
interconnected. The individual and society are interdependent and mutually
supportive. The individual is viewed as embedded in relationships and defined
by social contexts, fundamental relations, and social positions (Cross and Gore,
2003).
In individualistic cultures, an independent self-construal and personal
identity are the most important factors influencing behaviour. In intergroup
situations, however, people’s behaviour is based mainly on their interdependent
self-construal and social identity (Morisaki and Gudykunst, 1994). In
collectivistic cultures, an interdependent self-construal and social identity are the
most important factors influencing behaviour. This does not mean, however,
that independent self-construal and personal identity do nor influence people’s
behaviour to a certain extent in some situations (Morisaki and Gudykunst,
1994). These different conceptualizations of the individual and his roles in the
social organization, strongly influencing the character of social relations and
behavioural patterns, are a key to understanding cross-cultural differences in
social interaction in general, and face-management in particular.
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4.3.4. Emic and etic approaches to the study
of cultural concepts
There are two main approaches to the study of culture, cultural concepts and
communication, the emic approach and the etic approach. Originally the two
terms emic and etic were used in the discussion of phonemics (the study of the
sound systems of particular languages) and phonetics (a universal system of
describing sounds used in various languages) (Pike, 1967; Befu, 1989; Hinze,
2005). Later the two terms were transferred into the area of cultural research
(Pike, 1967; Befu, 1989).
The emic approach involves studying cultures from the inside. In this
approach, behaviour is analysed from within the system, only one culture is
examined, and the criteria are relative to internal characteristics. It focuses on
describing how members of a particular culture understand their own
communication. The etic approach involves looking at cultures from the outside
and comparing them using predetermined characteristics. In this approach,
behaviour is analysed from a position outside the system, many cultures are
examined and compared, and the criteria used are considered absolute or
universal. This approach is to compare how a specific aspect of communication
occurs in different cultures (Berry, 1980; Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey, 1996).
Emic analyses often are identified with the use of qualitative methods of
research, and etic analyses often are identified with the use of quantitative
methods (Gudykunst, 2000). The two approaches are used in the studies of
culture and communication in interpersonal relationships across cultures. As
Gudykunst (2000: 312) argues, for methodologically sound cross-cultural
research both approaches are needed. “Etic measures allow us to understand
commonalities across cultures, while emic measures allow us to understand
unique aspects of behaviour within cultures.”
Face is a category which can be investigated and analysed both as an emic
(culture-specific) and etic (universal) concept. The specificity of face lies in the
fact that some researchers consider it universal, while others treat it as
a concept which cannot be analysed as a universal category, but rather as an
emic concept, requiring investigation of its various culture-specific aspects. For
example, Strecker (1993: 120) writes that “‘face’ is, after all, not an ‘etic’ but an
‘emic’ category and should be studied as such.” The problem is not so simple,
though. Face should be treated in some respects as universal and in others as
culture-specific.
Universal in face is:
• the function of the face (a part of the body) as “a source of social signalling
and communication,”
• the existence of face (self-image) as a social construct.
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The rest is culture-specific. Basic facial expressions of emotion are universal, but
the contexts in which they are displayed depend on cultural factors (Ekman and
Oster, 1982). The social rules governing the display of and control over facial
expressions differ cross-culturally. And so do systems of social values, which
determine the socially constructed image of self. The basic, universal desire
inherent in human nature “for a ‘good’ face” earns different interpretations in
different cultures, because the constituents of ‘good’ are culturally determined
(O’Driscoll, 1996: 4), as is the content of face (Mao, 1994; Matsumoto, 1988).
Moral rules, hierarchies of values and social organization are specific to
particular cultures; in consequence the image of self created on their basis must
also differ. Cultures differ in the nature of face relationships. In individualistic
cultures, face relationships are said to be a matter of individual face, while in
collectivistic cultures they are rather a matter of the face of one’s family, one’s
cultural group, or one’s corporation (Scollon and Wong Scollon, 2001). The
emic concepts, such as English face, Chinese mianzi and lian, Japanese kao,
menboku, taimen, and mentsu, and Polish twarz, are said to be the “key players”
in social interaction; however, they differ in importance. Social interaction is
governed by different norms, and takes different forms and meanings depending
on the cultural context (Hinze, 2005). This has a great impact on the emic
concept of face. Thus face should be investigated and analysed in
a culture-specific perspective. A discussion of its universal applicability could
follow.
In Section 4.4., the Chinese concept of face is presented against the cultural
background, with special consideration of Confucianism. In the following two
sections, the emic concepts of face and twarz are analysed and discussed as
appearing in two cultures, Anglo-American (Section 4.5.) and Polish (Section
4.6.), respectively.
4.4. The Chinese concept of face
4.4.1. Chinese culture and its Confucian roots
Chinese culture, like most oriental cultures, can be categorized as collectivistic.
The Chinese see society as a unit (Lee-Wong, 2000). Their social orientation, as
Bond (1991: 34) maintains:
Is reflected in the highest endorsement they give to group-related traits and
roles, as well as the fact that their ideal self is closely involved in social
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relationships. The dimensions they use to perceive themselves and others are
likewise focused on interpersonal concerns, not on mastery of the external
world or absorption with narrowly personal processes.
For the Chinese, society and various social relations are more highly valued
than the individual. The individual self is bounded by mutual role obligations
and duties, and as such is subject to negotiation during social interaction
(Ting-Toomey, 1988; Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998). The Chinese value group
goals over individual goals, interdependence, reciprocal obligations, and the
need for approval and appreciation from others (Ting-Toomey, 1988;
Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998). In Chinese culture, sincerity and
demonstration of respect and deference are indispensable for successful social
interaction (Lee-Wong, 2000: 310). One of the most important cultural values is
qiangong (modesty and courtesy), which leads the Chinese to downgrade or
deny any instance of verbal recognition, praise, compliments or admiration
(Bond, 1991; Kornacki, 2002).
The philosophy of the school founded by Confucius (551—479 BC), “the
Venerable Master K’ung,” is the key to understanding Chinese culture. Although
many people think of traditional Chinese culture as Confucian, Confucianism
was only one of the intellectual movements that have existed in China over the
centuries (van Norden, 2002). Confucius was mainly “concerned with values as
the basis of social and political order” (Flew, 1979: 72). One of the main
concepts of his doctrine is dào (tao), which originally meant “way” (in the sense
of “path” or “road”). Dào is the proper way to behave and the proper way for
society to be organized (van Norden, 2002).
Another concept of Confucianism is the lι˘ (li), meaning “rites” or “rituals.”
They include matters of etiquette, everything concerning one’s way of life or
ethos, and proper behaviour in general (van Norden, 2002). The lι˘ , like all
rituals, have a symbolic function. Their performance is required for the proper
organization of the society. The reason why they are so powerful, however, is
a mystery (van Norden, 2002). In modern Chinese there are several compound
nouns involving lι˘ , e.g., lijiao (the Confucian ethical code), lijie (courtesy,
etiquette, protocol ceremony), limao (courtesy, politeness, manners), and lisu
(etiquette, custom) (van Norden, 2002).
One of the ethical terms used by Confucius is rén (jen), meaning
“benevolence,” “humaneness,” and “goodness” (van Norden, 2002). This is what
every individual should aim at. Confucius was concerned with the cultivation of
character and the problems of human perfection in both the individual and
social sense (van Norden, 2002, Cheng, 1986). This is related to one of the
most important values in Chinese culture mentioned above, modesty.
“Perfection” and “self-training” involve the avoidance of boasting, of
over-estimation of one’s abilities and of the exaggeration of one’s capacities,
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which can evoke envy or unpleasant feelings in others (Hu, 1944).
Confucianism held that “perfection of an individual is an essential way for
achieving social and political harmony and ordering which in their turn should
have preserved and encouraged individual perfection” (Cheng, 1986: 337). The
supreme value of rén is to value connection to others, similarity to others, and
harmony in relationships (Ho, 1995).
Yì (i) is another ethical term in the Confucian vocabulary. It means “right,”
“righteousness,” “appropriate” and “moral.” In Chinese culture, which was, and
still is, highly role-conscious, and in which social relations have always been
vertically structured, what is right or appropriate is determined by an
individual’s social role (Lee-Wong, 2000; van Norden, 2002). Thus the value of
an individual strongly depends on the way he performs his social roles.
According to Confucian ethics, self-cultivation involves expression of the
goodness of an individual in five kinds of basic social relationships (Cheng,
1986; Earley, 1997)):
• emperor—subject (or righteousness),
• father—son (or closeness),
• husband—wife (or distinction),
• elder—youth (or order),
• friendship (or faithfulness).
The self in the Confucian sense is defined by a person’s surrounding
relations, which are supported by cultural values such as filial piety, loyalty,
dignity, and integrity (Gao, 1996). Thus, the Chinese self (see interdependent
self-construal (Markus and Kitayama, 1991)) needs to be recognized, defined,
and completed by others, whose needs, wishes and expectations are essential
for its development (Gao, 1996). The importance of other people in the
creation of the Chinese self results from the values prevailing in Chinese
culture, such as tolerance for others, harmony with others, and solidarity with
others. This is reflected in social norms prevailing in Chinese culture, such as
modesty and humility, reserve and formality, and inhibition of strong feelings
(Gao, 1996).
Through moral self-cultivation an individual can achieve perfection, while
social harmony is an extension of virtues from an individual to his family and to
the society (Cheng, 1986). The connectedness between people, especially within
the family, is the key issue in Chinese culture. The Confucian Golden Principle
states:
The humane man, wishing to establish himself, seeks to establish others;
wishing to be prominent himself, he helps others to be prominent (Ho, 1995:
133—134).
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The social order is maintained through the fundamental social roles (e.g., parent,
child, husband, wife), which determine people’s behaviour in social interaction
(Gao, 1996).
Confucian philosophy can be summarized in three main principles (Cheng,
1986: 337):
• Self-cultivation of a person must be conducted in the context of developing
social relationships.
• The successfulness of self-cultivation of a person must be judged in terms of
successfulness of development of social relationships under a rule of
government.
• The ultimate form of successfulness of development of social relationships is
a good government under which everyone is well and properly placed in an
order of social relationships and everyone will look upon the maintenance
and improvement of this order as defining an intrinsic quality of his existence
and the worth of his moral achievement.
These three principles can serve as a basis for the understanding of the Chinese
concept of face.
4.4.2. Face in Chinese culture
Face is one of the central concepts in Chinese culture. Evidence for this is the
great number of expressions that employ the words denoting “face” in the
Chinese language. The notion of face also appears in Chinese sayings and
proverbs, e.g., Ren yao lian, shu yao pi (“A man needs face like a tree needs
bark”). This old saying tells a lot about the place of the concept of face in
Chinese culture. It refers to a person’s self-esteem, which is often formed on the
basis of others’ remarks. If they are positive, one’s self-esteem is boosted, and
consequently, one has face (Gao, 1996). John MacGowan, in his book Men and
Manners of Modern China (1912) comments on the specificity of Chinese face:
A Chinese is dominated by one passion, viz., to look well before his
fellow-men. To do this successfully is to have ‘face.’ To fail, or to appear in
disgrace, is to ‘lose face.’ He is well aware of the scenic effect, and so he is
always arranging the play that he may give the onlooker the best view of
himself (MacGowan, 1912: 301).
Chinese face emphasizes the harmony of individual conduct with the views
and judgement of other members of the community. For Ho (1976: 883),
Chinese face is
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the respectability and/or deference which a person can claim from others, by
virtue of the relative position he occupies in his social network and the degree
to which he is judged to have functioned adequately in that position, as well as
acceptably in his general conduct; the face extended to a person by others is
a function of the degree of congruence between judgements of his total
condition in life, including his actions as well as those of people closely
associated with him, and the social expectations that others have placed upon
him. In terms of two interacting parties, face is the reciprocated compliance,
respect, and/or deference that each party expects from, and extends to, the
other party.
Face in Chinese culture does not belong to an individual, but it can be
considered only in relation to others with whom he interacts. It is related to
such social concepts as honour, dignity, prestige, reputation and good name:
This word ‘face’ embodies two broad lines of thought, though these by no
means exhaust the many possibilities that lie lurking within it. The first of
these is honour, or reputation. Another idea contained in the word ‘face’ is
self-respect, or dignity, a thing that a Chinese must maintain at all costs and in
all circumstances. Whether he is right or wrong, he must never be placed in
a position where he would have to blush for himself. His ‘face’ must be
maintained at all costs (MacGowan, 1912: 301).
Thus, face in Chinese culture plays a very important role in social interactions
and in the established social code, which regulates how people should behave in
different situations.
There are two concepts of face (mianzi and lian) central to an understanding
of the character of social relations in Chinese culture, and explanatory of the
Chinese concepts of self and relational development (Gao, 1996). According to
Hu (1944), these two concepts of face are based on two distinct sets of criteria
for judging human behaviour.
[Mianzi (or mien-tzuˇ )] stands for the kind of prestige [...]: a reputation
achieved through getting on in life, through success and ostentation. [Lian (or
lien)] represents the confidence of society in the integrity of ego’s moral
character, the loss of which makes it impossible for him to function properly
within the community. [It is] both a social sanction for enforcing moral
standards and an internalized sanction (Hu, 1944: 45).
Thus, according to Hu, mianzi is the non-moral type of face, lian the moral
type. This distinction is, however, undermined by Hinze’s (2005) argumentation;
he claims that neither is mianzi completely devoid of moral content nor is lian
an exclusively moral type of face, as it is often used in situations in which
successful social performance matters most.
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Mien is a very old term, which acquired a figurative meaning referring to
“the relation between ego and society” as early as the 4th century BC (Hu, 1944:
45). Mianzi is the modern Chinese word which is the closest to mien
(Lee-Wong, 2000). Mianzi can be looked at from two perspectives, subjective
and objective. From the former, it is “the value and importance of oneself in
one’s self-esteem with regard to social relationships and society at large” (face as
“a personal claim”). From the latter perspective, mianzi is “the social place of
a person as recognized by others in the same society or in the same
community,” or “the social position or value of a person as recognized by
a specific person on a special occasion” (face as recognized by others) (Cheng,
1986: 332). So the objective mianzi is the desire for public acknowledgement of
one’s prestige or reputation (Mao, 1994; Ji, 2000). In general, it depends on and
is assessed in terms of what others think (Ho, 1976), and what they say about
a person; verbal recognition, e.g., praise, compliments or admiration, is vital for
the Chinese (Kornacki, 2004). “A person’s mianzi usually varies according to
the group with which he is interacting” (Ho, 1976: 869; Cheng, 1986). So the
same person can have different mianzi in different relationships, in different
situations.
Mianzi can be large or small. The larger it is, the greater the influence,
respectability and authority the person has. There can be different sources of
mianzi, e.g., power, ability, wealth, high offices, high social position, political
and academic titles, social ties to prominent people, and avoidance of acts
causing unfavourable comments (Hu, 1944; Cheng, 1986). Thus, the higher
the status, the greater the expectations are, and the greater are the demands
for maintaining face (Ho, 1974). Mianzi may be kept, given, taken, gained, lost
or saved. What can happen to a person’s face is reflected in language. In
modern Chinese, there are many expressions with mianzi, e.g., (Lee-Wong,
2000: 24):
ai mianzi: ‘love face’ (be concerned about face-saving),
you mianzi: ‘have face’ (enjoy due respect),
gei mianzi: ‘give face’ (show due respect for someone’s feelings),
tiu mianzi: ‘lose face’ (shame/humiliation),
baoquan mianzi: ‘save face’ (maintain one’s self-respect/reputation).
The other word meaning “face” is lian, which is a relatively modern term.
The earliest reference cited in The K’ang-his Dictionary dates from the Yuan
Dynasty (1277—1367) (Hu, 1944: 45). It refers to “the minimum social
respectability a person has in the society regardless of his actual social position,
prestige, wealth or power” (Cheng, 1986: 336). It is used as “a protective mask
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(persona)” that a person wears for communicating with other people in society
(Cheng, 1986). Everyone should possess it. Lian is a sign of a person’s moral
worth. It must be preserved and maintained by conforming to social rules of
conduct and good taste. But it can also be lost, or “torn up.” When a person
loses lian, he can be treated as being below moral dignity. A person “tears up”
his lian when he does not behave according to standards of social decorum
(Cheng, 1986). In Chinese, there are also many expressions with lian/lien, e.g.,
(Hu, 1944: 46—54):
tiu lien: ‘to lose face’ (condemnation by a group for immoral or socially
disagreeable behaviour),
pu-yao lien: ‘not to want face’ (a serious accusation meaning that the ego does
not care what society thinks of his character),
mei-yu lien: ‘to have no face’ (interchangeable with pu-yao lien; the most severe
condemnation that can be made of a person),
lien-p’I hou or po: ‘the skin on the face is thick’ or ‘thin’ (the thick skin
(negatively valued) is hard to penetrate with social disapproval; the thin skin
(positively valued) is highly sensitive to public opinion).
To lose lian means “a condemnation by a group for immoral or socially
disagreeable behaviour” (Hu, 1994: 4).When a person loses or breaks lian it is
much more serious than when he loses mianzi, because to lose lian means
dishonour and disgrace (Cheng, 1986; Earley, 1997; Haugh and Hinze, 2003).
This difference, however, is not due to the absence/presence of the moral
element, but due “to the seriousness of the particular event that has brought
about the loss” (Hinze, 2005: 174). The loss of mianzi causes less serious
damage to the social image than the loss of lian.
Chinese face can be associated with individuals or with groups. Apart from
damaging or losing one’s own lian, a person may lose lian for important others
(e.g., his friends, family, company, superiors or country); in other words he may
bring disgrace or ridicule upon them by behaviour incompatible with the social
rules of conduct (Hu, 1944). Thus, participating in social interaction, the person
avoids situations which may cause the loss of his individual face as well as the
face of the group he belongs to.
Confucianism can be treated as the ideological foundation of the Chinese
concept of face. The Confucian family is the basic social structure, in which the
most important values are family unity, harmony, propriety, mutual
consideration, and role relationship based on the obligations and duties to the
other family members (Cheng, 1986). The conceptions of a good society and of
a government function on the same principle. Members of a society or
government are like good family members, acting on the basis of feelings
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derived from self-cultivation, “virtue, good faith and trust toward one another,”
and respect for the honour and good will of others (Cheng, 1986: 340). The
concept of face involves the values forming the Chinese family, society and
government. And it can be treated as both the goal and the means for “the
harmonization of human relationships” (Cheng, 1986). Public knowledge and
external evaluation are extremely important for the operation of face in Chinese
culture (Haugh and Hinze, 2003). As Cheng (1986: 341) claims, “the very
source of face comes from the five relationships.” Lian is the basis of the
equilibrium in “the five relationships of a person in the process of his social
growth and self-cultivation,” while mianzi is “an enlargement of the scope of
meaningful relations through the basic five relationships of a person” (Cheng,
1986: 341).
Every person living in the society has the right to lian (an honest, decent
face), while his mianzi differs depending on his social status, family background,
personal ties and self-presentation skills (Hu, 1944). Relations with others often
shape an individual’s identity. Mianzi and lian can operate vicariously, i.e. one’s
identity can be shaped by the identity of others with whom one is connected
(Hinze, 2005). So the importance of mianzi and lian in Chinese society cannot
be overstated. Chinese face is not only the goal and the means for “the
harmonization of human relationships”; it is also the starting point from which
one gets involved in social interactions.
4.5. The Anglo-American concept of face
4.5.1. Culture of the United States
Some Americans say they have no culture, as they conceive of culture as “an
overlay of arbitrary customs” which can be found only in other countries
(Althen, 1988). They are often unable to say anything about American culture.
Some even deny that there is an American culture at all (Spindler and Spindler,
1993). There are, however, some basic ideas and values which all Americans
share. They are presented in the documents creating the United States (the
Declaration of Independence, the United States Constitution and the Bill of
Rights). The most important of these ideas and values are individualism,
freedom and equality. All of them are reflected in what is known as the
mainstream American culture, “usually equated with the predominant white
middle class” (Naylor, 1998: 51), or to be more precise, with the WASPs — the
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white, Anglo-Saxon Protestants belonging to the middle class. However, most
studies of American culture come to the same conclusion: “Beyond the
dominant, major, or orienting ideas of individualism and freedom, Americans
seemed to share very little” (Naylor, 1998: 51). Therefore, American culture is
hard to define. Unlike many other cultures, it is not homogeneous. It comprises
many genetically unrelated cultural communities and ethnic groups. This is
especially visible on the west coast, in northern California (where the data for
the present study were collected), which, apart from Anglo-Americans, is
inhabited by Latinos, Asians, and African Americans. The present study
involves only Anglo-American culture (further called American culture), as
taking into consideration other ethnic groups could bring to the fore elements
specific for these cultures and at the same time blur the picture of the culture
which is already sufficiently difficult to define.
According to Hofstede’s latest research results (2001), the United States
(aside from Australia, Great Britain, Holland, Canada and Luxemburg) is
among the most individualistic cultures. American culture values individuality,
respect rooted in the conviction of equality between people, moderate
emotionality, the promotion of success and solidarity, and the need for freedom
of action and freedom from imposition, which is expressed by means of
different face-saving devices, such as restraint, hedges, questions, expressions of
deference, polite pessimism and conventionalized indirectness (Ting-Toomey,
1988; Johnson, 1985; Wierzbicka, 1985; Lubecka, 2000).
Individualism is a key to understanding Anglo-Americans (further called
Americans). They cultivate their individuality. As Fitzgerald (1993: 40)
maintains:
American culture is often said to revolve around the ideal of the autonomous
self, as individualism (personal autonomy) has long been a primary focus of
American and, to a large extent, Western culture [...]. For Americans, the
fulfillment of self is of paramount value.
From very early childhood Americans are told to consider themselves as
separate individuals who are distinct from others and who are responsible for
their own lives. In American society, as in so-called Western societies in
general, “the paramount concern for individual rights, i.e. what is owed to the
individual” is reflected in the strategic type of politeness (Bargiela-Chiappini,
2003: 1466). Maintaining independence and protecting the “natural rights” of
each individual constitute the basis of American morality (Markus et al., 1997).
However, there is often a big difference between the ideals and the reality:
Individualism leads to the assumptions about freedom, privacy, and equality
that are shared among Americans, but rarely practiced. Freedom of speech in
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public goes hand in hand with equality in public, but the “private” is also part
of the reality with which people deal. The view that all people are of equal
value and should be given the same or equal opportunity is tied to
individualism and abundance, even if it is often violated in actual practice. It is
an imperative as opposed to a fact of life for them (Naylor, 1998: 59; Althen,
1988).
In American culture, the idea of independence is put into practice in many
different ways. It is visible, for example, in linguistic practices — the use of
conventionally indirect forms of request or suggestion to avoid imposition, as
well as in social practices, such as telling guests to “help themselves” (Naylor,
1998), “make themselves at home,” or accepting their turning down food
offers.
The idea of freedom is the foundation of American culture. For
individualists such as Americans, this most crucial value means “being able to do
what you want to do, providing you don’t interfere with the freedom of others”
(Lakoff and the Rockridge Institute, 2006: 88). Thus, the individual’s right to
freedom is restricted only by the consideration for another individual’s freedom.
American freedom includes:
physical freedom, freedom to pursue goals, freedom of the will, and political
freedom, where citizens freely choose who runs the state and where the state,
by law, cannot interfere with the basic freedoms of its citizens (Lakoff and the
Rockridge Institute, 2006: 88).
Among the basic freedoms is the freedom of choice, fundamental to the
successful life of the individual. Americans represent a consumer culture which
cultivates the value of choice. Choice and various practices of choosing are, as
Markus et al. (1997: 24) maintain, “central to many domains of U.S. life.”
Having a choice and being able to choose what one wants helps people manifest
their individuality and control their own life, which is the measure of their
success.
Another crucial value is equality, which for Americans means equal
participation in social, educational, political and economic life, and “translates
into equal opportunities for all people” (Naylor, 1998: 56). This potential
“sameness of distribution” (Lakoff and the Rockridge Institute, 2006) constitutes
the basis which makes it possible for members of the mainstream culture to
focus on achievement, success and mobility. One of the main tenets of the
culture is that “by hard work, anyone can achieve success” (Naylor, 1998: 57).
For Americans, life is dominated by a drive for success. Success is what
everyone should aim at. Professional success, success in private life, or success
in social relations makes the person attractive to others. The drive for success is
related to the American Dream, which results from Americans’ individualism
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and “their belief in equal opportunities to attain the abundance of America,
freedom to pursue the wealth (the measure of attainment), and all the rest that
goes together to make for the American Dream (home ownership, expensive
cars, lots of material goods, etc.)” (Naylor, 1998: 54). The American Dream
can come true and the individual can become an achiever who attains a success,
when he is not afraid of change. Change together with hard work is believed to
be the way to success. This is change understood in a positive sense, involving
improvement. Mobility implies such a change — a change for the better;
Americans distinguish different types of mobility (Naylor, 1998): geographical
mobility (to get education or to get a new, better job) and mobility in social
standing.
All these values — individualism, freedom, especially freedom of choice,
equality of opportunity, the focus on achievement and the drive for success —
have a strong impact on the character of American culture, which Naylor
(1998) calls a culture of diversity. Both the United States and American culture
can be characterized by multiple diversities, including ethnic, racial, religious,
political, social and ideological. Some of these diversities are consequences of
American individualism and freedom, the freedom of individuals to choose, to
act, and to achieve whatever they want (Naylor, 1998). Americans show
tolerance for any manifestation of diversity, expressed by politically correct
behaviours which oppose any kind of “stigmatization” of an individual
(Lubecka, 2001). American society, in spite of its great respect for equality, is
“more vertical than the average individualistic culture” (Triandis, 1995: 46). As
Triandis claims, this is related to the fact that Americans like to be distinguished
and to “stick out.” Thus, diversity, together with distinctness and any type of
otherness, are perceived as definitely positive. On the one hand, Americans
often behave in such a way as to be noticed or to look distinct. On the other
hand, they have a great tolerance for peculiarity and all kinds of eccentricity.
In American culture people put the emphasis on appearances over reality.
American culture is a culture in which the norm of affirmation dominates,
according to which everyone should be, or at least should seem to be, satisfied
and happy (Naylor, 1998; Wojciszke and Baryła, 2005). This is related to the
general drive for success and the focus on achievement. It is not enough to be
successful, to be an achiever; one has to show others that this makes him
satisfied and happy. Kövecses (2005) claims that at the heart of American
culture lies the metaphor LIFE IS A SHOW or SPECTACLE or
ENTERTAINMENT (cf. Goffman’s metaphors of social interaction — see
Sections 5.2.1. and 5.2.2.). This metaphor organizes extensive portions of
experience in many areas of American life, starting from everyday social
interaction, through spectator sports, shopping, politics and war to landscape
planning. Thus, the American concept of life is understood in terms of different
forms of entertainment (Kövecses, 2005). Popular sports events are turned into
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monumental shows. Advertising and selling products involves almost theatrical
scenery. American politics (e.g., political stage; “McCain must rely on more than
stagecraft” (http//: election.foxnews.com)), and especially the elections, and
even war (e.g., “Palin has visited the Iraq war theater” (http//:
blogsforjohnmccain.com)) are areas of life in which the metaphor LIFE IS
A SHOW exists. A proof of this is the high linguistic productivity of the
metaphor (Lakoff and Turner, 1989: 57):
LIFE IS A PLAY
She always wants to be in the spotlight.
That’s not in the script.
What’s your part in this?
He blew his line.
He saved the show.
He always plays the fool.
That attitude is just a mask.
You deserve a standing ovation.
He plays an important role in the process.
He only played a bit part in my life.
I’m improvising.
It’s showtime!
4.5.2. Interpersonal relations and facial expressions
in Anglo-American culture
The metaphors LIFE IS A SHOW and SOCIAL INTERACTION IS
A THEATRE also organize extensive portions of interpersonal experience.
Social interaction and interpersonal relations are shaped by two omnipresent
motives, the self-presentational motive to look successful and happy and the
interpersonal motive to “make others feel good” (Wierzbicka, 1999a). To
present a consistent positive self-image and at the same time make others feel
good requires self-control, which is considered the key to successful social
interaction in American culture.
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Americans believe that emotions are irrational and hard to control, and as
such dangerous (Lutz, 1989). Catherine Lutz, an American anthropologist,
investigated how Americans talk about emotions, and she noted that they often
resort to the rhetoric of emotional control; they talk about emotions as
controlled, managed or coped with. The “good” emotions should be controlled,
while the “bad” ones, such as a sense of guilt, envy or anger, should be avoided
(Szarota, 2006). This does not mean, however, that no expression of any
emotion is allowed. Wierzbicka (1999a; Klos Sokol, 1994) claims that American
culture promotes certain types of controlled emotion, namely, friendliness,
cheerfulness and happiness. All of them are related in expressing a generally
understood positive attitude to everything and everyone. Friendliness, or
expressing kindness to others, is the main principle of social interaction in
American culture. This is reflected in the common use of how-are-you type
questions, frequently expressed good wishes (e.g., Have a nice day!, Enjoy
yourself!), compliments, and various positive comments and exclamations
(e.g., Awesome! (extremely good)). Friendliness is also expressed by showing
willingness to stay in contact in the future; this purpose is most often served by
invitation-like forms (e.g., We have to meet some time, Let’s get together again),
which are intended as “statements of good intention” (Wolfson, 1993;
Jakubowska, 1999).
Cheerfulness, or being in good spirits, is a must in American culture. This
is expressed in many sayings, such as Keep smiling, Look on the bright side of
life, or Cheer up! To show others that they are cheerful, Americans smile
(Ekman calls this type of smile the false smile). Being cheerful is an
indispensable element of the American self-presentation style. When a person
shows a broad smile to others, he creates a positive self-image which, on the
one hand, makes others think “something good” about him, and on the other
hand, is a conscious attempt to get rid of “bad feelings” and evoke “good
feelings.” This is connected with the cultural principle of positive thinking.
Somebody who is cheerful and happy is accepted and liked by others, and,
which is also important, he feels good (Wierzbicka, 1999a). The smile
employed to enhance the individual’s public image is called by Szarota (2006)
the self-presentational smile.
The smile plays a very important role in social interaction in American
culture. Americans treat the smile like a social mask which should be put on
whenever a person comes into contact with others. Klos Sokol (1994: 93)
writes about the American Smile Code, according to which members of
American culture have at their disposal several types of smile for different
occasions:
[...] a half smile or smile without opening the mouth in the bank, in the shop
or on the bus is a polite sign that the person has noticed the other. This
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means that the person is ready to cooperate, but he does not look for any
social contact. A smile without opening the mouth, e.g., to someone sitting
next to him on the plane, may mean: “I’m friendly, but, please, do not accost
me”. A broad smile is nice, but if somebody is smiling from ear to ear to
strangers, they may think that he is batty, stupid or whacked. Or, even worse,
they will think he is a politician.
Americans also smile because they want to look happy. Happiness, or the
feeling of pleasure, contentment or satisfaction, is what everyone should try to
achieve. A happy looking person is perceived in American culture as one to be
trusted and respected, somebody who is competent and successful. A person
who is smiling is perceived as one who controls the situation. The same
function as that of the happy self-satisfied face is often performed by various
positive self-presentational comments and responses to how-are-you type
questions which are “as positive as possible” (Ferrara, 1980: 333; Jakubowska,
1999).
As mentioned above, in American culture unrestrained expression of
emotions is perceived in a negative way. This equally concerns positive and
negative emotions. Americans identify expressing emotions with irrational
behaviour, and their unwillingness to show their feelings is dictated by self-face
concerns (Duszak, 2003). The “cool” way of talking is related to the two
positive features, self-control and the ability to be dispassionate (the word has
positive connotations in English) (Wierzbicka, 1999a). To behave in this way,
Americans avoid controversial topics and engage in conversations on topics on
which they have similar opinions to their interlocutors. They tend to avoid
certain topics which would make them engaged, such as personal matters,
politics and religion (Althen, 1988; cf. Barnlund, 1989). This also explains the
popularity of small talk, “light conversation on unimportant or non-serious
subjects” (LDCE). Instead of expressing emotions, Americans talk about them
or analyse them. This introspection is very important, as the self-analysis helps
them distance themselves from their own emotions and as a consequence
control them. This control involves both expressing emotions and making them
less intense (Wierzbicka, 1999a).
Self-control does not have to be applied to the expression of opinions. In
American culture, everyone is allowed to say what he thinks. The freedom of
expression, however, does not apply to the speaker’s personal opinions about
others. This can be explained by the culturally determined need to make others
“feel good” (Wierzbicka, 1999a). This consideration for others is nothing more
than a thin cultural overlay which has nothing to do with “real” concern for
them. Thus, friendliness expressed during social interaction is enacted for the
sake of “show.”
The character of interpersonal relations has been formed mainly by the two
predominant elements of American culture, individualism and mobility. High
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mobility has caused most Americans to be separated from their family and
relatives whom they replace with new friends (Naylor, 1998). Americans, as
individualists, belong to many ingroups, and enter and exit them with great
frequency and ease. This does not allow them to develop very intimate
relationships (cf. Triandis, 1995). As a consequence, their personal relationships
are often shallow. Naylor (1998: 61; Althen, 1988) describes Americans as
“superficial in friendliness” and tending to avoid personal commitments. They
easily make friends with everybody, but their friendships, based on spontaneity,
are rarely deep.
Interacting with others in a very superficial manner, Americans value
informality, talkativeness and egalitarianism (cf. Fitzgerald, 1993; Althen,
1988). Informality, making friends with everybody and “fake” friendliness
(together with “fake” smiles) are characteristic of everyday social encounters.
In addition, as Naylor (1998) maintains, Americans have a tendency to
depersonalize their interactions with others. Both informality and
depersonalizing are used as a protective shield or mask behind which the
American self is hidden. Talkativeness is meant to help avoid silence, which is
unacceptable during social interaction. Egalitarianism is reflected, for example,
in the common use of the personal pronoun you, which used indiscriminately
to everybody functions as “a social equalizer” (Wierzbicka, 1985: 164).
Unwillingness to disclose one’s self is also visible in the fact that Americans
highly value privacy. They say that people need some time to themselves or some
time alone to come to terms with reality or think something over. The little of
the self that is intentionally presented has to appear successful, self-satisfied,
cooperative and, most of all, liked by others.
4.5.3. Face in Anglo-American culture
In mainstream American culture, value orientations emphasize the individual
and individuality (Spindler and Spindler, 1993; Naylor, 1998). Thus, the primary
orientation tends toward the individual self rather than toward the significant
other. Self-assertiveness, a high degree of self-reliance and independence are
highly valued by Americans (Chu, 1985). The American concept of self
emphasizes “the ideal of development toward autonomy and the liberation of
the self from external authority as part of social growth” (DeVos, 1985: 178).
The independent self-construal (Markus and Kitayama, 1991) which
predominates in American culture reflects the analytical worldview in which
“the person is defined by stable properties, separate from his or her social
context” (Cross and Gore, 2003: 542; Scollon and Scollon, 1994: 151). An
174 Face as a folk concept
individual’s self is unique, autonomous and independent. These are considered
the three most important aspects of the contemporary American concept of self.
From the very beginning American children and young people are treated as
fully-fledged human beings who are deserving of respect. They are perceived as
unique individuals, responsible for their words and actions. This has
consequences for their face. As Ervin-Tripp et al. (1995: 67) claim, Americans
treat face “as given to the individual in childhood, like good name or good
health, and capable only of being lost, restored, or saved.” Thus young people,
like other members of American society, have face, which constitutes their
self-image, as Goffman (1967: 5) maintains, delineated in terms of positive
social attributes. Although the attributes undergo some changes along with the
age of the individual, there is an invariant set of attributes specific for American
culture. My American respondents, when asked about attributes commonly
identified with face, most frequently mentioned the following concepts:
Table 1. Social attributes identified with face in American culture
Value Mentioned by the respondents (per cent)
Good reputation
Credibility
Self-respect
Dignity
Social status based on achievement
Appearance of competence
Pride
100
88
84
76
42
40
32
The selection of attributes defines the American conceptualization of face. Good
reputation is an attribute most frequently identified with face, which, like face,
can be easily damaged by any kind of “improper” behaviour, i.e. the one
considered morally wrong and violating social norms. Credibility, identified with
trustworthiness and competence, is often associated with prestige and respect.
However, face is given not only to those who deserve respect and are respected
by others, but also to those who present a self-satisfied image of self, and feel
respect for themselves (self-respect). For Americans, dignity is a very important
aspect of self-image; this true worth gains an individual the respect of others.
Another highly valued attribute related to face is social status based on
achievement. An individual is worth how much he can achieve. His face and the
respect he gains are the measure of his achievement and success. Social status
which contributes greatly to face (i.e. gives face to the individual) is achieved by
hard work, skill and competence. Competence, or at least its appearance, has
a very strong positive impact on the image of the individual in the eyes of
others. The last of the most frequently mentioned social attributes is pride (high
opinion of oneself) which together with self-respect comprises the aspect of face
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which entirely depends on the individual’s psychological state. Thus, American
face is a self-image which is mainly based on moral aspects of the individual’s
social performance and status acquired through personal effort. Similar results
were produced by the research done by Cole (1989; discussed by Morisaki and
Gudykunst, 1994). Making a study of culture-specific conceptualizations of face,
Cole noted that the definitions of face formulated by his North American
respondents most frequently included credibility, individual reputation,
self-respect, ego, claimed position in interaction, appearance of strength,
recognized positive worth, pride, status, lack of embarrassment, and self-defense.
American face belongs exclusively to an individual who is independent of
others and free to choose his optimal course of action. As Cross and Gore
(2003: 537) argue:
In the United States, the individual, separate from social ties, obligations, and
impediments, is sovereign. The maxim ‘To thine own self be true’ dominates
the understanding of how one should behave. The ideal person chooses his or
her own goals and direction and recognizes his or her distinctness from others
(Cross and Gore, 2003: 537).
The individual’s independence and autonomy is a consequence of loose social
bonds. His decisions and actions result from his being true to himself and
a rational way of thinking. He perceives himself, and is perceived by others, as
a unique person, distinct from others that similarly are unique and distinct. This
uniqueness and distinctness is related to self-orientedness.
Achieving the cultural goal of independence requires constructing oneself as
an individual whose behaviour is organized and made meaningful primarily by
reference to one’s own internal repertoire of thoughts, feelings, and action,
rather than by reference to the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others. [...]
the person is viewed as ‘a bounded, unique, more or less integrated
motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion,
judgement, and action organized into a distinctive whole [...]’ This view of the
self derives from a belief in the wholeness and uniqueness of each person’s
configuration of internal attributes (Markus and Kitayama, 1991: 226).
The attributes that determine the individual’s uniqueness are involved in the
creation of his personal identity. “Americans often assume that people are
‘self-made,’ [...].” For them, identity is something which is personally
‘constructed’ (Fitzgerald, 1993: 58). Although in interpersonal relations the
social identity (based on one’s ingroup/outgroup categorization) also matters, it
is one’s relatively stable set of internal attributes that identifies the person as
a unique and separate whole irrespective of situation.
The American concept of face is based on the independent
conceptualization of self. It is described by Morisaki and Gudykunst (1994: 57;
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cf. Goffman, 1955, 1967) as “independent face” (i.e. independent of any other
person’s face). It is “put on” by each participant and negotiated during social
interaction. What is “put on” is a mask-like face which is to be in line with the
requirements of good social relations necessary for successful social interaction
(e.g., friendly, cheerful and happy).
As Ervin-Tripp et al. (1995) argue, American face is “individualized.” The
actions of one individual do not affect the face of any member of his family.
Americans do not consider the actions of their family members as relevant to
their own face. In other words, everyone takes responsibility for his actions, and
it is only his own face that can be threatened by them. Similarly, any threat to
the individual’s face affects his face exclusively, not anyone else’s.
When interacting with others, Americans are oriented mainly at their own
face. For Americans, self-face maintenance is more important than other-face
maintenance (cf. Ting-Toomey, 1988), although other-face is not neglected.
Other-face maintenance is motivated by the necessity to make others feel good,
the necessity for cooperation, and self-presentational reasons. The most
important face need is the need for freedom of action and freedom from
imposition. The next most important one is for a “good” self-image. In
American culture, the “good” self-image involves the following features:
• (of the person’s self-image) self-satisfied, happy, successful,
• (of the person’s interpersonal skills) friendly, outgoing, cooperative, talkative,
• (of the person’s character) independent, self-assertive, competent, competitive.
These features were most frequently mentioned by my American respondents
asked about the “meaning” of the positive self-image. This goes along with what
Klos Sokol (1994: 24) describes as the American self-presentation style:
Patting oneself on the shoulder as a gesture of appreciation may seem to some
people distasteful, but it is deeply rooted in American mentality. We have
developed a habit of ‘selling oneself,’ if it is necessary. We can with great ease
talk about our professional achievements, also in private situations.
Thus, face understood as a self-image created and negotiated by participants
during social interaction is used to help “sell” the self, which is not always as
amiable and positive as face seems to imply.
The self-image (face) that is so carefully created and negotiated during social
interaction with others can easily be threatened or lost, either due to some
action by its owner or due to some action performed by others. The interviewed
Americans, when asked about face-threatening or face-loss situations, mentioned:
• situations in which the person shows lack of competence or makes a serious
error,
• situations in which the person fails to do something (e.g., failure to fulfil
a promise),
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• situations in which the person does something that is inconsistent with his
projected self-image (e.g., the use of swearwords),
• situations in which somebody else does and/or says something that threatens
his self-image (e.g., calling names, the use of wrong address terms, failure to
greet the person when this is interpreted as showing lack of respect),
• situations in which somebody else puts the person in a position in which he
feels imposed on (e.g., when he is made to admit something he is ashamed
of, or when he is made to do something he does not want or like to do).
In the already mentioned study by Cole (1989), his North American
respondents enumerated similar face-threatening situations: personal failure
(e.g., when a person loses an argument), threats to the person’s credibility, and
threats to the person’s self-image. Thus, what poses the greatest threat to
Americans’ face is failure, the opposite of one of their greatest values (success).
Lack of success in any aspect of their life, be it in private life, at work or in
interpersonal relations, always constitutes a serious threat to face. The resulting
self-image is out of keeping with American social norms. Americans must
always be happy-looking, competent “winners” or “survivors.” The other type of
face threat is any kind of imposition, made by the other, an attempt to limit
a person’s independence and freedom, the foundations of American culture.
The picture drawn above shows Americans as good actors constantly
participating in and creating a one-person show, in front of a very demanding
audience. The face they put on display must be at all costs positive. All the
features mentioned above, theatrical gestures (of good intentions), exaggerated
enthusiasm, frequent positive exclamations (e.g., It’s awesome!, It’s great!, Great
job!) and a friendly smile, which for members of other cultures seems fake and
insincere, constitute the self-image specific for members of American culture.
4.6. The Polish concept of face
4.6.1. Polish culture
Even though, according to Hofstede’s latest research results (2001), Poland can
be found in a relatively high position on the individualism—collectivism scale,
Polish culture has been considered collectivistic by many researchers
(e.g., Lewicka, 2005; Lubecka, 2000). Lewicka (2005), in her paper “‘Polacy są
wielkim i dumnym narodem,’ czyli nasz portret wielce zróżnicowany,” which is
178 Face as a folk concept
devoted to the Polish system of values, compares the results of different
cross-cultural research projects on values (Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz and Bardi,
1997; Inglehart, 1990, 1998; Hofstede, 2001). This analysis suggests that Poland
is one of the most conservative, hierarchical and collectivistic countries among
those studied. This inconsistency in evidence on the evaluation of Polish culture
can perhaps be explained by the changes which took place in Poland after
1989. The transition from communism to liberal democracy resulted in social,
as well as economic transformations (Wnuk-Lipiński, 2001). Their
consequences have been cultural changes and the opening of Poland to modern
Western culture, American culture in particular (cf. Ożóg, 2002; 2002a; 2004).
As Triandis claims (1995: 15):
In the formerly Communist countries, the shift toward market economies has
much in common with the shift from collectivism to individualism in many
parts of the world.
Poles have borrowed the main Western values and assimilated some elements of
Western lifestyle. For example, success, especially financial success, has become
one of the most important aims of life; individualism, independence, freedom of
choice and greater mobility have become the main categories of the lifestyle of
the Polish young generation (Triandis, 1995). Skudrzykowa and Warchala
(2002; Kita, 2006; Marcjanik, 2007) even talk about the fashion for privacy,
individualism and individual expression among the young generation.
However, Polish individualism is nothing new. There can be found many eras
in Polish history when individualism together with an emphasis on personal
freedom dominated, e.g., the period of złota wolność (Lat. aurea libertas — golden
liberty) (the 16th—18th centuries), “rights and privileges gained by Polish gentry”
(Kopaliński, 1987) and the law of liberum veto (free ‘I do not allow’) (1652—1791),
“the right to break off the parliamentary session by one member shouting I do not
allow,” a free voice of the gentry democracy (Kopaliński, 1987). Individualism and
the need for freedom of action is also a traditional element of Polish everyday life,
which is reflected in some proverbs and sayings, e.g., Każdy sobie rzepkę skrobie
(Everyone peels his own turnip), meaning “everyone does his own job, neither
expecting any help from others, nor providing any help to them,” Wolnoć Tomku
w swoim domku (Tom, (you) can do (whatever you want) at your home), meaning
“everyone can do whatever he wants in his house, without paying any attention to
others.”
Traditionally Poles value respect, interdependence, reciprocal obligations,
family, friendship, intimacy, emotionality, hospitality, and modesty, and have
a strong need for inclusion and approval, especially from significant others
(cf. Lubecka, 2000; Wierzbicka, 1991). Dyczewski (1995), having analysed
a great number of studies on values in Polish culture, created a list of values
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which he presented to a group of respondents of different ages. This resulted in
a list of the most typical values for Polish culture (it is not a hierarchical
ranking) (1995: 64):
1. Family, the family spirit, home.
2. Community, the sense of togetherness.
3. Affection for childen and the importance of the role of women.
4. Sensitivity to transcendental values and to sacrum, religiousness.
5. Irrationalism, emotionality, romanticism.
6. Internal freedom, personal dignity, honour, individualism.
7. Forgiveness, lack of vindictiveness and cruelty.
8. Hospitality, sociability, generosity.
9. Readiness to sacrifice, a sense of duty.
10. Love of freedom, patriotism.
11. Optimism, hope against hope.
12. Openness to other cultures, tolerance, universalism.
13. Respect for creative work.
14. Democracy, spirit of good citizenship and criticism of authority.
This list reflects the equivocal nature of Polish culture, which, on the one hand
attaches significance to family and the sense of togetherness, and on the other
cherishes individualism and democracy. This is similar to the results of the
research I have carried out (see Table 2).
Table 2. Major values in Polish culture
Values Mentioned by the respondents (per cent)
Family and friendship
Dignity
Freedom
Independence
Faith/religion
Individualism
Honour
Respect, especially for the elderly
Hospitality
Democracy
Tolerance
Patriotism
Emotionality
97
87
98
85
85
80
77
73
67
58
55
47
42
Almost all my Polish respondents when asked about values typical for Polish
culture mentioned family and friendship; these invariably constitute the most
important aspect of life and the greatest value for the majority of Poles. This
and other values mentioned constitute a mixture which does not allow of an
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easy and explicit classification of Polish culture. Theoretically, knowledge of the
values that a particular cultural group subscribes to should help the researcher
to classity it. The character of Polish culture, though, is not easy to define, first
because it arises from Polish historical tradition, second because Poland is
undergoing significant transformations in the most vital areas of life. The
presented list (Table 2) shows that the Polish hierarchy of values is also in the
process of changing. Important values, such as honour, patriotism, respect for
the elderly and even hospitality, have lost their primary position in the
hierarchy. And the others, such as independence and individualism, have gained
in significance. Generally speaking, we can observe a gradual axiological shift in
Polish culture. As Kazimierz Ożóg, in the paper “Współczesna polszczyzna
a postmodernism” (2006: 104), maintains:
The values that constitute the core of the national culture have receded into
the background: honour, patriotism, responsibility, common good, beauty, truth,
dignity, service, modesty, mercy, fidelity, family, home, morality, justice, tradition
and work. [...] [In the foreground,] a new axiological system [has appeared],
a system of concepts and values characteristic of postmodernism. These are
mainly pragmatic, hedonistic values, related to consumption.
Polish culture is said to be neither excessively masculine nor excessively
feminine (Lewicka, 2005). On the one hand, Poles cherish close family bonds
and friendship, value leisure, and celebrate family reunions and religious
festivals, which is typical for feminine cultures. Unlike members of masculine
cultures, Poles do not hesitate to externalize their feelings, both positive and
negative. On the other hand, there is Polish masculinity which is deeply rooted
in our history and patriotic tradition. It is connected with the idea of struggle
for independence and freedom and romantic heroism. Among the values that
used to have one of the highest positions in the value hierarchy in Polish culture
are Bóg, honor, ojczyzna (God, honour, homeland) (also the motto of the Polish
army), which form a trinity constituting the ideological basis for
patriotically-oriented Poles, especially during hard times (e.g., the partitions of
Poland, and the First and Second World Wars). God and the Roman Catholic
Church were for a long time, and still are, extremely important to the majority
of Poles. The Church played a consolidating role, gathering and supporting
people during hard times (e.g., when Poland lost independence, or during the
“Solidarity” era) (cf. Cudak, 2002). Honour, originally a virtue specific to
knights and the nobility, is for Poles one of the most face-related values. To
behave in a dishonourable way always involves a significant damage to face or
face loss. The third value — homeland — has always been highly cherished,
especially when Poland lost and had to fight for its independence; the nation’s
faithful sons sacrificed their lives to make it free and independent. Nowadays,
4.6. The Polish concept of face 181
when Poland is a fully independent country, everyday life has become highly
commercialized and people are more money- and pleasure-oriented, these values
are not so important as they used to be. Now honour is often less important
than money, other material gains and success, which dominate the new Polish
reality. As some Poles say, czasem trzeba schować honor do kieszeni, jeżeli chce
się coś zyskać (sometimes one has to put one’s honour in one’s pocket, if one
wants to gain something). Such moral compromises seem to be an integral
element of Polish social life in the era of consumerism. The same factors have
also put patriotism on the sidelines of Polish social life. For many young Poles,
it is a relic of the past.
Respect, marked by large power distance and ascribed status, is among the
traditional Polish values. Poles respect their family, the elderly, women, their
nation, tradition and property. Respect towards people is expressed by the use
of appropriate forms of address, “the speakers’ nearly self-effacing presence in
requests and apologies to superiors (age, gender and status),” and “age- and
status-oriented politeness” (Lubecka, 2000: 54; Jakubowska, 1999). Attachment
to and respect for one’s own land and home country in the past resulted in
limited mobility. Poles accepted stability and a settled way of life. A person who
frequently changed his place of residence, or was homeless or of unknown
origin, was viewed with great suspicion (Kosowska, 2002). Nowadays, however,
stability resulting from attachment to one’s place of residence is often perceived
negatively. Greater mobility has become generally accepted, as many Poles move
to get education, to find a better job or better living conditions, although getting
one’s own flat and establishing a family are still among their principal aims in
life (Kosowska, 2002). Many young Poles move to other European Union
countries. Others, especially the most ambitious ones, commute to the largest
Polish cities, e.g., Warsaw.
Interdependence and reciprocal obligations, family bonds and friendship
constitute the basis of Polish interpersonal relations. Group membership, loyalty
to one’s group, group responsibility and the idea of solidarity are very important
to members of Polish culture (Kosowska, 2002). The most important group in
every Pole’s life is his family, which constitutes a point of reference for life and
provides support of all kinds, financial included. The great variety of kinship
terms in the Polish language suggests the special role of family in Polish culture
(Dubisz, 2002: 125—132). For Poles, apart from family, friendship is of great
value. According to Słownik Języka Polskiego (1979), friendship in Polish culture
involves close, warm-hearted relations based on mutual kindliness, sincerity,
trust and the ability to count on the other in any circumstances. The dictionary
enumerates expressions which can modify the word przyjaźń (friendship):
bezinteresowna (unselfish), dozgonna (lifelong), niezachwiana (unswerving),
prawdziwa (true), serdeczna (bosom), szczera (sincere), wzajemna (mutual),
zażyła (intimate), do grobowej deski (till the day one dies). The features denoted
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by these expressions, however, characterize not only friendship, but also other
types of close relations. Intimacy, for example, inherent also in the majority of
family relations, is especially cherished by Poles who see in it the basis of the
emotional stability of any relationship.
Hospitality is another value important to the majority of Poles. This is visible
in Polish folk wisdom, expressed in numerous proverbs, e.g., Gość w dom, Bóg
w dom (A guest in the home, God in the home), Czym chata bogata, tym rada
(Whatever is at home, will do [to serve the guests]), Postaw się a zastaw się
(Pledge your entire fortune and cut a dash). The import of these sayings is that
the guest is a blessing sent by God. A good host should sacrifice everything he
has to entertain his guests, even go into debt. Polish hospitality can be evinced
as a genuine expression of feelings, a sincere interest in the guests’ life,
spontaneity, and the high value put on relationships (Jakubowska, 2004a).
Polish hospitality, however, can sometimes be troublesome for guests, as the
host’s duty is to feed the hungry and to give drink to the thirsty (Kosowska,
2002; Skudrzykowa, 2002). This duty has to be performed irrespective of the
guest’s will. The Polish understanding of hospitality differs markedly from the
American one; the two expressions Make yourself at home and Help yourself, so
frequently uttered by American hosts, signal that they do not want to impose
anything on their guests and give them freedom of action and choice. Unlike
American culture, in which imposition is to be avoided, even “for the good” of
the guest, Polish culture promotes imposition as an expression of hospitality
(e.g., Musisz skosztować jeszcze tej sałatki (You must try this salad), or Nie
wypuszczę cię, jeśli nie zjesz jeszcze jednego kawałka mojego tortu (I won’t let you
go if you don’t eat another piece of my cake)). However, together with the
above-mentioned social and economic transformations, Polish hospitality is also
changing. People work more and have less time to socialize, and face-to-face
contacts are often replaced by e-mails, sms messages or telephone conversations
at most.
Boasting in general, and boasting about one’s success in particular, has never
been accepted in Polish culture (Jakubowska, 1996, 1999; Grybosiowa, 2002).
Modesty was, and still is, considered by some Poles one of the fundamental
values that should be acquired by young people. The mention of one’s own
success or any positive comment about oneself should be avoided. What is
more, any comment of this kind made by another person should be played
down. Modesty is in conflict with the need for inclusion and approval, which is
the major face need in Polish culture. This need is satisfied by means of
different positive face-saving devices, such as expressions of gratitude, good
wishes, congratulations and compliments on the interlocutor’s appearance,
possessions, good work and achievements. Traditionally, modesty is marked by
timidity and lack of assertiveness, visible in responses to compliments and
congratulations (which are often played down or even rejected) and “in the way
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self-presentations are made [...] (inappropriateness of stressing one’s virtues and
successes)” (Lubecka, 2000: 54—55; Marcjanik, 2002). Due to the axiological
changes, however, modesty is no longer the top value. This has an impact on
the way people, especially members of the young generation, respond to
compliments and congratulations; they rarely reject them or play them down.
Like in American culture, in Polish culture acceptances have become the most
frequent responses to compliments and congratulations (Arabski, 2004;
Bogdanowska-Jakubowska, 2010). Generally, the Polish self-presentation style
has changed; the self-image that young Poles create has nothing to do with
modesty, timidity or shyness, and it does not preclude mention of a person’s
success and achievements. One can tell others about one’s success without
being perceived as a braggart.
In Polish culture, the need for acceptance prevails over the need for
autonomy. The approval of important others is more valued than freedom of
action and freedom from imposition. Poles, especially members of the older
generation, often say: Co ludzie powiedzą? (What will people say?), To nie
uchodzi! (This is not proper! [outdated]), To nie wypada! (This is not done!) (cf.
Marcjanik, 2006). That is why it is more threatening to one’s face to be
criticized than to be paid an uninvited visit. “Polish pragmatics of politeness can
be characterized by the principle of non-acceptance of any refusal and of no
consideration for other people’s objections and excuses” (Antas, 2002: 355).
This especially refers to offers and invitations which “must” be accepted; such
impositions are not treated as violations of the others’ freedom of choice or as
a threat to their face. This type of imposition is in accordance with Polish
norms of politeness. In this area, however, there have also occurred some
changes: especially among the young generation. Although the need for
acceptance is still very important, younger Poles do not pay so much attention
to what other people will say about them. They are also more sensitive to any
imposition or limitation on their freedom. For their parents, for example,
privacy was less important and isolation was viewed negatively. This is evident
from their attitudes toward unexpected visits, often interpreted as a welcome
surprise. This, however, has changed, and as Poles become more and more
individualistic and constantly lack for time, they are beginning, at least among
the younger generation, to value privacy and interpret unexpected visits as
a disturbance.
Having adopted the Western/American style of life, with a drive for success,
individualism, independence, freedom of choice, tolerance and mobility
(cf. Ożóg, 2006), Poles remain faithful to traditional Polish values. What makes
them different from members of Western cultures, and American culture in
particular, is their uncontrolled emotionality, which consists in a genuine
expression of feelings, both positive and negative, sincere interest in the
interlocutor’s life, directness of self-expression, spontaneity, and a high value put
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on relationships (Lubecka, 2000). In Polish culture, expression of emotions is
a norm. This is reflected in the language, in which there are many expressive
forms: diminutives (e.g., Tomek, Tomeczek, Tomiś, Tomisiek, Tomaszek), or
other words of endearment (e.g., słoneczko (sun (dim.)), kochanie (dear), żabciu
(frog (dim.)), skarbie (darling)) (see also Jakubowska, 1999). Some words of
endearment can take the form of augmentatives, e.g., Bacha, Krycha, Grzechu,
which express a slightly different emotional attitude (Kryk-Kastovsky, 2002). In
Polish culture, a person who does not show his emotions is, as Wierzbicka
(1999a) claims, perceived by others as cold (meaning that this person does not
“feel” anything). Generally speaking, emotionality in Polish culture shapes
interpersonal relations and influences everyday communication in every social
situation.
4.6.2. Interpersonal relations and facial expressions
in Polish culture
As far as interpersonal relations are concerned, Poles are collectivists.
Generally, they have few intimate relationships, which are developed through
their lifetime or at least over many years (cf. Triandis, 1995). This characteristic
feature is reflected in Polish vocabulary. Poles use three terms,
przyjaciel/przyjaciółka (friend), kolega/koleżanka (friend) and znajomy/znajoma
(acquaintance) (Wierzbicka, 2007), which differ in the degree of intimacy. The
first one can be used to refer to someone with whom the individual is in a close
and intimate relationship; the second is comparable to the English friend; the
third is only used with reference to someone with whom the individual is in
a relationship of low intimacy. Among the young generation of Poles, however,
there is a strong tendency to have as many friends (koledzy or znajomi) as
possible; these relationships are rather superficial and loose. These friends are
persons to whom they say hello, and with whom they engage in the Polish
version of small talk when meeting in the street, at the office or at a party.
The older generations of Poles, however, do not like talking about matters
that do not interest them. They do not value the so-called “safe” conversational
genres, such as small talk, as they feel it is not worth talking about unimportant
matters. The free exchange of opinions accompanied by the expression of often
negative emotions is widely approved of (Wierzbicka, 1999a). Poles follow the
imperative to say what one thinks. This freedom of expression includes also
one’s opinions about the hearer, no matter whether they are positive or negative
(e.g., Ty chyba zupełnie zgłupiałaś (You must be completely crazy)). So, even
though the hearer’s feelings are not neglected, the stress is on the speaker’s
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feelings (Wierzbicka, 1999a). This explains, for example, Poles’ attitudes
towards compliments and congratulations, which are universally used to “make
others feel good.” Poles often treat them as insincere and with a certain kind of
reserve. If the speaker wants to show that his intentions are sincere, he often
says: To nie komplement. To prawda (This is not a compliment. What I say is
true.) (Jakubowska, 1999). Unlike Americans, Poles rarely talk about or analyse
their emotions; they prefer to spontaneously express them, both verbally and
nonverbally (Wierzbicka, 1999a). Such uncontrolled expression of emotions is
often a threat to good social relations.
Polish culture stresses the importance of ingroups, which protect their
members in return for loyalty. For every individual, it is vital to establish and
maintain good relationships with other members of his ingroup and at the same
time create his own social identity as a member of this group. This is achieved
by means of claiming common ground with other members and establishing
in-group solidarity. Doliński (2005) claims that complaining is often used for
such purposes, as it can be treated as an attempt to agree on the evaluation of
the surrounding reality and opinions on relevant social issues (e.g., common
complaining about high prices, the difficult situation in the job market, or
a demanding boss).
Wojciszke and Baryła (2005) maintain that in contrast with American
culture, which is a culture of affirmation, Polish culture is a culture of
complaining and glorification of suffering, in which to be unhappy constitutes the
norm. Contemporary Poles have developed a widespread habit of complaining,
or expressing dissatisfaction, no matter whether they experience it or not. This
feeling of dissatisfaction centres mainly upon public rather than private or
family affairs. Poles are also discontented with their own financial situation and
future prospects (Wojciszke and Baryła, 2005). The norm of being unhappy and
dissatisfied is related to another norm governing Polish social life, the norm of
negative thinking, which makes Poles perceive everything in a negative light,
describe everything in negative terms and expect the worst. According to
Wojciszke and Baryła (2005: 42), the Polish public sector is “an incubator of
the culture of complaining”; they claim that the longer people work in this
sector the more frequently they complain, the more convinced of social injustice
and the more discontented they are. Complaining distinguishes Polish culture
from other cultures, American culture in particular. Our predilection for
complaining can be contrasted with the American predilection for success.
Complaining is a social activity which is always aimed at some audience
(Wojciszke and Baryła, 2005; Klos Sokol, 1994; Antas, 2002). It can be
explained by the conviction, widespread in Polish culture, that talking about
one’s happiness may lead to social rejection. For Poles, the American
self-presentation style involving the expression of self-satisfaction and positive
thinking seems extremely superficial and theatrical. Our complaining nature is
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especially visible in typical responses to how-are-you type questions. In
American culture, the answer to such questions is expected to be “brief, elusive,
and as positive as possible” (Ferrara, 1980: 333). In this way, Americans show
to others the self-image as a self-satisfied, successful person, who should be
appreciated and approved of. In similar situations, Poles tend to downgrade the
positive self-report (Jakubowska, 1999; cf. Grybosiowa, 2002; Doliński, 2005).
They say: Jakoś leci (It’s going somehow), Po staremu (As before), Może być (It
could be worse), or W porządku ((It’s) alright) (Ożóg, 1990; Jakubowska,
1999). This attitude is said to be deeply rooted in Polish history and cultural
tradition. Members of the younger generation, though, in replying to
how-are-you type questions, follow the American pattern and present themselves
as successful irrespective of the real situation.
In Poland, a part of interpersonal relations is constituted by specific gender
relations based on what Kiełkiewicz-Janowiak and Pawełczyk (2007) call
benevolent sexism, which, as they say, has its roots in the-knight-and-his-lady
tradition. Polish women are disadvantaged and idealized at the same time. After
the Second World War, both the influence of the communist regime and the
Roman Catholic tradition preserved the traditional gender roles. Women were
responsible for child rearing and man/husband caring, while men were to
struggle for the country and support the family (Jakubowska, 2007, 2009;
Kiełkiewicz-Janowiak and Pawełczyk, 2007). During the communist era, social
life in Poland was undergoing gradual changes. More and more women entered
the workplace. They did so mainly out of necessity; they still believed in the
traditional division of gender roles. Nowadays, women try to reconcile their
career with family life and bringing up children, to be perfect wives and mothers
and at the same time develop professionally. Trying to successfully perform so
many conflicting social roles, they are still treated as the ladies of their knights,
often getting panie przodem (ladies first), compliments and a kiss in the hand.
Along with the changes in the Polish social and economic life, the position of
women has changed a little for the better, although their situation is still that of
the “disadvantaged” and “idealized.” This is visible almost in every area of
social life in which women perform roles other than their traditional gender
roles.
One of the characteristic features of Polish culture and language is a well
developed system of formal categories of politeness. The Polish language
possesses a regular grammatical category of honorifics, among certain verbal
forms and within personal pronouns (Jakubowska, 1999; Huszcza, 2005). One
could even talk about the so-called traditional Polish titular mania, which was
especially strong among members of Academia, representatives of the so-called
professions (lawyers and doctors) and others who due to the function they
perform or post they hold deserve to be addressed by a title. However, in
modern Polish, the frequency of the use of titles is gradually decreasing due to
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the westernization of Polish culture and the tendency to treat everybody as
equal. This is related also to the process which Marcjanik (2002a; Grybosiowa,
2006) calls democratization of politeness, which consists in shortening the
distance between interactants. This is often accompanied by nonszalancja
(nonchalance) (Marcjanik, 2006) and luz (ease of manner) (Ożóg, 2002; 2005).
Nonszalancja refers here to verbal or nonverbal behaviour which does not in
principle involve breaking any basic norm of Polish politeness, but which is
perceived by the addressee as being inadequately or insufficiently polite in
a particular situation (e.g., the use of the title Pan/Pani + first name to
customers in service encounters, to those whom we do not know well; the use
the second person plural form to a group addressee) (Marcjanik, 2006;
Grybosiowa, 2006). Luz refers to natural behaviour which is not restricted by
stiff norms of politeness. Zachowywać się na luzie means “to behave in a casual
manner, without inhibitions.” This kind of behaviour involves greater directness
and greater freedom of expression.
While in almost every area of social life there can be noticed various
changes involving the borrowing of elements of the Western style of life and
patterns of behaviour, the Polish face (part of the body) seems to be resistant to
any foreign influence. In Poland, it is expected that the face should reflect what
one really feels. If it does not, it is a sign that the person is insincere (Szarota,
2006). Poles, who smile in as many different situations as members of other
cultures, do not like to smile “without any particular reason,” and perceive the
“smiling mask” as something artificial and insincere. The smile seems to be
important mainly in private life (Szarota, 2006). This can be explained by the
general lack of trust towards strangers, which is instilled in children from a very
early age. Polish mothers tell their children: Nigdy nie rozmawiaj z obcymi
(Never talk to strangers), or Nawet nie patrz na obcą panią lub pana, jeżeli
mówiliby coś do ciebie (Don’t even look at a strange woman or man, if they talk
to you). Looking directly at another person is interpreted in Polish culture as an
invitation to interaction. It is believed that it can attract unwelcome attention or
provoke aggression. A direct look accompanied by a smile employed by
a woman and aimed at a man is treated as sexually provocative. That is why
Poles rarely smile at strangers and tend to avoid direct eye contact with them.
Direct looks and genuine smiles are reserved for family, relatives and close
friends. Smiling strangers are viewed with suspicion and distrust. According to
Marcjanik (2007: 28), “the Pole [...] smiles when he thinks that such behaviour
is for him for some reasons advantageous, that it is profitable.” Polish culture,
according to Szarota, represents a model of a “culture without a smile.” The
majority of Poles rarely smile in public. A sad face and a pained expression,
together with a slumped posture, are the nonverbal effects accompanying
complaining, which is one of the main Polish strategies for establishing
harmony and maintaining good social relations (cf. Antas, 2002). For Poles,
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a solemn face at work is a sign of competence and professionalism. Generally,
in the presence of others, Poles seem to be serious, sad and tired. At least, this
is how members of other cultures perceive us.
4.6.3. Face in Polish culture
In Polish culture, the primary orientation is on the one hand on significant
others and one’s relationship with them, on the other hand on individuality.
Traditionally, the Polish concept of self emphasizes the ideal of ingroup
interdependence and cooperation. In addition, it is now undergoing some
changes connected with the general shift towards individualism. Poles, for
example, are learning what the concept of self-assertiveness means and that it
should be perceived as a positive value (the word assertiveness does not have any
equivalent in Polish and has been recently borrowed by Polish; the Polish word
used sometimes as its equivalent — pewność siebie — has a negative connotation).
As mentioned above, other Western/American values, such as the autonomy of
the individual, self-reliance and independence are also becoming highly popular,
especially among the younger generation of Poles. Thus, there is not one
self-construal predominating in Polish culture. The interdependent self-construal
predominates among the older generation and the less educated, while the
independent self-construal predominates among the younger generation, who
started their adult life within the last twenty years, and the educated. This is in
line with the view presented by Ewa Kosowska in her paper, “Kultura polska.
Korzenie współczesności” (2002: 106—107):
The basis of the differences that shape the modern axiological standards turns
out to be the level of education and the generation factor. In spite of the
strong influence of new elements [that create culture], the essence of Polish
identity is based on a range of traditional attitudes which different groups of
Poles refer to. [...] One can meet persons who build their hierarchy of values
on the traditional patterns of national culture and those who take the
postmodern orientation.
The Polish self-construal, like Polish culture, is evolving. It reflects the view in
which the person is created by his roles and relations with others as well as by
“stable properties, separate from his or her social context” (cf. Cross and Gore,
2003: 542). An individual’s self is either/partly unique and independent or/and
interdependent and belonging. Members of the younger generation often fight
an internal battle between the traditional Polish upbringing model, which
requires close contacts with the family, involving strong and long-lasting
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interdependence and taking into consideration “what others will say,” and the
new, “westernized”/“Americanized,” model, according to which they are
independent individuals who have the right to liberate themselves from external
authority and be “unique” (cf. DeVos, 1985; Scollon and Scollon, 1994).
As has been said in Section 4.5.3., American children are treated as
fully-fledged human beings deserving of respect. In Polish culture, children and
young people “do not deserve respect,” and face is not given to the individual in
childhood. This is visible in the manner adults treat them and refer to them.
Everyday politeness and facework in general seem not to apply in interaction
with children (there is an almost total lack of the use of such words as dziękuję
(thank you), proszę (please)). In the adult world, their face concerns often do
not count at all. A good illustration of the Polish attitude to children is the
saying: Dzieci i ryby głosu nie mają (Children and fish do not have the right to
speak), meaning, “a well brought up child should keep silent.” This is related to
the principle, taught in the former times, that the child can speak only when
addressed by an adult. However, the child can share some of his family face, as
Polish face can be either treated as belonging to an individual or as shared
among some important groups, such as the family. Face can be treated as
a heritage which can be lost, restored or saved. The following examples of
a teacher’s comments addressed to her student illustrate this:
Od profesorskiego dziecka więcej się wymaga. (More can be expected of
a professor’s child than of others.)
Znam twoich rodziców i wiem, że stać cię na więcej. (I know your parents and
I know that you are capable of much more.)
The following comment by a father to his son also invokes family face:
Nie kompromituj nas zachowując się w taki sposób! (Don’t compromise us by
such behaviour!)
Thus, the actions of one individual can affect the face of his family, as the
reputation of his family can influence his own face. These comments are related
to face which is shared by members of a group (the family), but face can also
be shared by members of some groups of professionals, e.g., doctors. Members
of this group are very sensitive to any critical comment directed towards their
colleagues, whether it concerns their professional competence or their moral
integrity. Although in both cases (the family and the collectivity of doctors), the
facework stimulus is loyalty to other co-members, the value of group face in
these two cases is perceived differently in Polish society. The positive evaluation
of family face results from the traditional Polish respect for the family. The
negative evaluation of the face of the professional group of doctors is related to
the general condition of Polish health care.
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In Polish culture, face is acquired and gradually increases together with
social status in adult life (cf. Ervin-Tripp et al., 1995). It can be identified with
the following set of attributes mentioned by my Polish respondents, asked about
concepts commonly identified with face:
The selection of attributes, presented in Table 3, defines the Polish
conceptualization of face. Honour, the attribute most frequently identified by
Poles with face, and respect, like face, can be lost due to behaviour at variance
with what is morally acceptable. The high percentage of mentions of dignity,
positive self-image and good reputation proves that Poles perceive face as
a positive worth which can bring them success in relations with others. Another
highly valued attribute related to face is faithfulness to one’s principles, which
requires the identity of the presented opinions/principles with the
opinions/principes acted on. A value which contributes greately to face in Polish
culture is social status, both the one based on achievement and the one based on
a position acquired through ascription. Face depends on an individual’s hard
work, skills and competence as well as on his relationship to important others
(i.e. belonging to a respectable family, having an influential relative or being the
son/daughter of a respectable or successful person). The latter type of status
used to prevail over the former; however nowadays people are more often
evaluated on the basis of what they have achieved and what they represent than
on what they belong to. The last face-related value on the list is credibility,
which, according to the Polish respondents, has a much smaller impact on the
individual’s face than that claimed by the American respondents. Taking
everything into consideration, Polish face is a self-image based mainly on moral
aspects of the individual’s performance, others’ opinion of the individual and
generally understood social status, in which social ascription still has its part.
The Polish concept of face is based on the two competing self-construals
existing simultaneously in Polish culture. Therefore it can be described neither
as purely independent nor as purely interdependent, it is rather face “in
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Table 3. Social attributes identified with face in Polish culture
Value Mentioned by the respondents (per cent)
Honour
Respect
Dignity
Positive self-image
Good reputation
Faithfulness to one’s principles
Social status based on achievement
Social status based on a position
acquired through ascription
Credibility
95
92
67
62
60
50
47
42
42
transition” (i.e. undergoing certain changes, parallel to the changes in Polish
society and culture). The type of face which is “put on” by each participant
during social interaction depends on the context of the situation and on one’s
relationship with others. Unlike the American mask-like face, which is friendly
and smiling, the Polish face still recalls a pained, unhappy mask, although there
are some changes in the direction of the more positive and more optimistic
image.
Together with transformations that have affected Polish economic and social
life, there can be noticed significant changes in the Polish politeness model, in
which, according to Kazimierz Ożóg (2005: 14), “there has occurred a shift
from expressing kindness towards another person to focusing on oneself.” The
speaker becomes more important than the addressee. He can behave in certain
ways, as he is a free, autonomous participant in social interaction who has the
right to self-expression (Ożóg, 2005). Thus, interacting with others, Poles, like
Americans, are oriented mainly at their own face. However, they express greater
mutual-face and other-face maintenance than members of individualistic
cultures, such as American culture. They use more approval-seeking strategies
than autonomy-preserving strategies, because inclusion and approval still
dominate over autonomy among their face needs (cf. Morisaki and Gudykunst,
1994). In Polish culture, the “good” self-image involves the following features:
• (of the person’s positive image) cheerful (although it may sound paradoxical),
nice,
• (of the person’s interpersonal skills) amiable, considerate, approachable,
non-conceited, cooperative,
• (of the person’s character) independent, caring, competent, generous,
sensitive.
These features were most frequently mentioned by my Polish respondents asked
about the “meaning” of the positive self-image.
Self-presentation may take many different forms; people employ many
different strategies to present themselves to others in an acceptable way; they
always try to show their positive attributes, or at least try to convince others
that they possess them. The Polish self-presentation style differs from the
American; this results from the differences in hierarchies of values, the
character of social relations and the type of self-construal prevailing in Polish
and American cultures. Klos Sokol (1994: 24), an American linguist who
worked at the University of Warsaw, discusses the differences between Polish
and American self-presentation styles:
The Polish sociolinguist, Adam Jaworski, claims that modesty is a feature
highly valued in Polish culture. At the same time, he stresses the difference
between the Polish and American way of self-presentation. The American way
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(‘Listen to what I have achieved’) is ‘looking for confirmation’ from others. It
consists in the hearer agreeing with the speaker, and then congratulating him
[on what he has achieved]. This can seem to be arrogant in comparison to the
Polish preference for modesty (‘I didn’t come out best’). Jaworski describes
this style of behaviour as ‘getting [a compliment/congratulation] out [of the
other].’ Finally, the hearer objects to the speaker’s low self-evaluation and
stresses his good points.
Generally speaking, self-presentation consists in stressing one’s positive attributes
and down-playing one’s negative attributes (Goffman, 1959; Baumeister, 1982;
Leary, 1999; Schlenker and Pontari, 2000; Schlenker, 2003). In Polish culture,
a “good” self-image is often created by means of down-playing one’s own positive
attributes. These are, however, only appearances (resulting from false modesty)
which are intended to enhance the self-image.
Doliński (2005: 59) describes another typically Polish strategy of self-
presentation, complaining. This can be employed by an individual to show that
he is in possession of some desirable attributes, to save his face, or to present to
others some positive but stressful incidents. Poles, for example, often complain
about hotel rooms or food served at a restaurant, implying in this way that they
are used to higher standards of living and eating. They complain about other
people’s behaviour, intelligence or moral standards to show in this way that they
are better (i.e. behave in a proper way, are more intelligent and have higher
moral standards). Doliński maintains that the act of complaining is a signal that
others do not reach the standards used by the complaining individual. Another
situation in which Poles resort to complaining is when in the presence of
important others they perform an act which is threatening to their own face.
This is reflected in the Polish saying: Marnej tanecznicy wadzi rąbek u spódnicy
(A bad workman (always) blames his tools). For example, students who failed
the exam often blame for their failure an excessively demanding examiner, bad
luck or difficult access to the required resource books. Thus, every failure or
error can be excused in this way, and such an act of excuse-complaining is
a self-face-saving device. As mentioned above, boasting about one’s success or
happiness is not accepted in Polish culture, because it does not agree with the
Polish norms of self-presentation, which require modesty and sincerity.
However, the need to talk about something positive that happened, is happening
or will happen to us is universal. To comply with the norms of self-presentation,
Poles refer to their success or happiness by means of complaint. So instead of
boasting openly about getting a better job, getting married or buying a new
expensive car, they complain about the stressful situation in their new job, about
many problems connected with their wedding organization or about their
inability to choose the car’s colour. Simply speaking, what Americans say
explicitly about their true or alleged success or happiness, Poles imply, or allude
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13 — Face...
to, “putting on” a suffering face. This suffering, pained face, however, is falling
“out of fashion” as members of the young generation of Poles adopt the
Western/American way of self-presentation.
Polish face, which is created in a way foreigners often perceive as devious,
can easily be threatened or lost. The interviewed Poles, when asked about
face-threatening or face-loss situations, mentioned:
• situations in which the person, or a member of his group/family, or one
of his belongings, is disapproved of or rejected by important others
(e.g., criticizing, failing to invite him to a party),
• situations in which somebody else does and/or says something that threatens
the person’s self-image (e.g., offending, calling names, failure to greet the
person, interpreted as showing lack of respect),
• situations in which the person does something that is inconsistent with his
projected self-image (e.g., lying which is found out by others),
• situations in which the person shows lack of competence or makes a serious
error, unforgivable mistake, or faux pas,
• situations in which the person fails to do something (e.g., letting another
person down, betraying another person’s trust).
This list clearly shows how important for Poles is the opinion of other people. It
is the approval of others, especially important others, and their perception of
the person’s image that mainly contribute to the creation of Poles’ face.
A good illustration of the Polish attitude to face is a statement made by the
Polish politician Marek Borowski on his resignation as deputy prime minister
(February 4, 1994):
Funkcje sprawować można różne, twarz ma się tylko jedną (Markiewicz and
Romanowski, 1998: 90).
(One may perform many functions, but he has only one face.)
For every person, face is a value of the utmost importance which cannot be
neglected in any situation.
The picture drawn above shows Poles as a cultural group that is highly
diversified in terms of values they cherish, employed patterns of behaviour and
self-construals. Similarly, Polish face cannot be classified unambiguously, either
as independent or as interdependent. Like Polish culture, Polish face is
undergoing great changes, changes towards individualism among them. That is
why it is face “in transition.”
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Chapter 5
Face as an academic concept
5.1. Introduction
As a scholarly concept face has existed for about sixty years. It was first
introduced into academic discourse by Erving Goffman (1922—1982) (1955,
1967), called by Randall Collins (1988: 41) “the greatest sociologist of the latter
half of the twentieth century.” Goffman created a theoretical construct and
based it on the Chinese concept of face, as presented by Hsien Chin Hu (1944),
in her seminal paper on Chinese face, and on some sociological theories (e.g.,
Emile Durkheim, 1912). Goffman’s ideas about face and facework became an
inspiration for representatives of many areas of social sciences. Their traces can
be found both in social psychology and linguistic research. As Levinson (1988:
161) puts it, “the ‘face-work’ ideas have been recycled as a theory of linguistic
politeness by Lakoff (1973), Brown and Levinson (1978), Leech (1983) and
others.” Following Goffman, other scholars focused on the concept of face,
diverging from the original folk meaning of the notion.
The concept of face discussed in this chapter is an academic concept, the
so-called second-order face (face2). The chapter begins with a presentation of
the works of Erving Goffman. Next, an overview of theories whose central
concept is face is provided. Finally, my own contribution to the interpretation of
the social construct of face, an alternative theory of face and facework, the
Cultural Face Model, is presented. The chapter concludes with a discussion of
the applicability of the model.
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5.2. Erving Goffman’s world of social encounters
All people live in “a world of social encounters” in which they enter into
contact with other people. This contact may be of face-to-face or mediated
nature. Face-to-face interaction, as Goffman defines it, is “the reciprocal
influence of individuals upon one another’s actions when in one another’s
immediate physical presence” (1959: 13), or an occasion when two or more
persons are co-present with one another. Co-presence occurs when persons
“sense that they are close enough to be perceived in whatever they are doing,
including their experiencing of others, and close enough to be perceived in this
sensing of being perceived” (1967: 17). And whenever they are co-present, they
are sources of information for one another. Goffman distinguishes two types of
information, the information that they give (voluntarily) and the information
that they give off (involuntarily, whether the individual wants to give it or not).
The former involves verbal symbols or their substitutes, and this is
communication in its traditional sense, whereas the latter “involves a wide range
of action that others can treat as symptomatic of the actor” (Goffman, 1959: 2).
Thus, for Goffman, face-to-face interaction is much more than what people say;
what he is interested in is an integrative view of human communicative
behaviour.
People’s conduct in each other’s immediate presence is governed by what
Goffman, in Behavior in Public Places (1963), calls public order. Public order is
a part of social order, which is defined as “the consequence of any set of moral
norms that regulates the way in which persons pursue their objectives”
(Goffman, 1963: 8). These norms require that every individual should be
perceptive and considerate, have pride, honour and dignity, and should behave
tactfully, and have feelings and some amount of poise. These are the moral
values, which the self expresses through face.
5.2.1. Social interaction in dramaturgical perspective
Goffman’s dramaturgical approach to social interaction provides a detailed
elaboration of the Shakespearean thought, “All the world’s stage, and all the
men and women merely players” (As You Like It, act II, scene 7). A similar idea
is expressed by Hobbes, in Leviathan, where he says: “So that a Person, is the
same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation [...]”
(Hobbes, 1973: 83). On this basis Goffman formulates the role theory, in which
human communication is presented metaphorically as action on the stage where
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individuals play their roles interacting with others. He writes (1959: 30;
cf. Edgley and Turner, 1975):
While in the presence of others, the individual typically infuses his activity
with signs which dramatically highlight and portray confirmatory facts that
might otherwise remain unapparent or obscure. For if the individual’s activity
is to become significant to others, he must mobilize his activity so that it will
express during the interaction what he wishes to convey.
This dramaturgical perspective is first taken in his Presentation of Self in
Everyday Life (1959), which he characterizes as “a sort of handbook” describing
dramaturgical “principles.” In his description of social interaction in this work,
Goffman uses the metaphor: SOCIAL INTERACTION IS A THEATRE. This
dramaturgical model involves the existence of a series of selves, “one ‘inside’ the
other, after the fashion of [...] a Russian doll. The divisions match those
between playwright, producer, actor, and part” (Burns, 1991: 107). The social
self (“producer”) controls whether the individual’s role is appropriate to the
social position in which it is fixed (“part”). But there is also “an inner ‘I’”
which manages the social self through social situations (Burns, 1991: 107).
Goffman claims that social situations provide “the natural theater in which all
bodily displays are enacted and in which all bodily displays are read” (1983: 4).
All “the activity of a given participant on a given occasion which serves to
influence in any way any of the other participants” is called a performance
(1959: 26). Participants, or performers, actors, to make their performances
successful use fronts (masks), expressive equipment such as appropriate facial
expressions, speech patterns, role attitudes and stage props (e.g., insignia of
office or rank). As “abstract stereotyped expectations” (1959: 28), fronts help
the performers become more convincing and credible, and add “dramatic
realization” to their performances. Performances are “idealized”, i.e. shown to
fully adhere to the norms and hierarchies of values of the actor’s culture. As
Manning (1992: 41—42) comments:
[...] performances are both realized and idealized as our all-too-human selves
are transformed into socialized beings capable of expressing control. During
a performance the individual’s attributes may be stretched to the needs of the
occasion and different audiences will be held in a greater or lesser degree of
‘mystification,’ thereby allowing the performer to maintain a distance from
which to appear more interesting.
Performances are often staged by teams, sets of individuals whose
cooperation is necessary to maintain the definition of a given projected social
situation. Sometimes in the team performance there is a director, someone who
dominates the show and controls the performance of team members. They
5.2. Erving Goffman’s world of social encounters 197
perform in frontstage and backstage (“front regions” and “back regions”). The
front-stage is the place from which the actors can be seen by the audience. Here
they give their performance, tend to be polite and behave in accordance with
certain standards of decorum. In the backstage, they behave in a completely
different way. They can relax, drop their fronts and “step out of character.” The
backstage is a place “where the impression fostered by the performance is
knowingly contradicted as a matter of course” (1959: 114). Thus, the actors’
behaviour is regionally variable. Usually, the passage from the frontstage to the
backstage is closed off from the members of the audience and the entire back
region is kept hidden from them. For the performance to be fully successful the
audience has to agree to believe that the frontstage is the only reality. Examples
of this can be found almost everywhere, e.g., in a mental hospital:
If a mental hospital staff is to give a good impression of the hospital to those
who come to visit their committed kinfolk, then it will be important to be able
to bar visitors from the wards, especially the chronic wards, restricting the
outsiders to special visiting-rooms where it will be practicable to have relatively
nice furnishings and to ensure that all patients present are well dressed, well
washed, well handled and relatively well behaved (Goffman, 1959: 116).
Due to the regional variability of behaviour in team performances, team
members have to keep the information of backstage activities secret. Goffman
distinguishes five types of secret (1959: 141—143): “dark secrets” (facts
incompatible with the image of the team), “strategic secrets” (facts about what
the team is planning to do), “inside secrets” (facts whose knowledge marks an
individual as a member of the team), “entrusted secrets” (facts that are kept
secret because of the possessor’s relationship to the team to which the secret
refers), and “free secrets” (facts which can be disclosed without discrediting the
team’s image). The knowledge of these facts can be valuable to other people
with discrepant roles (e.g., informer, shill, spotter, shopper, mediator, nonperson
(such as servant), confidant, or colleague). They may try to get access to these
secrets by pretending to be team members. Most of them have access to the
backstage, and they try to use it to gain something for themselves.
The disclosure of backstage information, however, may happen also due to
inadvertent loss of the balance of formality and informality established for the
interaction. Usually, members of two interacting teams present themselves to
each other for interaction purposes and “tend to maintain the line that they are
what they claim to be: they tend to stay in character” (1959: 166). The
disclosure of some damaging information by members of one team means their
dropping “out of character.” In such situations performers often make
exclamations such as Good Lord! or Oh my God!, or their facial equivalents,
admitting in this way to their momentary inability to sustain the performed
character. Discussing communication in which performers convey information
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incompatible with the image officially maintained, Goffman distinguishes its
four types (1959: 168—187):
• treatment of the absent, which involves presenting the absent in a disrespectful
way (e.g., ridiculing, gossiping about, caricaturing, cursing or criticizing),
• staging talk (‘shop talk’), in which people of different social roles engage
when discussing their performance problems and audience reception,
• team collusion with part of the audience, which consists in communication
conveyed in such a way “as to cause no threat to the illusion that is being
fostered for the audience” (1959: 175),
• realigning actions, involving unofficial communication, speaking out of
character “in a way that will be heard by the audience but will not openly
threaten either the integrity of the two teams or the social distance between
them” (e.g., innuendo, mimicked accents, jokes, significant pauses, veiled
hints, purposeful kidding or expressive overtones) (1959: 187).
To avoid the disclosing of discreditable facts every performer engages in what
Goffman calls impression management. In managing “the show,” he does his best
to behave in such a way as to make his projected self match his presented self.
However, “scenes” happen when he acts in a way that may damage his own
image or the image of the other. Such disruptions of projections (e.g., faux pas,
unmeant gestures, or inopportune intrusions) may result in a serious threat to or
total destruction of “the polite appearance of consensus” (1959: 205). The
persons involved may feel flustered, embarrassed or nervous, and this may
further jeopardize the performance. However, both the performer and the
audience want the show to be successful and are ready to take some preventive
measures. The performer employs some defensive practices. The audience also
contributes greatly to the maintenance of “the show.” To help the performer
maintain his presented self, members of the audience employ protective
practices and exercise tact.
In the situations which Goffman mainly portrays, actors manipulate their
performances to hide their true motives. Everything they are engaged in is
staged. For Giddens (1988: 260; Manning, 1992), what Goffman describes is
“a cynical world of self-concerned agents, in which appearance counts above all
else.”
5.2.2. Social interaction as a game
Social interaction is a hazardous enterprise. An individual, interacting with
others, takes a chance of being embarrassed or humiliated due to some
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inadvertent disclosure of some damaging facts or some action that threatens his
self-image. Therefore, social interaction is not only a theatrical event, it is also
“a gamble,” a game of risk (Goffman, 1959: 236) (SOCIAL INTERACTION IS
A GAMBLE; SOCIAL INTERACTION IS A GAME).
Goffman first resorts to the game analogy in his doctoral dissertation,
“Communication Conduct in an Island Community” (1953), where he notes
that during social interaction the islanders try to extract as much as possible
information about each other, but reveal as little as possible about themselves.
These practices, which consist in the routine withholding and uncovering of
information, are called by Goffman “gain strategies.” He suggests that they are
so common “that it is better to conceive of interaction not as a scene of
harmony but as an arrangement for pursuing a cold war” (1953: 40). This war,
however, is one that allows for some working acceptance which makes social
interaction possible. For Goffman, interaction is played like a game of
“concealment and search” (1953: 84).
The game metaphor is also used in Encounters (1961), where it is viewed
as a good way of describing the structure of real-life interactions, in which
winning and losing are the key issues. In “Where the action is,” published in
Interaction Ritual (1967), Goffman refers to the world of gambling and casinos.
He tries to employ a casino vocabulary in the analysis of everyday life.
“Action,” which takes place during plays, is connected to “chance taking.”
Every participant, or player, risks a stake or bet in trying to win the prize. The
prize that he wins or the bet that he loses is the payoff. Bet and prize
combined are called the pot. As in actual gambling, there are two types of
odds on winning, theoretical ones, “referring to the chances of a favorable
outcome compared to those of an unfavorable one,” and true odds, given
biases (1967: 150). The advantage of the play is the pot from which the bet is
subtracted. “When there is neither advantage not disadvantage, the play is said
to be fair” (1967: 151). One can talk about the action when the bets are
staked. Then the game is played and “a fully known set of possible outcomes is
faced” (1967: 150).
The attractiveness of gambling and games can be explained in the following
way: our everyday social life is “safe and momentless,” and, as Goffman claims,
we need the chance-taking actions and fateful situations in order to affirm some
aspects of our character which “can be neither expressed nor earned safely”
(1967: 260). There is the widely held belief that character can be dramatically
acquired and lost, and that is why individuals are ready to go through with
chancy situations no matter what the likely cost to themselves, in this way
manifesting pride. During moments of action, “character is gambled,” generated,
no matter whether its expression is good or bad. “The self [...] can be
voluntarily subjected to re-creation” (1967: 237).
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The game perspective is also used in “Expression Games,” published in
Strategic Interaction (1969), where Goffman discusses moves available to players
in games other than casino games (e.g., moves made by agents in some
undercover operation). The players in expression games have at their disposal
different types of move: the unwitting move (behaviour unoriented to the
observer’s assessment — “the subject acts mindlessly relative to impression
management”), the naïve move (the behaviour of the observer believing in the
subject’s unwitting move — “the observer draws information from what he takes
to be an unwitting move”), the covering move (behaviour intended to produce
expressions to improve the individual’s situation — “the subject attempts to
influence the conclusions that the observer comes to”) (Goffman, 1969: 17), the
uncovering move (behaviour aimed at uncovering covering moves), and the
counter-uncovering move (behaviour aimed at countering uncovering moves)
(1969: 18—19). Goffman concludes the essay with the statement:
In every social situation we can find a sense in which one participant will be
an observer with something to gain from assessing expressions, and another
will be a subject with something to gain from manipulating this process.
A single structure of contingencies can be found in this regard which renders
agents a little like us all and all of us a little like agents (1969: 81).
Game analogies point “to the calculative element in our everyday dealings and
present us as information managers and gain strategists” (Manning, 1992: 71).
Goffman uses them to show and explain the mechanisms of social interaction.
However, he is aware of the existence of other important elements of our social
life, which make it more predictable and less hazardous — rituals.
5.2.3. The ritual organization of interpersonal contacts
Goffman’s early work was inspired by the Durkheimian tradition in sociological
theory, which if reduced to its most simple elements, says that “social reality is
at its core a moral reality” (Collins, 1988: 44). In The Elementary Forms of
Religious Life (1912/2001: 282), Durkheim suggests that ritual is what keeps
society together. He writes that religious rituals are “a collection of ceremonies
intended solely to awaken certain ideas and feelings, to link the present to the
past, the individual to the collectivity.” Such rites consist of “recalling the past
and making it in some way present by means of an actual dramatic
representation” (Durkheim, 1912/2001: 278). In being faithful to the past,
people “preserve the collectivity’s moral profile” (Durkheim, 1912/2001: 277).
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In performing rituals, people fulfil certain duties towards society and in this way
become social beings, dependent on the collectivity they belong to. For
Durkheim, the moral is inseparably related to the religious. Having investigated
totemism as a religion, he came to the conclusion that in any religion one can
find two categories or two worlds — the sacred (gods) and the profane
(believers). They enter into relations which Durkheim calls rites, enabling the
two worlds to communicate. He distinguishes three kinds of rites: negative rites,
which prevent the sacred from contacting the profane; positive rites, through
which the profane communicates with the sacred; and sacrificial rites, which are
resorted to in case of some loss or disaster. The concept of rites, as understood
in this way, became an inspiration, first for Goffman in writing about the ritual
character of social order, and second for Brown and Levinson (1987), who
elaborated on strategic, goal-oriented politeness (negative and positive
politeness).
Goffman noted that a similar description can be given to rituals we perform
every day while interacting with other people. The recurrence of certain
communicative goals (face maintenance being the main one) in interpersonal
communication results in some communicative strategies being turned into
interaction rituals (cf. Rawls, 1987). The similarity to Durkheim’s idea of rites is
clearly visible in his understanding of rituals. In Relations in Public, Goffman
defines rituals (or interpersonal rituals (1981: 20); contact rituals (1983: 10)) as
perfunctory, conventionalized acts “through which an individual portrays his
respect and regard for some object of ultimate value to that object of ultimate
value or to its stand-in” (1971: 62). Every social situation which Goffman
analyses as a ritual is centred on the self. Conversation is a ritual, whose aim “is
to create a little temporary cult, a shared reality consisting of whatever is being
talked about” (Collins, 1988: 47). He compares the ritual of conversation to
a mystic trance or “a psychosis-like state” (Collins, 1988: 48). In Interaction
Ritual, he writes that “talk creates for the participant a world and a reality that
has other participants in it. Joint spontaneous involvement is a unio mystico,
a socialized trance” (Goffman, 1967: 113).
Later, Goffman characterizes these rituals as “micro-ecological metaphors”
serving as “summaries and iconic symbols of structural arrangements” (1983:
11). Individuals participating in social interaction, following a certain social
code, perform some actions (rituals) which, apart from their explicit meaning,
have symbolic meaning which must be expressed for the interaction to be
successful. Thus, the metaphor he refers to may be formulated in the following
way: SOCIAL INTERACTION IS A RITUAL, or CONVERSATION IS
A RITUAL.
These rituals have the following ingredients (Collins, 1988: 44):
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• The group (which may be as small as two persons) is assembled face to
face. Ritual is thus a micro-situational phenomenon, though it has macro,
trans-situational consequences.
• The participants develop a mutually aware focus of attention. They focus on
the same thing, action, or thought; and they become aware that each other
is focusing upon it. [...] The content of a ritual is arbitrary. [...] The
stereotyped action found in formal rituals is important only because it
provides an easy and habitual common focus.
• The participants share a common emotional mood. Again, the particular
emotional content is arbitrary, since any mood held in common can sustain
a ritual: reverence, fear, thankfulness, anger at one’s enemies, love, and so
forth.
• If these ingredients are present, an intensification takes place. The mood
becomes heightened.
• The consequences of such ritual interactions are to shape the subsequent
behaviour, thought and feeling of those who took part in them. [...] Rituals
thus produce (and reproduce) moral sentiments in individuals. [...] The
physical and mental world, in short, becomes populated with objects that
symbolize society. Internalized and carried around in the minds of
individuals, these symbols become the steering mechanisms by which people
recognize co-members. By means of these symbols people feel where to
gravitate for support, where are the centres of power they must respect. On
the negative side, they recognize the boundaries of their groups by the lack
of respect for their own sacred symbols; [...].
Interacting with other people is potentially threatening to every participant.
And the function of the interaction rituals is to establish and/or maintain
a state of ritual equilibrium in social interaction. The equilibrium can be
maintained when individuals adhere to the moral rules specified in the social
code, which designates the general pattern of the game every participant is
obliged to play. The code includes ritual constraints which have to do with
“how each individual ought to handle himself with respect to each of the
others, so that he does not discredit his own tacit claim to good character or
the tacit claim of the others that they are persons of social worth whose
various forms of territoriality are to be respected” (Goffman, 1976: 266). The
term ritual order is used by Goffman in two ways. First, referring to the ‘moral’
character of interaction, he claims that participants in social interaction have
a moral obligation to sustain their own and each other’s claims to relevant
identities, in other words, an individual possessing certain social characteristics
has a moral right to be treated by others in an appropriate way, and is obliged
to be what he claims. Second, the ritual order stands for “the ‘standardized’
character of interaction” — a certain kind of “ritualization” (Williams, 1988:
67). Strong (1988) claims that ritual order is nothing but etiquette, which lends
weight and stability to every encounter.
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This involves a certain kind of ceremonial activity. In “The nature of deference
and demeanor,” published in Interaction Ritual (1967), Goffman distinguishes two
different components of this activity, deference and demeanour. The two are
strongly reminiscent of Durkheim’s idea of the interdependence of social beings
and their “duties towards society” (Durkheim, 1912/2001; see also
Bargiela-Chiappini, 2003). Deference functions as “a symbolic means by which
appreciation is regularly conveyed to a recipient of this recipient, or of something
of which this recipient is taken a symbol, extension, or agent” (1967: 56). Such
ceremonial activity usually takes the form of rituals. People have to address each
other properly with respect to the context of the situation, the relationship
between the interlocutors and their social status.
As stated above, for Goffman conversation is a ritual activity. “It is a little
social system with its own boundary-maintaining tendencies” (1967: 113). The
conversational boundaries are marked by the rituals, which in Relations in Public
(1971), Goffman calls access rituals (greetings and farewells) (see also status
rituals in Goffman, 1967). “Greetings mark the transition to a condition of
increased access and farewells to a state of decreased access” (Goffman, 1971:
79). Apart from access rituals, there are two kinds of ritual interchanges:
supportive rituals, which are performed for the sake of mutual support
(e.g., thanks, congratulations, condolences), and remedial rituals, performed
when the person tries to remedy an offence he has committed and thus
re-establish a state of ritual equilibrium (e.g., apologies) (Goffman, 1971; or
interpersonal rituals in Goffman, 1967).
In writing about deference, Goffman concentrates on two types of activity,
avoidance rituals and presentational rituals. The former make the participant
keep his distance from the recipient and refrain from doing anything that would
impose anything on him, while the latter are acts through which he shows his
appreciation of the recipient. This distinction is similar to Durkheim’s
classification of ritual into negative and positive rites. Both Durkheim’s positive
and negative rites (2001) and Goffman’s rituals present a dichotomy between “a
desire to include the individual” and “showing respect for his privacy”
(Goffman, 1967: 76). Goffman stresses a special function of the negative rites,
as “a central organizational device of public order” (Goffman: 1971: 63).
Respect for the other’s privacy, giving him feedom of choice and refraining from
imposing anything on him are, in fact, prominent elements of American public
order, which Goffman analysed.
The other component of ceremonial activity, demeanour, is usually “conveyed
through deportment, dress, and bearing,” which is to show others that the
individual is a person of desirable or undesirable qualities (Goffman, 1967: 77).
Goffman enumerates attributes characteristic of a well demeaned individual,
e.g., discretion, sincerity, modesty, control over his emotions, appetites and
desires, and poise.
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The individual is responsible only for the demeanour image of himself. The
deference image of himself he owes to the other participants, while he is
responsible for the deference image of the others. Thus to create a complete
self-image the individual needs others, as self-presentation is a ritually
coordinated sequence of social actions by means of which a person gains his
position in a network of social relations. A “dialogistic character,” as Goffman
(1971) claims, is typical for all interpersonal rituals. They have to be performed
during the interaction of at least two persons (e.g., the giver and the receiver of
the compliment, the offended and the offender in the case of apology or
account), as a reply makes the ritual complete.
5.2.4. Frames
The ideas presented in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life and in “Fun in
Games,” published in Encounters (1961), were later revised and refined in
Goffman’s longer and more mature Frame Analysis (1974). The theatricality of
everyday behaviour, which was “used not simply as a metaphor but as
a paradigm for social conduct” (Burns, 1991: 239) and the game-like character
of social interaction, described by Goffman as a series of interactional moves
between players, are shown here in a new light. In Frame Analysis, Goffman
treats theatricality only as the necessary consequence of the individual’s ability
to divide the self into “a multiplicity of part-selves” (Burns, 1991: 239), but the
main theme remains the same — how people manipulate social situations to
achieve their goals.
Although the terminology used is different, the concepts lying behind it are
the same as those presented in The Presentation... Frame refers to “any situation,
as it has become organized through social moves up to the point in time, [...]
a socially defined reality” (Collins, 1988: 54) (cf. frontstage). Frames help us
define the situations we are in and our experiences; they answer the question
“what is happening?” There are formal situations (e.g., lectures) in which the
structure is consciously and purposively manipulated by individuals
(performers) to have a certain effect on the audience. The more formal the
situation, the greater the embarrassment caused by frame-breaking is. Frame
space (cf. backstage) (e.g., personal conversation), on the other hand, is any
informal situation in which “both participants more or less interchangeably take
the stage, as well as sympathetically participate in what the other person is
trying to put on” (Collins, 1988: 56). Even though devoid of much of the
tension characteristic of formal situations, conversations in informal situations
are not free from problems of framing and staging. Performance failures,
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however, do not involve as much embarrassment as in the case of formal
situations.
According to Goffman, frames organize our experiences and make social
interaction meaningful. The most fundamental frames are called “primary
frameworks”; Goffman divides them into “natural” and “social.” The natural
frameworks define situations as “purely physical,” unguided by human agency,
while the social frameworks, which “provide background understanding for
events that incorporate the will, aim, and controlling effort of an intelligence,
a live agency, the chief one being the human being,” define situations as “guided
doings” involving intervention (1974: 22).
Any framework can be keyed, i.e. its meaning can be transformed into
something patterned on but independent of it (e.g., a make-believe key
transforms a serious frame into a non-serious one) (Manning, 1992). The keying
itself can be rekeyed indefinitely. In the case of a frame incorporating rekeyings,
each transformation can be said to add a layer or lamination to the activity. In
the innermost layering, “dramatic activity can be at play to engross the
participant” (Goffman, 1974: 82). The outermost lamination (“the rim of the
frame”) provides information concerning the status of the activity in the real
world. Primary frameworks can also be transformed by fabrications, an effort by
one or more individuals to manage activity so that others will have “a false
belief about what it is that is going on” (Goffman, 1974: 83). Keyings and
fabrications leave participants unsure as to what is happening, so they are no
longer able to identify the frame.
In order to make participants sure that a given frame is maintained, during
social interaction various procedures anchoring the frame activity are employed.
Manning (1992: 127) defines them in the following way: “Anchors use a series
of devices to convince us that what appears to be real is real.” These are
bracketing devices (telling us when a frame begins and ends), resource
continuity (it is possible to verify past events), roles (played by participants,
telling us what to expect in the interaction), or assumptions we make about
human beings. These assumptions are especially important for the anchoring of
the frame. As Goffman (1974: 293) states:
It is hardly possible to talk about the anchoring of doings in the world without
seeming to support the notion that a person’s acts are in part an expression
and outcome of his pursuing self, and that this self will be present behind the
particular roles he plays at any particular moment.
So whatever we are doing, whichever roles we play, our activities are marked by
our character and personality. Our unique self spans all the roles we perform,
and “[b]eliefs about the constant nature of personal identity anchor a frame and
limit its meaning” (Manning, 1992: 128).
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5.2.5. Goffman’s concept of self
Goffman provides a double definition of self. The first definition describes it as
“an image pieced together from the expressive implications of the full flow of
events in an undertaking.” The second shows it as “a kind of player in a ritual
game who copes honorably or dishonorably, diplomatically or undiplomatically,
with the judgemental contingencies of the situation” (Goffman, 1967: 31). Thus,
the self is an end-product of what one did in the past and what one is doing at
the moment of interaction. But it is not so much a private attribute as a public
reality created during social interaction. Goffman (1959: 13) claims that:
When an individual enters the presence of others, they commonly seek to
acquire information about him or to bring into play information about him
already possessed. They will be interested in his general socio-economic status,
his conception of self, his attitude towards them, his competence, his
trustworthiness, etc.
When participating in social interaction an individual tries to present a positive
image of self, consistent with his true or pretended socio-economic status, his
idea of goodness and trustworthiness, and the expectations of the important
others. In some situations, by some linguistic choices and modes of behaviour
the individual presents his competence, genuine or not, in a given field. All this
information constitutes the overall image of self established during social
interaction. The second definition presents the self as a “player in a ritual
game,” deliberately making certain choices and analysing thoroughly every move
that may have an impact on the self-image.
Durkheim claims that “Man is double” (1912/2001: 29). This strongly
influenced the way Goffman sees the individual: as a coexistence of the sacred
and the profane. Goffman’s concept of self resembles Durkheim’s soul, which is
something sacred and “as such is opposed to the body, which in itself is
profane. The soul is distinguished not only from its material envelope, as inside
is distinguished from outside; [...] it is seen to have a spark of divinity”
(1912/2001: 193). Goffman ascribes the same features to the self. He describes
it as “a sacred object which must be treated with proper ritual care and in turn
must be presented in a proper light to others” (Goffman, 1967: 91). The self is
created during interaction with other people, through acting with proper
demeanour and through being treated by others with deference.
The rituals of deference and demeanour consist mainly in the “worship” of
the self. The ritual code existing in society requires individuals to establish and
maintain a self-image consistent with their line and also to help others to
maintain their self-image. Thus it is a ritual cooperation in enacting a shared
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reality (Collins, 1988). People have to accept how others define themselves and
protect these self-definitions. This is what the politeness of everyday interaction
consists in (Collins, 1988).
The self, as the central sacred object of modern society, is unreal. It is real
only as a symbol, a linguistic concept that is used to account for what people
do. “It is an ideology of everyday life, used to attribute causality and moral
responsibility in our society [...]” (Collins, 1988: 50). In his theory of the
socially constructed self, Goffman maintains that everything related to the self
consists of symbolically defined social roles that the individual plays in different
situations (social roles are similarly presented by Mead (1934/1972)), his social
status, and his relations with other people.
5.2.6. Face
As has been mentioned above, Goffman claims that there is a close relationship
between the process of creation of the self and the context of interaction.
Depending on the context, individuals try to create and maintain their
self-image (face), adjusting their behaviour to the roles they play and to the
others they are interacting with. Thus, face is the key issue in every social
interaction. It is the concept that governs our thoughts and behaviour.
Goffman was one of the first to take up the concept of face from an
academic point of view. In his seminal work Interaction Ritual: Essays on
Face-to-Face Behaviour, Goffman defines face as “the positive social value
a person effectively claims for himself by the line others assume he has taken
during a particular contact” or “an image of self delineated in terms of
approved social attributes” (1967: 5).
For Goffman, face is a public property. It is not part of a person’s body, but
something that is “located in the flow of events in the encounter” (1967: 7). As
such it is only on loan to the person from society. This public character of
Goffman’s concept of face also brings it near the Chinese conceptualization of
face (cf. Hu, 1944; Ho, 1976; Chang and Holt, 1994). On the other hand, his
“sacred self” and face are inherently individualistic. The ideal social actor
Goffman describes is based on the Western model of the person, obsessed with
his self-image.
In contacts with other people, every person tends to act out a line,
“a pattern of verbal and non-verbal acts by which he expresses his view of the
situation and through this his evaluation of the participants, especially himself”
(Goffman, 1967: 5). A person may have, be in, or maintain face when the line he
takes presents an image of him as internally consistent and supported by
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judgements of other participants. Then he can feel confidence and assurance. In
other situations, he may be in wrong face when his social worth cannot be
integrated, or out of face when he does not have a line of the kind participants
in certain situations are expected to have; generally speaking, the person may be
said to lose face. Then he can feel ashamed and inferior because of the possible
damage to his reputation. A person may save his face when “he sustains an
impression for others that he has not lost it” (Goffman, 1967: 9). To maintain
face is not easy. Everyone has to try to live up to his face by showing respect
for others, avoiding certain actions which “are above or beneath him, while
forcing himself to perform others even though they cost him dearly” (1967: 9).
Unless the individual conducts himself properly, face (being only “on loan to
him’) will be withdrawn.
Face is, for Goffman, at the centre of interaction. This drives his account
toward the individual and the psychological at two levels (Schegloff, 1988: 95):
• the understanding of “conduct by reference to a concern for preservation or
demeaning of face” (one’s own or the other’s),
• the presentation of an organization of interaction which is driven by the
individual’s main interest, face.
Thus, on the one hand, face can be the key to understanding why interactants
behave one way and not another. Their conduct is aimed both at their own face
and the face of the other. On the other hand, the whole interactional activity is
focused on the management of the individual’s face.
The individual’s face, like the self whose image the face is, is for Goffman
also “a sacred thing, and the expressive order required to sustain it is therefore
a ritual one” (Goffman, 1967: 19). Face maintenance requires a ritual order,
acts “through whose symbolic component the actor shows how worthy he is of
respect or how worthy he feels others are of it” (Goffman, 1955: 328; 1967:
19). The necessity of taking care of both one’s own face and the face of the
other, on the one hand, and the dialogic character of interaction rituals, on the
other, make face a common enterprise implying mutuality of considerations.
Face is related to such concepts as pride, honour and dignity (see Section
4.2.). All of them can be perceived as major reasons for sustaining a particular
expressive order (an order regulating the flow of events so that everything
expressed by them will be consistent with an individual’s face). When his
actions result from duty to himself, one can speak of pride; when from duty to
wider social units, honour; and when his actions are aimed at handling his body
and feelings, or the things with which he has physical contact, dignity
(Goffman, 1967).
A member of any group is expected to have self-respect and to be
considerate towards others. Goffman claims that the combined effect of the rule
of self-respect and the rule of considerateness makes the person conduct himself
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14 — Face...
so as to maintain both his own face and the face of the other participants of the
encounter. The mutual acceptance (of the lines taken by interactants) that is
gained in this way is the basic structural feature of social interaction, especially
of the face-to-face type. However, it is usually “a ‘working’ acceptance, not
a ‘real’ one” (Goffman, 1967: 11). Everyday interpersonal interaction is like
stage performance, in which everything is conventional, enacted and controlled
by the participants.
Ordinarily, maintenance of face is a condition of interaction, not its objective.
[...] To study face-saving is to study the traffic rules of social interaction; one
learns about the code the person adheres to in his movement across the paths
and designs of others, but not where he is going, or why he wants to get there
(Goffman, 1967: 12).
Thus, to be able interact with others successfully, or to be able to interact at all,
the person has to maintain his own face and the face of the other. Sometimes it
seems that there is no difference between one’s own face and the face of the
other. In certain relationships, the members share a face, which means that an
improper act on the part of one member is also a source of embarrassment to
the other members. In such relationships the individual’s face depends on the
tact and good conduct of the others.
In Goffman’s world of social interaction all activities in which the self is
engaged are highly moral. Morality, which is not understood here in terms of
principles or imperatives, plays an important role in the process of self
construction. It is an indispensable element of the constant redefinition of
individuals’ face and the interaction in which they participate with others.
5.2.7. Facework
To secure their self-image, people engage in what Goffman calls facework, “the
actions taken by a person to make whatever [they are] doing consistent with
face” (Goffman, 1967: 12). The main function of facework is to counteract
events that are potential threats to face. In fact, almost all acts involving
others are modified by considerations for face. The knowledge of facework and
the ability to use it is often identified with tact, savoir-faire or diplomacy
(Goffman, 1967). The practical realization of this knowledge and the actual
use of social skills differ across different cultures and societies; in other words,
members of different cultures employ their own characteristic face-saving
practices.
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When engaged in any face-saving action, the individual has simultaneously
a defensive orientation to save his own face and a protective orientation to save
the face of others. So when someone’s face has been threatened, it is of
secondary importance who will do facework: the offender, the offended or
a third party (Goffman, 1967). Since each participant has to do everything both
to save his own face and to protect the face of the other participants, every
social interaction can be treated as an undertaking requiring “tacit cooperation
in face-saving” (Goffman, 1967: 29). Goffman enumerates several types of tacit
cooperation, e.g., tact (e.g., in making it easy for the others to do facework), or
reciprocal self-denial. This cooperation can be noticed in different kinds of
facework.
Goffman differentiates two kinds of facework, the avoidance process and the
corrective process. The former consists in avoiding potentially face-threatening
acts. The latter involves performing various redressive acts. When one of the
participants fails to avoid performing a face-threatening act, he and other
participants “find themselves in an established state of ritual disequilibrium or
disgrace” (Goffman, 1967: 19). To re-establish the ritual order, the participant has
to perform some redressive acts. They form part of the whole redressive
interchange, “the sequence of acts set in motion by an acknowledged threat to
face, and terminating in the re-establishment of ritual equilibrium” (1967: 19).
The redressive interchange usually consists of four moves, challenge (calling
attention to the misconduct), offering (the offender’s correcting for the offence
and re-establishing the ritual order), acceptance (of the offering as “a satisfactory
means of re-establishing the expressive order and the faces supported by this
order” (1967: 22)), and thanks (for forgiveness on the part of the offender).
Even though, as mentioned above, the main function of facework is to
counteract events that are potential threats to face, facework is also used in
aggressive interchanges (Goffman, 1967: 24—25). These are situations in which
an individual presents favourable facts about himself and unfavourable facts
about the other, and shows that he can handle himself better than his adversary.
In this case, facework involves neither mutual considerateness nor tacit
cooperation, indispensable for successful interaction. Whatever the particular
interactants’ intentions, though, one thing remains true: all their actions have an
effect on face.
Goffman’s main concern throughout his career was to investigate social
interaction, narrowly understood as “that which uniquely transpires in social
situations, that is, environments in which two or more individuals are physically
in one another’s response presence” (1983: 2). Summing up his academic work
in his Presidential Address to the American Sociological Association (1983: 2),
Goffman called the interaction order “a substantive domain in its own right,”
worth investigating because most of our everyday life is spent in the presence of
others.
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Although, Goffman’s (1983: 5) “own experience has been mainly with
middle-class conduct in a few regions of America,” and it is to this environment
that his findings apply, the social mechanisms and patterns of behaviour he
describes are not unique to this particular social group. What is more, Goffman
finds in face-to-face interaction some universal features, because, as he claims,
the necessity for it “is rooted in certain universal preconditions of social life”
(1983: 3). He makes it clear that what he writes about social interaction in the
American middle class may be characteristic of social interaction in other social
groups, at other times and in other places. He believes in the existence of what
he calls “universal human nature,” which makes people follow certain patterns
of conduct and behave in a similar way irrespective of what culture they belong
to:
[...] underneath their differences in culture, people are the same. [...]
[S]ocieties everywhere, if they are to be societies, must mobilize their members
as self-regulating participants in social encounters. One way of mobilizing the
individual for this purpose is through ritual; he is taught to be perceptive, to
have feelings attached to self and a self expressed through face [...] (Goffman,
1967: 44).
5.3. Face theories — an overview
In this section, I will review the main theories of face and facework. All of them
have appeared as a result of the face studies “boom” which started in the late
1980s. The original sources of their inspiration were two seminal works, “The
Chinese concepts of face” (1944) by Hsien Chin Hu, and Erving Goffman’s
Interaction Ritual: Essays in Face-to-Face Behavior (1967). The direct inspiration,
however, was Penelope Brown and Stephen C. Levinson’s theory of politeness
(1978, 1987), in which face is the central concept.
In the case of Brown and Levinson’s theory and that of many others,
facework is equated with (im)politeness. So apart from face and facework,
(im)politeness will constitute one of the key issues here. However, the overview
of the theories to be presented does not include politeness theories that do not
treat face as a causative factor.
Drawing from the same theoretical sources, the theories represent various
approaches to the concept in question:
• a sociolinguistic approach to face:
— perceived in terms of individual wants,
— perceived as an interactional and relational phenomenon,
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• a cross-cultural approach,
• a socio-psychological approach,
• a communicative approach.
5.3.1. A sociolinguistic approach to face
The popularity of the concept of face in sociolinguistics results from the need to
understand how participants negotiate their positions in social interaction, what
language they use to encode their assumptions about these positions, and to
interpret their assumptions about the self-image (face) presented by other
participants in communication (Scollon and Wong Scollon, 2001).
The sociolinguistic approach to face and facework was first presented by
Brown and Levinson in their theory of politeness. From the moment of its
publication, the theory and, especially, the conceptualization of face evoked
a great number of criticisms. The main voices of criticism of Brown and
Levinson’s theory, whose discussion will follow its presentation, concern the
way they conceptualize face, their claim to the universality of their concept of
face (especially its negative aspect), treating face as a determinant of
interactional dynamics, their conceptualization of face-threatening acts (FTAs),
and the concept of facework. In spite of this, the theory still attracts a lot of
attention among scholars of different disciplines, linguists in particular. Some of
them, drawing inspiration from its main assumptions, try to reformulate and
improve it. As a result, new face theories have appeared which are inspired by
Brown and Levinson’s model.
5.3.1.1. Brown and Levinson’s theory of politeness
Brown and Levinson’s (1978, 1987) theory is the most thorough treatment of
the notion of politeness. It is grounded in Grice’s (1975) model of conversation
and his Cooperative Principle, which has an impact on one of the main
assumptions of the theory, namely, that human communication is rational and
goal-oriented. Central to Brown and Levinson’s theory is the concept of face,
drawn from Erving Goffman’s (1967) work and the English folk notion of face,
and partly based on Emile Durkheim’s (1912/2001) work.
Brown and Levinson constructed a Model Person (MP), who is “a wilful
fluent speaker of a natural language, endowed with two special properties —
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rationality and face” (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 58). By rationality they mean
the availability to the MP of a mode of reasoning “from ends to the means
that will achieve those ends” (1987: 58). They define face as “the public
self-image that every member wants to claim for himself” (1987: 61).
Interacting with others, the MP has to choose the optimal means to achieve
communicative goals. Doing so, he is caught between two wants, the want to
be efficient in whatever he is going to do, no matter how threatening this may
be to the other participant’s face, and the want to satisfy his face. He has to
assess the potential threat to the other participant’s and his own face, and
choose the strategies that would minimize it. The type of politeness presented
in the model is similar to Goffman’s concept of facework, whose main aim is
to maintain every participant’s face during social interaction. For Brown and
Levinson, however, politeness involves mainly avoiding face threat and
minimizing face loss.
Brown and Levinson’s face, unlike Goffman’s, is an image intrinsically
belonging to the individual, which consists of two related aspects (1987: 61):
• negative face: the basic claim to territories, personal preserves, rights to
non-distraction — i.e. to freedom of action and freedom from imposition,
• positive face: the positive consistent self-image or “personality” (crucially
including the desire that this self-image be appreciated and approved of)
claimed by interactants.
Further on they redefine face in terms of basic wants (1987: 62):
• negative face: the want of every “competent adult member” that his actions
be unimpeded by others,
• positive face: the want of every member that his wants be desirable to at
least some others.
Brown and Levinson argue that the abstract concept of face and “the social
necessity to orient oneself to it in interaction” (1987: 62) can be treated as
universal. However, the two face wants (negative face and positive face) are
“subject to much cultural elaboration” (1987: 13). In other words, the content of
face, i.e. what the exact limits are to personal territories and what the publicly
relevant content of personality consists in, differs across cultures.
Face, however, is not only want; it is something that can be threatened, lost,
or saved. Brown and Levinson claim that it is something which is “emotionally
invested” and “must be constantly attended to in interaction” (1987: 61). As all
participants are endowed with face, it is in their mutual interest to maintain
each other’s face during social interaction. Thus people cooperate in
maintaining face (1987: 61):
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In general, people cooperate (and assume each other’s cooperation) in
maintaining face in interaction, such cooperation being based on mutual
vulnerability of face. That is, normally everyone’s face depends on everyone
else’s being maintained, and since people can be expected to defend their faces
if threatened, and in defending their own to threaten others’ faces, it is in
general in every participant’s best interest to maintain each others’ face.
Certain kinds of actions, Brown and Levinson maintain, are intrinsically
face-threatening, i.e. they are contrary to the face wants of the hearer and/or of
the speaker. There can be distinguished acts that threaten negative face and acts
that threaten positive face. Another distinction involves acts threatening the
hearer (H)’s face and acts threatening the speaker (S)’s face. All these acts are
called face-threatening acts. They can be divided into:
• acts threatening the hearer’s negative face (e.g., requests or warnings),
• acts threatening the hearer’s positive face (e.g., expressions of disapproval or
criticism),
• acts threatening the speaker’s negative face (e.g., expressing thanks or
excuses),
• acts threatening the speaker’s positive face (e.g., apologies or acceptance of
a compliment).
In all the cases, the authors provide long lists of acts, which can be performed
during everyday social interaction and which have to be dealt with by all
participants. They maintain that to avoid face loss or face damage, every
rational user of a natural language will try to avoid FTAs, or at least will employ
certain strategies to minimize the threat.
Brown and Levinson distinguish five strategies for doing FTAs. To choose
one of them, every rational language user will have to take into consideration
the possible face-threatening character of the act he intends to make. He can
choose to avoid doing it or to minimize its threat using one of the strategies.
Doing an FTA off record, the speaker resorts to using metaphor, irony,
rhetorical questions, understatement, tautologies, and hints, “so that the
meaning is to some degree negotiable” (1987: 69). Off-record FTAs depend on
implicature. According to Brown and Levinson (1987: 213), “the basic way to
do this is to invite conversational implicatures by violating, in some way, the
Gricean Maxims of efficient communication.” On-record FTAs are done when
S’s communicative intention is clear to other interlocutors. Doing an FTA
baldly, on record, S does so in the most direct, unambiguous, concise way.
On-record FTAs without redress are done in conformity with Grice’s
Cooperative Principle (Grice, 1975); they are transparent, sufficiently
informative, and relevant. Redressive action is meant “to counteract the
potential face damage of the FTA by doing it in such a way, or with such
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modifications or additions, that indicate clearly that no such face threat is
intended or desired” (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 69—70). There can be two
kinds of redressive action: positive politeness and negative politeness, which
strongly resemble Goffman’s concepts of avoidance and presentational rituals.
Brown and Levinson admit that these two strategies were borrowed from
Durkheim’s distinction between negative and positive rites. Positive politeness is
oriented toward the hearer’s positive face. The potential face threat is
minimized “by the assurance that in general S wants at least some of H’s
wants” (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 70). Negative politeness is oriented toward
redressing H’s negative face. Here the potential face threat is minimized by the
assurance that S recognizes and respects H’s negative-face wants and will not
impede him in his action.
Brown and Levinson (1987: 71) maintain that “any rational agent will tend
to choose the same genus of strategy under the same conditions — that is, make
the same moves as any other would make under the circumstances”. These
circumstances can be specified in terms of three sociological variables by means
of which the agent can analyse the weightiness of an FTA (Brown and
Levinson, 1987: 74):
• the “social distance” (D) of S and H (a symmetric relation),
• the relative “power” (P) of S and H (an asymmetric relation),
• the absolute ranking (R) of impositions in the particular culture.
These factors, existing “in many and perhaps all cultures,” are employed by
Brown and Levinson (1987: 74) in the following equation to calculate the
weightiness of the FTA:
W× = D(S, H) + P(H, S) + R×
Where W× is the weightiness of the FTA.
The knowledge of the weightiness of a particular FTA is to help the speaker to
determine the appropriate strategy to be used. For example, a request for
passing the salt at the table, which does not constitute a great imposition, can
be performed by means of strategies which do not involve much redress, while
a request for a great favour, which would be highly threatening to the H’s face,
will require the use of a strategy involving more redress.
Much research has been conducted on the influence of these three variables
on the weightiness of the FTA. It has been confirmed that the higher the
speaker power, the lower is the level of politeness (e.g., Holtgraves and Yang,
1990; Holtgraves and Yang, 1992). The imposition variable also gained great
support (e.g., Brown and Gilman, 1989; Holtgraves and Yang, 1992). The social
distance variable proved to be most controversial; some researchers agreed that
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greater politeness is related to greater distance between interlocutors (e.g.,
Holtgraves and Yang, 1992); others negated the importance of this factor (e.g.,
Baxter, 1984; Brown and Gilman, 1989).
To test the cross-cultural applicability of their model, Brown and Levinson
present and discuss many examples of similar politeness strategies used in three
different languages: English, Tamil and Tzeltal.
The model of politeness presented by Brown and Levinson, and their
interpretation of face as the key concept in the goal-oriented behaviour of the
rationally thinking language user, have become an inspiration for researchers
from many different disciplines, such as sociolinguistics, social psychology,
business and management studies, gender studies, etc. Brown and Levinson’s
theory of politeness has, since its first publication in 1978, and revision in 1987,
been used as a basis for further research in politeness and face. It constitutes
a theoretical framework for some empirical work on speech act realization
patterns, and for some cross-cultural studies of politeness.
5.3.1.2. Criticism of Brown and Levinson model
of politeness and face
Brown and Levinson’s theory of politeness and face has been widely discussed,
deeply investigated and broadly applied. Many scholars have tested its main
theses. The results of this research, however, have evoked a lot of criticism of
the model.
Criticism of the way Brown and Levinson conceptualize face
Brown and Levinson’s conceptualization of face has especially attracted
attention and has been challenged by many linguists. Fraser (1990: 239; Mao,
1994; Watts, 2003) noted a big difference between Goffman’s and Brown and
Levinson’s definitions of face: while in the former the public is an intrinsic
constituent, in the latter the public is treated as an “external modifier.”
Goffman’s face is a “public property” which is “located in the flow of events”
and “on loan from society,” while Brown and Levinson’s face is a “public
self-image,” which belongs to an individual (cf. Arundale, 2006).
Their conceptualization of face lacks an important social identity element.
This is noted by many scholars (e.g., Matsumoto, 1988; Lim and Bowers, 1991;
Lim, 1994; Mao, 1994; Spencer-Oatey, 2000; Spencer-Oatey and Xing, 2000).
Spencer-Oatey and Xing (2000: 279) argue that people have two positive face
wants, “a desire for positive evaluation in terms of personal qualities” and
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“a desire for positive evaluation in terms of social identity.” In Brown and
Levinson’s face, the latter element is missing, in this way depriving face of the
necessary social grounding.
Werkhofer (2005), who discusses “the social constitution and the power of
politeness,” comments on Brown and Levinson’s choice of ideas that they use
as a basis for their theory of politeness, namely, Grice’s (1975) conversational
maxims and Goffman’s (1955) concept of face. For him, the two ideas seem to
be incompatible, first due to their (a)social nature, second due to the fact that it
is difficult or even totally impossible to adhere to conversational maxims in
face-maintaining or face-saving. Werkhofer rightly argues that such
a combination of ideas could only bring about the construction of a politeness
theory which “will turn out to be a problematic, inherently contradictory
venture” (2005: 160). He ponders the role of the concept of face in Brown and
Levinson’s model:
Though to some degree socially oriented — more so at least than the Gricean
approach — this notion [Goffman’s face metaphor] abstracts from macro-
sociological dimensions. And being selectively received, it only partially serves
the function it is meant to serve here, that is, it does not really compensate for
the asocial nature of the Gricean model (Werkhofer, 2005: 162).
The weakness of Brown and Levinson’s concept of face consists in the fact that
it is not treated as a social phenomenon. Werkhofer criticizes Brown and
Levinson also for
[r]eceiving Goffman’s face selectively, [claiming that they] reinterpret it in
unambiguously individualistic terms, abstracting not only from the dimension
of ritual order, but from all kinds of social order [...] they unduly favour
individualistic, Gricean elements over the social ones taken from Goffman
(Werkhofer, 2005: 178).
Face is not described in terms of what may happen between participants during
social interaction, but rather in terms of “what is assumed to be represented
within a single speaker’s mind” (Werkhofer, 2005: 180). Likewise, O’Driscoll
(2007: 467; Kopytko, 1993, 1993a) refers to Brown and Levinson’s
conceptualization of face as a set of wants as “a severe truncation of Goffman’s
original definition,” which does not include the social element so relevant in
Goffman’s definition of face. O’Driscoll (2007: 467) mentions two important
elements, “the social dependence of a person’s face” and “its situational
contingency,” which are absent from the concept of face-as-wants. It is in this
absence that O’Driscoll sees the cause of the limited application of the concept
to many cultures. Kopytko (1993: 98; 1993a), discussing the reduction of face to
wants, argues:
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Face is more than just want, if it is at all. It is also (or perhaps primarily)
a social value and norm. Face is value in itself. Someone (an actor) is afraid of
losing face because of a probable loss of reputation, respect, social prestige or
any kind of social punishment. The frustration of his individual want which
may be a blow to his positive self-image, may still be less harmful than the
distortion of his public self-image and its social consequences.
Eelen (2001) notes inconsistency between the way face and the Model
Person are conceptualized by Brown and Levinson and what they explicitly
maintain. They deny any normative dimension for their framework. For them,
the main goal of politeness is conflict-avoidance, which can be achieved by
strategic face-attendance. However, as Eelen (2001: 126) argues:
[...] the validity of face and rationality is based on the claim that they are “[...]
assumptions that all interacting humans know that they will be expected to orient
to” (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 58). Face and rationality are standards people
are expected to live up to — in simple terms, social norms.
The Model Person represents normative social expectations which help
interactants to see the effect of their behaviour on others. It constitutes a norm,
whether they admit it or not, that:
[...] normally everyone’s face depends on everyone else’s being maintained,
and since people can be expected to defend their faces if threatened, and in
defending their own to threaten others’ faces, it is in general in every
participant’s best interest to maintain each others’ face, [...] (Brown and
Levinson, 1987: 61).
Criticism of Brown and Levinson’s claim to the universality of their concept of
face (especially its negative aspect)
A large amount of the criticism aimed at Brown and Levinson’s model of
politeness and concept of face involves their cross-cultural validity. In spite of
the claim for the universality of the concept of face, Brown and Levinson
created a cognitive model of face which is founded on Western ethnocentric
assumptions (Bargiela-Chiappini, 2003; Watts, 2003):
• the existence of a predominantly rational actor,
• strategic, goal-oriented facework.
This is an individualistic concept of face. Brown and Levinson admit that (1987: 61):
[Their] notion of ‘face’ is derived from that of Goffman (1967) and from the
English folk term, which ties face up with notions of being embarrassed or
humiliated, or ‘losing face.’
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They borrowed the concept of face from Goffman, who defines it as “an image
of self.” But in doing so, they also adopted his social psychological
interpretation of face and the Western conceptualization of the interactant
(Arundale, 2006). The second source of their notion of face (the English folk
term) is said to be responsible for “the negative bias” omnipresent in Brown and
Levinson’s picture of human communication (Terkourafi, 2007). They claim
that (1987: 74):
It is safer to assume that H prefers his peace and self-determination than that
he prefers your expressions of regard, unless you are certain of the contrary.
This assumption, as Terkourafi (2007) notes, is present neither in Goffman’s
nor in Durkheim’s works. The individualistic character of the notion of face,
resulting from the reference to these two sources, and “the negative bias” in
Brown and Levinson’s presentation of human communication, are not
consonant with their claim to the universality of face, and have often been
criticized as ethnocentric (e.g., Matsumoto, 1988; Gu, 1990; Wierzbicka, 1991;
Nwoye, 1992).
The negative aspect of face is said to have “a strong anglocentric bias”
(Wierzbicka, 1991: 67; Kasper, 1990: Reynolds, 1995), as it is held to
presuppose a Western-style individualistic notion of self. Evidence from studies
of different languages and cultures (Ide, 1989: 223—248; Matsumoto, 1988:
403—426; Gu, 1990: 443—467; Ting-Toomey et al., 1991: 275—296; Nwoye, 1992:
309—328; Strecker, 1993: 119—141; Cocroft and Ting-Toomey, 1994: 469—506;
Ervin-Tripp et al., 1995: 43—71) suggests that both politeness phenomena in
general, and the notion of face in particular, are perceived and manifested
differently in different cultures. Strecker (1993: 121) argues that
although the metaphor of ‘face’ may well prove to be a part of the very
wide-spread analogical repertoire which can be utilised for metaphorical
production in all cultures, its specific meanings are far from universal and
demand investigation.
Major criticism of Brown and Levinson’s claim to the universality of their
concept of face (especially its negative aspect) comes from Asian scholars. In
Chinese culture, as Lee-Wong (2000: 24) suggests, “face maintenance is
essentially an act of balancing — the perception of self in relation to other.” This
is consonant with what Mao (1994: 460) claims:
Chinese face encodes a reputable image that individuals can claim for
themselves as they interact with others in a given community; it is intimately
linked to the views of the community and to the community’s judgement and
perception of the individual’s character and behaviour.
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In a similar vein, Hinze (2005: 177) claims that defining face in the way Brown
and Levinson do does not apply to Chinese mianzi and lian, which rather
consist in “other people’s impression/image of oneself.” The Goffmanian face is
what is “claimed” by an individual, or what he “wants to claim” (Brown and
Levinson, 1987: 61). However, as Hinze suggests, in Chinese context, neither
mianzi nor lian can or need be claimed (Hinze, 2005). This is clearly explained
by Hsu (1996: 70):
[P]ersonal intention or claim is by no means a necessary condition in the
matter of ‘face’ (mianzi or lian). One may be viewed positively by the public
and thereby have ‘face’ without wishing or striving for it. After all, the public
does not grant someone respect because he or she claims it, or treat without
deference because it is not being claimed. One symptom of this problem is
that these definitions do not fit some popular Chinese expressions of ‘face.’
Discussing the concept of negative face, Gu (1990) does not agree with the
claim that concerns for autonomy and imposition are specific to Western
cultures. He argues that they also exist in Eastern cultures, but that they are
not regarded as face concerns. He does not, however, entirely reject the
concept of negative face, but redefines it in Chinese terms. For him, “the
Chinese negative face [...] is threatened when self cannot live up to what s/he
has claimed, or when what self has done is likely to incur ill fame or
reputation” (1990: 242).
Matsumoto (1988; Mao, 1994), who discusses the notion of face in
Japanese, criticizes Brown and Levinson (1987) for neglecting the interpersonal
perspective on face, and for stressing the importance of negative face. She
maintains that:
What is of paramount concern to a Japanese is not his/her own territory, but
the position in relation to the others in the group and his/her acceptance by
those others. Loss of face is associated with the perception by others that one
has not comprehended and acknowledged the structure and hierarchy of the
group. The Japanese concepts of face, thus, are qualitatively different from
those defined as universals by Brown and Levinson. The difference transcends
the variability of cultural elaboration acknowledged in Brown and Levinson’s
theory (e.g. what kinds of acts threaten face, what sorts of persons have
special rights to face-protection, etc.) and calls into question the universality of
a core concept: the notion of face as consisting of the desire for approval of
wants and the desire for the preservation of one’s territory. [...] [In Japanese
culture, a]cknowledgement and maintenance of the relative position of others,
rather than preservation of an individual’s proper territory, governs all social
interaction (Matsumoto, 1988: 405).
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Some years later, in a discussion note “Reply to Pizziconi” (2003: 1517;
cf. Pizziconi, 2003), Matsumoto clarifies her objections to Brown and
Levinson’s concept of face: “I was questioning the efficacy of employing what
appeared to be an English folk concept in a universal account of linguistic
politeness.” But in spite of all the criticism and arguments against Brown and
Levinson’s claim for the universality of face, Matsumoto (1988: 423) does not
deny the fact that
‘face’ defined as one’s ‘socially given self-image’ is plausibly a useful notion in
explaining a universal motivation for politeness. The observations I have made,
however, suggest that the constituents of ‘face,’ and, thus, the objects of
people’s concern in conversational exchange, are dependent on the culture.
For Ide (1989), Brown and Levinson’s model of politeness understood as
“diplomatic behaviour” cannot be treated as universal. A really universal
definition of politeness, according to her, should include both acts of volition
and wakimae (discernment). Volitional politeness is the type of politeness which
the speaker decides to use irrespective of the type of situation. Discernment is
“the choice of linguistic form or expression in which the distinction between the
ranks or the roles of the speaker, the referent and the addressee are
systematically encoded” (Ide, 1989: 230; cf. Mayumi, 2002). In discernment, as
Hill et al. (1986: 348) explain, “the speaker can be considered to submit
passively to the requirements of the system.” And cultures differ in the
prominence of volition/discernment (Hill et al., 1986: 348):
The relative prominence of Discernment over Volition appears to predominate
in the polite use of language by speakers of Japanese. Conversely, Volition
appears to predominate in the polite use of American English.
Both Matsumoto (1988) and Ide (1989) argue that what is of importance in
Japan is not individuals’ right to be unimpeded in their actions, but their relation
to others in the group and their acceptance by those others. A similar objection
was put forward by Haugh (2005), who claims that the Japanese folk notions of
face are not so much of what is claimed by an individual through his behaviour,
but rather are based on evaluations of the individual (or group) by significant
others. Fukushima (2002: 58) does not agree entirely with this criticism, saying:
[...] in contemporary Japan, in which individualism has also developed as the
economy has grown [...], the aspect of negative face wants in Brown and
Levinson’s sense is important.
Positive face, in Fukushima’s opinion, in such collectivistic societies as Japan,
includes a subcategory: “the desire to conform to social conventions,
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acknowledging one’s position in a group” (Fukushima, 2002: 59). Fukushima
admits that both aspects of face are relevant in Japanese social interaction.
Objections to Brown and Levinson’s model were also raised by Mao (1994:
471), who notes that, according to them,
cultural variability only determines how polite behaviour is to be evaluated,
whether it is essentially positive-politeness oriented or negative-politeness
oriented (or a combination of both). Cultural variability, they argue, does not
affect their posited positive and negative face. [...] this position is not quite
tenable any more.
To Mao, this position is untenable in at least two cultural contexts he has
investigated, Chinese and Japanese. In these two cultures, face “gravitates
toward social recognition and hierarchical interdependence,” while American
face “spirals outward from individual desires and wants” (Mao, 1994: 471). Mao
maintains that these are two divergent face orientations which shape our
behaviour during social interaction. He develops an alternative interactional
construct — the relative face orientation, defined as a direction of face “that
emulates [...] one of the two interactional ideals [...]: the ideal social identity
and the ideal individual autonomy” (Mao, 1994: 472). The content of face in
a given culture is determined by one of these two ideals, which are similar to
the distinction between interdependent and independent construals of self. Mao
objects also to Brown and Levinson’s failure to identify the original source of
the concept of face. This, to Mao (1994: 454), has an “impact upon their
formulation of face, [and] has consequences for their theory’s claim of
universality.”
Brown and Levinson’s claim for the universality of negative face is also
rejected by Ukosakul (2005), who discusses the significance of face in Thai
culture. She claims that
the Thai notion of face is not so much one’s right to act freely (à la Brown &
Levinson) but rather other people’s acceptance of one’s accomplishments and
social position in society. Consequently, people who express behaviours which
are considered ‘positive’ for the face tend to be people of whom Thai society
approves (Ukosakul, 2005: 119).
The concept of negative face and its individualistic character, however, has
been criticized not only by Asian researchers. Nwoye (1992), who analysed
politeness in Nigerian Igbo society, claims that among the Igbo the main
concern is not for the individual’s self-image, but for the group self-image. He
defines Igbo society as “egalitarian” and states that for them “concern for group
interests rather than atomistic individualism is the expected norm of behaviour”
(1992: 310). What matters is what he calls the group face. “[T]he avoidance of
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behaviour capable of lowering the public self-image or self-worth of one’s group
[is] dictated by the fear of imecu iru (to darken face)” (Nwoye, 1992: 314).
Hirschon (2001) comes to similar conclusions in his analysis of politeness in
Greece. He states that Greek face is a collective as well as a personal matter. In
a similar vein, other researchers raise criticism with respect to the
inapplicability of the concept of negative face to some cultures (e.g., Strecker’s
(1993) study of face in the Hamar culture in southern Ethiopia and Kadt’s
(1998) study of face in Zulu culture).
Objections to Brown and Levinson’s concept of face and its universal
applicability (although significantly less numerous) have also come from
Western scholars. Watts, Ide and Ehlich (2005: 10) question the validity of
Brown and Levinson’s concept of negative face, asking:
But how is negative face to be understood in a culture in which the
possessions of individuals are at one and the same time the possessions of the
community, or in which the individual’s right to act depends crucially on the
consent of the community?
Criticism of Brown and Levinson’s concept of face as a determinant of
interactional dynamics
Another type of criticism concerns face as a determinant of interactional
dynamics. Some scholars argue that in non-Western cultures there are different
determinants of interactional dynamics than face. Bargiela-Chiappini (2003:
1463; 2006: 422) distinguishes between:
• status-based cultures (e.g., China, Korea, North America), in which
normative and volitional politeness coexist, and face is “an important, if not
central, explanatory key to interpersonal behaviour” (cf. Brown and
Levinson’s face),
• socially stratified cultures (e.g., Japan, Mexico, and the Zulu in South
Africa), in which normative politeness dominates, and face “takes second
place to seemingly more dominant notions such as discernment, respeto
(Garcia, 1996) and deference.”
Ide (1989: 241), who suggests that discernment, rather than face, is the main
motivation for politeness in Japanese culture, explains the difference between
these two culture groups in the following way:
In a Western society where individualism is assumed to be the basis of all
interactions, it is easy to regard face as the key to interaction. On the other
hand, in a society where group membership is regarded as the basis of
interaction, the role or status defined in a particular situation rather than face
is the basis of interaction.
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Criticism of Brown and Levinson’s conceptualization of face-threatening acts
and their role in social interaction
Defining face-threatening acts, Brown and Levinson claim that these are acts
which are intrinsically threatening to face. This conceptualization of FTAs, the
method Brown and Levinson employ to classify them, and especially the fact
that acts are classified as threatening or not without reference to the situation
in which they are performed, have evoked a lot of criticism among scholars
(e.g., Matsumoto, 1988; Gu, 1990; Nvoye, 1992; Spencer-Oatey, 2000; Fraser,
2005; O’Driscoll, 2007). Some of them maintain that the illocutionary acts
identified by Brown and Levinson as face-threatening cannot be said to be so
in all cultures and in all social contexts. O’Driscoll (2007: 469) argues that no
act can be either intrinsically threatening or intrinsically supportive to face, as
“Effects on face are radically situational.” The same illocutionary act in one
situation can constitute a threat to face, while in another it can be supportive
of it.
Brown and Levinson provide a classification of FTAs with respect to the
type of face threatened (positive or negative) and whether it is the speaker’s or
the addressee’s face, but they seem not to consider that many acts may be
directed at more than one aspect of face. Sifianou (2001: 399) claims that all
acts, and specifically compliments, are multidirectional, that is, “they are not
merely or primarily threats oriented to the addressee’s negative aspect of face”:
such acts primarily enhance his self-image. Similarly, Sifianou and
Antonopoulou (2005) note that such acts as requests, which are treated by
Brown and Levinson as primarily threatening to the addressee’s negative face,
can also enhance his positive face, indicating closeness and solidarity or the
speaker’s high opinion of the addressee. All acts can range along a continuum
from the most face-threatening ones to the most face-enhancing ones (Sifianou
and Antonopoulou, 2005). The degree of face threat or face enhancement of an
act depends on its situational and sociocultural context.
The picture of social interaction presented by Brown and Levinson is rather
gloomy and dominated by face-threatening acts; it does not have any positive
elements (O’Driscoll, 2007). Terkourafi (2007: 321), discussing this picture,
writes about “an avalanche of negative terms” (e.g., “being embarrassed or
humiliated,” “losing face,” “maintaining face,” “the mutual vulnerability of face,”
“defending face” and “threatening face” (1987: 61)). Kerbrat-Orecchioni (2005),
discussing characteristic features of politeness in France, proposes a ‘revamped’
Brown and Levinson Model. She adopts their idea that politeness equals
facework. However, agreeing with those who criticize Brown and Levinson’s
model for being overly pessimistic, Kerbrat-Orecchioni stresses the fact that there
is another side of politeness: “on a more positive note, politeness also consists in
producing ‘anti-threats’ (given that face-work aims both to save one’s face and to
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expand on it)” (2005: 30). In other words, she claims that we should see the
positive side of some FTAs. Such acts as an expression of gratitude, a good wish
or a compliment, which are considered by Brown and Levinson as threatening to
the hearer’s negative face, are primarily an ‘anti-threat’ to this individual. Such
acts that reinforce the other’s face Kerbrat-Orecchioni calls face-flattering acts.
A similar view is presented by Manno (2005), Sifianou (2001) and Sifianou and
Antonopoulou (2005).
Presenting their politeness strategies, Brown and Levinson (1987: 68) write:
In the context of the mutual vulnerability of face, any rational agent will seek
to avoid these face-threatening acts, or will employ certain strategies to
minimize the threat.
Thus, according to them, face threats are the main reason for politeness. For
Bargiela-Chiappini (2003: 1461), their ideal rational actor makes “obsessive”
attempts to mark and protect personal territory from potentially harmful
interpersonal contact, which, she argues, is not in line with the work of
Durkheim they quote frequently, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life
(1912/2001). There Durkheim (1912/2001: 311) maintains that “the negative cult
serves only as an introduction and preparation for the positive one”. It is treated
as “a condition of access to the positive cult” (1912/2001: 309), and constitutes
a positive contribution in the interaction between the individual and society.
Brown and Levinson’s negative face, understood as the claim to freedom of
action and freedom from imposition, and negative type of politeness,
understood as redressing the other’s negative face, seem not to be derived from
Durkheim.
Criticism of Brown and Levinson’s concept of facework
Brown and Levinson see facework as strategic conflict-avoidance. In other
words, people engage in facework to avoid conflict in social interaction. This
approach to facework has met with a lot of criticism, especially among
non-Western scholars (e.g., Hill et al., 1986; Matsumoto, 1988; Ide, 1989; Gu,
1990; Nwoye, 1992; Mao, 1994; Yu, 2003), who argue that in many cultures
(especially those that are collectivistic) the main motivation for facework is
establishing and/or maintaining harmony during social interaction. Referring to
the above criticism of Brown and Levinson’s concept of facework, O’Driscoll
makes an attempt to defend it. He maintains that
the degree of conscious strategy employed in an act is more situationally than
culturally determined. [...] [Besides,] it is precisely the handling of FTAs
which the B&L’s model was designed to explain (B&L: 56—57). They clearly
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state (B&L: 93) that their strategies could be used for other face purposes but
that is not what they address (2007: 470).
There are, however, more serious criticisms related to the general
interpretation of politeness in Brown and Levinson’s model. Watts (2003)
argues that what they offer is a theory of facework, rather than a theory of
politeness. Supporting his claim with many examples of positive and negative
politeness, he maintains that “the linguistic structures that realize these
facework strategies are by no means always associated with linguistic politeness,
although of course a large number of them may be” (2003: 93). Many
utterances which constitute the so-called politic behaviour (see Section 5.3.2.)
are not inherently polite, but doing some facework, they may be interpreted as
polite in a particular context.
Brown and Levinson’s theory focuses mainly on other-oriented politeness
and does not pay attention to the speaker’s face needs. In this way, it does not
account for an important area of social interaction. Trying to compensate for
this, Chen (2001) builds a model of self-politeness within the framework of
Brown and Levinson’s theory. The main concerns of the speaker, according to
this model, are self-face needs and self-face threatening acts redress. Similar
arguments are expressed by Manno (2005), who claims that politeness does not
concern only the addressee’s face (e.g., tact and compliments), but also the
speaker’s face (e.g., modesty).
The foregoing discussion of criticism of Brown and Levinson’s theory of
politeness and face shows that, although far from universal and unable to
account for all culture-specific social behaviour, it nevertheless provides us with
the picture of social interaction which after some modifications could
adequately explain the mechanisms of human behaviour and clarify the role of
face in social interaction. The main objections to the model can be summarized
in the following points:
• Their definition of face, a “public self-image,” which belongs to an individual,
lacks an important social identity element.
• Their claim for the universality of face (especially negative face) is untenable,
because in some cultures concerns for autonomy and imposition are not
interactionally relevant.
• Contrary to what Brown and Levinson assume, in many (non-Western)
cultures there are other determinants of interactional dynamics than face.
• Their claim that certain acts are intrinsically threatening to face is untenable,
because effects on face are situation-dependent.
• Their conceptualization of facework as strategic conflict-avoidance is not cross-
culturally valid, as establishing and maintaining harmony rather than avoiding
conflict is the main motivation for facework in some (non-Western) cultures.
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In spite of many criticisms aimed at its several aspects, Brown and
Levinson’s model has become the milestone in the politeness and face research.
Many scholars either use it as a theoretical framework for various types of
research (e.g., on facework in nursing interactions (Spiers, 2007)) or treat it as
a starting point for the formulation of their own theories.
5.3.1.3. Face theories inspired by Brown
and Levinson’s model
The theories of face to be discussed here, Thomas Holtgraves’ (1992) face
management theory of language use, Ron Scollon and Suzanne Wong Scollon’s
(2001) model of politeness (or face), Jim O’Driscoll’s (1996; 2001; 2007) model
of face-opposition and face model of language choice in intercultural
communication, and Jonathan Culpeper’s (1996) model of impoliteness, differ in
many respects, but have one thing in common — their source of inspiration and
the theoretical background from which they have begun is Brown and
Levinson’s model of politeness.
Face management theory (Holtgraves)
Holtgraves (1992) proposes a face management theory of language use which is
based on the works of Goffman (1967; 1971) and Brown and Levinson (1987). He
argues that face and facework can be extremely useful for understanding language
use. Concerns with face and facework, or as Holtgraves prefers to call them means
of managing face, are the necessary prerequisites for orderly social interaction.
The main assumptions of the face management theory are the following
(Holtgraves, 1992: 155):
• Face concerns are encoded both in utterances carrying a face threat (single
turns at talk) and in sequences of talk.
• “[T]he more threatening the act (as a function of power, distance, imposition,
and possibly other variables), the greater the extent to which face concerns
will be encoded.”
• The hearer’s face support is possible only when the speaker’s face concern is
not of greater importance.
• Face management processes are involved both in language production and
language comprehension.
• Differences in the assessment of face threat depend on individual, cultural
and subcultural factors, which result in differences in the extent to which face
is attended to in language.
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The face management theory was formulated on the basis of the research on
Brown and Levinson’s theory of politeness conducted on requests (Holtgraves
and Yang, 1990), accounts, disagreements, and self-disclosures. In spite of many
similarities, the face management theory differs from Brown and Levinson’s
theory in some important respects. First, it assumes that face is managed
linguistically over a series of turns rather than only within a single turn. Thus, in
the assessment of face threat or face support what matters is preference
organization (Holtgraves, 1992; 2005). Second, differences in face management
do not depend exclusively on cultural factors but are also conditioned by
individual ways of behaviour and subjective ways of perception. The face
management theory tries to explain both the social and the psychological
aspects of language use. Holtgraves (1992; 2009) claims that the key issues to
understand differences in cross-cultural communication are the universal
concept of face, which has a “regulatory role” in social interaction, and the two
variables, power and psychological distance, which underlie social interactions
in all cultures. They strongly influence the linguistic production and
comprehension on any occasion. To some extent, Holtgraves’ face management
theory tries to compensate for the inadequacies of Brown and Levinson’s theory.
Politeness (or Face) Systems (Scollon and Wong Scollon)
Drawing on the work of Brown and Levinson, Scollon and Wong Scollon (1993;
2001) discuss the effect of self-presentational strategies in terms of the
communication of politeness, in which face (as in Brown and Levinson’s model)
is the central concept. According to them (Scollon and Wong Scollon, 2001:
45), face is not only “the negotiated public image, mutually granted each other
by participants in a communicative event.” Participants, before they begin any
communication, must make assumptions “about the face they want to claim for
themselves and are willing to give to the other participants” (2001: 45). Later
face is negotiated during interpersonal communication. This combination of
assumptions about the participants and their relationships and the negotiations
of these assumptions are called by Scollon and Wong Scollon the study of face,
or politeness theory.
For them, face is a paradoxical concept. It has two aspects, involvement
(cf. positive face, solidarity politeness) and independence (cf. negative face,
deference politeness). On the one hand, people want to be involved with other
participants and to show them their involvement; on the other, they want to
maintain some degree of independence from other participants and to show
them that they respect their independence. The involvement aspect of face
concerns “the person’s right and need to be considered a normal,
contributing, or supporting member of society” (Scollon and Wong Scollon,
2001: 46). The independence aspect of face stresses “the individuality of the
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participants” and “their right not to be completely dominated by group or
social values, and to be free from the imposition of others” (2001: 47). The
paradox consists in that the two aspects of face “must be projected
simultaneously in any communication” (2001: 46) and that they are in
conflict: “emphasizing one of them risks a threat to the other” (2001: 48).
Thus, any communication involves a threat to face, both to involvement face
and independence face, as well as both to the speaker’s face and the
addressee’s face. In other words, we cannot avoid the problem of face, and,
Scollon and Wong Scollon (2001: 48) claim that “There is no faceless
communication.”
They formulated a model of politeness (or face) which is based on the
assumption that face relationships (i.e. relationships between and among
participants in communication) consist of two elements:
• an unmarked set of initial assumptions,
• a series of negotiations in which those assumptions are ratified or changed.
Although it is not stated explicitly, face is presented here as a relational
construct based on the interactants’ assumptions and negotiations. Scollon and
Wong Scollon claim that normally face relationships, once established, are fairly
stable and rarely subject to negotiation. However, they do not take into account
that during social interaction the relationship between interactants may be
subject to change. Other factors may influence the relationship and cause
participants to re-negotiate it.
The authors describe the regularities in face relationships as politeness (face)
systems, which depend on three main factors, power (+P, –P), distance (+D,
–D), and the weight of imposition (+W, –W). There are three main types of
politeness systems in different contexts (1993; 2001: 54—56):
• Deference politeness system (–P, +D), in which participants (e.g., two
university professors) treat each other as equals and use many independence
politeness strategies,
• Solidarity politeness system (–P, –D), in which participants (e.g., two close
friends) treat each other as equals and use many involvement strategies,
• Hierarchical politeness system (+P, +/–D), in which participants (e.g., an
employer and his employee) recognize and respect their different social
positions (an asymmetrical relationship). The person in the superordinate
position uses involvement strategies “in speaking ‘down,’” whereas the person
in the subordinate position uses independence strategies “in speaking ‘up.’”
The three face systems provide the strategies for possible relationships that can
occur during communication. They resemble Robin Lakoff’s (1977) rules of
politeness (Formality, Hesitancy and Equality), which can be applied in different
situations and depend on relations between interactants.
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The face and politeness model proposed by Scollon and Wong Scollon
creates a picture of social interaction almost as gloomy as that of Brown and
Levinson. The inevitability of face threat in every interaction with the other and
the conflict between involvement face and independence face present
interpersonal encounters as a risky venture.
O’Driscoll’s model of face-opposition and face model of language choice
O’Driscoll (1996) elaborates on Brown and Levinson’s conception of positive
and negative face and tries to uphold their claim that these are universal
phenomena. To succeed in that, he outlines a different conception of positive
and negative. He claims that:
It is quite manifest of human existence, and contingent on the existential facts
of human life, that people need to do some things with other people and some
things on their own. This is a condition which humans share with all primates.
[...] A universal category of human wants relative to human interaction can
thus be posited. The two opposing sides of this category may be characterised
as, on the one hand association/belonging/merging and on the other hand
dissociation/independence/individuation (O’Driscoll, 1996: 10).
These oppositions involve, in varying degrees, either contact (positive wants) or
lack of contact (negative wants). Irrespective of personal inclinations and
cultural norms, nobody likes either his positive or negative wants to be
disregarded (e.g., lack of recognition of one’s return home, or lack of
recognition of one’s right to be alone sometimes, respectively).
Unlike wants dualism, face, according to O’Driscoll (1996: 12), “results from
the more specifically human trait of foreground consciousness — our capacity
for being introspective and for being aware of ourselves through the passage of
time.” He derives face from wants dualism in the following way:
• For every human being, it is not enough that his wants be satisfied. He wants
to feel that they have been, are being, or will be satisfied. This want is called
self-esteem.
• Our self-esteem depends largely on the attitudes of other people towards us.
“This aspect of our self-esteem — the part that depends on others’ attitudes
towards us — is face” (O’Driscoll, 1996: 12).
As O’Driscoll maintains, face is involved in the satisfaction of positive and
negative wants. Like Brown and Levinson, he distinguishes between positive and
negative face, but he understands face dualism in a slightly different way.
Positive face is “the need for one’s positive wants to be given recognition,” while
negative face is “the need for one’s negative wants to be given recognition”
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(O’Driscoll, 1996: 13). These are not mere desires for association/togetherness
or disassociation/apartness, respectively, but the need for some symbolic
recognition of these desires by others. O’Driscoll (2007: 480) admits that his
model of face-opposition “trades in richness for clarity,” as it encompasses only
one of many aspects of face — togetherness/apartness. It does not involve
feelings of general esteem, which are traditionally related to face, such as
shame, pride, embarrassment, confidence, approval, or disapproval.
Apart from the two aspects of face in interaction, O’Driscoll (1996)
discusses the third one — culture-specific face, which is involved in folk notions of
face. While the desire for good face is universal, the constituents of good face or
a good self-image, things to do with personal esteem, are culturally variable; they
depend on the value judgements people make and on attributes considered
praiseworthy or blameworthy in a particular culture. Even more significant than
culture-specific face is situation-specific face, because face exists only in situated
interaction (2007).
O’Driscoll (2007) stresses the difference between the cross-cultural, which
involves culture-specific norms and values, and the intercultural. And he
claims that the study of interaction across cultures (IAC), apart from the
concepts of norms and values, needs culture-specific descriptive parameters,
among which he sees the parameter of positive and negative faces, understood
as “a uni-dimensional spectrum.” On one end point on the scale there is
positive face(work), involving connection and belonging, on the other, negative
face(work), involving separation and individuation. This kind of facework does
not necessarily arise from FTAs. This is especially relevant to IAC, as routine
moves across cultures differ along the positive-negative scale. While in one
culture paying positive face is a routine, in another the routine move consists
in paying negative face. An FTA can appear as a result of the divergence
between the respective routine moves. O’Driscoll (2001) also maintains that in
different cultures many conversational turns are prejudiced in favour of
different responses, and that this is partly for the sake of face. In other words,
using conversation analysis terminology, he claims that cross-cultural
differences in preference organization are face-related. Face dualism is
applicable cross-culturally because the constituents of positive and negative
face “are inherent in the human condition.” Attention to both kinds of face
should “be instantiated in every culture to at least some degree” (1996: 29).
But he considers the division into positive and negative politeness cultures as
“a gross generalisation.”
O’Driscoll’s interpretation of face can be applied to the analysis of
intercultural communication, viewed both as “the colliding of the two cultures”
and as “the interaction, via their different identities, of the two walking micro-
cultures” (1996: 30). Intercultural communication, according to O’Driscoll,
depends on:
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• social norms, which are system-internal,
• norms for dealing with outsiders,
• individual characteristics of the participants and their reactions during social
interaction.
All these factors have a strong impact on face-related choices made by
participants of intercultural communication. According to O’Driscoll’s (2001)
face model of language choice in intercultural communication, language choice is
one of the most frequently recurring aspects of IAC. This is in line with what
Tracy (1990: 217) states: “Facework refers to the identity implications of
messages” and “while face concerns are not necessarily focal, they are always
immanent.” O’Driscoll contends that “since language choice is one kind of
identity implication, it partakes in this immanence” (2001: 251). The language
choice made by an interactant is part of the line (cf. Goffman, 1967) he
takes during a particular social encounter, and results in a face claim. Thus,
the interactants can use a language associated with ego, a language associated
with alter, or a language which is a link between them. They can posit three
faces, respectively. An interactant puts on an ethnoliguistic face when he uses
L1, which involves stressing ethnolinguistic group membership. When
interactants choose to use “a language of international standing,” which is L2
for both of them, they predicate a cosmopolitan face. The third type is polite
face, which is put on by an interactant when he uses alter’s L1. These three
faces are not mutually exclusive. O’Driscoll wants them to be treated as
“face-primitives” which can be combined according to the situation. The
language choices interactants make have implications for their mutual face
(2001: 258):
• Use of Lx predicates ego’s ethnolinguistic face and alter’s polite face.
• Use of Ly predicates ego’s polite face and alter’s ethnolinguistic face.
• Use of Lz (L2 for both) predicates cosmopolitan face for both.
In multilingual settings, interactants’ choice of language always results in
predicating ego’s and alter’s faces which are interdependent.
O’Driscoll’s (1996, 2001, 2007) insightful discussion of the concept of face,
and face opposition in particular, gives a new interpretation to Brown and
Levinson’s face dualism. It shows that face is not limited to the two wants; apart
from other constituents, it involves also social recognition of these wants.
O’Driscoll’s interpretation of culture-specific face helps to explain some
differences in face-related behaviour across cultures; he sees the source of these
differences in the constituents of good face and value-judgements specific for
a given culture. His face model of language choice in intercultural
communication accounts for identity- and face-related issues resulting from
a particular language choice. The model may have an explanatory role in the
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analysis of identity creation and mutual face maintenance in intercultural
communication.
Face and impoliteness (Culpeper)
Face is a central concept in the model of impoliteness proposed by Culpeper
(1996) and Culpeper et al. (2003). The model is the reverse of Brown and
Levinson’s model of politeness. The main difference between Brown and
Levinson’s model of politeness and Culpeper’s model of impoliteness is that in
the latter superstrategies, instead of minimizing a face threat, attack face. As in
the case of politeness, the main reason for impoliteness is face. Culpeper
enumerates several circumstances in which impoliteness is most likely to appear.
It happens especially when there is an imbalance of power between interactants.
This leads to a situation when “the vulnerability of face is unequal and so
motivation to cooperate is reduced” (1996: 354). Impoliteness appears also
when it is not in the participant’s interest to maintain the other’s face. In equal
relationships, the question of impoliteness is more complex. Culpeper argues
that impoliteness correlates with intimacy — in intimate relationships, people are
more hostile towards each other than are strangers, and they know which
aspects of face are particularly sensitive to attack. Certainly, impoliteness is
more likely to appear in dislike relationships in which people expect less
concern for face. By analogy to Brown and Levinson’s politeness strategies,
Culpeper (1996: 356—357) proposes five impoliteness strategies:
• Bald on record impoliteness — the FTA is performed in a direct and
unambiguous way in a situation when face is not irrelevant,
• Positive impoliteness, employed to damage the hearer’s positive face,
• Negative impoliteness, employed to damage the hearer’s negative face,
• Sarcasm or mock politeness — “the FTA is performed with the use of
politeness strategies that are obviously insincere, and thus remain surface
realisations,”
• Withhold politeness, which involves the absence of “politeness work” where it
is expected.
All these strategies are used to attack particular aspects of the other’s face.
However, as Culpeper claims (1996: 361):
The notion of face is not confined to the immediate properties of the self, but
can be invested in a wide range of phenomena such as one’s family, job,
nationality. Liu (1986) conceptualised the notion of face as consisting of
concentric circles with the most face-laden closest to the ego.
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Insults or other impolite remarks may be directed at different components of
the other’s face, e.g., his social roles, personal values, self-sufficiency, mental
abilities or psychological make-up.
Before the publication of Culpeper’s paper, “Towards an anatomy of
impoliteness” (1996), most researchers focused on politeness and investigated
the so-called “polite” speech acts and the strategies used to mitigate threats to
face. Culpeper was the first to concentrate on the analysis of the “negative side”
of politeness. His model is a reversed version of Brown and Levinson’s theory;
all the strategies, instead of minimizing a threat to face, are aimed at
maximizing it. The model includes an interesting interpretation of the concept
of face; Culpeper’s face has a broader scope of meaning, because it also
includes properties which are not directly relevant to the self and face, although
in certain situations they can constitute sensitive issues to the self.
The applicability of Culpeper’s (1996) system of impoliteness strategies has
been already successfully tested. It was used by Barbara Kryk-Kastovsky (2006)
as a methodological tool for the analysis of impoliteness in the Early Modern
English court. In this way, she has proved that the synchronic pragmatic
apparatus is capable of analysing diachronic data. To improve the system of
impoliteness, Kryk-Kastovsky also suggested a distinction between structural
(syntactic) impoliteness (comparable to Culpeper et al.’s (2003) bald-on-record
impoliteness) and semantic/pragmatic impoliteness (related to the literal
meaning or the speaker meaning of a particular utterance).
5.3.2. A relational (interactional) approach to face
This approach, although stemming from the same source as the previously
discussed models, has developed in opposition to them. Politeness and facework
are considered by the representatives of this approach in a broader, discursive,
perspective. Face no longer belongs to an individual, but is conjointly created by
interactants who form a certain relationship during social interaction. The
relational approach to face is represented by Richard J. Watts and Miriam
A. Locher, Helen Spencer-Oatey, Francesca Bargiela-Chiappini, Robert Arundale
and Marina Terkourafi.
Face and relational work — the discursive approach to politeness and face (Watts,
Locher)
In the introduction to the new edition of Politeness in Language (2005),
Watts stresses the importance of the distinction between first-order and
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second-order politeness, presented in the first edition (1992; later developed by
Eelen, 2001, Watts, 2003). First-order politeness consists of lay concepts of
politeness, while second-order politeness “refers to the constructs of theoretical
politeness models proposed in the literature” (Locher, 2006: 252). Watts (2005:
xx) claims that:
Evaluative terms [...] such as polite, impolite, rude etc. are subject to discursive
dispute in that participants in social interaction are likely to differ in
attributing these evaluations to individuals’ contributions to the interaction.
In other words, what is perceived as polite by some people may seem impolite to
others. This is why many politeness researchers (e.g., Watts, 2003, 2005; Locher,
2006; Locher and Watts, 2005; Haugh, 2007) postulate a discursive approach to
politeness. It abandons the creation of any theory of politeness or a theory which
would be universal and valid cross-culturally (Watts, 2003, 2005a, Locher and
Watts, 2005). What should be at issue is relational work, which refers to “the
‘work’ individuals invest in negotiating relationships with others” (Locher and
Watts, 2005: 10). It comprises negatively marked behaviour (impoliteness,
rudeness), positively marked behaviour (politeness), and unmarked behaviour
(politic behaviour) (Locher, 2006: 249—251). The difference between the former
two and the latter lies in the fact that (im)polite behaviour is that which is
perceived as being beyond what is expectable, while politic behaviour, as Watts
(2003: 19) defines it, is “linguistic behaviour which is perceived to be appropriate
to the social constraints of the ongoing interaction, i.e. as non-salient.” Thus,
relational work comprises all types of behaviour that can be observed during
social interaction. It can be understood as equivalent to Goffman’s concept of
facework. However, the term facework in contemporary politeness literature is
usually limited to face-threat mitigation and polite behaviour.
Central to the concept of relational work is Goffman’s (1967) face, as “any
interpersonal interaction involves the participants in the negotiation of face”
(Locher and Watts, 2005: 11). The discursive approach to face and politeness
(Watts, 2003: 142, 2005; Locher, 2004, 2006; Locher and Watts, 2005;
cf. Lerner, 1996) is in line with Goffman’s ideas on face and interaction:
We can interpret Goffman as implying that face is constructed discursively in
instances of socio-communicative verbal interaction, i.e. it is constructed
socially. If this is the case, we need a theory of facework rather than one of
politeness, unless we are prepared to give up the notion of face threat
mitigation as being the basis of politeness (Watts, 2005: xxix).
Locher and Watts (2005) agree with Goffman that face does not belong to an
individual, but is constructed discursively during interaction with other people in
accordance with the line an individual has taken, so that every individual can
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have an infinite number of faces, each attributed in different social encounters.
For Locher and Watts, as for Goffman, faces are like masks, “on loan to us for
the duration of different kinds of performance” (Locher and Watts, 2005: 12;
Locher, 2006).
The works of Watts and Locher represent an important turn in politeness
and face research. The changes they propose can be presented in the following
postulates:
• Face is a relational construct; it is created discursively during social
interaction with other people.
• Facework does not equal politeness. It involves the whole spectrum of
behaviour observed in social interaction.
• Relational work, which is equivalent to facework, involves all types of
behaviour people engage in to negotiate relations with others (impolite/rude
behaviour, polite behaviour and the so-called politic behaviour).
• Politic behaviour is a type of behaviour (neither polite nor impolite) which is
appropriate for a particular situation.
The discursive approach to politeness and face postulates the abandonment of
the creation of politeness and face theories and a focus on the analysis of
relational work.
Rapport management (Spencer-Oatey)
Language has a dual function, the transfer of information and the management
of social relations. Spencer-Oatey (2000) refers to the latter aspect of language
use as rapport management. The key term here is rapport, defined as
“(dis)harmony or smoothness-turbulence in relationships [...] which is partly
dependent on relational (mis)management” (2007: 647). The theoretical
framework presented by Spencer-Oatey (2000) incorporates elements of Brown
and Levinson’s, Leech’s, and Fraser’s views on politeness, and is an attempt to
find some remedy for the weaknesses of these models. Spencer-Oatey (2000: 12)
uses the term rapport management rather than face management, as the former
“suggests more of a balance between self and other,” while the latter focuses
only on “concerns for self.” However, the former includes the latter.
Rapport management involves two components, the management of face and
the management of sociality rights. Spencer-Oatey’s understanding of face is in
line with Goffman’s (1967), and face management is the management of face
needs. The management of sociality rights involves the management of
personal/social expectancies. Sociality rights “reflect people’s concerns over
fairness, consideration, social inclusion/exclusion and so on,” and can be
defined as “fundamental personal/social entitlements that individuals effectively
claim for themselves in their interactions with others” (Spencer-Oatey, 2000:
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14). Two types of sociality rights can be distinguished: equity rights, entitlements
to personal consideration from others and to fair treatment, and association
rights, entitlements to an association with others “that is in keeping with the
type of relationship that we have with them” (2000: 14).
The rapport management framework differs from Brown and Levinson’s
model of politeness in that apart from the individual (the personal
conceptualization of face) it also includes the social (the management of
interpersonal relations). Distinguishing between face needs and sociality rights,
Spencer-Oatey rejects Brown and Levinson’s conceptualization of positive face
and negative face as face needs. For her, while positive face can be treated as
a face need, negative face is rather a sociality right. As a consequence, rapport
or harmony in social interaction can be threatened in two ways (while Brown
and Levinson’s model specifies one): through face-threatening behaviour and
through rights-threatening behaviour. While Brown and Levinson concentrate on
threats to face and their mitigation, Spencer-Oatey (2000) holds that people
interacting with others can hold different orientations towards rapport — they
may want to enhance (e.g., give face to the other), maintain (e.g., use
appropriate words of address, honorifics or register), neglect (e.g., concentrate
more on maintaining their own face than on maintaining harmony) or challenge
it (e.g., deliberately cause others to lose face).
Spencer-Oatey (2005) distinguishes between the pan-situational face
(respectability face) (see Ho, 1994) and the situation-specific face (identity face)
(see Goffman, 1967). Respectability face corresponds to the Chinese concepts
of mianzi and lian, and refers to “the prestige, honor or ‘good name’ that
a person or social group holds and claims within a broader community”
(Spencer-Oatey, 2005: 102). It reflects the relative values of the following
attributes: biographical variables (e.g., age, sex), relational attributes
(e.g., marriage ties), social status indicators (e.g., educational attainment,
occupational status, wealth), formal title/position/rank, personal reputation
(moral or amoral) and integrity. As cultures differ in the degree of importance
attached to different attributes, the understanding of respectability face can
differ across nations and social groups.
Identity face, corresponding to Goffman’s concept of face, is “a situation-
specific face sensitivity” which can be threatened or enhanced in specific
interactional encounters (Spencer-Oatey, 2005: 103). Identity face includes:
• face claims reflecting people’s social values,
• face claims related to specific social attributes,
• face claims occurring in specific social encounters/interactions,
• face claims to social group membership.
Spencer-Oatey (2005), analysing the bases of face sensitivity, refers to Simon’s
(2004) self-aspect model of identity. According to her, people’s claims to
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identity face depend on the positive values that they associate with their
various self-aspects (“concepts that serve to process and organise information
about oneself”). Self-aspects can refer to psychological characteristics
“(e.g., introverted), physical features (e.g., red hair), roles (e.g., father), abilities
(e.g., bilingual), tastes (e.g., preference for red wine), attitudes (e.g., against the
death penalty), behaviours (e.g., ‘I work a lot’) and explicit group or category
membership (e.g., member of the Communist Party)” (Simon, 2004: 45).
Some of these self-aspects are more important to the individual’s identity than
others. Around them, certain sensitivities develop, including bodily features
and control, possessions, performance, skills, social behaviour and verbal
behaviour.
Face sensitivities depend also on the importance people attach to certain
values (i.e. on their personal value systems) and the context of interaction.
Spencer-Oatey (2005) quotes the psychological work on universal values of
Schwartz (1992) and Schwartz et al. (2001), who found that 10 different value
constructs emerged in the majority of countries/cultures. Discussing the types of
positive social values which people may claim for themselves and be sensitive
to, Spencer-Oatey divides Schwartz’s value constructs into:
• independent value constructs (e.g., self-direction, stimulation, hedonism and
achievement), which are characteristic for independent self-construals,
• interdependent value constructs (e.g., universalism, benevolence, conformity
and tradition), which are characteristic for interdependent self-construals.
By analogy to Brewer and Gardner’s (1996) three-level perspective on
self-representation, Spencer-Oatey (2007) proposes distinguishing three types of
face sensitivities (Brown and Levinson’ model of politeness focuses only on
individual face sensitivities):
• individual face sensitivities, involving individual qualities,
• relational face sensitivities, involving qualities of the relations between
interactants,
• collective face sensitivities, involving qualities of a group.
She claims that taking into consideration the three perspectives, individual,
relational and collective, allows the researcher to make a complete analysis of
face.
Spencer-Oatey (2005) also discusses interconnections between face,
(im)politeness and wants — factors influencing people’s perceptions of rapport.
She maintains that all three elements are conceptually distinct and “can work
both independently and in different directions” (Spencer-Oatey, 2005: 108).
Thus, impolite behaviour, which constitutes a breach of behavioural
expectations, does not have to involve a face-threat. And conversely, a threat to
face is not always associated with impoliteness.
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Recently, Spencer-Oatey (2009) has propagated an action-oriented approach
to the study of face. She claims, rightly in my opinion, that an analysis of face
issues is not enough, and that the communicative activity of the interactants
should be analysed as a whole. Issues that contribute greatly to the description
of face are participants’ self-presentational concerns, the identity attributes they
are face-sensitive to and their interactional goals. Self-presentation is an element
of every interaction which has a strong impact on face issues. Self-presentational
concerns interrelate with face concerns (cf. Ruhi, 2009). To maintain or
enhance his own face, the speaker engages in positive self-presentation, even if it
may be face-threatening to others. Spencer-Oatey is right to note that the
problem of face sensitivities is much more complex than Brown and Levinson’s
duality of face. Interactants are often face-sensitive to many identity attributes
(e.g., generosity, power, friendliness) other than the ones included in the
concepts of positive face and negative face. People entering into interaction with
others have various interactional, relational and transactional, and long-term and
short-term goals. All these goals influence the construction and management of
face in social interaction.
According to Spencer-Oatey, face is the central but not the only issue in
social interaction; as such it should be investigated against the background of
other communicative activities. In her rapport management framework, she
combines the individual (face management) with the social (sociality rights
management). Apart from analysing social interaction exclusively in terms of
face concerns, she focuses also on the management of interpersonal relations.
To make a complete analysis of face, Spencer-Oatey interprets it with respect to
the relative value of relevant social attributes and to the interactant’s own face
claims. Doing so she takes three (instead of one) different perspectives,
individual, relational and collective.
Face as a relational and interactional phenomenon — Face Constituting Theory
(Arundale)
Arundale (2006) puts forward an alternative to both Brown and Levinson’s and
Goffman’s concepts of face. Questioning Goffman’s concept of the social self,
which was later drawn on by Brown and Levinson, he maintains that social
actors do not reproduce interaction rituals imposed on them during their
socialization, but are actively engaged in sustaining the social order during
interaction with other people. Another critique involves the fact that in
describing the dynamics of talk, in spite of the earlier claim that “the proper
study of interaction is not the individual and his psychology, but rather the
syntactical relations among the acts of different persons mutually present to one
another” (1967: 2), Goffman focuses on ritual requirements and the psychology
of social actors. A third critique presented by Arundale is that Brown and
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Levinson in their theory of politeness adopt Goffman’s social psychological
concept of face, with its Western conceptualization of the social actor. Brown
and Levinson’s face becomes even more individual and psychological when it is
redefined in terms of individual wants, which “are not an interactionally
relevant phenomenon” (Arundale, 2006: 200).
Drawing on Baxter and Montgomery’s (1996) Relational Dialectics Theory,
Arundale creates his own Face Costituting Theory (1999; 2006). Baxter and
Montgomery claim that persons engaged in everyday communication form and
sustain relationships which can be described by three different dialectics. These
relationships can be characterized by openness or closeness with the other,
certainty or uncertainty about the relationship, and connectedness with the
others or separateness from them. Arundale makes use of the dialectic of
connectedness and separateness to reconceptualize Brown and Levinson’s
concepts of positive and negative face. In his Face Constituting Theory, he
redefines face as:
[...] a culturally specific interpreting that participants achieve interactionally
regarding their persons as dialectically connected to and separated from one
another. Face is central to being human in that connecting creates the social
out of the individual, while dialectically, separating creates the individual out
of the social (2009: 51).
Instead of Brown and Levinson’s positive and negative face, he distinguishes
between connection face and separation face, which have meanings broader than,
but inclusive of, positive and negative face. The main difference between
Arundale’s face and Brown and Levinson’s face is that the concepts of
connection face and separation face are not based on any emic concept of face.
They are culture-general (cf. universal face needs of affiliation and autonomy).
The two kinds of face are conceptualized as a dialectic, which differs from
a dualism of face, or from the conceptualization of the two aspects of face as
two opposite poles of a continuum (cf. O’Driscoll, 1996; 2007), in which
movement towards one end means movement away from the other. A dialectic,
according to Arundale (2009), involves two distinct, although unified,
phenomena which function interdependently in a dynamic and interactive
manner.
Face Constituting Theory provides an alternative explanation of face and
facework which is based on two shifts:
• away from Goffman’s (1955) view to a relational account of the social self
and face,
• away from an encoding/decoding to an interactional achievement model of
communication (Arundale, 2006: 207).
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Arundale (2006: 201; Bargiela-Chiappini, 2003) proposes an alternative
ontology to “Goffman’s (1955) ontology of the monadic social actor engaged in
rituals of presentation and avoidance,” the ontology in which “face is not a matter
of the individual actor’s public self-image. Instead, [...] face is an emergent
property of relationships, and therefore a relational phenomenon, as opposed to
a social psychological one.” Using the compound term persons-in-relationship-
to-other-persons, he maintains that “social selves exist only in relation to other
social selves, not as separate, monadic individuals” whose actions can be
explained by internal wants and desires. And they “can be conceptualized only in
view of the relationships they sustain in communicating with other social selves.”
A “relationship” is defined here as “a single dyadic phenomenon, not the sum of
two separate monadic phenomena. A relationship is therefore distinct from
a ‘role’ in that a role is an abstract pattern observed in communication events
across multiple dyads” (2006: 200—201).
The shift to an interactional achievement model of communication implies
that no utterance inherently carries any meaning relevant to face. The utterance
gains a specific face meaning only during interaction between participants. In
other words, participants conjointly co-constitute face in conversation. As
a consequence, no utterance is inherently face-threatening. Arundale (2006:
209) explains face threat “as a participant-specific evaluation of the face
meanings and actions conjointly co-constituted in the moment.”
To sum up, Arundale’s conceptualization of face is both relational and
interactional; it is created and maintained only in relation to other people
during social interaction. In his interpretation of the concept of face, Arundale
rejects the individual and the psychological as irrelevant to social interaction.
This does not seem to be viable, as persons-in-relationship-to-other-persons at
the same time remain persons of certain character, life, preferences, likes and
dislikes. Thus, participants of interaction should be considered both in terms of
their individual features and in terms of the relation they create with others.
Accordingly, face should be better considered as both individual and relational.
The universal concept of face, rationality and cooperation (Terkourafi)
In line with Arundale, Terkourafi (2007) admits that face is both relational and
interactional. She goes further and calls face, alluding to Grice’s Cooperative
Principle (1975), the “accepted purpose... of the talk exchange” (2007: 316). As
a consequence, she proposes the following reformulation of the Cooperative
Principle (2007: 317):
Co-operate as much as necessary to constitute your own face (which may
involve constituting or threatening your interlocutor’s face in the process).
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The reformulated Cooperative Principle is social. And face becomes the central
element and the point of reference in human communication. It regulates the
generation of implicatures. Mutual awareness of face makes interactants
continue inferencing until they constitute their own faces (cf. Jakubowska,
2001a).
Looking for a universal concept of face, Terkourafi agrees with O’Driscoll
(1996: 8), who argues that we need a second-order notion of face which would
be “divorc[ed] from any tie to folk notions, [...] a theoretical construct, not
a notion which various societies invest with varying connotations.” Such
“a universalizing notion of Face2” should have two properties (Terkourafi, 2007:
322; 2009):
• Its biological grounding in the dimension of approach/withdrawal;
• Intentionality (as this is understood in the phenomenological tradition).
Terkourafi identifies the dimension of approach/withdrawal with the evaluation
of a stimulus as ‘friend’ or ‘foe,’ which is encountered across species, and as
a consequence may be considered universal. Intentionality is understood here as
“the distinguishing property of mental (as opposed to physical) phenomena of
being about something, i.e. directed at an object” (2007: 323). Thus, face2
is intentional in the sense that “it presupposes an Other. Awareness of the
Other, in turn, presupposes a notion of Self” (2007: 323). Intentionality as
a characteristic of face2 is specific to humans, and what is more it is grounded,
as Terkourafi argues, “in the interactional dyad,” as one cannot “have face” in
isolation. During social interaction, participants are involved in joint action, and
the face of one participant is constituted in the way the other perceives him.
Certainly, all this is true, but is the interactional dyad the only grounding? It is
true that one cannot “have face” in isolation, but if deprived of one’s
individuality/character one cannot have it either.
Terkourafi’s face2 is a universal concept. Particular conceptualizations of
face1 appear when this face2 is filled with particular culture-specific contents
under particular socio-historical contexts. She has recently employed the
theoretical concept of face in empirical research on contemporary Greek society
(Terkourafi, 2009), linking together its different manifestations observed in
various social circumstances.
What makes Terkourafi’s proposal different from others discussed above is
its cross-disciplinary basis, which gives support to the claim for the universality
of face2. This basis consists of neurophysiological research on emotions and the
phenomenological tradition in philosophy. It is different from the models
described before that are based on socio-psychological and communication
studies. Terkourafi’s concept of face2 refers, on the one hand, to the primal
nature of all living species and, on the other, to the distinctive feature of human
beings.
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5.3.3. A cross-cultural approach to face
In the vast literature on intercultural and cross-cultural communication, the
concept of face plays a very important role (e.g. Ting-Toomey’s (1994) The
Challenge of Facework). Cultural norms and values strongly influence and shape
the way people communicate and present themselves, and they also have an
impact on the type of facework employed and the content of face. The theory
which most thoroughly tries to account for face and facework in communication
across cultures is Stella Ting-Toomey’s Face-Negotiation Theory. This approach
has also been employed by other researchers, e.g., Christopher Earley (1997),
who concentrated on face in organizational context.
Face-Negotiation Theory (Ting-Toomey)
Apart from Brown and Levinson’s theory of politeness, Ting-Toomey’s
Face-Negotiation Theory, the first version of which was published in 1988, is the
most thorough presentation of the concept of face and facework. The main
assumptions of Face-Negotiation Theory are (Ting-Toomey, 1988; 1994):
• People in all cultures try to maintain and negotiate face in all communication
situations.
• Active face management by both participants is especially demanded in
a conflict (face-threatening) situation.
For Ting-Toomey, face is “the claimed sense of favorable social self-worth and
the simultaneous assessment of other-worth in an interpersonal situation”
(Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998; Ting-Toomey and Oetzel, 2001: 36). It is
a “cluster of identity- and relational-based issues.” According to Ting-Toomey
and Oetzel, face can simultaneously be perceived at three levels, affective
(e.g., feelings of shame and pride), cognitive (e.g., calculating how much to give
and receive), and behavioural. The concept of face is especially problematic in
vulnerable interpersonal situations, such as request, embarrassment or conflict
situations, when the interactants’ self-images are threatened (Ting-Toomey and
Kurogi, 1998).
Ting-Toomey argues that cultural values and norms influence and shape the
way people manage face. Her understanding of the concept of face is based on
Brown and Levinson’s dichotomy, positive and negative face, but what makes it
different is the cultural variability dimension of individualism—collectivism.
According to Ting-Toomey (1988: 216—217), approval face (need for association;
Brown and Levinson’s positive face) and autonomy face (need for dissociation
and independence; Brown and Levinson’s negative face) are universal concepts
which can be found in every culture, but
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while one might expect both negative facework and positive facework to be
present in all cultures, the value orientations of a culture will influence cultural
members’ attitudes towards pursuing one set of facework more actively than
another set of facework in a face-negotiation situation. Facework then is
a symbolic front that members in all cultures strive to maintain and uphold,
while the modes and styles of expressing and negotiating face-need would vary
from one culture to the next.
From the individualistic perspective, the self is “free to pursue its own personal
wants, needs, and desires.” Facework in individualistic cultures is aimed at
preserving “one’s own autonomy, territory, and space, simultaneously respecting
the other person’s need for space and privacy” (Ting-Toomey, 1988: 216). From
the collectivistic perspective, the self is “bounded by mutual role obligations and
duties.” Facework in collectivistic cultures “is focused on how to lend
role-support to another’s face and at the same time not to bring shame to one’s
own self-face” (1988: 216).
Face is not a simple concept; it consists of three dimensions (Ting-Toomey
and Oetzel, 2001: 36—37):
• locus of face — a concern for self, other, or both,
• face valence — whether face is being defended, maintained, or honoured,
• temporality — whether face is being restored or proactively protected.
In her Face-Negotiation Theory, Ting-Toomey concentrates on the first, main,
dimension of face. Self-face is the concern for one’s own self-image threatened in
the conflict situation, other-face is the concern for the self-image of other
participants in the conflict situation, while mutual-face is the concern for both
images of self and others, or the image of their relationship (Ting-Toomey and
Kurogi, 1998; Ting-Toomey and Oetzel, 2001).
Ting-Toomey argues that the way individuals tend to their own face and to the
face of the other depends on the culture they belong to, their individual
characteristics, and relational factors (e.g., relationship length, familiarity, intimacy,
and power dynamics) and situational factors (e.g., conflict salience, intensity,
interaction goals, and public—private setting) (Ting-Toomey, 1988, 1994, 2005). The
self—other dimension and the approval face and autonomy face dimension are
influenced by the cultural context (the individualism—collectivism dimension).
Members of individualistic cultures are mainly concerned with self-face
maintenance, to assert and defend the “I” identity, and enhance personal
self-esteem responses. Members of collectivistic cultures are mainly concerned with
both other-face and mutual-face maintenance, to maintain harmony between
interactants and diffuse shame and anxiety in social interaction, and to enhance the
“we” identity and social self-esteem responses (Ting-Toomey, 1988, 1994;
Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998; Ting-Toomey and Oetzel, 2001).
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Another value dimension that strongly influences the character of facework
is power, as face-negotiation process entails “complex, power interplay” between
the participants in conflict. In small power distance cultures, defending and
asserting one’s personal rights reflects self-face behaviour; individuals are
concerned with horizontal facework interaction (i.e. minimizing the respect-
deference distance via informal interaction). In large power distance cultures, on
the other hand, playing one’s role optimally and carrying out one’s ascribed
duties in a responsible way is perceived as appropriate facework; individuals are
concerned with vertical facework interaction (i.e. maximizing the respect-
deference distance via formal interaction) (Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998:
194—195; Merkin, 2006a).
People engaged in facework can use either low-context or high-context
strategies. Ting-Toomey (2005) claims that members of individualistic cultures
tend to engage in low-context, direct styles of facework, while members of
collectivistic cultures prefer high-context, indirect styles.
Facework and conflict management depend also on some individual-level
factors, mainly on the distinction between independent and interdependent
self-construals (Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998; Ting-Toomey, 2005). Ting-Toomey
(2005) maintains that independent self-construal is associated with self-face
concern, and interdependent self-construal with other-face concern.
In her paper “The matrix of face: An updated Face-Negotiation Theory”
(2005), Ting-Toomey, modifying her Face-Negotiation Theory, discusses possible
face movement (or face moves’ patterns) options that a negotiator has at his
disposal in a conflict episode. He can choose (2005: 76):
• mutual-face protection moves, which involve high concern for self-face and
high concern for other-face movements,
• mutual-face obliteration moves, which involve low concern for self-face and
low concern for other-face movements,
• self-face defensive moves, involving high concern for self-face and low
concern for other-face movements,
• other-face upgrading moves, involving low concern for self-face and high
concern for other-face movements.
These movements, however, through which face becomes more noticeable, are
performed only in conflict situations (e.g., face threat or face attack). During
everyday social interaction, maintaining one’s own face and the face of the other
requires only performing everyday interaction rituals (Goffman, 1959;
Ting-Toomey, 2005; 2009), which are hardly noticeable (cf. Watt’s politic
behaviour).
In different situations, individuals have different face wants and needs (more
than just those for autonomy and inclusion) (Ting-Toomey, 2005; cf. Spencer-
Oatey, 2009). Consequently, in different situations the content of face differs as
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well. Ting-Toomey distinguishes the following face content domains (Ting-
Toomey, 2005: 81):
• autonomy face, concerned with the individuals’ “need for others to
acknowledge [their] independence, self-sufficiency, privacy, boundary,
nonimposition, control issues, and vice versa (i.e. our consideration for the
face needs of the other on the autonomy face domain),”
• inclusion face, concerned with the individuals’ “need for others to recognize
that [they] are worthy companions, likeable, agreeable, pleasant, friendly, and
cooperative,”
• status face, concerned with the individuals’ “need for others to admire [their]
tangible or intangible assets or resources such as appearance, social
attractiveness, reputation, position, power, and material worth,”
• reliability face, concerned with our “need for others to realize that we are
trustworthy, dependable, reliable, loyal, and consistent in [our] words and
actions,”
• competence face, concerned with our “need for others to recognize our
qualities or social abilities such as intelligence, skills, expertise, leadership,
team-building skills, networking skills, conflict-mediation skills, facework
skills, and problem-solving skills,”
• moral face, concerned with our “need for others to respect [our] sense of
integrity, dignity, honor, propriety, and moral uprightness.”
These face domains are not separate areas; their boundaries overlap, and during
a single interactional encounter one often has to tend to or negotiate more than
one face content topic.
In Ting-Toomey’s model of facework, face is a multi-dimensional concept. She
presents general directions in facework along various dimensions: self—other,
individualism—collectivism, power distance, low—high context and self-construals.
To account for the differences in face concerns and conflict behaviours, she also
takes into consideration relational and situational factors. Generally speaking,
Face-Negotiation Theory helps to explain how all these dimensions and factors
influence conflict styles, face management and the content of face. Since its first
publication in 1988, it has been improved and updated several times
(Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998; Ting-Toomey, 2005), gaining support from
research (e.g., Oetzel and Ting-Toomey, 2003) carried out to test its applicability.
Face, harmony, and social structure (Earley)
In his book Face, Harmony, and Social Structure (1997), Earley presents a model
which integrates concepts of face and harmony into a general social structure or
social system, understood here as behavioural interactions of individuals existing
within a culturally organized population. As Earley claims (1997: 40):
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The model [...] is a psychologically based analysis of how culture and society
impact organizations and their functioning and how organizations and
employees reciprocally influence one another.
The model includes six basic elements: face, harmony, social actor,
organizational structure and context, and societal context.
The key concept of the model is face, whose regulation and maintenance
drives all the aspects of the model that involve employee behaviour within an
organizational context. Earley’s conceptualization of face is based on the works
of Hsien Chin Hu, David Yau-Fai Ho, Erving Goffman and Stella Ting-Toomey.
The author does not view face as an exclusive product of social discourse, but
treats it as an extension of self in a social context. Following Hu (1944), Ho
(1976) and other researchers who investigated the Chinese concept of face,
Earley claims that there are two forms of face (although his understanding of
the two concepts differs a little from the Chinese conceptualization):
• lian, “a person’s adherence to moral or evaluative rules of conduct based on
universal, societal, organization, and community standards for accepted
behavior” (Earley, 1997: 56),
• mianzi, “a characteristic of a person that reflects his or her standing in
a social hierarchy, such as position, status, role, et cetera” (Earley, 1997: 57).
In other words, lian involves the moral character and morality of action, and
mianzi involves aspects of interpersonal relations and personal prestige. There
are also other significant differences between lian and mianzi. Lian is given to
every person as a birthright, while mianzi may be earned from one’s family or
peers. Lian can be maintained (through engagement in moral acts) or lost, but
cannot be recovered easily, while mianzi can be lost or gained during social
interaction. In Earley’s conceptualization of face, in addition to two forms of
face, there are also two different sources of these perceptions — internal and
external reference. Thus, face involves internal as well as external presentations
of oneself. Earley (1997: 57) argues that “face reflects an interaction of self and
others’ perceptions and attributions.” Although Earley admits that lian depends
mainly on internal reference and mianzi on external reference, in both cases
other references are also possible. Internally enacted lian involves self-evaluation
based on adherence to a “moral standard of behavior internally referenced”
(Earley, 1997: 56). Externally enacted lian involves social evaluation of the
morality and goodness of the individual’s behaviour. Internally enacted mianzi is
related to the individual’s personal view of his achievements, while externally
enacted mianzi to social recognition of his position. Earley argues that face is
a concept central to the functioning of people in any social setting,
organizational settings included, and it is “an engine driving the entire [social]
system” (Earley, 1997: viii). As a universal concept, face has different emic
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realizations in different cultures. As a consequence, face regulation and
maintenance depend on culture and societal context.
Societal context, for Earley, involves the cultural values and beliefs shared
among individuals. He analyses societal context in terms of six cultural
dimensions which are relevant to interpersonal interaction and morality, and as
such relevant to face. These cultural dimensions are: individualism—
collectivism, tightness vs. looseness (referring to “the extent to which rules and
norms are present and enforced within a given society” (1997: 27)), relationship
to nature, power distance, guilt vs. shame (referring to “the nature of people’s
relationship to moral principles), and masculinity—femininity.
As Earley analyses the reciprocal influence of organizations and their
employees, organizational context together with organizational structure are
important elements of the model discussed. Organizational context refers to the
general situation in which organizations operate in a particular society, whereas
organizational structure, including technology, institutional roles and rules,
intraorganizational dependencies, communication systems and governance
structures, refers to the influences of the organization on the social actor, his
behaviour and the regulation of face.
The next element of the model is the social actor, referring not only to the
psychological aspect of a person within a society (the mental representation of
his personality, his identity and social roles), but also to his view of himself
formed “through direct experience and evaluations adopted from significant
others” (Earley, 1997: 33). Earley discusses various forces driving the social
actor’s behaviour. One of the most important of these is face. He enumerates
several intrapersonal and interpersonal dynamics which are also relevant for the
social actor, e.g., role expectations, personal values, self-concept and social
identity. The social actor’s behaviour is guided also by organization and culture.
However, as Earley maintains, there is a two-way dependency. On the one hand,
the social actor’s behaviour, face-related behaviour included, is shaped both by
culture and organization. On the other hand, the way he behaves and maintains
face has an impact on the organization and its structure, and patterns of
interaction. He shapes the nature of his organizational setting “in order to
facilitate personal and collective motives and desires” (1997: 34). According to
Earley, the social actor is a major determinant of an organizational content and
structure, and patterns of interaction specific for a particular social setting,
while face is the underlying determinant of the actor’s motives and intentions.
The concept of harmony is another relevant element of the model. It can be
compared to Goffman’s (1959) facework. Harmony is understood by Earley as
“face regulatory processes” which, unlike Goffman’s facework, occur both
within an individual’s own psyche and in a group of people. Through harmony,
“face is exchanged, adapted, and built upon via social interactions” (Earley,
1997: 119). In other words, harmony, according to Earley, is a form of social
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equilibrium (cf. Goffman’s ritual equilibrium), a balance in the presentation and
regulation of face, which is socially desirable.
These six elements constitute the model the author has applied to
a cross-cultural analysis of organizational behaviour in group, organizational,
institutional and societal contexts. The main subject of the analysis is face in
organizations in four cultural contexts: the Czech Republic, India, Sweden and
the United States.
The model of face presented by Earley differs from the models described
earlier in many respects. According to him, face involves both the social (it is
partly a product of social discourse) and the individual (it is partly an extension
of self). Although Earley claims that face is universal, his conceptualization of
face is based on the modification of culture-specific concepts, Chinese mianzi
and lian. The greatest difference between Earley’s model and others that have
been discussed here is that in his model the two aspects of face can be both
internally and externally enacted, i.e. they are created on the basis of self and
other evaluations. Thus, the actor creates his face not only by his actions and
self-presentation, but also by self-evaluation.
5.3.4. A socio-psychological approach to face
The two models I shall now discuss, Horst Arndt and Richard W. Janney’s
(1985, 2005) model of face and William R. Cupach and Sandra Metts’ (1994)
Theory of Face Management in Close Relationships, represent an approach which
incorporates the social and the interpersonal.
Face and tact (Arndt and Janney)
According to Janney and Arndt’s (2005) socio-psychological view, politeness is
a dynamic interpersonal activity which can be divided into social and
interpersonal. Social politeness involves the use of socially appropriate forms,
adherence to social norms and performance of social rituals. Its main function is
to facilitate interactional exchange. Interpersonal politeness, or tact, “is rooted in
people’s need to maintain face, in their fear of losing it, and in their reluctance to
deprive others of it” (Janney and Arndt, 2005: 23). Metaphorically speaking,
“social politeness is somewhat like a system of social traffic rules, while tact is
more a matter of interpersonal driving styles and strategies” (2005: 24).
The main function of tact is to help to avoid threats to face and conflicts in
interpersonal communication. To be tactful is considered a conventional way of
avoiding threats to face in all cultures (Janney and Arndt, 2005). It involves the
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use of interpersonally supportive communicative techniques and strategies. For
Arndt and Janney, “interpersonal supportiveness” is what matters in social
interaction. They describe it as follows:
Positive messages have to be accompanied by displays of confidence and
involvement in order to avoid creating the impression that they are not positive
enough (i.e. covert threats to face); and negative messages have to be
accompanied by displays of lack of confidence and uninvolvement in order to
avoid creating the impression that they are too negative (i.e. overt threats to
face) (Arndt and Janney, 1985: 294).
Politeness is related to emotive communication, “in which affective displays
are produced consciously and used strategically in a wide variety of social
situations to influence others’ perceptions and interpretations of conversational
events” (Janney and Arndt, 2005: 27). Emotive communication therefore differs
from emotional communication in that the former is strategic while the the
latter is spontaneous. Emotive communication is oriented to the face needs of
the hearer. In line with Brown and Levinson (1978), Janney and Arndt
distinguish between two basic face needs, the need to feel unimpeded (personal
face) and the need to feel accepted (interpersonal face). These two needs are
often in conflict, both within an individual and between people. Threats to face
are the cause of most interpersonal conflicts. This makes people resort to the
use of various face-saving strategies. “A conventional way of avoiding threats to
face in all cultures is to be tactful” (Janney and Arndt, 2005: 28; Leech, 1977).
However, facework as described by Arndt and Janney (1985) does not involve
only face-saving, but in fact the whole spectrum of emotive communication,
which often poses a threat to face.
Janney and Arndt (2005; cf. Brown and Levinson, 1987) suggest that
although tact is a universal form of strategic conflict avoidance, it is culturally
based. To be tactful in one’s own culture the individual has to take into
consideration the culture-specific dynamics of interpersonal relations, and how
levels of intimacy and distance, and of power and affiliation, may be signalled in
different situations. In intercultural communication settings, differences in these
factors may result in breakdowns in emotive communication and serious
misunderstandings. Such misunderstandings, they claim, are “probably less
a matter of divergent human values that of divergent cultural assumptions about
the tactful [behaviour]” (Janney and Arndt, 2005: 32).
Stressing the interpersonal character of politeness and the importance of
tact in social interaction, Arndt and Janney react against the
“appropriacy-based” approach to politeness, understood as complying with the
rules of politeness and savoir-vivre. Instead they describe tact as an
interpersonally supportive communicative behaviour oriented at maintaining
face and good social relations between interactants.
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The Theory of Face Management in Close Relationships (Cupach and Metts)
The Theory of Face Management in Close Relationships, as proposed by Cupach
and Metts (1994), focuses on the concept of face and is aimed at explaining
processes occurring during interaction in close relationships (e.g., between
husband and wife, or between lovers). As the authors themselves state, “The
theory is not intended to be [...] an all-encompassing grand explanation of
social and personal relationships” (1994: 96). It is based on Goffman’s (1967)
concept of face and Brown and Levinson’s theory of politeness. The main
assumption of the theory is that the partners “co-construct the interaction
episodes that constitute their relationship” (Cupach and Metts, 1994: 96).
They negotiate their faces with respect to each other. Each partner, like every
participant in social encounters, contributes to the identity which is to be
displayed and “reach[es] what Goffman calls a ‘working consensus’ with
regard to the face and behavioral line that each is expected to assume in
particular encounters” (1994: 96). Later, as the relationship becomes more
intimate, the “working consensus” turns into a relational culture, which is
co-constructed by the couple. Like culture in its general sense, relational
culture provides its members with a set of attitudes, beliefs, values and rules
that help define their relationship and tell them how to behave in the
presence of each other and of other people. Each relational culture is,
according to Cupach and Metts, fluid — it evolves together with the
relationship which has created it.
They admit that individuals differ in respect of their face needs, and that
they also differ in their personal orientations to relationships. In other words,
some people prefer greater autonomy and freedom, while others do not object
to much interdependence. Thus, in managing relationships people also have to
manage their own conflicting desires for independence and connectedness
(cf. O’Driscoll, 1996). At different stages of relationships face is managed in
different ways. At the very beginning, Cupach and Metts (1994) claim,
individuals try to “put on their best face” to make a good impression. As
intimacy in the relationship develops, they mutually support their positive face
to increase the solidarity of the relationship. In established relationships, in
which the degree of intimacy is at the highest level, “support for positive face is
assumed” (Cupach and Metts, 1994: 98). In relational culture, acts which would
normally be perceived as threatening to face (positive or negative) are not
treated as face-threatening.
In their theory of face management, Cupach and Metts distinguish three
specific aspects of face (1994: 39—40):
• social face, which is the identity that individuals perform in everyday
interactions with “role-related individuals and nonintimates,”
• relational face, which they assume in potentially relational contexts,
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• relationship-specific face, which individuals present to a particular other person
(e.g., friend, spouse, romantic partner) in the context of that relationship.
This aspect of face involves elements of the individuals’ relational face as well
as elements of their social face.
As members of a relational culture, partners develop interdependent identities,
and interacting with other people they “put up a ‘relational’ front” and present
a joint “relational face,” which may differ from interaction to interaction, like
the face of any individual.
The picture of face and facework in the specific type of close relationship, as
presented by Cupach and Metts, focuses on interactions whose main
characteristic feature is intimacy. This specific feature conditions the individuals’
face which is presented to others as well as all their behaviour oriented to face
in the interaction in which their relationship matters.
What makes this theory different from others is that it accounts for the
mechanisms of face management only in one type of relationship, namely,
intimate relationship. The variability in face management in this particular case
depends, apart from the usual factors (i.e. culture-specific norms and values,
individual socialization, personality orientations, individual values, and
self-construals), on a relational culture which is co-constructed by the two
members in the process of the relationship creation. Being a member of the
relational culture, the individual “acquires” one more face — a face specific to
the particular relationship.
5.3.5. A communicative approach to face
This approach has been put forward by Karen Tracy in her paper “Many faces
of facework” (1990). She claims that the models representing sociolinguistic and
socio-psychological approaches to face give inadequate attention to the
discourse behaviour used to realize face concerns. The communicative approach
appears in opposition to them, and is intended to compensate for their
limitations. Apart from Tracy’s contribution, the communicative approach is
taken also by Tae-Seop Lim and John Waite Bowers’ (1991) communication
model of facework and Robyn Penman’s (1994) model of facework.
A communicative perspective on face and facework (Tracy)
Tracy stresses the multifunctional character of facework; she says that “facework
has many faces” (1990: 221). It can be oriented at self or at other; it can be
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used to enhance self or other, to defend self or to attack other. The nature of
facework and participants’ self and other concerns are often complicated. This
can be explained by the fact that:
• Desired identities are often in competition.
• Language serves other purposes than facework.
• The meaning of facework is culture-specific.
• The meaning of facework depends on the situation.
Tracy (1990: 210) proposes an approach which, in her own words, “takes
account of the full range of identity concerns people have in interaction and
that attends to the ways these concerns are expressed in people’s discourse
practices.” The approach is based on five basic tenets (Tracy, 1990:
217—221):
• Facework refers to the identity implications of messages.
• The face wants (i.e. identity claims) to which people orient are dependent on
situation, personality, and culture (cf. Spencer-Oatey, 2005).
• Social situations involve tensions between different aspects of face.
• The level of face-threat in a situation is first and foremost determined by the
types of acts people perform.
• All interaction is potentially face-threatening.
Tracy claims that face wants or concerns are not always focal but that they
are always immanent. So facework refers to “the ways particular
communicative moves speak to the identity claims of self and other in specific
social situations” (Tracy, 1990: 217). It is not enough to say that individuals
want to be appreciated and approved of by others, because the face wants
individuals pursue are context-dependent. Besides, there are also individual
differences in identity claims. In addition to contextual and personal
differences there are also cultural ones, as people’s face wants depend on
cultural factors as well. Social situations often involve tensions between
cooperation and competition. Individuals are faced with the dilemma of
defending their own face or supporting the other’s face and threatening their
own. A great impact on the level of face threat is made by the choice of
a particular act and a discourse variation used in it. However, people cannot
feel safe in any social situation, as in every interaction there is a possibility of
their face being threatened.
The communicative approach to face and facework, according to Tracy,
involves the study of the relationship between discourse and situated identity, as
each of them is a key to the understanding of the other.
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Solidarity, approbation and tact — a communication model of facework (Lim and
Bowers)
Drawing on Brown and Levinson, Lim and Bowers (1991; cf. Domenici and
Littlejohn, 2006) formulated their own theory — a communication model of
facework. The central concept around which the model is created is face.
Defining it, Lim (1994: 210; cf. Goffman, 1967) argues that it is “not what one
thinks of oneself, but what one thinks others should think of one’s worth.” The
claim for face does not have to necessarily refer to the real opinions of others,
but to the manifested opinions of others: “In other words, the bottom line of
face want is ‘no matter what you really think of me, you must act as if you
respected me,’ so that the projected image can be preserved” (Lim, 1994: 210).
Lim claims that face is a universal concept, but like Goffman (1967), he
adds that “face is in terms of social values” (Lim, 1994: 210), which is as
complex as the value system of a society. Thus it differs across cultures, as
systems of values do.
The main assumption of Lim and Bower’s communication model of
facework is that every person has three (rather than two, as Brown and
Levinson argued) basic types of face:
• autonomy-face, referring to the need to be free from the imposition of others
(cf. Brown and Levinson’s negative face),
• fellowship-face, referring to the need to be approved of (cf. Brown and
Levinson’s positive face),
• competence-face, referring to the need to uphold an image of ability.
These three types of face may be redefined in terms of three basic human wants
(Lim, 1994: 211; cf. Brown and Levinson, 1987):
• the want not to be imposed on (autonomy-face),
• the want to be included (fellowship-face),
• the want that their abilities be respected (competence-face).
These face wants are addressed by facework. It involves actions taken to deal
with face wants of one and/or the other (Lim, 1994). Lim and Bowers describe
three types of facework corresponding to the three types of face (1991: 421;
cf. Fant, 1989):
• tact facework addressing autonomy-face,
• solidarity facework supporting fellowship-face,
• approbation facework addressing competence-face.
Tact facework is aimed at maximizing the freedom of action of the other and at
minimizing the impositions that restrict it. Solidarity facework is performed to
minimize the differences and maximize the commonalities between interactants,
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whereas approbation facework minimizes blame and maximizes praise of the
other (Lim, 1994). All three types of facework vary in the extent of support
given to face. Lim (1994: 213) distinguishes four basic facework strategies
differing in the amount of face support:
• face-giving (the most supportive), actively promoting the face of the other,
• withdrawal, which consists in avoiding threatening the face of the other
(cf. Brown and Levinson’s off-record politeness),
• moderation, which consists in performing the intended face-threatening act
but attempts to mitigate the possible face-threat,
• disregard, which consists in not paying attention to the face want of the other.
Further, Lim considers different ways of enacting disregard, moderation, and
face-giving strategies of tact, solidarity, and approbation, giving examples and
discussing different tactics used in these three types of facework.
The degree to which individuals honour the other’s face and engage in
facework depends on three social factors: relational intimacy, power differences,
and the speaker’s right to perform a given act in a given situation. It is also
influenced by the individuals’ intention to renegotiate the nature of their
relationship (Lim and Bowers, 1991; Lim, 1994).
Discussing the nature of facework, Lim (1994: 227) makes an attempt to
redefine it:
Facework is not a social requirement that must be always satisfied, but
a means of manipulating a given relationship and/or situation. Facework,
therefore, should be understood as a reflection of one’s relational intentions
and action goals.
The facework strategy we choose does not depend solely on our relationship
with the other and the situation we are in. But as it is first of all “the product of
internal purposes, its value should be measured in terms of effectiveness not
appropriateness” (Lim, 1994: 227). What is at issue here is a different approach
to facework: unlike Goffman, who claims that “maintenance of face is
a condition of interaction” (1967: 12), Lim sees it as a strategic manipulation
employed to achieve one’s goals. Thus, the picture of social interaction
presented by Lim seems to be more gloomy than the ones presented by
Goffman and by Brown and Levinson.
Lim and Bowers’ (1991; 1994) studies provide some important insights into
the nature of facework and interpersonal relationships. There is a clear
interdependence between them — the type of facework employed can change the
relationship, and the relationship can influence the character of facework. In
spite of the clear influence of Goffman (1967) and of Brown and Levinson
(1987), Lim and Bowers’ model, especially in its different approach to facework,
is not devoid of some potential and originality.
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Facework as an element of interpersonal communication (Penman)
Robyn Penman (1994) developed a model of facework inspired by Brown and
Levinson’s politeness theory, which, however, goes beyond the sociolinguistic
tradition based on their model. For her, the concepts of face and facework are
integral elements of communicative practices. Penman (1994: 19) argues that:
Face and facework [...] are phenomena that we bring about in [our
communicative] activities. And we do so in two ways: in our communicative
activities we generate labels of face and facework, and we continue to engage
in the actions to which we fit the labels.
Face, or self-identity, can be understood as the psychological ascriptions we take
on and negotiate with others during social interaction. As such it is integrally
related to the concept of relationship. But there is more to it than that; the
concept of face also includes an implicit concept of moral judgement (cf.
Goffman, 1967; Earley, 1997). Communicating with others, people constantly
have to make moral choices and judgements. The idea of right and wrong is
central to the concept of facework. We perform facework all the time, and it is
the core of our social selves (cf. Tracy, 1990). The inspiration for this
understanding of face and facework Penman draws from the works of John
Dewey (1981) and Jürgen Habermas (1975).
The chief assumption of Penman’s model of facework is that the main goals
of facework are the maintenance of respect for self and avoidance of contempt.
Analogously to Brown and Levinson’s theory, Penman distinguishes between
threats to self-face and threats to other-face, and between positive and negative
face. These distinctions lead to four major facework categories:
• Self-Directed Positive and Negative Facework,
• Other-Directed Positive and Negative Facework.
On the basis of the above-mentioned categories, sixteen possible facework
options, analogous to Brown and Levinson’s strategies, can be discerned:
e.g., direct facework strategies oriented towards contempt (cf. Brown and
Levinson’s bald on record FTAs); direct facework strategies oriented towards
respect (cf. some of Brown and Levinson’s politeness strategies); less direct
facework strategies (cf. Brown and Levinson’s “off-record” strategies, some
politeness strategies). These strategies are not mutually exclusive. Penman
claims that “utterances of actors can be multifunctional” (Penman, 1990: 19;
cf. Sifianou and Antonopoulou, 2005). Either different facework strategies can
be expressed sequentially in the same utterance, or different strategies can be
expressed simultaneously in the same utterance. Thus one may expect multiple
goals to be served simultaneously and/or sequentially. Different facework
strategies may vary also along the direct-indirect dimension.
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According to Penman (1990: 21), the facework effects of the strategies fall
into one of the four categories:
• depreciating and aggravating self-face or other-face, enacted in a direct,
unambiguous and contemptuous manner,
• threatening self-face or other-face, brought about by indirect strategies
indicating some degree of contempt or lack of respect,
• protecting self-face or other-face, brought about by indirect strategies
indicating some degree of respect,
• mitigating or enhancing self-face or other-face, brought about directly by
strategies indicating respect.
Thus, Penman’s conceptualization of facework can be compared to the concept
of relational work in Locher and Watts (2005). It comprises the whole spectrum
of face-related activities.
Penman’s model of facework gained substantial support from her case study
in courtroom discourse (1990), which was based on Wittgenstein’s (1968)
concept of the language game. Analysing court discourse, Penman noticed that
it shows recurrent patterns of communicative behaviour which can be
interpreted as two kinds of games, a fact game and a face game. The fact game
involves official communication in court and is concerned with obtaining
relevant factual information. It stems from justice morality. The face game,
stemming from a different moral order, honour morality, involves unofficial
communication, occurs simultaneously with the fact game and is played at the
relational level. This unofficial communication is aimed at the two main
interactional goals — the maintenance of respect for self and avoidance of
contempt.
Penman’s concept of face is almost identical with Brown and Levinson’s
face. What makes them different is the relational character of the former.
However, a concept of face which is based on the concept of moral judgements
seems to be incomplete, for it lacks other socially and interpersonally relevant
bases (e.g., social position). Penman’s model of facework, unlike many facework
models, involves more than other-directed facework. It includes all possible
types of facework, and as such it can account for all communication at the
relational level.
This section has provided an overview of the major theoretical approaches
to face and facework and has discussed some of the criticisms of these
approaches. It has presented a variety of problems encounterd by face
researchers and has attested to the importance of the concept of face in the
fields of (im)politeness and communication research. Section 5.4. will aim to
provide an alternative model of face and facework.
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5.4. The Cultural Face Model — an approach
to face interpretation and management
The purpose of this chapter is to work towards an alternative model of face and
facework. The model I wish to develop is based on three main assumptions:
• Face is created during social interaction.
• Face is both a property of relationships and a property of the individual.
• Face is shaped by culture.
Face is a sociocultural construct. It is created by the participation of other
people during social interaction and determined by a system of social values
specific for a given culture (Lim, 1994: 210; Goffman, 1967; Chu, 1985: Brown
and Levinson, 1987). In other words, face is a complex image of self which is
socially constructed and shaped by culture. In a similar vein, Bargiela-Chiappini
describes face in the Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics (2006: 423)
as a bridging concept between interpersonal interaction and social order in the
sense that face, at the micro-level of verbal and nonverbal behaviour,
encapsulates and dynamically displays the manifestations of (macro-level)
cultural values.
Although the public self-image (face) and the social need to orient oneself to
it in interaction are universal, face also has culture-specific constituents. The
basic, universal desire inherent in human nature “for a ‘good’ face” acquires
different interpretations in different cultures, because the constituents of “good’’
are culturally determined (O’Driscoll, 1996: 4); thus there are differences in the
content of face (Mao, 1994; Matsumoto, 1988). Moral rules, hierarchies of
values and social organization are specific to particular cultures; and as
a consequence the image of self created on their basis must also differ.
In this section I am going to present a model of face which tries to explain
the cultural variability of face both in its interpretation and management.
According to this model, face is a multi-faceted construct which can be analysed
at different interrelated levels.
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5.4.1. Face and interaction
There is a close relationship between the process of creation of the self and the
character of social interaction (Goffman, 1967). An image of self (face) can be
created and presented by the individual only during social interaction. It is
intended to be supported by the judgements of other people the individual is
interacting with. It is adjusted to the roles he plays in a particular context and
the expectations of the others. Thus, face is determined by the participation of
others and earned through social interaction (Goffman, 1967; Ho, 1976, 1994;
Lim and Bowers, 1991; Mao, 1994).
In Goffman’s world of social encounters, “maintenance of face is
a condition of interaction” (Goffman, 1967: 12). To be able to interact with
others successfully, or at all, the person has to maintain his own face and the
face of the other (cf. Holtgraves, 1992). So what is at issue is the interactional
order, although individual psychology also matters in social encounters and
facework involves also self-presentation (Bargiela-Chiappini 2003). In other
words, face management constitutes the main interactional activity; the
individual’s conduct is aimed both at his own face and the face of the other.
And face provides the explanation of his behaviour; it is the key to
understanding why interactants behave in one way and not the other.
Face is an interactional phenomenon and its interactional character can be
looked at from different perspectives. Its meanings and actions emerge during
social interaction in the same way as other “interpretings” formed by
participants using language (Arundale, 2006; cf. Holtgraves, 1992). Though he
does not deny its interactional character, Arundale sees face in a different way
than Goffman. For him, it is rather “an emergent property of relationships”
than a social psychological phenomenon (Arundale, 2006: 201). According to
Spencer-Oatey (2007: 643):
[...] face entails making claims about one’s attributes that in turn entail the
appraisal of others, so in this sense the notion of face cannot be divorced from
social interaction.
Face, however, is not only constituted in interaction, the result of
self-presentation and a property of relationships emerging during interaction; it
is also “constitutive of interaction,” constraining language use (Haugh, 2009)
and imposing on interactants certain patterns of behaviour.
Undeniably, face is an integral element of social interaction, and it has an
impact on what happens between interactants. Individuals entering into social
interaction with others become, as Arundale (2006) claims, persons-in-
relationship-to-other-persons. However, while assuming certain social identities and
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performing certain social roles, they do not stop being individuals. Therefore,
face cannot be said to be exclusively the property of the emergent relationship
between interactants. It is also a property specific to the individuals involved
(cf. Holtgraves, 2009). Thus, it should be considered as both a relational and
a social-psychological phenomenon.
5.4.2. Face as a property of the individual
Spencer-Oatey (2007: 648; Kopytko, 1993, 1993a) suggests that
analysing face only in interaction is comparable to studying just one side of
a coin. [...] face, like identity, is both social (interactional) and cognitive in
nature [...] there are cognitive underpinnings that influence (but do not
determine) how face unfolds in interaction.
These cognitive underpinnings are values and expectations. Individuals have
different personal value constructs which influence their judgements of their
own attributes and those of the others. These can have a strong impact on their
face claims and sensitivities (Spencer-Oatey, 2007). And so can expectations,
which derive from a wide range of sources, e.g., different conventions of
communicative activities, different conceptualizations of role relationships
(Spencer-Oatey, 2007), and different personality characteristics (cf. idiocentric
and allocentric types of personality in Triandis et al., 1988).
One of the most important elements of face-related behaviour is self-presenta-
tion, whose end-result is the individual’s image of self (face). Face is a complex
entity which is constructed through the individual’s choices and performances (the
creation of the image of his “true,” “real,” or “private” self) (Cooley, 1902; Mead,
1934), and through self-presentation, which is an activity shaped by “a combination
of personality, situational, and audience factors,” such as an expression of self,
a role-played response to situational pressures, and conformity to the identity
expectations of salient others (Schlenker, 2003: 498; Brown, 1998). Thus,
a significant part of the individual’s face is a complex of attributes the individual
wants to be associated with and characterized by. However, creating the self-image
is a matter of self-presentation only insofar as it is concerned with establishing the
image of oneself in the minds of others (Baumeister, 1982). So the information
concerning the individual as a person, provided by his face is always modified by
interpersonal relations in which he is with others, social situations in which he
interacts with them, and the culture he belongs to. In other words, face is definitely
a property of a particular individual, but at the same time it has also an undeniably
relational and interactional character. Moreover its content is modified by culture.
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5.4.3. Face and culture
It is common knowledge that “culture affects the development of an individual’s
psychological make-up, which, in turn, affects communication behavior”
(Singelis and Brown, 1995: 355). There is a relational sequence of culture, its
individual members and the different behaviour patterns they follow. Culture, by
influencing the psychological make-up of individuals, shapes their behaviour.
Apart from affecting people’s value constructs and ways of thinking, cultural
experience also conditions the formation of the self (Marsella, 1985; Holland,
1997; Thoits and Virshup, 1997; Hofstede, 1998; Owens and Aronson, 2000).
As a consequence, face, which has a central role in interpersonal
communication and is a major contributor to behaviour, is also strongly
influenced by cultural norms and values (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Marsella
et al., 1985; Singelis and Brown, 1995; Spencer-Oatey, 2007). As Ruhi and
Işik-Güler (2007: 681) claim, “cultures may foreground different aspects of self
toward which people show sensitivity in relational work.” Values serve as “the
explanatory logic for why people behave the way they behave” (Ruhi and
Işik-Güler, 2007: 682). They provide guidance for human activities. Members of
different cultures are face sensitive to a wide variety of attributes related to
different hierarchies of values (Spencer-Oatey, 2007). Different understanding of
face across cultures results from differences in cultural values, communication
styles and conceptualizations of the self (Chu, 1985; Lim, 1994; Morisaki and
Gudykunst, 1994).
Social norms “influence our expectations about behavioural responsibilities
so that failure to fulfil these expectations may be perceived as a ‘negatively
eventful’ occurrence, and the result may be face threat and/or face loss”
(Spencer-Oatey, 2007: 652; 2005). Thus, the perception of some act as a face
threat depends also on people’s conceptions of rights and obligations, their
conceptualizations of different role relationships and their different
interpretations of face-related values. Social norms which are specific to a given
culture constitute the social order expressed in interpersonal and inter-group
encounters (Bargiela-Chiappini, 2003). All these elements of culture participate
in shaping the self and face.
As has been mentioned, face is a complex construct. First, it includes an
implicit concept of moral judgement (cf. Goffman, 1967; Penman, 1994;
Earley, 1997). Second, it depends on a person’s achievements and position in
a social hierarchy (Earley, 1997). As social creatures, we cannot exist without
other people, and we have face only in their presence. Therefore, face also
includes a concept of interpersonal relations. So face is the image of self
created on the basis of judgements concerning a person’s adherence to moral
rules of conduct, his position within a given social structure and the
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interpersonal relations he creates with other interactants. Moral rules, social
organization and interpersonal relations are specific to a particular culture;
thus the image of self created on their basis must also differ across cultures.
5.4.4. The Cultural Face Model — presentation
In order to account for all cultural differences that have an impact on the
content of face, I suggest a model of face, which I call the Cultural Face Model.
The conceptualization of face which is the key concept here stems from the
idea of multiple selves (James, 1890; Mead, 1934; Showers and Zeigler-Hill,
2003). Multiplicity of self refers to a self-concept which is represented as a set
of self-aspects involving distinct roles, contexts, relationships, activities, traits
and states. By analogy to the concept of multiple selves, we can refer to the
multiple faces of a person, though not necessarily having in mind his distinct
social roles. Multiplicity of face refers to different aspects of the person’s
self-image, related, for example, to his moral integrity, social position and
relations with others.
In the Cultural Face Model, face has two dimensions, social and individual.
The social dimension of face involves those attributes of the individual’s
self-image that are socially relevant. According to Ho (1994: 276), the following
attributes important for face judgements can be valid in various cultural
contexts:
• biographical variables (e.g., age, sex),
• relational attributes based on birth, blood or marriage ties,
• social status indicators based on personal effort or achievement
(e.g., educational attainment, occupational status, and income; social
connections and influence),
• social status indicators not based on personal effort or achievement
(e.g., wealth and/or social connections acquired through marriage),
• formal title, position, or rank acquired through personal effort or through
ascription (e.g., inheritance),
• personal reputation based on the amoral (e.g., skill-related or task-oriented)
aspects of social performance,
• personal reputation based on moral character, judged on the basis of
personal conduct,
• integrity of social being: freedom from stigmata.
In addition to the attributes mentioned above, there are also other attributes
important for face judgements — interpersonal aspects of social performance.
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They include interpersonal skills and “facework competence,” which can be
characterized in three dimensions (Ting-Toomey and Kurogi, 1998: 200):
• cultural knowledge which helps the individual to understand other people’s
cultural perspectives;
• mindfulness in simultaneous attention to one’s own and the other’s
assumptions, cognitions and emotions;
• “communication skills in managing self’s and other’s face-related concerns,”
such as identity- and relational-management issues.
An individual competent in facework can be evaluated as behaving appropriately
and effectively and as being able to adapt to problematic interpersonal
situations. The relative value of all these attributes varies across cultures and
depends on the hierarchy of values, social norms and social organization
existing in a given culture.
The social dimension of face includes three types of face:
• Moral Face — face tied to moral conduct (cf. the Chinese concept of lian,
Goffman, 1967; Earley, 1997).
• Prestige Face — face as a position in a social setting (cf. the Chinese concept
of mianzi, Earley, 1997).
• Relational Face — face tied to interpersonal skills and facework competence,
and emerging from the relationship between interactants (cf. Arundale, 2006).
The three constituents of the social dimension of face form a culture-general
whole. It can be treated as an empty container which, when filled with some
specific cultural content, may constitute the face specific for a given culture.
Face is a complex entity which cannot be considered either as exclusively
monadic (see Goffman, 1967) or as exclusively relational (Arundale, 2006).
Spencer-Oatey (2007: 654) claims that “face belongs to individuals and to
collectives, and yet it also applies to interpersonal relations.” It is both a result of
self-presentation and purposeful impression management as well as of other types
of behaviour (Moral Face and Prestige Face) and a property of an emerging
relationship (Relational Face), which is formed during social interaction.
To make this face model truly culture-general, it is necessary to distinguish
between situation-specific face (cf. Goffman’s (1967) conception of face) and
pan-situational face (cf. the Chinese conception of face; Ho, 1994)
(Spencer-Oatey, 2005). Moral Face can be both situation-specific and
pan-situational, as it can involve a self-image created in a particular social
interaction, and a “largely consistent over time” image of self concerned with
moral character and the ability to function within a community. Prestige Face is
a pan-situational self-image concerned with social status, rank and prestige.
Relational Face is situation-specific, as it appears as a result of the interaction
between individuals establishing a certain kind of relationship.
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Every human being has several basic wants and desires, the desires for
proximity and inclusion and for distance, independence and individuation
among them. These two desires are socially relevant. The fulfilment of the
desires contributes to an individual’s face maintenance; disregard for the desires
results in his face damage or loss. By analogy to the two desires, the individual
dimension of face consists of two complementary elements:
• Solidarity Face, resulting from the desire for proximity and inclusion
(cf. Durkheim’s (1912) positive rites; Goffman’s (1967) presentational rituals;
Brown and Levinson’s (1987) positive face).
• Autonomy Face, resulting from the desire for distance, independence and
individuation (cf. Durkheim’s (1912) negative rites; Goffman’s (1967)
avoidance rituals; Brown and Levinson’s (1987) negative face).
Solidarity Face and Autonomy Face are culture-general concepts; they are
not based on any emic concept of face (cf. culture-general connection face and
separation face in Arundale (2006)). The two desires for proximity and
inclusion and for distance, independence and individuation are inherently
present in every individual, in every culture; the cross-cultural difference is only
in their intensity (O’Driscoll, 1996). Whether one prevails over the other
depends on culture, the context of a situation and the individual characteristics
of a person (cf. Mao’s (1994) relative face orientation; Markus and Kitayama’s
(1991) independent and interdependent self-construals).
According to the Cultural Face Model, both dimensions of face and all their
constituent elements are culture-general. What makes particular emic concepts
of face different from one another is the content of face which depends on
cultural context (social organization, social norms, moral rules and a hierarchy
of social values).
5.4.5. Types of facework
Facework can be generally defined as “actions which have a bearing on face”
(O’Driscoll, 2007: 467). It involves not only threat and support but also actions
which routinely address face (O’Driscoll, 2007; Tracy, 1990). Authors differ in
their interpretation of the direction of facework. Goffman (1967), admitting that
it may be both self-directed and other-directed, puts the main emphasis on
self-directed facework and self-presentation. In Brown and Levinson’s (1987)
model, in which facework is identified with politeness, for obvious reasons
politeness is commonly interpreted as sensitivity to other people’s feelings, and
facework is considered as mainly other-directed. These are, however, only
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fragmentary pictures of what can be defined as facework. To adequately
maintain face, people have to engage in facework, both self-directed and
other-directed (Tracy, 1990; Wood and Kroger, 1994; McGlone and Batchelor,
2003). Participants of social interaction are always involved in some form of
facework.
My interpretation of facework is in line with the concept of relational work
(Locher and Watts, 2005; cf. Arundale, 2006), involving actions in which
individuals engage to negotiate relationships with others. Thus facework
comprises:
• Negatively marked facework, involving actions threatening or damaging face:
— actions directed to other-face (impolite or rude behaviour),
— actions directed to self-face (self-denigrating behaviour),
• Unmarked facework, involving actions intended to maintain self and/or other
face (unmarked behaviour sustaining the current state of a relationship)
(cf. politic behaviour (Watts, 2003; Locher, 2006); Arundale, 2006),
• Positively marked facework, involving actions intended to enhance face:
— actions directed to other-face (polite behaviour),
— actions directed to self-face (self-praising behaviour, positive self-presenta-
tion).
The three types of facework are oriented at the social dimension of face
(i.e. Moral Face, Prestige Face and Relational Face) and the individual
dimension of face (i.e. Solidarity Face and Autonomy Face). In the social
dimension, the use of a facework strategy oriented at one type of face does not
preclude the use of a strategy oriented at another type of face. Thus, in addition
to being multi-directional, facework may be multi-oriented. Each type of
facework may be employed in a different face-orientation (see Fig. 6.).
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FACEWORK
Fig. 6. The Scope of Facework Orientation
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In the individual dimension of face, the use of a facework strategy oriented
at one type of face precludes the use of a strategy oriented at the other type of
face. Solidarity Face and Autonomy Face constitute a continuum. Facework may
involve a move towards one end or the other (see Fig. 7.).
SOLIDARITY FACE FACEWORK AUTONOMY FACE
Fig. 7. The Facework Continuum
In line with Watts (2003), I claim that facework cannot be equated with
(im)politeness. It is more than that. Linguistic structures that realize facework
strategies are by no means always associated with linguistic (im)politeness,
although a large number of them may be (cf. Watts, 2003: 93). The (im)polite
sense of the utterances often depends on the context of their use. Many
utterances which are used to realize unmarked facework are not inherently
polite, but help maintain harmony and good relationships between interactants
(cf. Ożóg, 1990).
Facework strategies may be realized by actions other than verbal. Nonverbal
facework involves gestures, facial expressions and eye contact. It may also
consist in absence of any actions (both verbal and nonverbal), which has
a bearing on face. Thus, strategies of all types of facework may be realized by:
• verbal actions (e.g., greeting the other with Good morning or Dzień dobry
(Good day)),
• nonverbal actions (e.g., greeting the other with a greeting gesture,
e.g., shaking hands, waving a hand, bowing or raising the hat),
• lack of any action (e.g., avoidance of the greeting action when such an action
is expected).
Lack of any action, though, is not always intended and interpreted as
a negatively marked facework strategy. In some situations, especially when
a person’s actions pose a threat to his own (usually relational) face (e.g., slips of
the tongue, momentary lack of control over bodily reactions, coughing, or
dropping things), his interlocutor may pretend not to notice what has happened.
Lack of any reaction on his part may at least partly save the person’s face and
be beneficial for his self-esteem and relations with others.
The above model of facework is culture-general. Facework, like face, is
affected both by cultural factors and individual-level factors. As Merkin (2006a:
142) maintains, cultural factors have both “an indirect effect on facework
strategy choices when mediated by individual-level factors,” and “a direct effect
on facework strategy choices” (see also Singelis and Brown, 1995; Oetzel and
Ting-Toomey, 2003). The choice of actions and linguistic structures that realize
facework depends on the hierarchy of cultural values, the social norms, and the
character of social relations specific for a particular culture.
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5.4.6. The applicability of the Cultural Face Model
To test the applicability of the Cultural Face Model, I present two emic concepts:
American face and Polish face (twarz), which differ in their interpretation and
management. This is caused by different hierarchies of values cherished in these
cultures, different social norms, and differences in the character of social relations
and in the construction of the social self. I will apply the Cultural Face Model to
real life situations and present a number of authentic examples (coming from the
Polish and American press and from observation of everyday interactions in
Polish and American settings) which show the importance of certain
face-sensitive attributes in the two cultures.
Moral Face
Moral Face epitomizes what makes an individual human. Morality is a code
of conduct which exists in every culture, in every society. Polish and
American cultures have the same European roots, so rightness and honesty of
behaviour generally mean the same both for Poles and Americans. Faithfulness
to one’s ideals and one’s friends is of utmost importance in both cultures (see
Example 1).
E x a m p l e 1
Jarosław Kaczyński, the leader of the Law and Justice party, accused Stefan
Niesiołowski, the Deputy Speaker of the Sejm, from the Civic Platform party, of
having at one time informed on his friends to the communist security services.
Niesiołowski was one of the founders of the Ruch organization established in
Łódź in 1964, which was the largest opposition group at the end of the
Władysław Gomułka government. On May 20, 1970, Ruch organization
activists, Niesiołowski included, were arrested the day before their planned
arson of the Lenin Museum in Poronin. Referring to Niesiołowski’s arrest on
this occasion, Kaczyński said:
Stefan Niesiołowski sypał już na pierwszym przesłuchaniu. To haniebna sprawa.
(Stefan Niesiołowski informed [on other co-members of the Ruch
organization] during the first interrogation. This is a disgrace.)
Niesiołowski himself commented on Kaczyński’s statement:
To potwarz. Nienawiść rzuciła się Kaczyńskiemu na mózg (Gazeta Wyborcza,
December 4, 2008).
(This is a slander. Hatred has made him crazy.)
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Informing or reporting on members of one’s own group is considered a highly
immoral act whose performance leads to a person’s face loss, its moral aspect in
particular. In this situation, however, no Moral Face loss is involved, as
Niesiołowski did not commit the act of reporting on other Ruch activists. His
Moral Face is only threatened by Kaczyński’s false statement. Although
Kaczyński seems to commit himself to the truth of the presented proposition
(he refers to a recently published book, Działania SB wobec organizacji Ruch),
the intention of the speaker is not to present certain historical facts to others,
but to damage Niesiołowski’s good name and reputation as a man of moral
integrity. Thus, the perlocutionary effect of the act committed is that of slander,
i.e. an intentional false statement about somebody, which damages the good
opinion held of him by other people. Niesiołowski’s words uttered in
self-defence explicitly define Kaczyński’s intention. Referring to Kaczyński’s
impaired intellectual abilities can be interpreted as a case of defence by means
of attack; Niesiołowski by attacking Kaczyński’s Prestige Face defends his own
Moral Face.
Example 2, coming from American culture, involves Moral Face as well.
E x a m p l e 2
John McCain, who twice ran for president (2000, 2008), presented himself as
a person of high moral standards:
[McCain] reinvented himself as the scourge of special interests, a crusader for
stricter ethics and campaign finance rules, a man of honor chastened by a brush
with shame (The New York Times, February 21, 2008).
Aware of the fact that both his political and private life is subject to public
scrutiny, he tried to present an image of himself as internally consistent:
I would very much like to think that I have never been a man whose favor can be
bought. [...] From my earliest youth, I would have considered such a reputation to
be the most shameful ignominy imaginable. Yet that is exactly how millions of
Americans viewed me for a time, a time that I will forever consider one of the
worst experiences of my life (The New York Times, February 21, 2008).
However, last year McCain’s Moral Face was threatened twice. First, by his own
inconsiderate behaviour:
his friendship with Ms. Iseman, a lobbyist for telecommunications companies that
had business before the commerce committee, which Mr. McCain once headed
(The New York Times, February 20, 2009).
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Second, his Moral Face was threatened by the article, “For McCain,
Self-Confidence on Ethics Poses Its Own Risk,” published in The New York
Times (February 20, 2009):
The article said that in 1999, during a previous presidential run, some top McCain
advisers were “convinced the relationship had become romantic,” warned Ms.
Iseman to steer clear of the senator, and confronted Mr. McCain about the matter.
According to the article authors, McCain’s advisers thought that his behaviour
threatened the story of redemption and rectitude that defined his political identity.
Further, the authors comment on the inconcistency of McCain’s image:
Even as he has vowed to hold himself to the highest ethical standards, his
confidence in his own integrity has sometimes seemed to blind him to potentially
embarrassing conflicts of interest.
They quote the words of a friend of McCain’s, which presumably were to
defend him, but include also an element of implied criticism:
He is essentially an honorable person.
To defend himself and maintain face, McCain, in a call to Bill Keller, the
executive editor of The New York Times, made the following statement:
I have never betrayed the public trust by doing anything like that.
In support of McCain, his presidential campaign issued the following statement:
It is a shame that The New York Times has lowered its standards to engage in
a hit-and-run smear campaign. John McCain has a 24-year record of serving our
country with honor and integrity. He has never violated the public trust, never
done favors for special interests or lobbyists, and he will not allow a smear
campaign to distract from the issues at stake in this election. Americans are sick
and tired of this kind of gutter politics, and there is nothing in this story to suggest
that John McCain has ever violated the principles that have guided his career.
The article also threatened the Moral Face of Vicki Iseman, who filed a libel
suit against The New York Times. On settling the libel action, her attorneys
issued a statement in which, justifying their client’s right to a good name, they
made the following comment:
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Words have extraordinary power to wreak havoc on the life of a human being.
Shakespeare, writing in Othello that “Good name in man and woman, dear my
lord, is the immediate jewel of their souls” marked this essential link between our
reputation and our humanity. United States Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart,
writing centuries later, asserted this same fundamental truth when he wrote that
the individual’s right to protection of his or her good name “reflects no more than
our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being —
a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.” (The New York
Times, February 20, 2009)
As can be seen, in both cultures moral integrity is a very delicate issue. A threat
to Moral Face always evokes strong emotions on the part of the person and his
supporters and friends, and requires some action to counteract it.
Prestige Face
In the case of Prestige Face, the differences between American and Polish
culture are not great either. One might expect that, as equality is one of the
most important values for Americans, and Poles are known for their titular
mania and hypersensitivity to social status, the content of Prestige Face will
differ in the two cultures. However, both cultures are rather conservative and
hierarchical (Triandis, 1995). What makes them different is that Poles try to “be
like others” and look similar, stressing in-group solidarity, while Americans want
to be distinguished and to “stick out.” The desire to be distinguished (e.g., for
one’s knowledge, competence or social rank) is not alien to Poles, however. Any
questioning of the person’s right to social recognition for his talent, achievement
or work is an attack at his Prestige Face (see Example 3).
E x a m p l e 3
In December 2008 Bogdan Rymanowski, a television journalist (for the private
channel TVN), was chosen as Journalist of the Year 2008. Piotr Pacewicz,
a Gazeta Wyborcza journalist, published a commentary on this event, which he
entitled:
Rymanowski — niedziennikarz roku. (Rymanowski — non-journalist of the year.)
The subtitle read:
Nagradzajmy dziennikarzy, a nie arbitrów elegancji podczas kłótni w maglu.
(Let’s give prizes to journalists, not Arbiters of Elegance during arguments in
the laundry.)
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In the first sentence of the article, Pacewicz writes:
Bogdan Rymanowski wyrokiem środowiska dziennikarskiego został Dziennikarzem
Roku 2008.
(Bogdan Rymanowski by the judgement of the press community became the
Journalist of the Year 2008.)
The author uses here an expression more suitable for the court of law than
for the hall in which such titles are awarded; this conveys the impression that
the title given to Rymanowski should not be considered as an award for his
merits but as penalty. Further on in the article the author asks several
questions:
Za co?! [...] Co takiego ważnego Bogdan Rymanowski ma do przekazania
Polakom? Na czym się zna? Jakich wartości broni? Co ujawnia, czego byśmy nie
wiedzieli?
(What for? [...] What, in particular, does Bogdan Rymanowski have to tell the
Poles? What does he know? What values does he defend? What does he reveal
that we would not otherwise know?)
Gdyby to były wybory „Twarzy Roku” czy „Ekranu 2008” — w porządku. Ale
dziennikarz?
(If it were a contest for “Face of the Year” or “Screen of the Year 2008,”
alright. But Journalist?)
In his attack on Rymanowski, Pacewicz even comments ironically upon the
laureate’s behaviour on receiving the title:
Bogdan Rymanowski — co było ujmujące! — stwierdził w środę, że to chyba nie
jemu należy się ta nagroda. Rzeczywiście. I nie chodzi o Rymanowskiego jako
takiego, lecz o profesję, którą uprawia. Nie określiłbym jej terminem
dziennikarstwo (Gazeta Wyborcza, December 19, 2008).
(Bogdan Rymanowski — how charming! — stated on Wednesday that perhaps
he did not deserve this award. Indeed. And it is not about Rymanowski as
such, but about the profession that he practises. I would not call it
journalism.)
As a reaction to Pacewicz’s commentary, the channel TVN 24 cancelled the
programme “Skaner polityczny,” in which a Gazeta Wyborcza journalist was to
take part. Another reaction was a commentary by Adam Pieczyński, the
editor-in-chief of the channel TVN 24:
Może Durczok, Pochanke, Olejnik to po prostu pseudodziennikarze? Tak jak
Rymanowski. Tylko sadzają tych gości i rozmawiają z nimi. Niczego nie tłumaczą,
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nie są tak dociekliwi, jak „Gazeta”, nie są tak mądrzy jak „Gazeta”, nie są tak
profesjonalni jak „Gazeta”. Tylko jeśli dziennikarze telewizyjni są tak straszni, tak
żałośnie nieprofesjonalni, tak trywialnie pokazują rzeczywistość, więc jeśli taka
właśnie jest prawda o telewizji — to dlaczego, do licha, tak chętnie oglądają ich
widzowie? (tvn24.pl)
(Perhaps Durczok, Pochanke, and Olejnik are also simply pseudo-journalists
like Rymanowski. They only give their guests a seat and talk to them. They do
not explain anything, they are not as inquisitive as Gazeta Wyborcza, they are
not as wise as Gazeta, they are not as professional as Gazeta. But if television
journalists are so terrible, so miserably unprofessional, and show reality in
such a trivial way; if such is the truth about the television — why, for God’s
sake, are spectators so willing to watch them?)
Pacewicz’s remarks are an example of an attack on Prestige Face. They are
an attack on the individual face of Rymanowski as well as on the group face of
television journalists. He not only attacks Rymanowski, he criticizes the whole
group of television journalists who, in his opinion, unlike press journalists, do
not have the necessary skills to perform their job.
The cancellation of the programme and the remarks in response by the
editor-in-chief of TVN 24 are oriented at the defence of Prestige Face of the
individual (Bogdan Rymanowski) and of the group (television journalists). In
the first case, the strategy employed is the “eye-for-an-eye” strategy, consisting of
retaliatory actions. In the commentary, Pieczyński expresses solidarity with the
attacked: the TVN journalist Rymanowski, other TVN journalists (he names
only a few, the best and the most popular) and all television journalists whose
professionalism has been implicitly questioned by Pacewicz. He uses here two
face-saving strategies, one consisting in comparison with the best (Rymanowski
is put in the same category as the leading journalists of TVN) and
the argument-based-on-facts strategy, in which real facts are used as arguments
against a face threat.
A threat to Prestige Face, in American culture, also requires some action
either on the part of the person involved or his supporters (see Example 4).
E x a m p l e 4
In the article “After Criticism, Paterson Cancels Trip to Davos” (The New York
Times, January 26, 2009), the author describes the story of Governor David
A. Paterson, who “seeking to contain some of the fallout over his administration’s
handling of the United States Senate appointment, said [...] that he had canceled
a trip to the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, [...].” Mishandling of
the problem damaged the Prestige Face of Paterson and his administration. To
counteract the damage he took some redressive steps. He tried to distance himself
from members of his administration who had been quoted anonymously saying
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that “various problems with Caroline Kennedy sank her bid to become a senator.”
He unwillingly admitted that:
[...] there’ve been leaks coming from my administration throughout this entire
process of choosing a senator of contradictory types of information. Now as you
know this is a pretty serious thing, and actually one that I would condemn (The
New York Times, January 26, 2009).
In this way he expressed his disapproval of the incompetence of his
administration. He also added that:
I would love to know who is responsible. But at this point, I’ve been unable to
determine that.
Referring to his trip to the World Economic Forum, Paterson said:
I think I’ll stay here. Perhaps it would be a better idea to go at another time, send
a couple of assistants and stay right here with the leaders of the Legislature and
work on the budget.
The act of cancelling his trip to Davos was a reaction to the criticism of his
administration and an act of redress. Although Paterson was not directly
responsible for the leaks, he found himself responsible for the actions of
members of his administration. His popularity suffered as a result of Ms.
Kennedy’s withdrawal from the selection process and the way his administration
handled it. Summing up the whole situation, Paterson said:
You have ups and downs in public service, and you have to keep working. You
have to keep trying. You have to keep doing your best. And if you conduct yourself
ethically, I think over a period of time people see that.
Relational Face
In the social dimension of face, the greatest differences between Polish and
American cultures can be observed in its relational component. They result
from the disparate character of interpersonal and inter-group relations and
different conceptualizations of self. These differences can be best seen in the
opening phase of everyday conversation. As noted in Section 4.5.2., Americans
often turn social interaction into a theatrical show, and this also refers to
greeting rituals (see Example 5). When two persons approach each other, the
moment they have made eye contact they put on a broad, satisfied and friendly
smile. They exchange greetings, addressing each other by their first names / title
+ surname / professional title + surname. First names are used most commonly
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even in the case of a wide social distance between interlocutors. The exchange
of how-are-you type questions is the next element of the ritual (Jakubowska,
1999). The answers to the questions are positive, and as such they contribute to
the “good” self-image of the participants who have to look self-satisfied and
successful. Participating in this exchange, the persons show a ritual concern for
each other. Greeting rituals, and their component elements — how-are-you type
questions in particular — perform several functions. They have a phatic function,
as they are used to establish and maintain social contact with the other. By
showing willingness to do so, the speaker expresses concern for the other’s
Solidarity Face. He also performs greeting rituals for pragmatic reasons — to
create his own “good” self-image, the image of a person who is worthy of
respect and amiable; he engages in greeting rituals to create his Relational Face,
the image of a person who knows how to “behave.”
E x a m p l e 5
Sharon: (Department Chair): (smiling) Good morning, Paula.
Paula: (Manager): (smiling) Good morning, Sharon. How are you?
Sharon: Fine, thanks, and you?
Paula: Oh, I’m alright, thank you.
Sharon: Is there any mail for me?
Paula: I have just left it in your pigeonhole.
Sharon: Thanks.
Differences in social norms between cultures have an impact on the content
of Relational Face. In situations similar to the one presented in Example 5,
Poles create their Relational Face in a different way. In Example 6, Polish
interactants (work colleagues) behave in a much less theatrical way than
Americans do. The greeting ritual performed here consists of the same elements
as American greetings. First, Ewa and Iwona exchange greetings proper. To
show concern for the other’s Solidarity Face and to help create her own
Relational Face, Ewa asks a question that may be treated as a how-are-you type
question (Co u ciebie?). It performs the phatic function; it is “a kind of cross
between a greeting, a question and an invitation for the addressee to say
something about their current state” (Wierzbicka, 1991: 132). What makes it
different from the American how-are-you type question is that it involves more
genuine concern for the other. Iwona’s answer to this question constitutes
a norm in Polish culture; unlike American responses to how-are-you type
questions, it includes more detailed information and is not as positive as
possible; it is an act of complaining. She tries even to play down the positive
fact that she is going for a weekend in the mountains by saying Daj spokój!
(Leave it alone!).
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E x a m p l e 6
Ewa: Cześć! (Hi!)
Iwona: Cześć! (Hi!)
Ewa: Co u ciebie? (What’s up?)
Iwona: Ach, nic ciekawego. Jestem okropnie zagoniona. Wiesz, koniec semestru,
pełno prac mam do sprawdzenia. Jeszcze wyjeżdżamy na weekend w góry.
(Oh, nothing special. I’m terribly busy. You know, it’s the end of the
semester and I have loads of papers to read. And to top it all, we are
going to the mountains for the weekend.)
Ewa: To świetnie! (That’s great!)
Iwona: Daj spokój! Nie wiem, w co ręce włożyć. (Come on! I’m up to here in
work.)
Examples 5 and 6 show how Relational Face is being built from the very
beginning of everyday interaction. The greeting rituals by means of which
members of the two cultures create their Relational Face do not differ much;
however, due to the differences in hierarchies of values in the two cultures there
are significant differences in face-sensitive attributes. In American culture, these
attributes are satisfied, happy, successful and friendly, and they result from the
American predilection for success and a positive way of thinking. In Polish
culture, the positive self-image is often based on a predilection for complaint
and a negative way of thinking.
Relational Face, which every participant creates during social interaction,
has to be adjusted to the context of culture and context of situation. It can
easily be threatened in intercultural communication, when interactants —
members of different cultures — have different standards for creating a “good”
Relational Face. For example, a Pole responding to a how-are-you type question
in a complaining way and making himself look unhappy in American culture
settings would be perceived as unable to control his emotions (and thus
threatening his Relational Face) and, what is worse, as somebody whose life
does not consist exclusively of success (threatening his Prestige Face).
Solidarity Face and Autonomy Face
The two types of face belonging to the individual dimension of face, Solidarity
Face and Autonomy Face, are inherent in every individual, in every culture
(O’Driscoll, 1996). Members of the two cultures pay attention to both of them.
What differs across cultures is the significance attached to Solidarity Face and
Autonomy Face. This also depends on individual characteristics. Members of
the same culture may make different choices or interpret others’ interactional
activity in different ways due to individual preferences and different contexts of
situation. Examples 7 and 8 illustrate the host—guest interactions in American
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and Polish cultures, respectively. All the participants behave in accordance with
the culture-specific rules of politeness. In Example 7, Richard offers Sharon
some spaghetti; however, he does not impose anything on her. He gives her
freedom of action and choice. Sharon declines his offer. Richard expresses
concern for her, saying: Are you sure?, checking whether her answer is what she
means. Sharon confirms it and gives the reason for her decision, which is
accepted. American hosts serve their guests once and expect sincere responses:
No, thank you generally means a sincere turning down of the offer.
E x a m p l e 7
Richard: I’m just making myself spaghetti. Would you like some?
Sharon: No, thanks.
Richard: Are you sure?
Sharon: Yes. I’m not hungry.
Richard: OK.
In a similar situation (see Example 8), the Polish host, Irena, imposes on
her guest by using the word musieć (must). She does not give her interlocutor
any choice. Such behaviour is sanctioned by customs of Polish hospitality which
are based on the assumption that the host knows what is best for his guests. His
role, even obligation, is to make his guests eat and drink as much as possible.
This is what Irena aims at. The guest’s preferences do not count here. Although
Danka turns down the offer and gives a reason for her decision, Irena does not
stop trying to make her eat. Danka declines the offer twice and finally accepts
it. This is a ritual Polish guests follow: turning the offer down with dziękuję (no,
thank you) repeated several times, before accepting it finally. This ritual can be
explained by a timidity and lack of assertiveness which are deeply rooted in
Polish culture (Jakubowska, 2004a).
E x a m p l e 8
Irena: Zrobiłam pyszną sałatkę. Musisz spróbować. (I have prepared a delicious
salad. You must try it.)
Danka: Nie, dziękuję. Dopiero jadłam obiad. (No, thank you. I have just had
lunch.)
Irena: Może jednak dasz się skusić? (Perhaps I can tempt you to it.)
Danka: Naprawdę dziękuję. (No thanks, really.)
Irena: Chociaż spróbuj! (At least taste it!)
Danka: To proszę. Ale nie dużo. (Well, thank you. But only a little.)
The two examples show the differences in the individual dimension of face in
the two cultures. In American culture, the maintenance of Autonomy Face,
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one’s own as well as that of the other, is very important in social interaction.
Even concern for the other person’s good does not allow the speaker to neglect
his desire for distance, independence and individuation, and threaten his
Autonomy Face. In Polish culture, this desire is not so strong, and concern for
the other person’s Automony Face is of secondary importance in situations
when other values prevail (e.g., hospitality).
Facework strategies
Each of the aspects of face discussed above is subject to some action on the
part of interaction participants. In both cultures, Polish and American, the
following facework strategies were observed to be used:
(A1) Negatively marked Moral Face-oriented strategies:
 Questioning the interlocutor’s truthfulness and moral integrity
You are a liar, a bloody liar!
I don’t believe a word you say.
Nie spodziewałam się po tobie takiego zakłamania. (I didn’t expect such
hypocrisy from you.)
Po prostu kłamiesz w żywe oczy! (You are simply lying through your teeth!)
Ty chyba zupełnie nie masz kręgosłupa moralnego! (You must completely lack
any moral fibre!)
 Accusing the interlocutor of some morally wrong action
You must have taken my money. Nobody else has been here since Monday.
Wziąłeś moją szczotkę. Po co ci ona? Nigdy nie ruszaj nie swoich rzeczy!
(You have taken my brush. What for? Never touch things that don’t belong to
you!)
 Admitting to doing some morally wrong action
I did it, I did it. But I did not want to hurt him.
No to się przyznam. To ja powiedziałem Joli, że jej ojciec nie jest jej prawdziwym
ojcem. Myślałem, że powinna wiedzieć.
(Well, I will tell you the truth. I told Jola that her father was not her true
father. I thought that she should know.)
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 Boasting about doing some morally wrong action
Dla mnie Le Clerk jest najtańszym supermarketem. Tam wszystko waży się
samemu. Gdy ważę jabłka czy pomarańcze, najpierw ważę trzy, nalepiam cenę,
a potem dokładam jeszcze jedną.
(For me, Le Clerk is the cheapest supermarket. There, you have to weigh all
the products by yourself. When I weigh apples or oranges, first I weigh three,
I put on a price label, and then I add one more (apple or orange).)
This strategy differs from the previous one in that in admitting to doing
something wrong the actor evaluates his action as morally wrong, but while
boasting about doing it he always evaluates it positively. He thinks others
approve of it, too. Thus, in his eyes this action does not damage his Moral Face;
it may even enhance his Prestige Face (in his own opinion, he is clever and
resourceful). Whether the action really enhances his Prestige Face in the eyes of
the others depends on their sense of morality and values they represent.
However, this strategy is usually used in situations in which the actor shares the
moral code with the other interlocutors; then it has nothing to do with his
Moral Face, but is intended to enhance his Prestige Face.
(A2) Unmarked Moral Face-oriented strategies
The use of this type of facework is hard to observe. A person’s moral integrity
does not attract much attention in everyday social interaction. Behaviour in
accordance with the moral code, by means of which the person maintains his
Moral Face, is what is expected. The situation is different, however, when the
person tries to enhance his Moral Face or to create it on false pretences.
The person’s Moral Face may be enhanced by his own actions and the actions
of other interactants. It may be enhanced indirectly, by the other’s action when
that implies that the other has a good opinion of the person; or directly, when the
other praises him or compliments him on high moral standards.
(A3) Positively marked Moral Face-oriented strategies:
 Entrusting the interlocutor with something
I entrust her safety to you (BNC).
Jesteś jedyną osobą, której mogę powierzyć moją tajemnicę.
(You are the only person to whom I can confide my secret.)
 Praising the person for high moral standards
You’re the most trustworthy person I’ve ever met.
He is a trustworthy, dedicated, and professional assistant I just need.
Nigdy nie wątpiłam w twoją uczciwość. (I never doubted your honesty.)
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Ręczę za nią. To osoba godna zaufania. (I vouch for her. She is a trustworthy
person.)
 Making self-praising comments
You can trust me.
You know I’ll always do that, Stephen; you can rely on me (BNC).
Możesz mieć do mnie pełne zaufanie. (You can have complete trust in me.)
Myślę, że zasługuję choć na odrobinę twojego zaufania. (I think that I deserve at
least a little of your trust.)
 Positive self-presentation
To get approval and respect the person is ready to consciously present an image
of self which is more desirable than others, and which constitutes what he
would like to be rather than what he really is. A commonly employed strategy is
the use of disclaimers, in which the positive first part usually expresses a certain
value (which the person claims to cherish) and at the same time serves for
face-keeping purposes, whereas the second “but-part” expresses a negative
property of the other(s) (van Dijk, 1995), e.g.:
We have nothing against blacks, but… (van Dijk, 1995: 145)
Jestem wyjątkowo tolerancyjny, ale takiego zachowania nie zniosę. (I am
exceptionally tolerant, but I can’t bear such behaviour.)
Other strategies of positive self-presentation include self-other polarization,
consisting in favouring of the self and derogation of the other, which involves
the association of the self with good values and noble intentions; or
self-glorification (van Dijk, 1995). Usually the improvement of the person’s
image does not go that far; enhancing occurs within reasonable limits. However,
the whole presentation process cannot be limited to the person’s linguistic
production, as it encompasses the whole spectrum of activity he is engaged in
during interaction with others.
Prestige Face, like Moral Face, is a result of some actions and choices of the
person as well as of his purposeful self-presentation. It is concerned with the
person’s social status, rank, reputation, competence and skills. Facework
oriented at Prestige Face involves the use of the following strategies:
(B1) Negatively marked Prestige Face-oriented strategies:
 The use of address term improper for a person’s position
An improper address term is one which is not suitable for a given addressee, his
social position, his relation with the speaker, and for the overall situation of
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interaction (e.g., the use of the pronoun ty (you) instead of the form pan/pani
(sir/madam) in Polish culture, or the use of the pronoun you instead of
sir/madam in American culture). What also matters is the political
(in)correctness of the term used. This is especially vital in American context,
where political correctness is a socially relevant issue. In Polish culture, it is still
a new phenomenon which is beginning to gain some importance, although it is
often ridiculed. For a majority of Poles, especially those who think traditionally,
politically correct forms are considered artificial and foreign to the Polish
language.
 The omission of titles in addressing a person who has the right to them
In Polish culture, the omission of the title in addressing a person who has the
right to it constitutes a serious threat to his face. Polish titles include:
• V-form titles, e.g., pan, pani (sir, madam, or Mr, Mrs/Ms),
Proszę pani, czy mogłaby się pani trochę przesunąć? (Please ma’am, could you
(ma’am) move over a bit?)
• Academic titles, e.g., profesor (professor), doktor (doctor)
Dzień dobry, panie profesorze. (Good morning, (Mr) professor.)
• Managerial titles, e.g., prezes (president), dyrektor (director, manager),
kierownik (manager):
Pani prezes, czy podać już kawę? (Ms President, shall I serve coffee?)
• Professional titles, e.g., sędzia (judge), redaktor (editor), doktor (doctor,
physician),
Panie redaktorze, nie zgadzam się z panem. (Mr Editor, I don’t agree with you.)
As can be seen from the above examples, all the titles are combined with the
forms pan/pani. In less formal situations, they can be used alone, e.g., doktorze,
kierowniku (vocative forms). All these titles are necessary elements of social
interaction in institutional settings. However, they are not so commonly used as
in former times. Due to democratization of politeness in Polish culture, the
principles of the use of titles are not so strictly observed. The form pan/pani
when used reciprocally by young adults is often replaced by the reciprocal T-form
— ty (you). Academic titles are used mainly when S addresses the superior,
receiving pan/pani in return. Managerial and professional titles, though, are still
widely used, especially in professional person—client interactions.
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In American culture, social relations are more democratic and the pronoun
you is used almost in all contexts. Academic titles (professor, doctor) are rarely
used, and they occur usually in situations when S addresses a superior. The title
doctor is also used to address physicians and lawyers who are the holders of
professional degrees.
Good morning, Professor Garrett.
How nice to see you, Doctor Johnson (a physician, Ph.D. or J.D.).
It does not hurt any more, Doctor/Doc (a physician).
Judge Arnold, can I talk to you for a minute?
The majority of titles can be followed by a surname, although in less formal
situations they can be used alone. Generally speaking, the use of titles does not
play an important role in shaping social relations in American culture.
 Questioning the person’s competence
Are you sure you can do this?
Daj! Ja to zrobię. Ty się zupełnie do tego nie nadajesz. (Give it to me! I’ll do it.
You’re not fit for it at all.)
 Showing lack of competence or lack of knowledge
I don’t know how to fix it. You’ll have to call someone from PG&E.
Sorry, I can’t answer your question.
Mogę położyć pani tylko gładkie tapety. Nie umiem dopasować wzorków.
(I can put up only plain colour wallpaper. I can’t adjust patterns.)
Young doctor: Nie mam pojęcia, co to jest. Musi pani oko zobaczyć ktoś bardziej
doświadczony.
(I have no idea what it is. You eye must be examined by somebody more
experienced.)
 Questioning one’s own competence or group membership
I think I’ll have to change classes. I don’t understand what they are talking about.
Math is not my favorite subject.
Completnie się do tego nie nadaję. (I’m not fit for that at all.)
Ja tu zupełnie nie pasuję. Oni wszyscy są ode mnie mądrzejsi i inteligentniejsi.
(I don’t fit in here at all. All of them are smarter and more intelligent than I.)
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(B2) Unmarked Prestige Face-oriented strategies
In order to maintain balance and harmony in social interaction all participants
should behave in a manner suitable to their position in the social setting and
that of the others. According to the old saying noblesse oblige (nobility obliges),
one must act in a fashion that conforms to one’s position, and to the reputation
one has earned. This refers to appropriateness of behaviour, appearance and
language used (register, the use of address terms and titles), which in itself does
not attract others’ attention. But even a minute error or inconsistency may
constitute a threat to the Prestige Face of the person and/or his interlocutor.
(B3) Positively marked Prestige Face-oriented strategies
 Appointing a person to an important post
Dr. Franklin’s prestige led Mr. Clinton to select him in 1997 to head the Advisory
Board to the President’s Initiative on Race, which was formed to promote dialogue
about the country’s race problems (The New York Times, March 25, 2009).
Powołuję Panią do pełnienia funkcji Kierownika Studiów Niestacjonarnych na
Kierunku Filologia, Specjalność: Filologia Angielska.
(I appoint you to the position of Manager of Extra-mural Programme in
Philology, English specialization.)
Mianuję Pana na stanowisko adiunkta naukowo-dydaktycznego na czas
nieokreślony.
(I nominate you to the position of assistant professor (an open-ended
contract).)
 Awarding academic degrees, grants, fellowships, prizes or medals
I am pleased to advise you that you have been awarded a Kosciuszko Foundation
Fellowship for the Academic Year 2006/2007 at the University of California,
Berkeley.
Decyzją Rady Wydziału Filologicznego Uniwersytetu Śląskiego nadano Panu
Janowi Kowalskiemu stopień naukowy doktora nauk humanistycznych w zakresie
językoznawstwa.
(The Philological Faculty Council of the University of Silesia has decided to
confer on Mr Jan Kowalski the degree of doctor of the humanities in
linguistics.)
 Praising the person’s competence and knowledge
You clever boy!
You are clever!
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Ale jesteś zdolna! (How clever you are!)
Ty to jesteś artystka! Świetnie ci to wyszło. (You’re an artist! It came out very
well.)
Gdzie ty się tego nauczyłaś? (Where have you learnt that?)
 Making self-praising comments
I feel very fortunate to have made it all the way from there to here. (Kate
Winslet’s Oscar best actress acceptance speech, www.telegraph.co.uk, February
23, 2009)
Films and life are like clay, waiting for us to mould it. And when you trust your
own insides and that becomes achievement, it’s a kind of principle that seems to
me is at work with everyone. God bless that principle. God bless that potential that
we all have for making anything possible if we think we deserve it. I deserve it.
(Shirley MacLaine’s Oscar best actress acceptance speech, 1983; The
Washington Post, March 21, 1999).
Przyjmuję tę zaszczytną nagrodę jako wyraz uznania, nie tylko dla mnie, ale dla
całego polskiego kina. (Andrzej Wajda’s Oscar acceptance speech, 2000,
www.wajda.pl)
(I accept this honourable award as an expression of recognition not only of my
accomplishments, but of all the accomplishments of Polish cinematography.)
Ja spodziewałem się, że będzie nieźle, bo nieskromnie powiem, mam poczucie, że
to niezły film (a Wirtualna Polska interview with Borys Lankosz about his film
Rewers, on receiving the Złote Lwy award in the Polish Film Festival in
Gdynia, 2009, http://film.wp.pl)
(I expected that it wouldn’t be bad, because, maybe it will sound immodest,
I feel it is a good film.)
(C1) Negatively marked Relational Face-oriented strategies
 Pretending not to know the person
Policeman: Are you together?
Person X: Oh, no. We have been sitting at the same table. I haven’t seen him
before.
A: Ten pan zaświadczy, że mówię prawdę. (This man can testify that I’m telling
the truth.)
B: Niech pani da spokój. Ja pani nie znam. (Leave me alone, ma’am. I don’t
know you.)
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 Pretending not to notice a person one knows
When someone pretends not to notice the person, turns his head away, does not
greet the person or does not reply to his greetings, he first of all threatens their
relationship. Such a behaviour damages the actor’s Relational Face, as he shows
that he lacks facework competence and interpersonal skills. This kind of
behaviour also damages the other’s Solidarity Face, as his desires for proximity
and inclusion are not satisfied.
 Using a word of address unsuitable for the relationship between the
interlocutors
A: Oh, hi Tommy.
B: Good morning. Don’t call me like that.
A: Sorry, Thomas.
A: Wiesz co, Łukasz, zastanówmy się nad tym razem. (You know, Łukasz, let’s
think about it together.)
B: Nie pamiętam, żebyśmy przeszli na ty. (I don’t remember that I am on
first-name terms with you.)
A: Panie dyrektorze, czy mogę na słówko? (Mr Director, may I have a word with
you?)
B: Nie pamiętasz? Wypiliśmy wczoraj bruderszaft.
(Don’t you remember? We drank bruderszaft (= got on first-name terms
over a drink) yesterday.)
The character of the relationship between people is a very sensitive issue. Any
move on the part of either of them, resulting in intended or unintended change
in the status quo, constitutes a potential threat to their face. The use of an
improper word of address is a threat to the other’s Autonomy Face, if the term
used is to increase familiarity and decrease the distance between the interactants
(e.g., the use of T-form instead of V-form in Polish culture; the use of first name
or nick name instead of title + surname in American culture); or it is a threat to
his Solidarity Face, if the term used is to increase the distance between them
(e.g., the use of V-form instead of T-form in Polish culture; the use of title +
surname instead of first name or nick name in American culture). In either
case, this incompetent face management results in damage or at least threat to
the actor’s Relational Face. The rank of this threat is relatively greater in Polish
culture than in American, because the passage from mutual forms of respect to
mutual familiar forms in Polish culture involves a significantly greater change in
the degree of familiarity or intimacy between interactants and takes much more
time.
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(C2) Unmarked Relational Face-oriented strategies
 Using a word of address suitable for the relationship between the
interlocutors
 Performing everyday rituals (e.g., greetings, farewells, thanks and apologies),
when expected and in a form suitable for the situation
 Making a phatic inquiry (how-are-you-type questions)
How are you?
Are you OK?
How are you doing?
How are you feeling?
Are you alright?
Jak się masz? (How are you?)
Co u ciebie słychać? (What’s up?)
Wszystko w porządku? (Is everything alright?)
 Creating a self-image desirable in a given culture
As presented in Sections 4.5. and 4.6. respectively, the American “good”
self-image differs from the Polish “good” self-image. However, the difference
between them has recently become less significant. This refers mainly to the
self-image presented by the young generation of Poles whose system of values
and patterns of behaviour have been influenced by Western culture, American
culture in particular. This is also reflected in the content of Relational Face.
Young Poles present themselves as self-satisfied, happy and successful. Unlike
their parents or grandparents, who still like to complain, they respond to
how-are-you type questions in a positive manner:
Dziękuję, świetnie. (Thank you, great.)
Super, aż się boję zapeszyć. (Super, I don’t want to jinx it.)
Dziękuję, w porządku. (Thank you, I’m alright.)
W porzo. (inf) (OK)
Young Poles (aged up to late thirties), especially when in larger groups,
enhance their Relational Face by loud laughter, broad “American-style” smiles,
excessive enthusiasm and controlled outbursts of merriment. Their behaviour,
especially exclamations of happiness and excessive compliments, strongly
resemble Americans’ behaviour and expressions they use for the same purposes:
286 Face as an academic concept
Super! (Super!)
Bosko! Mamy trzy tygodnie wolnego. (Fantastic! We have three weeks off.)
Wow! (Wow!)
It’s awesome!
Wow!
 Showing willingness to maintain contact with another person
This is my telephone number. Call me when you visit London.
We must meet up some time.
Let’s get together again.
We’ll be in touch.
Myślę, że się niedługo zobaczymy. (I think we’ll meet soon.)
No to będziemy w kontakcie. (Well, we’ll be in touch.)
Musimy się kiedyś spotkać. (We must meet up some time.)
 Seeking agreement/avoiding disagreement with an interlocutor
Isn’t your dress gorgeous!
A: Aren’t they a beautiful couple?
B: Oh, yes. They are.
A: I’ve lost a library book.
B: A library book!
A: Prawda jaka zdolna ta moja córka? (Isn’t my daughter clever?)
B: Tak. Inteligencję odziedziczyła po ojcu. (Yes. She inherited intelligence from
her father.)
A: Ale samochód, co? (Some car, isn’t it?)
B: No. (Yeah!)
A: Wiesz co mi się dziś przytrafiło? Ukradli mi komórkę w tramwaju.
(Do you know what happened to me today? My cellphone was stolen in the
tram.)
B: Ukradli ci komórkę? No, to ładnie. (Your cellphone has been stolen? Well,
how nice.)
Seeking agreement and avoiding disagreement is a good way to maintain a good
relationship with others and create Relational Face. To do so Americans also
engage in small talk and choose safe, uncontroversial topics in conversations.
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Establishing and maintaining a good relationship with others is of more
importance to them than presenting one’s own opinion on some controversial
issue.
Poles also employ this strategy to establish and maintain their Relational
Face, but for them disagreement does not constitute such a threat to it.
Although they do not abstain from discussing controversial topics, in encounters
in which interactional goals prevail they prefer to engage in conversations on
safe, unimportant, topics like weather.
 Seeking common ground with the other
Seeking common ground with others helps to build a relationship with them. It
contributes to maintaining the actor’s Relational Face, and at the same time the
other’s Solidarity Face, because admitting to having something in common with
the other (e.g., sharing with him some values, desires or opinions, or belonging
to the same group) the actor satisfies the other’s desire for inclusion. In seeking
common ground with others, people often resort to gossip (one feels good to be
able to engage in ill-natured talk about other people’s affairs), joking (to be able
to laugh at the same things and people means that we are similar) and
complaining (common problems and enemies bring people together). In both
cultures, Polish and American, people sometimes gossip, tell jokes and
complain. The difference is mainly in the intensity of these practices, which
depends not only on culture, but also on the context of the situation and the
individual characteristics of a person. Americans rarely complain (see Section
4.5.). In my study, there were not any observed instances of the use of
complaining as a common-ground-seeking practice. In Polish culture, this
practice is extremely popular, especially among the older generations (see
Section 4.6.).
(C3) Positively marked Relational Face-oriented strategies
 Describing the relationship with the person in positive terms
This is my best friend, Camila.
A to mój najlepszy przyjaciel, Marek Wolski z rodziną.
(This is my best friend, Marek Wolski, and his family.)
 Performing the so-called “polite” rituals (e.g., compliments, congratulations
and good wishes)
A: You look awesome!
B: Thank you.
A: Isn’t she sweet?
B: She’s adorable!
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A: Bardzo ładnie wyglądasz w tej sukience. (You look great in this dress.)
B: Daj spokój! Taka stara. (Come on! It’s old.)
A: Super fryzura! Po prostu super! (A super hairdo! It’s just super!)
B: Dziękuję. (Thank you.)
Differences in the use of this strategy between Americans and Poles are best
seen in the case of compliments and responses to them (see also Jakubowska,
1999). In American compliments, in comparison to Polish compliments,
expression of admiration and approval is more exaggerated. Unlike Americans,
Poles are reticent in expressing positive comments on others or their belongings.
This can be explained by the common belief that compliments are insincere and
meant to get someone’s favour (this is even reflected in the Polish dictionary
definition of komplement (compliment) — “polite, often exaggerated praising;
flattery” (SJP)). This negative attitude towards compliments together with
Polish modesty influence the types of response to compliments Poles most often
choose, i.e. self-praise-avoiding responses, which downgrade the praise of the
receiver, reject the compliment or disagree with its force (see also Jakubowska,
1999). Nowadays, however, Poles’ attitude towards compliments has changed;
they take them more lightly and see them as intended to make the other feel
good rather than to get his favour. Poles, the young generation in particular,
have borrowed the overdone, theatrical ways of approval expression that are
typical of Americans, as well as their ways of responding to compliments
(acceptance and agreement).
 Other positive comments about the other
Taking into consideration everything I said before, I would very sincerely like to
support Gary Palmer in his attempts to get the Research Grant, and to warmly
recommend him to my American Colleagues.
Mgr Janusz Jaworski jest badaczem o wyraźnie określonym już profilu naukowym;
wygłosił szereg kompetentnych i starannie przygotowanych referatów; wziął udział
w kilku konferencjach naukowych, w Polsce i za granicą.
(Janusz Jaworski, MA, is a researcher of a well defined academic profile; he
presented several competent and thoroughly prepared papers; he participated
in several academic conferences, in Poland and abroad.)
The Cultural Face model has been applied to real life situations in the two
cultures, Polish and American. The model was to provide us with the tools
necessary for the analysis of face interpretation and management in different
cultures. Thus, the above discussion is divided into two parts, the one devoted
to the interpretation of the two emic concepts, face and twarz; the other devoted
to an analysis of facework strategies used in Polish and American cultures. The
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analysis of the examples presented in the first part indicates the importance of
certain face-sensitive attributes (morality, social position and interpersonal
skills) in the overall image of self (face) in the two cultures, and at the same
time utilizes the Cultural Face Model. The variety of data sources shows that
there is no difference between public figures and ordinary people in the content
of these aspects of face (e.g., there is one morality for all members of a given
culture; a threat to one’s social position is equally detrimental to all, only its
social consequences can differ). The analysis of the facework strategies shows
parallelisms in face management in the two cultures. Although linguistic
realization of particular strategies may differ, the linguistic data coming from
both cultures demonstrate striking parallels in facework employed.
What makes the Cultural Face Model different from other face models is
that:
• It treats face both as a social and an individual phenomenon.
• The two-level assessment of face allows for the explanation of both cultural
differences and similarities in its interpretation and management.
• Apart from “traditional” components (morality and a social position), face
includes also the relational component, which is the result of interaction with
others.
• Solidarity Face and Autonomy Face are perceived in terms of basic human
desires, and as such constitute only one dimension of face.
The model can be a good starting point for further analysis of the concept of
face, its interpretation and management in different cultures.
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Conclusions
This book is an attempt to describe the concept of face. The resultant picture of
face presented here does not pretend to be exhaustive. However, as
a representation of such a multi-faceted concept as face it includes elements of
diversified character, which like elements of a jigsaw puzzle have to fit with
each other to form a whole. That is why I decided to look at the concept of face
and investigate it from different perspectives.
First, a cognitive study of the concept of FACE has been carried out. FACE
has been treated here as a radial category which has numerous metonymic and
metaphoric extensions. FACE is considered a universal category (e.g., Strecker,
1993). Also nearly universal are FACE metonymies and metaphors comprising
the cognitive category of FACE. The operation of these metaphors has been
subject to analysis in both English-speaking and Polish cultures. All the analysed
metaphors and metonymies have been shown to exist in the two cultures. The
concept of FACE (i.e. its two folk variations, English FACE and Polish
TWARZ) appears to be categorized in much the same way by members of these
cultures. The linguistic expressions related to the FACE metaphors display
a high degree of equivalence. It can be observed, however, that the word face is
more broadly used than its Polish equivalent twarz. The word face can appear in
all face-related metaphorical expressions, while the word twarz is one among the
many words found in Polish face-related metaphorical expressions. Apart from
twarz, Polish face-related expressions include oblicze, lico, czoło, nos, oczy, usta,
podbródek, bezczelny, czelność, potwarz, fasada, front and przodek.
The existence of all the FACE metaphors is not only reflected in language,
they pervade our thoughts and ways of perception. They are the motive force
behind our actions and the key to our attitudes towards others. They govern our
everyday life in its many aspects. The truth they carry can be found in folk
sayings and philosophical works; it constitutes the basis for various scientific
and pseudo-scientific investigations.
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Second, the role of the face (part of the body) has been discussed in its
treatment across cultures and disciplines. The face (its secrets and revelations)
has fascinated both laymen and scholars for centuries. The key to understanding
this fascination is a common belief that the face can tell us something about
its owner, about his character and his mental and physical state. As a source
of useful information, it has been subject to research in many scholarly
disciplines (e.g., psychology, philosophy, medicine, sociology, anthropology and
criminology) and “sciences” (e.g., physiognomy). One single common
conclusion comes out of all these studies: the face is undeniably of the utmost
significance for human life. It has various roles and functions:
• It helps to identify the person.
• It is used to communicate, both verbally and nonverbally, and as such is
indispensable for interaction with the other.
• Its part (the mouth) participates in the feeding process.
• Its part (the eyes) makes visual perception possible.
Its significance is both biologically and socially justified. In the present study,
however, the main focus is on the social functions of the face and the roles it
plays in an individual’s life. It is possible to distinguish between interpersonal
and social functions of the face. In interpersonal relations, it functions as
a displayer of emotions; proper control over facial expression is important for
the success of social interaction. Depending on the character of relations
between interactants, the face becomes more face-like (true) or more mask-like
(false). In social interaction, there are always two faces involved, “my” face and
the face of the other; they are equally relevant and equally responsible. As the
face is said to be an “identity card,” everyone looking at it is obliged to identify
the other; face-blindness is a social “sin.”
The face can also be a determinant of a person’s social success or its lack.
Certain “types” of face are generally approved of and even welcome (e.g., faces
of the “normal” or the beautiful); others meet with suspicion or prejudice
(e.g., faces of the “stigmatized” (alcoholics, the mentally ill, members of other
races and all those who do not belong to the “normal”). The multitude of
functions that the face has constitutes a good explanation for the interest it has
evoked.
Third, in order to truly understand the concept of face (the image of self)
I have decided to precede its analysis with a presentation of the concept of self
as it is understood by psychologists, sociologists and philosophers. A short
discussion of the social character of the self and of the relationship between the
self and the body has formed the basis for the following analysis of the concept
of face.
Fourth, face (the image of self), which is a sociocultural construct, has been
investigated. It has been described together with morality and other related
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social concepts (pride, dignity, tact respect, (self-)esteem and honour), which
like face, are main determinants of interactional dynamics. Next, as the content
of face is culture-dependent, the notions of culture and cultural variability have
been briefly described and discussed. The dimensions of cultural variability
(Hofstede, 1991, 1998, 2001) and the types of self-construals (Markus and
Kitayama, 1991) have constituted the basis for the analysis of emic concepts of
face. As an example of such an emic concept, the Chinese face (the two
concepts mianzi and lian) has been presented; its central role in social
interaction makes it one of the most important values in Chinese culture.
What follows is an analysis of face as a folk concept. The two emic
concepts, American face and Polish twarz, have been described and investigated
in a broad context of respective cultures. Cultural experience strongly influences
our hierarchies of values and ways of thinking, and they all shape the self and
face. The analyses of the two concepts of face have been supported by
a discussion of the character of interpersonal relations and the role of facial
expressions in the two cultures, which are explanatory of the character of these
emic concepts. Although American face and Polish twarz display some relevant
differences stemming from the different cultural backgrounds, their common
European roots mean that the similarities outnumber the differences. This is
also related to the transformations which have affected Polish economic, social
and cultural life since 1989. American face is a prototypical independent face,
resulting from the long-cherished values of independence, freedom, equality and
autonomy of the individual; it is shaped by the American lifestyle, which can be
characterized by a drive for success and great mobility. Polish face is more
difficult to categorize for two reasons:
• Although Polish culture is by many researchers considered collectivistic, the
Polish historical tradition is full of contrary examples in which typically
individualistic values (e.g., independence, freedom and the autonomy of the
individual) prevailed.
• The recent sociocultural changes in Poland have strongly influenced the
character of social interaction. The opening of Poland to modern Western
culture, American culture in particular, has resulted in great changes in the
character of interpersonal relations and self-presentation style.
Thus, Polish face cannot be called either definitely interdependent or definitely
independent. Like Polish culture, it has been undergoing some changes in the
direction of “westernization” or “Americanization,” which have made it a face
“in transition.” These changes have not, however, influenced the whole
population of Poles to the same extent. More interdependent face predominates
among the older generation and the less educated, while more independent
(“westernized”) face predominates among the younger generation, who started
their adult life during the last twenty years, and the educated. The comparison of
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American face and Polish twarz shows that there are differences between them
in self-presentation style and components of “good” self-image. The similarities
are in the general interpretation of the meaning of the concept, the moral aspect
of face and the interpretation of certain situations as face-threatening.
Fifth, face has been presented as an academic concept, a central issue in
(im)politeness and (cross-cultural and intercultural) communication studies.
After a detailed presentation of Erving Goffman’s works on social interaction
and his understanding of the concept of face, and an overview of face theories,
an alternative theoretical approach to face interpretation and management, the
Cultural Face Model, has been proposed. It has been formulated to account for
all cultural differences having an impact on the content of face. According to
the Cultural Face Model, all the dimensions of face (the individual dimension
and the social dimension) and all their constituent elements (Moral Face,
Prestige Face and Relational Face, and Solidarity Face and Autonomy Face) are
culture-general. What makes particular emic concepts of face different from one
another is the content of face, which depends on cultural context.
The presented model of facework is culture-general as well. Facework, like
face, is affected both by cultural factors and individual-level factors. The choice
of linguistic structures that realize facework strategies depends on the social
norms and the character of social relations specific for a particular culture. In
my model, facework includes the whole spectrum of “actions which have
a bearing on face” (negatively marked facework, unmarked facework and
positively marked facework); it is directed to self-face and other-face, and
oriented at both dimensions of face. However, facework operates differently in
the two dimensions: in the social dimension, each type of facework may be
oriented at a different type of face, and the use of a strategy oriented at one
type of face does not preclude the use of a strategy oriented at another type of
face; in the individual dimension, the use of a strategy oriented at one type of
face precludes the use of a strategy oriented at the other type of face. Finally,
the applicability of the Cultural Face Model has been tested. It has been applied
to real life situations which occured in American and Polish culture. The
analysis of the situations threatening Moral Face and Prestige Face shows great
similarities in the importance attached to these aspects of face and in the
reactions to the threat in the two cultures. Differences can be observed in
situations in which Relational Face matters, and in the significance attached to
Solidarity Face and Autonomy Face. The analysis of the facework strategies
shows great similarities in face management in the two cultures. The Cultural
Face Model has proved to be a viable approach to face interpretation and
management in different cultures.
The analyses discussed above constitute elements of a picture of the concept
of face. The picture is far from being complete, however, it provides the
sufficient evidence for the centrality of face in human and social life.
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TWARZ
Perspektywa interdyscyplinarna
S t r e s z c z e n i e
Celem książki jest możliwie najszersze przedstawienie pojęcia twarzy. Omawiane zagadnienie
obejmuje zarówno elementy wynikające z fizycznego aspektu twarzy, jak i te związane z jej
socjokulturowymi uwarunkowaniami. Mimo że moim zamiarem jest szeroka i gruntowna
prezentacja pojęcia, za kwestię kluczową uznałam rolę, jaką odgrywa twarz w interakcjach spo-
łecznych. Stykając się z ludźmi, musimy zawsze brać pod uwagę:
• twarz jako część ciała, z jej cechami stałymi i mimiką;
• twarz rozumianą jako wizerunek własny, jaki każdy człowiek tworzy na potrzeby danej interakcji
społecznej.
Kulturowy wymiar pojęcia twarzy umożliwia interpretację różnorodnych zachowań ludzkich —
zarówno językowych, jak i pozajęzykowych. Tłumaczy również relacje międzyludzkie, które
kształtują treść pojęcia twarzy specyficzną dla danej kultury.
Kategoria twarzy znajduje się w centrum zainteresowania wielu dyscyplin naukowych,
a w szczególności nauk społecznych: antropologii kulturowej, studiów nad komunikacją (między-
kulturową), psychologii (w szczególności psychologii społecznej) oraz socjologii. Twarz jest przed-
miotem dociekań filozoficznych. W medycynie traktowana jest jako część ciała ludzkiego, poprzez
którą ujawnia się choroba. Rysy twarzy — jako oznaki natury przestępczej — interesują również kry-
minologów. Powstała nawet „nauka” poświęcona twarzy — fizjonomia. Twarz jako wizerunek własny
stała się jednym z głównych przedmiotów socjolingwistycznych badań nad uprzejmością. Obecność
omawianego pojęcia w tak wielu dziedzinach badań jest wystarczającym uzasadnieniem przyjęcia
perspektywy interdyscyplinarnej.
Twarz nie była dotąd tematem „popularnym” wśród polskich uczonych. Istnieje zaledwie kilka
publikacji omawiających to zagadnienie. Zupełnie natomiast brak opracowań dotyczących pol-
skiego rozumienia pojęcia twarzy. Niniejsza rozprawa ma tę lukę wypełnić.
Książka składa się z pięciu rozdziałów oraz wniosków końcowych. Rozdział pierwszy, zaty-
tułowany „Kognitywne studium pojęcia TWARZY w języku angielskim i polskim”, poświęcony jest
ogólnej prezentacji pojęcia, poprzedzonej semantyczną analizą angielskiego słowa face i polskiego
słowa twarz. W oparciu o założenia językoznawstwa kognitywnego, TWARZ przedstawiona została
jako kategoria radialna. W drugiej części rozdziału podjęto próbę kognitywnej analizy metafor i me-
tonimii TWARZY występujących w kulturze anglojęzycznej oraz polskiej.
Rozdział drugi, „Twarz jako część ciała”, prezentuje twarz w kategoriach funkcji, jakie pełni
ona w życiu człowieka. Rozważany jest wpływ jej wyglądu na relacje z innymi ludźmi i na
ogólnie pojętą jakość życia. Ta specyficzna część ciała przez wieki wzbudzała wielkie zaintereso-
wanie, stając się przedmiotem analizy różnych dziedzin naukowych i pseudonaukowych. Różnie
też postrzegano i interpretowano twarz w poszczególnych kulturach. Rozdział ten stanowi anali-
Streszczenie 339
22*
zę najczęściej występujących sposobów pojmowania twarzy w wielu dziedzinach wiedzy i w róż-
nych kulturach.
Pozostałe rozdziały traktują o twarzy jako o wizerunku własnym, który jest kreowany
w trakcie interakcji społecznej. Analiza społecznego aspektu kategorii twarzy wymagała przede
wszystkim rozpatrzenia pojęcia jaźni (self). Nie bez przyczyny bowiem mówi się, że „ja”
uzewnętrznia się poprzez twarz. Rozdział trzeci przedstawia jaźń w różnych perspektywach:
psychologicznej, socjologicznej i filozoficznej. Pojęcie jaźni stanowi centralny punkt wielu teorii
społecznych tłumaczących złożoność doświadczenia ludzkiego oraz zachowań w trakcie interakcji
społecznej. Dla pełnego zrozumienia pojęcia jaźni istotne jest również zrozumienie relacji między
jaźnią a ciałem.
Rozdział czwarty przedstawia twarz jako pojęcie w potocznym jego rozumieniu. Twarz jako
konstrukt społeczny skorelowana tu jest z innymi pojęciami pokrewnymi, istotnymi dla relacji mię-
dzyludzkich, takimi jak godność, honor i moralność. Rozumienie pojęcia twarzy oraz zachowania
społeczne z niego wynikające podlegają zróżnicowaniu kulturowemu. Dlatego też rozdział ten oma-
wia pojęcie kultury oraz wybrane jego modele, które dostarczają kryteriów niezbędnych do inter-
pretacji tych zachowań. Kultura i doświadczenie kulturowe mają silny wpływ na hierarchię
wartości, sposób myślenia oraz relacje społeczne, kształtują one społeczne i indywidualne „ja”, jak
również twarz (wizerunek własny). Główny element tego rozdziału stanowią analizy rozumienia po-
jęcia twarzy w trzech różnych kulturach oraz związanych z tym rozumieniem zachowań społecz-
nych. Jako pierwsze przedstawiono chińskie rozumienie twarzy, gdyż Chiny uważane są za
pierwotne źródło tego pojęcia. Twarz chińską zaprezentowano na podstawie literatury socjolo-
gicznej i językoznawczej. Pozostałe dwie analizy — wykorzystujące materiał empiryczny zgromadzo-
ny przez introspekcję, obserwację uczestniczącą, wywiad oraz ankiety przeprowadzone w Stanach
Zjednoczonych i w Polsce — dotyczą twarzy angloamerykańskiej i twarzy polskiej. Każda z analiz
poprzedzona jest opisem charakteru danej kultury, specyfiki relacji międzyludzkich w niej pa-
nujących oraz roli wyrazu twarzy (w szczególności uśmiechu).
Rozdział piąty poświęcony jest teoriom dotyczącym pojęcia twarzy. Na wstępie omówione
zostały podstawowe pojęcia teorii interakcji społecznej Ervinga Goffmana (np. 1955, 1959, 1967)
wybitnego socjologa amerykańskiego, który jako pierwszy potraktował pojęcie twarzy jako
przedmiot badań naukowych. Oryginalne idee Goffmana, a w szczególności jego ujęcie twarzy,
stały się inspiracją badań w różnych dziedzinach, takich jak psychologia społeczna, socjologia,
studia nad komunikacją międzykulturową czy socjolingwistyka. Przegląd głównych teorii twarzy
oraz teorii uprzejmości i komunikacji, w których twarz odgrywa centralną rolę, począwszy od
teorii uprzejmości Brown i Levinsona (1987), stanowi kolejny element tego rozdziału. Podrozdział
„Model Twarzy Kulturowej — podejście do interpretacji i zarządzania twarzą” stanowi wkład
własny autorki w dyskusję na temat teoretycznego pojęcia twarzy. Rozdział kończą rozważania nad
możliwościami zastosowania Modelu do analizy interakcji społecznych w kulturze
angloamerykańskiej i polskiej.
Uwagi końcowe zawierają wnioski dotyczące charakteru pojęcia twarzy.
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Le visage
Une perspective interdisciplinaire
R é s u m é
Le but de livre est de présenter de manière la plus large possible la notion de visage. La ques-
tion abordée englobe de même des éléments résultant de l’aspect physique du visage que ceux qui
découlent de leur conditionnement socioculturel. Bien que mon objectif soit une présentation pro-
fonde de cette notion, j’ai trouvé cruciale le rôle du visage dans les interactions sociales. En regar-
dant les autres nous devons prendre toujours en considération :
• le visage comme une partie du corps, avec ses traits permanents et la mimique ;
• le visage compris comme une image personnelle que chaque homme crée pour une interaction
sociale concrète.
La dimension culturelle du visage rend possible une interprétation de divers comportements
humains, linguistiques et non-linguistiques. Elle explique également des relations interpersonnelles,
qui modèlent l’essentiel de cette notion, spécifique pour une culture donnée.
La catégorie de visage se place au centre d’intérêt de nombreuses disciplines scientifiques, et
en particulier des sciences humaines : anthropologie culturelle, études de communication (inter-
culturelles), psychologie (surtout la psychologie sociale) et sociologie. Le visage est l’objet des re-
cherches philosophiques, et dans la médecine il est traité soit comme une partie du corps humain
qui extériorise la maladie, soit est soumis aux opérations de chirurgie esthétique. Les traits du vi-
sage — comme signes d’instinct criminel — fascinent également les criminologues ; même une
pseudo-science, la physiognomonie, consacrée à l’étude du visage, est née. Le visage en tant que
l’image personnelle est devenue une des matières sociolinguistiques les plus importantes dans les
recherches sur la politesse. La présence du phénomène en question dans des domaines de re-
cherche si nombreux est une justification suffisante d’admettre une perspective pluridisciplinaire.
Le visage n’était pas, jusqu’au présent, un sujet « populaire » des chercheurs polonais. Il existe
à peine quelques publications concernant ce problème, néanmoins il n’y a absolument pas
d’études sur la perception polonaise de la notion de visage. La dissertation présente cherche
à combler ce vide.
Le livre se compose de cinq chapitres et d`une conclusion. Le premier chapitre est consacré
à une présentation générale de la notion, précédée par une analyse sémantique du mot anglais face
et du mot polonais twarz. En accord avec les suppositions de la linguistique cognitive, le visage est
présentée comme une catégorie radiale. Dans la seconde partie du chapitre l’auteur a entrepris
une tentative d’analyser dans la perspective cognitive des métaphores et des métonymies FACE /
TWARZ qui apparaissent dans les cultures américaine et polonaise.
Le deuxième chapitre analyse le visage dans le contexte des fonctions qu’il joue dans la vie de
l’homme. L’auteur examine l’influence de son aspect physique sur des relations avec d’autres gens
et sur la qualité de vie. Cette partie du corps particulière pendant des siècles éveillait un grand in-
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térêt en devenant l’objet de recherches de nombreux domaines scientifiques et pseu-
do-scientifiques. L’auteur analyse des façons de conceptualiser le visage, présentes le plus souvent
dans des cultures et des domaines de science différents.
Les chapitres suivants traitent du visage comme de l’image propre qui est créée au cours de
l’interaction sociale. L’analyse de l’aspect social de la catégorie du visage exige avant tout de
prendre en considération la notion du moi (self) ; on dit souvent, et non sans cause, que le « je »
se manifeste à travers le visage. Le troisième chapitre présente le moi dans des perspectives diffé-
rentes : psychologique, sociologique et philosophique. La notion du moi constitue le point central
de nombreuses théories sociales expliquant la complexité de l’expérience humaine et des compor-
tements au cours des interactions sociales. Pour une pleine compréhension de la notion de moi il
est important de comprendre la relation entre le moi et le corps.
Le quatrième chapitre présente le visage dans sa conception populaire. Le visage, en tant
qu’une construction sociale, est corrélé avec d’autres notions proches, importantes pour des rela-
tions interpersonnelles, comme dignité, honneur et moralité. La compréhension de la notion de vi-
sage et des comportements sociaux qui en résultent dépendent de la différenciation culturelle ;
c’est pourquoi dans ce chapitre l’auteur explique la notion de culture et ses modèles choisis qui
fournissent des critères indispensables pour interpréter ces comportements. La culture et
l’expérience culturelle influencent profondément la hiérarchie de valeurs, la façon de penser et les
relations sociales, elles forment le « je » collectif et individuel aussi que le visage (image propre).
Ensuite l’auteur a présenté des analyses de la conception de visage dans trois cultures diffé-
rentes ainsi que des comportements sociaux liés avec elles. Dans le premier lieu l’auteur décrit la
conception chinoise, car la Chine est considérée comme la source première de cette notion. Le vi-
sage chinois est formulé à partir de la littérature sociologique et linguistique. Les autres deux ana-
lyses, basées sur le matériel empirique recueilli par l’introspection, grâce à un observateur
participant, par l’entretien et des enquêtes menées aux Etats-Unis et en Pologne, concernent le vi-
sage anglo-américain et polonais. Chaque analyse est précédée de la description du caractère de la
culture donnée, de la spécificité des rapports interpersonnels au sein d’elle, et du rôle de
l’expression de visage (en particulier du sourire).
Le cinquième chapitre est consacré aux théories concernant la notion de visage. En premier
lieu l’auteur explique des notions de base de la théorie de l’interaction sociale d’Erving Goffman
(p. ex. 1955, 1959, 1967), un éminent sociologue américain, qui a placé comme premier le visage
dans le cadre de recherches scientifiques. Les idées originales de Goffman, et en particulier sa
conception du visage, sont devenues une inspiration pour les recherches dans des domaines
comme psychologie sociale, sociologie, études sur communication intra-culturelle ou sociolinguis-
tique. La partie suivante de ce chapitre s’appuie sur une étude des théories où le visage joue le
rôle principal, en commençant par la théorie de politesse de Brown et Levinson (1987). Le
sous-chapitre « Le Modèle du Visage dans la Culture — approche d’interprétation et de gestion du
visage » constitue la proposition de l’auteur dans le débat sur la notion théorique du visage. Le
chapitre finit par des réflexions sur l’application possible du Modèle dans une analyse des interac-
tions sociaux dans les cultures anglo-américaine et polonaise.
La partie finale comprend une conclusion sur le caractère de la notion de visage.
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